STEADMAN (JAMES) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: APRIL 16, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-001264-MR
AND
NO. 2008-CA-002376-MR
JAMES W. STEADMAN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEALS FROM LOGAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TYLER L. GILL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CR-00126
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART AND VACATING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; CAPERTON, JUDGE; WHITE,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
1
Senior Judge Edwin M. White, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
CAPERTON, JUDGE: James W. Steadman directly appeals his convictions for
theft by deception over $3002 and being a Persistent Felony Offender (PFO) in the
Second Degree following a jury trial in Logan County. In addition, Steadman
appeals the trial court’s denial of his CR 60.02 motions. After a thorough review
of the parties’ arguments, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm Steadman’s
conviction, sentence, and the denial of his CR 60.02 motions. However, we find
that the trial court acted outside of its jurisdiction by ordering restitution under
KRS 532.033 more than ten days after entering Steadman’s conviction and
sentence. Accordingly we vacate the order of restitution.
The facts that give rise to this appeal stem from an auction conducted
by Robert Blackford on April 8, 2000, wherein Steadman purchased fourteen items
totaling $29,175. Out of the fourteen items purchased at the auction most notable
were a pickup truck for $1,100, a Volvo truck and trailer for $19,800 and a Ford
6600 tractor for $6,250. Steadman paid for all items by check and left the auction
with the goods. The check was then returned twice from Steadman’s bank, Pioneer
Bank, for insufficient funds.
Thereafter, Blackford tried numerous times to obtain payment from
Steadman, all of which were unsuccessful. Steadman was subsequently indicted
for theft by deception over $300 and PFO first degree to which he pleaded not
2
The felony amount at the time of Steadman’s charges was $300; in 2009 that amount was
amended to $500. KRS 514.040.
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guilty. At the ensuing jury trial, Steadman represented himself, with assistance
from an attorney with the Department of Public Advocacy.3
In addition to the aforementioned facts, at trial the jury was presented
evidence concerning the auction, the titles to the purchased vehicles, the
disposition of the vehicles, Steadman’s history with Pioneer Bank, the amount of
funds in his bank account in the months following the auction and Steadman’s
hospitalization following the auction. Specifically, the jury was presented with
testimony from Blackford that the conditions of the auction were that all accounts
had to be settled on the day of the sale; that titles would be released upon the
checks clearing or payment of cash; and that Steadman took possession of the
goods which he paid for with the bad check the day of the auction. Blackford
further testified that after Steadman’s check did not clear, Blackford had to receive
a bank loan in order to pay the sellers for the items. Thereafter, the Volvo truck
and trailer had their liens released on May 2, 2000.4
The jury was also presented evidence that Pioneer Bank had allowed
Steadman to write checks and then wire in money to pay for it. In the months
before the auction Steadman had transferred $96,000 into his account and had paid
off at least one large check for $27,223.86 prior to the auction. However, there
were never sufficient funds in Steadman’s account to cover the check at issue postauction.
3
The Department of Public Advocacy was not appointed to represent Steadman but was
available at trial to assist him.
4
As to the tractor, it was conveyed by the sales receipt, which Blackford gave Steadman.
-3-
The jury was presented evidence that Steadman had a pattern of
checks returned for insufficient funds. In March 2000, Steadman had three checks
returned for insufficient funds; four checks were returned in April 2000; six checks
returned in May 2000; three checks returned in June 2000; and eight checks
returned in July 2000.
After being presented the aforementioned evidence, the jury convicted
Steadman of theft by deception over $300 and PFO in the Second Degree
Thereafter, the court sentenced Steadman to eight years and entered the final
judgment on May 29, 2007. The court then entered a restitution order for
$11,917.50 pursuant to KRS 532.033 on June 13, 2007. Thereafter, Steadman
filed two pro se CR 60.02 motions, which were denied by the trial court.
Steadman appeals from his conviction, sentence, imposition of
restitution and also from the denial of his CR 60.02 motions. We shall first address
Steadman’s appeal concerning his conviction, the final judgment imposing his
sentence, and the order of restitution; thereafter, we shall consider Steadman’s
appeal from the court’s denial of his CR 60.02 motions.
