NEWBOLD (ANNA MARIE) VS. CENTRAL BANK OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, INC., ET AL.
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RENDERED: JANUARY 29, 2010: 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-002544-MR
ANNA MARIE NEWBOLD
v.
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE A.C. MCKAY CHAUVIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-07203
CENTRAL BANK OF JEFFERSON
COUNTY, INC., F/K/A FIRST BANK, INC.,
CENTRAL BANK & TRUST CO.,
CENTRAL BANCSHARES, INC.,
DAVID S. GREENBERG AND
PREMIER HOMES, INC.
AND
APPELLEES
NO. 2008-CA-000003-MR
CENTRAL BANK OF JEFFERSON
COUNTY, INC., F/K/A FIRST BANK, INC.,
CENTRAL BANK & TRUST CO.,
CENTRAL BANCSHARES, INC.,
v.
APPELLANT
CROSS-APPELLANTS
CROSS-APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE A.C. MCKAY CHAUVIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-07203
ANNA MARIE NEWBOLD
CROSS-APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE AND NICKELL, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
NICKELL, JUDGE: Anna Marie Newbold brings this appeal from an opinion and
order entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court on November 21, 2007, dismissing her
verified complaint as being time barred by KRS 413.120(7) and (12). By crossappeal, Central Bank of Jefferson County, Inc., formerly known as First Bank, Inc.
(FBMC), Central Bank & Trust Co., and Central Bancshares, Inc., (Bank),2
challenges that portion of the same opinion and order that found Newbold’s claims
were not compulsory counterclaims that had to be affirmatively asserted in a prior
foreclosure action, and were not barred by res judicata. The remaining defendants,
David S. Greenberg and Premier Homes, Inc., (collectively Builder) have not
cross-appealed. After considering the law and the record, we affirm the trial court
as to the direct appeal and deem the Bank’s cross-appeal to be moot in light of our
resolution of the direct appeal.
1
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
2
Over time, the banking entities were involved in various mergers, acquisitions, and name
changes which are not of real consequence to the resolution of the direct appeal and will not be
explained.
-2-
On July 31, 2007, Newbold filed a verified complaint against the
Bank and the Builder alleging fraud, fraud in the inducement, negligence, gross
negligence, bad faith and predatory lending. The genesis of the claims was
Newbold’s desire to build a new home. She discussed a particular model home
with Greenberg and disclosed her financial situation to him. It was Newbold’s
theory that Greenberg, as president of both FBMC and Premier Homes, recklessly
advised her she could afford to build a $500,000.00 home even though she was
newly widowed, unemployed with only a high school education, and was living on
income from investments and her late husband’s pension fund. Greenberg offered
to not only build Newbold’s desired home, but also offered to secure financing for
the new home.
Newbold went forward with the project. She purchased a lot for
$115,300.00 in Bridgemoore Estates in Jefferson County. She applied for and
received a $500,000.00 construction loan from PNC Bank on which she closed in
mid-November 1998. As collateral for the construction loan, she pledged a
security interest in a $100,000.00 certificate of deposit.
Once construction was underway, at Greenberg’s direction, Newbold
applied for a $500,000.00 mortgage loan from FBMC. Upon learning her
application would be rejected because she had no income, Newbold did as FBMC
Vice President of Sales, Charles Hall, Jr., directed her to do—withdraw money
from the construction loan account in $10,000.00 increments over several months,
place that money into her checking account, and spend it to give the appearance of
-3-
income. Upon making the suggested withdrawals, the mortgage loan was
approved and on August 30, 1999, Newbold signed the closing documents,3 again
at Greenberg’s direction and with little knowledge of what she was signing.
Premier built the home and Newbold used the mortgage loan from FBMC to repay
the construction loan to PNC Bank.
