BRONK (DAVID P) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: JUNE 18, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-001724-MR
DAVID P. BRONK
APPELLANT
ON REMAND FROM SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY
FILE NO. 2009-SC-000492-DG
v.
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KATHLEEN VOOR MONTANO, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CR-000617
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, NICKELL, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
COMBS, JUDGE: This case is before us on remand from the Supreme Court of
Kentucky by order entered on January 13, 2010. In its order, the Supreme Court
directed us to reconsider our opinion of July 2, 2009, in light of Leonard v.
Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009). After studying the Court’s analysis
in Leonard, we have re-examined the nature of Bronk’s appeal as directed. We are
compelled to reverse the trial court’s denial of Bronk’s motion to vacate his
sentence and conviction.
Bronk was arrested in August 1995 when he was seventeen years of
age. He was charged with murder, first-degree arson, first-degree burglary, and
third-degree burglary. The charges were related to the burglary of a storage
facility in August 1994. Following the burglary, an intentional fire was set. A
Louisville firefighter, Sgt. Strawn Nutter, tragically died while fighting the fire.
Bronk’s father retained attorney David Kaplan to represent Bronk. The record
indicates that the only compensation that Kaplan received was a two-hundreddollar check that was returned for insufficient funds.
Because he was a juvenile, Bronk was placed under the jurisdiction of
Jefferson District Court. Finding that there was probable cause to believe that
Bronk had participated in the burglary and in the setting of the fire, the court
ordered a transfer hearing. Following that hearing, Bronk’s case was transferred to
Jefferson Circuit Court where he was to stand trial as an adult. After Bronk’s
indictment in March 1996, his case was consolidated with that of three codefendants.
Between the time of Bronk’s indictment in March 1996 and his guilty
plea in July 1996, there were various pre-trial motions that required Bronk and his
co-defendants to appear in court. In June 1996, attorney Kaplan and the
-2-
Commonwealth’s Attorney entered into an agreed order for Bronk to submit to a
polygraph exam. He was taken to the Louisville Arson Squad offices where three
polygraph exams were administered. After the polygraph, Bronk gave a statement
in which he admitted to being the lookout for one of his co-defendants who, he
alleged, committed the burglary and set the fire.
One month after giving this statement, Bronk pled guilty to seconddegree manslaughter, second-degree arson, and two counts of third-degree
burglary. He was later sentenced to twenty-five years’ incarceration. In 1997,
Bronk entered a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming that but for
ineffective assistance of counsel, he would have proceeded to trial. After a threeday evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court
upheld denial of the motion. Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 482 (Ky. 2001)
(Bronk I).
In 2003, Bronk filed a motion in the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate
his sentence and conviction pursuant to Kentucky Rule[s] of Criminal Procedure
(RCr) 11.42. The trial court denied that motion in 2006. Because the Supreme
Court of Kentucky had already addressed the issue as to whether ineffective
assistance of counsel had rendered Bronk’s guilty plea involuntary, the trial court
held that the law-of-the-case doctrine prevented it from examining the same issue.
On appeal, this court affirmed the trial court and its reasoning in 2009. Bronk filed
a motion for discretionary review, which the Supreme Court granted. After its
-3-
review, the Supreme Court remanded the case to us and ordered us to re-examine it
under the recently rendered case of Leonard, supra.
In his direct appeal in 1999, Bronk argued that he had received
ineffective assistance of counsel and that, therefore, the trial court should have
granted his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In his current appeal, Bronk
contends that he had actually been constructively denied assistance of counsel, a
fact that rendered his guilty plea involuntary. As noted earlier, we had originally
held that we could not address Bronk’s claim because his arguments could have
been made in his direct appeal. See Bronk v. Commonwealth, 2009 WL 1884371
(Ky. App. July 2, 2009). However, we have been directed to examine his
arguments anew under the Leonard criteria.
In the pertinent section of Leonard, the Supreme Court abolished a
previous precedent; namely, that “an issue raised and rejected on direct appeal may
not be relitigated in these proceedings by claiming that it amounts to ineffective
assistance of counsel.” Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d at 157, 159. In
restating the holding of Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2006),1 the
Supreme Court announced a new rule: that a collateral claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel -- albeit related to an error previously alleged on direct appeal
-- may be raised if different issues exist as to the alleged ineffectiveness. Leonard
v. Commonwealth 279 S.W.3d at 158.