As to Steadman’s appeal concerning his conviction, the final
judgment imposing his sentence, and the order of restitution, he presents three
arguments. First, Steadman argues that the trial court erred by not granting his
motion for a directed verdict. Second, Steadman argues that the trial court erred in
allowing the Commonwealth to present a rebuttal expert witness, Al Thacker,
without notice to the defense and without conducting a proper Daubert hearing
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prior to Thacker’s testimony. Third, Steadman argues that the trial court acted
outside its jurisdiction when it ordered restitution.
The Commonwealth counter argues that the trial court properly denied
Steadman’s motion for directed verdict; did not abuse its discretion in allowing
Thacker as a rebuttal witness; and that the trial court retained jurisdiction to have a
restitution hearing and enter an order concerning restitution. With this in mind we
turn to each of Steadman’s arguments.
Steadman first argues that the trial court erred by not granting his
motion for a directed verdict. In furtherance of this argument Steadman claims
that there was insufficient proof that he intended to pass a bad check; that there is
only a possibility that at the moment the check was given that he did not intend to
pay for the goods and that this is insufficient evidence to sustain a verdict of guilty;
that the evidence was all circumstantial and pointed to guilt as well as innocence;
that he did not have the burden of persuasion;5 that his conviction was built upon
numerous inferences; and lastly that his conviction violates his rights to Due
Process because the Commonwealth failed to prove Steadman’s intent beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The Commonwealth believes that Steadman’s alleged error
concerning the denial of his directed verdict motion has been waived since at trial
5
We disagree that the evidence presented by the Commonwealth shifted the burden to Steadman
to prove his innocence by a preponderance of the evidence. Steadman relies upon Sandstrom v.
Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450 (1979) for this assertion; however, in the case sub judice
the jury instructions did not contain an improper presumption as in Sandstrom. Thus,
Steadman’s reliance on Sandstrom is misplaced.
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Steadman did not argue to the court that there was insufficient evidence to convict
him. Instead, Steadman argued to the court that Blackford did not have ownership
of the items with liens attached at the time the check was passed and that at the
time he passed the check he did not receive full value.
In reply, Steadman concedes that he told the trial court he was not
arguing lack of intent to deceive, but was instead arguing that he did not receive
full value; i.e., that he withheld funds to cover the check because he was waiting
for good title. Steadman contends that this argument to the trial court “clearly
conveyed” the additional argument that it was not his intent to dishonor the check
when he handed it to Blackford. Thus, Steadman argues that not only is this issue
preserved for appeal, he was entitled to a directed verdict because some of the
items at auction had liens on them that had to be removed; therefore, Blackford did
not hold clear, unencumbered title to the Volvo truck and trailer.6 In addition,
Steadman argues that there were issues with the Volvo truck’s vehicle
identification number (VIN).
Steadman relies upon Lanham v. Commonwealth, 171 S.W.3d 14 (Ky.
2005), for his argument that his alleged error is preserved as his request for a
directed verdict clearly conveyed the argument that the evidence was insufficient.
We find Steadman’s argument disingenuous since Steadman informed the trial
court he was not taking the position that at the time he passed the check he had no
6
No explanation was given why Steadman did not pay for the items of which he did not contest
title.
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intention to deceive. Steadman presented one issue for directed verdict to the trial
court and expressly denied the argument he now presents on appeal.
It has long been this Court’s policy that novel arguments will not be
considered for the first time on appeal and we shall not now entertain a change in
policy. See Shelton v. Commonwealth, 992 S.W.2d 849, 852 (Ky.App. 1998)
(“[a]n appellate court will not consider a theory unless it has been raised before the
trial court and that court has been given an opportunity to consider the merits of the
theory.”).
Moreover, in Potts v. Commonwealth, 172 S.W.3d 345 (Ky.2005), the
Kentucky Supreme Court held:
CR 50.01 states, in pertinent part, “[a] motion for a
directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor.”