Within a matter of months, it became apparent that Newbold could not
afford the monthly mortgage payment of $4,204.27 on her new home. By April of
2000, she sold the condominium in which she was living to make the mortgage
payments on the new house. By May of 2001, she had exhausted her financial
resources and defaulted on the $500,000.00 mortgage loan. By the summer of
2001, she had put her new home on the market, and in October of 2001, the home
was in foreclosure. Final judgment in the amount of $494,693.16 plus interest was
entered in favor of the Bank in the foreclosure action on February 4, 2003. On
April 6, 2004, Newbold’s home, which was appraised at $625,000.00 for loan
purposes, was bought by the Bank for $510,000.00 at a court-ordered auction.
On July 31, 2007, Newbold filed a verified complaint alleging fraud
in the inducement, fraud, bad faith and predatory lending, negligence and gross
negligence based upon the allegedly reckless advice Greenberg had given her and
his assurances that she could afford the desired home. On August 15, 2007, citing
CR4 12.02, the Builder moved to dismiss the complaint as being time barred
3
Included in the closing packet were two promissory notes, each in the amount of $500,000.00,
and two “hold harmless” agreements insulating Premier and Greenberg from liability for the
advice they had given Newbold and encouraging her to seek legal counsel.
4
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
-4-
because it was filed nearly three years after the five-year statute of limitations
expressed in KRS 413.120 had expired. The Builder argued all of the challenged
conduct by Greenberg and Premier occurred in 1998 and 1999, with the last
challenged act occurring at the mortgage loan closing on August 30, 1999.
According to the Builder, to be considered timely, Newbold’s complaint had to be
filed by August 30, 2004.
Similarly, on August 24, 2007, the Bank moved to dismiss the
complaint alleging it was time barred and did not state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. The Bank alleged Newbold’s own complaint showed she knew
of her injury as early as April 2000 when she sold her condominium to make
monthly mortgage payments on the new home. There was also proof that she
knew of her injury as early as 2001 when she placed the newly built home on the
market and again when she defaulted on the mortgage, all of which occurred more
than five years before the filing of the verified complaint in 2007. The Bank
argued the latest date Newbold could have “discovered” the alleged fraud was
October 2001 when the Bank filed the foreclosure action on the new home.5 By
that point she had already sold her condominium to pay the monthly mortgage, had
unsuccessfully tried to sell the newly constructed home, and had been served with
foreclosure papers. Using the October 2001 date, according to the Bank, the action
5
There is no allegation that Greenberg or Premier concealed or attempted to conceal the alleged
fraud. Therefore, the statute of limitations began running when, through the exercise of ordinary
care, Newbold should have discovered the fraud. Shelton v. Clifton, 746 S.W.2d 414, 415 (Ky.
App. 1988).
-5-
would have been timely under KRS 413.120(12) and KRS 413.130(3) only if filed
by October of 2006. By the Bank’s calculation, the action was filed more than
eight months too late.
On September 11, 2007, the Bank filed a second motion to dismiss
pursuant to CR 12.02(f) and CR 13.01 arguing Newbold’s claims were barred by
the doctrine of res judicata because her allegations of fraud and predatory lending
arose from the same facts that gave rise to the foreclosure action instituted by the
Bank and were lost when not asserted as compulsory counterclaims in that action.
DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 520 (6th Cir. 2004). As support for its
argument, the Bank asked the trial court to take judicial notice of the Final
Judgment & Order of Sale and the Master Commissioner’s Report in the
foreclosure action as well as a deposition Newbold had given in a malpractice
action she had filed against her former attorney for failing to file counterclaims in
the foreclosure action. Both documents establish Newbold intended to pursue a
predatory lending claim against the Bank as early as June of 2003, and she had
retained an attorney as early as 2000 to assert counterclaims in the foreclosure
action.
Newbold responded to all the motions to dismiss arguing the
complaint was filed timely and if it was not, allowing her to amend the pleading
was more appropriate than dismissal. Citing KRS 413.130(3), Newbold argued
she had ten years from either the execution of the contract or the perpetration of the
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fraud to file her claim for fraud. Additionally, citing KRS 413.160, she argued she
had ten years in which to seek relief for any claims not provided for by statute.
In dismissing the complaint, the trial court concluded Newbold’s
claims of fraud and fraud in the inducement fell within KRS 413.120(12)
pertaining to “[a]n action for relief or damages on the ground of fraud or mistake.”