1
Martin had not discussed the previous line of cases that dealt with the issue; however, Leonard
explicitly overruled them.
-4-
In Martin, the appellant on direct appeal had argued that the
prosecutor’s closing argument constituted palpable error. In a collateral appeal, he
argued that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not objecting to the
prosecutor’s argument. Although it rejected the claim of palpable error as to the
closing argument, the Supreme Court nonetheless held that the claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel survived on its own even though the underlying allegation of
palpable error had been rejected. It reasoned as follows:
When an appellate court engages in a palpable error
review, its focus is on what happened and whether the
defect is so manifest, fundamental [sic] and unambiguous
that it threatens the integrity of the judicial process.
However, on collateral attack, when claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel are before the court, the inquiry is
broader. In that circumstance, the inquiry is not only
upon what happened, but why it happened, and whether it
was a result of trial strategy, the negligence or
indifference of counsel, or any other factor that would
shed light upon the severity of the defect[.]
Id. at 5.
In evaluating Bronk’s RCr 8.10 claim in Bronk I, the Supreme Court
held that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that none of
Bronk’s counsel’s deficiencies affected the voluntariness of Bronk’s guilty plea
and denied the motion to withdraw the plea.” Bronk v. Commonwealth at 487.
However, under the reasoning of Martin and Leonard, we review RCr 11.42
ineffective assistance claims de novo, bifurcating that issue from other substantive
errors that may have been alleged. Brown v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 490, 499
(Ky. 2008).
-5-
Both the trial court and the Supreme Court focused on the validity of
Bronk’s guilty plea in his direct appeal. The trial court concluded that his plea was
knowing and voluntary in spite of the questionable nature of his legal
representation. The Supreme Court applied the clearly erroneous standard when it
affirmed the trial court. Bronk I at 489 (Justice Cooper, concurring)2. At that
point, however, the Supreme Court did not grant broad de novo review to Bronk’s
ineffective assistance claim.
Bronk now contends that he was effectively denied counsel
throughout the proceedings that led to his guilty plea. It is fundamental that “a
criminal defendant has a right to be represented by counsel that extends beyond the
actual trial to every critical stage of the proceedings.” Stone v. Commonwealth,
217 S.W.3d 233, 237 (Ky. 2007). (citations omitted). Critical stages are events
that place the accused in an adversarial situation. Cain v. Abramson, 220 S.W.3d
276, 280 (Ky. 2007). The right to representation has been deemed the most basic
right of an accused person. U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654, 104 S.Ct. 2039,
2044 (1984). (quoting Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1956)). If a defendant has been completely denied counsel,
there is a presumption that prejudice resulted, rendering his proceedings unfair and
requiring reversal. Id. at 659. See also Stone, supra.
2
In a previous reference to Bronk I, we mentioned that the Supreme Court used the “abuse of
discretion” standard. Justice Cooper’s concurrence correctly argued that the majority should
have applied the “clearly erroneous” standard instead. He concluded, however, that both
standards lead to the same result.
-6-
Kaplan’s representation has never been scrutinized or analyzed by any
court in the context of constructive denial of counsel. Nor has it been the sole
focus of judicial review separate and apart from the substantive allegation of error
inevitably intertwined with the charge of ineffective performance of counsel. When
the trial court denied Bronk’s motion to deny his guilty plea in 1999, it neither
addressed nor did it base its findings on the effects of Kaplan’s representation.
Instead, it relied on the opinion of the original trial court that had reviewed Bronk’s
guilty plea and found that it had been entered knowingly and voluntarily because
Bronk had participated in the boiler-plate colloquy. The Supreme Court in turn
relied on the same finding in affirming the trial court in Bronk I. Although the
law-of-the-case doctrine is firm precedent, it is not absolute. We note in particular
the reasoning of the former Court of Appeals, the predecessor of our current
Supreme Court, when it articulated such an exception in Gossett v.
Commonwealth, 441 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Ky. 1969):
Where the law of the case rule is applicable, it has
sufficient flexibility to permit the appellate court to admit
and correct an error made in the previous decision where
substantial injustice might otherwise result and the
former decision is clearly and palpably erroneous.
We are persuaded that under Leonard and Martin, Gossett applies and compels us
to remand this case to the trial court to address Bronk’s claims.