We have previously applied CR 50.01 to criminal cases
and have held that its requirement of “specific grounds”
must be followed to preserve for appellate review a
denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.
Potts at 348.
Thus, Steadman’s argument concerning the insufficiency of the
evidence is unpreserved.7 Steadman essentially asserts that his unpreserved error
be reviewed under RCr 10.26 by arguing that under Schoenbachler v.
Commonwealth, 95 S.W.3d 830 (Ky.2003), his conviction is a violation of federal
7
While we recognize that the pro se pleadings are not to be held to the same standard as those of
an attorney, (See Case v. Commonwealth, 467 S.W.2d 367, 368 (Ky. 1971)), issues raised upon
appeal still must be preserved. Moreover, Kentucky courts still require pro se litigants to follow
the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. Watkins v. Fannin, 278 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Ky.App.
2009). Therefore, Steadman was required to preserve this issue for appeal by stating his grounds
for a directed verdict to the trial court.
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Due Process. Accordingly, we shall review this claimed error under RCr 10.26,
which states:
A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a
party may be considered by the court on motion for a
new trial or by an appellate court on appeal, even though
insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and
appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination
that manifest injustice has resulted from the error.
“Manifest injustice” requires that substantial rights of the defendant were
prejudiced by the error; i.e., there is a substantial possibility that the result of the
trial would have been different. Schaefer v. Commonwealth, 622 S.W.2d 218 (Ky.
1981) and Jackson v. Commonwealth, 717 S.W.2d 511 (Ky.App. 1986).
Further refining the parameters of RCr 10.26, the Kentucky Supreme
Court in Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343 (Ky. 2006), undertook an
analysis of what constitutes a palpable error.
For an error to be palpable, it must be easily perceptible,
plain, obvious and readily noticeable. A palpable error
must involve prejudice more egregious than that
occurring in reversible error. A palpable error must be so
grave in nature that if it were uncorrected, it would
seriously affect the fairness of the proceedings. Thus,
what a palpable error analysis “boils down to” is whether
the reviewing court believes there is a “substantial
possibility” that the result in the case would have been
different without the error. If not, the error cannot be
palpable.
Id. at 349.
Steadman’s argument under Schoenbachler v. Commonwealth, 95
S.W.3d 830 (Ky. 2003), that his conviction on less than full proof of the element of
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intent is per se a manifest injustice and a violation of federal Due Process thereby
entitling him to relief under RCr 10.26, was previously rejected by the Kentucky
Supreme Court in Potts, supra. In Potts, the Court held that:
Appellant interprets dictum in Schoenbachler v.
Commonwealth, 95 S.W.3d 830 (Ky. 2003), to mean that
a failure by the Commonwealth to present sufficient
evidence to support a criminal conviction always
constitutes palpable error. Id. at 836-37.... Our cases,
however, are replete with affirmances of convictions
where unpreserved errors pertained to the
Commonwealth's failure to prove an element of the
offense....Appellant's interpretation of Schoenbachler not
only runs contrary to each of these decisions, but also
would essentially eliminate the well-established
requirement that a party properly preserve a claim of
insufficiency of evidence by informing the trial court of
the relief requested and the reasons therefor. We
therefore disagree with Appellant's interpretation of
Schoenbachler.
Potts at 348.
The standard for addressing Steadman’s claimed violation of Due
Process was also addressed by the Court in Potts, which held therein:
In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61
L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), the United States Supreme Court
articulated the standard of review required by the Due
Process Clause with respect to the sufficiency of
evidence to support a criminal conviction, holding that
“the relevant question is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at
318-19, 99 S.Ct. at 2788-89.
Potts at 349.
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Steadman argues that there was an issue with the title and VIN
number of the Volvo truck, that he did not receive full value, and that he did not
intend to dishonor the check at the moment it was passed. Nevertheless, the jury
was also presented evidence from which they could determine that Steadman did
intend to dishonor the check the moment it was passed. The Commonwealth
presented ample evidence concerning Steadman’s bank account, the values of the
items taken from the auction and Steadman’s disposition of the items. Any title
issues argued by Steadman only affected part of the items taken at auction, as there
were certainly items taken from the auction over $300 that did not require a title
for ownership.8 Thus, in light of the evidence presented to the jury and viewed in
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the theft by deception over $300 and PFO Second
Degree beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, Steadman’s argument for violation of
Due Process must fail. Likewise, Steadman is not entitled to relief under RCr
10.26 as no manifest injustice has resulted.
Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that Steadman’s alleged error
concerning insufficiency of the evidence was preserved by his motion for directed
verdict, Steadman would still not be entitled to relief. In Commonwealth v.
Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1991), the Kentucky Supreme Court stated:
On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw
all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in
favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient
8
As previously noted, no explanation was offered by Steadman why he did pay for the items to
which he did not contest title.
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to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed
verdict should not be given. For the purpose of ruling on
the motion, the trial court must assume that the evidence
for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury
questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to
such testimony.
On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict
is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly
unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the
defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.
Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S.W.2d 3 (Ky.1983).
Benham at 187.
The Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence through the
testimony of its witnesses to establish the proper mens rea based on the
circumstances. “Intent can be inferred from the actions of an accused and the
surrounding circumstances.” Anastasi v. Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 860, 862
(Ky. 1988). See also Caudill v. Commonwealth, 256 S.W.2d 8 (Ky. 1953)
(Scienter may be established by the circumstances) and Dawes v. Commonwealth,
349 S.W.2d 191 (Ky. 1960) (Evidence of state of mind can be either direct or
circumstantial). Further, the jury has wide latitude in inferring intent from the
evidence. Rayburn v. Commonwealth, 476 S.W.2d 187 (Ky. 1972).
Moreover, it has long been the law in Kentucky that a conviction may
rest upon circumstantial evidence. See Newton v. Commonwealth, 2 S.W.2d 661
(Ky. 1928). Sufficient circumstantial evidence is such evidence from which the
judge can conclude that reasonable minds might fairly find guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt based on the totality of the evidence. Hodges v. Commonwealth,
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473 S.W.2d 811, 812-813 (Ky. 1971). Thus, Steadman’s argument that the
evidence was circumstantial and thereby insufficient to prove his guilt or intent
must fail. In light of the evidence presented to the jury, Steadman was not entitled
to a directed verdict of acquittal as the jury could reasonably find him guilty. We
affirm the trial court as it properly denied Steadman’s motion for a directed
verdict.
We now turn to Steadman’s second argument, that the trial court erred
in allowing the Commonwealth a rebuttal expert witness, Al Thacker, without
notice to the defense and without conducting a proper Daubert hearing prior to
Thacker’s testimony. We shall first address the alleged rebuttal error and then
whether the trial court erred in not conducting a Daubert hearing.
At trial the Commonwealth called Al Thacker, a rebuttal witness.
Thacker testified that he had been working on trucks for a living since 1994 and
had worked on trucks on his farm for another ten years before that. Steadman
objected to the relevancy of Thacker’s testimony. In response, the Commonwealth
informed the court that Thacker was familiar with trucks, their VINs, and could
testify that the truck in question at trial was indeed a Volvo truck.9 Steadman then
objected to Thacker’s testimony as hearsay, which was overruled by the trial court.
9
Steadman claimed at trial that the title to the Volvo truck purchased at auction was invalid on
its face because it named the wrong manufacturer. At trial there was conflicting evidence as to
whether the truck had a VIN or had received a new VIN. Additionally, there was evidence that
the title was for a White-GMC truck. Thacker testified that White, GMC, and Volvo were the
same manufacturer.
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Steadman argues that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting
a rebuttal witness that was withheld from the defense since Steadman specifically
requested during discovery to be informed of any expert witness or reports that the
Commonwealth intended to produce. Steadman argues that the Commonwealth is
prohibited from holding back evidence and then using it to “sandbag” a defendant
on rebuttal. Additionally, Steadman argues that Thacker introduced new evidence
as to the history of truck mergers while explaining the White-Volvo-GMC
relationship and the art of reading VIN numbers for parts.