Such claims must be asserted within five years of the accrual of the action and the
ten year catch-all provision mentioned in KRS 413.160 does not extend the fiveyear window provided in KRS 413.120(7). The trial court went on to conclude the
allegations of bad faith and predatory lending, as well as negligence and gross
negligence, fell under KRS 413.120(7) pertaining to claims “for an injury to the
rights of the plaintiff, not arising on contract and not otherwise enumerated.” The
applicable statute of limitations for these claims is also five years. The trial court
concluded Newbold had to be aware of the conduct leading to her injury well in
advance of the foreclosure sale in 2004, and perhaps as early as April of 2000
when she had difficulty making the monthly mortgage payments. The trial court
concluded the limitations period began running on May 1, 2001, the date of her
default on the mortgage loan, and expired five years later on May 1, 2006. Since
the complaint was not filed until July 31, 2007, the trial court determined it was
time barred because the filing occurred outside the five year statute of limitations.
This appeal follows.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
-7-
All parties agree our review of the trial court’s grant of the motion to
dismiss is de novo. James v. Wilson, 95 S.W.3d 875, 883-84 (Ky. App. 2002). As
such, we will construe the pleadings liberally and in a light most favorable to
Newbold and we will accept as true, all of her allegations. Mims v. WesternSouthern Agency, Inc., 226 S.W.3d 833 (Ky. App. 2007). If Newbold was
“entitled to relief under any set of facts” she could prove, the trial court should not
have dismissed her complaint. Pari-Mutuel Clerks' Union v. Kentucky Jockey
Club, 551 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Ky. 1977). While we need not give deference to the
trial court’s conclusions, we believe he accurately applied the law to the facts on
the direct appeal. Therefore, we will adopt that portion of the trial court’s opinion
and order pertaining to the direct appeal as if it was our own. In the interest of
time, we will set forth only the trial court’s conclusions of law.
All of the claims raised in Ms. Newbold’s complaint
are subject to the limitations period set out in KRS
413.120. The claims enumerated under KRS 413.120
must be brought within five (5) years after the cause of
action accrued. The general rule is that an action
“accrues” on the date of injury, and the limitations period
begins to toll from that date. Caudill v. Arnett, 481
S.W.2d 668, 696 (Ky. App. 1972). However, provision
is made for fraud claims where it would not have been
reasonable for the plaintiff to have discovered the injury
on the actual date the fraud was perpetrated. Instead, the
aforementioned five (5) year limitations period does not
begin to toll until the date that the fraud was discovered
or, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should
have been discovered. KRS 413.130(3); Hernandez v.
Daniel, 471 S.W.2d 25, 26 (Ky. 1971). This ‘safe-harbor
period’ set out in KRS 413.130(3) is only available
where the plaintiff is able to satisfy the Court as to why
the fraudulent act could not, through reasonable
-8-
diligence, have been discovered sooner. McCoy v.
Arena, 174 S.W.2d 726, 729 (Ky. 1943). In any event, a
fraud action must be brought within ten (10) years after
the perpetration of the alleged fraud. KRS 413.130(3).
While there must be a cognizable injury in order for a
claim to ripen, Kentucky law has never required a
specific dollar amount to be known before the statute of
limitations can run. Matherly Land Surveying, Inc. v.
Gardiner Park Development, LLC., 230 S.W.2d 586, 591
(Ky. 2007); Meade County Bank v. Wheatley, 910
S.W.2d 233, 235 (Ky. 1995). The statute of limitations
begins to run as soon as the injury becomes apparent to
the injured. Matherly Land Surveying, Inc., 230 S.W.3d
at 591. It is immaterial, with respect to the tolling of the
limitations period, that the injured party was unaware that
he or she had a cause of action against another so long as
he or she was aware of the conduct giving rise to the
injury complained of. Graham v. Harlin, Parker &
Rudloff, 664 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Ky. App. 1983).