Upon remand, the trial court should consider the totality of the
circumstances. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2066
(1984). Bronk was incarcerated throughout the period of Kaplan’s representation.
-7-
In his testimony, Kaplan admitted that during that time, he never met with Bronk at
the jail or anywhere else to discuss the case. Kaplan and Bronk spoke very little on
the telephone: once when Kaplan complained about the check that had bounced
and once when Bronk was about to take a polygraph exam. Counsel for Bronk’s
co-defendants testified that Bronk inquired of her as to the nature of charges
against him. Kaplan never shared discovery materials with Bronk nor sent him
written correspondence. Because Bronk simply denied involvement or presence at
the crime scene, Kaplan admitted that he did not conduct any investigation -- such
as conducting interviews with potential alibi witnesses or following up on potential
alternative perpetrators.
Quite often, Kaplan would not appear in court for proceedings
involving Bronk and his co-defendants. The first trial judge3 testified that Kaplan’s
absences complicated proceedings because Bronk could not be questioned without
his counsel. If Kaplan did appear, he sat in the back of the courtroom, leaving
Bronk alone in the jury box while his co-defendants sat with their attorneys. The
court became so concerned about Kaplan’s absences that it met with the attorneys
of Bronk’s co-defendants and with the prosecutor in order to discuss what course
of action would be appropriate. The judge admitted under oath that he had been
relieved to learn Bronk was going to plead guilty because he no longer had to
worry about how to deal with the problem of Kaplan’s behavior.
3
This case was originally in Judge Stephen Mershon’s division of Jefferson Circuit Court. Judge
Mershon recused during the RCr 8.10 proceedings in order to testify as a witness.
-8-
Additionally, Kaplan never filed any motions on Bronk’s behalf -other than to change his plea to guilty and to withdraw as counsel. He joined in a
motion for change of venue but did not remain in the courtroom for the hearing.
Without consulting with Bronk, Kaplan gave a television station permission to
interview Bronk outside Kaplan’s presence. Furthermore, Kaplan signed an agreed
order allowing the Louisville Police Department to administer a polygraph
examination to Bronk. Kaplan testified that he did not think it was necessary for
him to be present at that exam. He merely spoke to Bronk on the phone and told
him, “knock ‘em dead, kid.” The agreed order only referred to one polygraph
examination – not an interrogation. However, the police gave Bronk three exams
(which he failed), and they then interrogated him at length until he confessed to
being a lookout while one of his co-defendants committed the burglary and set the
fire. In the following days, Kaplan did not ask Bronk any questions about what
had transpired. He testified that it did not occur to him to file a motion to suppress
the confession. Instead, he advised Bronk to enter a guilty plea.
The United States Supreme Court has expounded on the nature of pretrial proceedings, noting that perhaps their most critical phase are consultation,
thorough investigation, and preparation. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57, 53
S.Ct. 55, 59-60 (1932). Bronk was a juvenile at the time that he was Kaplan’s
client. Kaplan admitted not communicating with him and not investigating the
case even though our Supreme Court has inexorably charged defense counsel with
the duty “to intimately know the case prior to trial.” Commonwealth v. Corey, 826
-9-
S.W.2d 319, 322 (Ky. 1992). Furthermore, the trial court stated on the record that
if Kaplan had filed a motion to suppress the statement that Bronk gave following
the polygraph exam, a hearing would have been warranted, noting that the motion
probably would have been granted. In light of overarching, constitutionally
guaranteed nature of the right to counsel, we hold that a trial court must make
findings as to Bronk’s claims.
This is a tragic case. Revisiting the circumstances that cut short the
life of a courageous firefighter will no doubt severely traumatize his family,
friends, and fellow firefighters. Nonetheless, we are compelled by due process,
rule of law, and Supreme Court precedent to guarantee a criminal defendant his
constitutional right to adequate counsel. Bronk is not being vindicated by this
decision by any means. It is the judicial process itself that is being held to an
accounting to assure proper performance of counsel at trial so that such a tragedy
need never be relived again.
Accordingly, after fulfilling our review pursuant to Supreme Court
directive, we remand this case to the trial court, which shall examine the record
and make findings in light of Cronic, supra, to determine whether Bronk was
denied counsel during his pre-trial proceedings.
ALL CONCUR.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Dennis J. Burke
Assistant Public Advocate
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
-10-
LaGrange, Kentucky
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-11-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.