The Commonwealth responds that this error is unpreserved as this
argument was never presented to the trial court, nor is this the type of error that
qualifies as manifest injustice under RCr 10.26. Moreover, the Commonwealth
argues that the admission of Thacker’s testimony was not an abuse of discretion
because the defense presented the testimony of Herman England, Jr. England
testified that the title given to Blackford at the auction was for his White-Volvo
even though the title said White-GMC because GM owned White-Volvo and titles
sometimes said White-GMC. The Commonwealth asserts that they only presented
Thacker to clarify England’s testimony.
As held in Pilon v. Commonwealth, 544 S.W.2d 228, 231(Ky. 1976),
“The trial court is afforded a great degree of discretion in determining when
rebuttal evidence will be received. RCr 9.42. Where there is no clear showing of
arbitrariness or an abuse of discretion, the ruling of the trial court will not be
disturbed.” RCr 9.42 further grants the trial court the discretion to allow evidence-13-
in-chief presented during the rebuttal stage. See also Davis v. Commonwealth, 795
S.W.2d 942 (Ky. 1990). Thus, we review the trial court’s admission of rebuttal
evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. “The test for abuse of discretion is
whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or
unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d
941, 945 (Ky. 1999).
After a review of the record and the parties’ arguments, we conclude
that any error, if at all, in allowing Thacker to testify was harmless given the
testimony of England. Thus, the absence of Thacker’s testimony would not have
changed the outcome of trial and therefore error did not affect the substantial rights
of Steadman. Under RCr 9.24, a harmless error is not grounds for reversal. See
also Bratcher v. Commonwealth, 151 S.W.3d 332 (Ky. 2004).
We now turn to whether the trial court erred by failing to conduct a
Daubert hearing. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). Steadman argues that the trial court
erred by failing to conduct a sua sponte Daubert hearing. At trial, Steadman did
not request a Daubert hearing for Thacker. Instead, Steadman objected to the
foundation10 for Thacker’s testimony and then objected to hearsay. The trial court
overruled both objections. Steadman now argues on appeal that his objections
were effectively a Daubert challenge and that the trial court should have
undertaken the hearing. The Commonwealth disagrees and argues that this error is
10
Thacker testified that he had been working with trucks for at least 13 years.
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unpreserved. Alternatively, the Commonwealth asserts that even if the alleged
error were preserved the trial court did not abuse its discretion, as Thacker was
qualified as an expert given that Thacker had been working with trucks for thirteen
years.
We agree with the Commonwealth that Steadman is not entitled to
relief for this alleged error. While under Daubert the trial court functions as a
gatekeeper, charged with keeping out unreliable and pseudoscientific evidence, our
courts have repeatedly held that the trial court is not required to sua sponte conduct
a Daubert hearing. See R.T. Vanderbilt Co., Inc. v. Franklin, 290 S.W.3d 654
(Ky.App. 2009); Tharp v. Commonwealth, 40 S.W.3d 356 (Ky. 2000); Ferry v.
Commonwealth, 234 S.W.3d 358 (Ky.App. 2007); and Clay v. Commonwealth,
291 S.W.3d 210 (Ky. 2008). As such, Steadman is not entitled to relief from his
unpreserved alleged error.
We now turn to Steadman’s third alleged error that the trial court
acted outside its jurisdiction when it ordered restitution.
Steadman was sentenced by the trial court to eight years and the final
judgment was entered on May 29, 2007.11 Thereafter, the court held a restitution
hearing on June 8, 2007, and entered a restitution order for $11,917.50 pursuant to
KRS 532.033 on June 13, 2007. Steadman now argues that the trial court was
without jurisdiction to enter such an order. The Commonwealth argues that
11
The “Final Judgment Sentence of Imprisonment” made no reference to restitution and
specifically advised defendant that any appeal therefrom must be taken within thirty days of its
entry.
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because Steadman agreed to a restitution hearing after his final sentencing, then his
argument that the trial court was without jurisdiction to order restitution is waived.