The Court must find that Ms. Newbold had to have
been aware of the conduct giving rise to her injury well
in advance of the date of the foreclosure sale (April 6,
2004). A strong argument may be made that she should
have known that Mr. Greenberg grossly underestimated
and/or misrepresented the sufficiency of her assets once
she was (sic) began to have difficulty making the
monthly mortgage payment (April of 2000). The
circumstance/injury created as a result of that fraudulent
conduct was certainly apparent by the time she had
exhausted her financial resources and defaulted on the
loan. As such, the limitations period began to run on the
date of the default (May 1, 2001) and ended five (5)
years later (May 1, 2006). Insofar as the instant action
was filed on July 31, 2007, more than one (1) year after
the limitations period tolled, it is time-barred by the
statute of limitations.
Newbold must take responsibility for her predicament. While we must affirm the
trial court’s decision based upon Newbold’s claims being time barred, no proof has
-9-
been taken in this case and we do not know whether Greenberg provided faulty
advice or the bank loaned Newbold $500,000.00 knowing it was highly unlikely
she could repay it. We do know, however, that it was ultimately Newbold’s
decision to go forward with construction and the closing packet bears her
signature. She had the opportunity to seek advice from independent legal counsel
who would have only her best interests at heart, but instead she chose to rely on a
builder and a bank, both of whom had a financial stake in seeing the project
proceed. Realistically, as the trial court concluded, Newbold had to know she was
in financial straits well before her dream home was sold at a court-ordered auction.
There were many points along the way that Newbold should have realized she had
taken on a debt she could not manage—when advised to engage in a creative
financing scheme to qualify for the mortgage loan from FBMC; when her credit
was destroyed; when she had to sell her condo to try to make the monthly
mortgage payments; when she defaulted; and when she was served with
foreclosure papers, all of which occurred well before the passage of five years
from her signing of the closing documents on August 30, 1999. In light of all these
significant events, it is unreasonable to say the statute of limitations did not begin
running until Newbold’s home had been lost to foreclosure on April 6, 2004.
While she would have us start the clock running from the sale of her home, or
entry of the foreclosure judgment on February 4, 2003, we decline to do so.
Newbold’s injury was fixed and non-speculative early on; it was only the amount
of her damage that was yet to be calculated.
-10-
Under Queensway Financial Holdings Ltd. v. Cotton & Allen, P.S.C.,
237 S.W.3d 141, 151 (Ky. 2007) (quoting Combs v. Albert Kahn Associates, Inc.,
183 S.W.3d 190, 199 (Ky. App. 2006)), one who has suffered an injury “has a duty
to investigate and discover the identity of the tortfeasor within the statutory time
constraints.” Based upon Newbold’s deposition testimony and her admissions to
the Master Commissioner, she contemplated taking action as early as 2000 or
2001. In light of that knowledge, we cannot say she did not have a cognizable
cause of action at that time. Therefore, we hold the trial court properly dismissed
the complaint as being filed outside the applicable statute of limitations. KRS
413.120.
CROSS-APPEAL
In addition to arguing Newbold’s complaint was filed outside the five
year statute of limitations, the Bank alleges Newbold’s complaint is barred by the
doctrine of res judicata. The Bank argues Newbold should have asserted her
claims as compulsory counterclaims as part of the foreclosure action since all the
activity sprang from the same transaction or occurrence. The trial court rejected
this theory because none of the Bank defendants were part of the foreclosure
action. Regardless, it is unnecessary for us to explore this question in detail due to
our resolution of the direct appeal.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of
Newbold’s claims as being filed outside the applicable five year statute of
-11-
limitations and therefore time barred. Further, we deem the Bank’s cross-appeal
moot.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE:
Stanley W. Whetzel, Jr.
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEES/CROSSAPPELLANTS, CENTRAL BANK
OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, INC.,
CENTRAL BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY AND CENTRAL
BANCSHARES, INC.:
Victor B. Maddox
Jennifer Metzger Stinnett
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEES, DAVID
S. GREENBERG AND PREMIER
HOMES, INC.:
Houston M. Oppenheimer
Louisville, Kentucky
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