Contrary to the Commonwealth’s assertion, Steadman did not waive
this error because the issue is one of jurisdiction of the trial court. We have
previously held that “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time and
cannot be consented to, agreed to, or waived by the parties.” Gaither v.
Commonwealth, 963 S.W.2d 621, 622 (Ky. 1997). Generally, a trial court loses
jurisdiction over a defendant’s case ten days after the entry of a final judgment.
Silverburg v. Commonwealth, 587 S.W.2d 241, 244 (Ky. 1979) and CR 59.05.
Jurisdiction can only be extended by rule or statute. Rollins v. Commonwealth,
294 S.W.3d 463, 466 (Ky.App. 2009). As held in Rollins, restitution is statutorily
based:
Indeed, a trial court's authority to order a defendant into
court for the purpose of restitution is strictly statutory.
KRS 431.200; KRS 532.032, et seq. As there is no
applicable statute which would have extended
jurisdiction to the court in this circumstance, it was
acting without jurisdiction. As KRS 431.200 is the only
statute dealing with post-sentencing orders of restitution,
its mandates must be met in order for the trial court to
have jurisdiction.
Rollins at 466.
In the case sub judice, the trial court did not order restitution under
KRS 431.200 which permits post-sentencing orders of restitution, but under KRS
532.032 and KRS 532.033. Unfortunately, the trial court was divested of
jurisdiction ten days after entry of the final judgment imposing sentencing. As
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such, the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter restitution more than ten days
after entry of the final judgment. Consequently, we are compelled to vacate the
order of restitution.
We now turn to Steadman’s claimed errors concerning the denial of
his multiple12 CR 60.02 motions.13 As previously noted, Steadman argues that the
trial court committed error in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the CR
60.02 motion to vacate the conviction and sentence based upon the
Commonwealth’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence and that Steadman was
denied due process of law by the failure of the Commonwealth to disclose
exculpatory evidence.
The Commonwealth argues that the trial court properly denied
Steadman’s CR 60.02 motions without an evidentiary hearing as Steadman offered
only vague allegations and no actual proof of exculpatory evidence. The
Commonwealth additionally argues that Steadman’s notice of appeal was untimely
filed and thus, his appeal concerning the denial of his CR 60.02 motions is not
properly before this Court. We agree with the Commonwealth that Steadman’s
notice of appeal was untimely filed and such is dispositive of the issues brought
forth by Steadman’s CR 60.02 motions.
12
We note that under Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853 (Ky. 1983), successive postconviction motions are prohibited.
13
Steadman filed one CR 60.02 motion asking the court to vacate his order of restitution and one
CR 60.02 motion asking the court to vacate his sentence.
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On July, 22, 2008, the court entered an order denying Steadman’s CR
60.02 motions. Thirteen14 days later on August 4, 2008, Steadman filed an
untimely motion for reconsideration. CR 59.05 only permits such motions to be
filed within ten days of the entry of the final judgment; thereafter, the trial court
loses jurisdiction to proceed with a case. See Commonwealth v. Gaddie, 239
S.W.3d 59, 62 (Ky. 2007).
The trial court’s ruling on October 6, 2008, on Steadman’s motion for
reconsideration was a nullity as it had already lost jurisdiction. Thus, Steadman’s
time for appeal commenced on entry of the final judgment and not on the trial
court’s ruling of October 6, 2008. Thus, the notice of appeal filed on December
18, 2008, was untimely and the appeal from the trial court’s ruling on the CR 60.02
motions is not properly before this Court.15 See RCr 12.04 and CR 73.02.
Accordingly, we dismiss Steadman’s appeal concerning the denial of his CR 60.02
motions.
In light of the aforementioned analysis, we hereby affirm Steadman’s
conviction and sentence, vacate the order of restitution, and dismiss Steadman’s
appeal of the denial of his CR 60.02 motions.
ALL CONCUR.
14
The time limit in CR 59.05 is not expanded by CR 6.05, the “mail rule”. See Arnett v.
Kennard, 580 S.W.2d 495, 496 (Ky. 1979).
15
Steadman’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis was denied by the trial court on December
11, 2008.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Susan Jackson Balliet
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Todd. D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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