KESSLER HOMES, INC. VS. PETZOLD (ADOLPH), ET AL.
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RENDERED: JUNE 18, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001127-MR
AND
NO. 2006-CA-001179-MR
AND
NO. 2006-CA-001928-MR
KESSLER HOMES, INC.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
ON REMAND FROM SUPREME COURT
2008-SC-000106-DG
v.
FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA R. GOODWINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-04138
ADOLPH PETZOLD AND
MARILYN PETZOLD
APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, VACATING IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, DIXON AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.
LAMBERT, JUDGE: This matter comes to us on remand from the Kentucky
Supreme Court for consideration of issues that were presented in an appeal before
this panel, but not addressed due to our previous holding. See Petzold v. Kessler
Homes, Inc., 303 S.W.3d 467 (Ky. 2010). Kessler Homes, Inc. appeals from
judgments entered by the Fayette Circuit Court involving the construction of
Adolph and Marilyn Petzold’s home. The Petzolds cross-appeal from the
dismissal of their Consumer Protection Act claim against Kessler Homes.
This appeal addresses attorney and expert fees, the dismissal of
Kessler’s claim for breach of contract, the trial court’s finding that the Petzolds
were entitled to damages for billing discrepancies, the admission of certain expert
testimony, and whether a home construction contract is exempted under the
Consumer Protection Act. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm all of the trial
court’s orders except for its award of attorney fees. The attorney fee ruling is
vacated, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings.
I. Factual Background
The factual background is as follows:
On August 30, 2000, the Petzolds and Kessler
entered into a contract for the construction of a residence.
Toward the end of the construction project, disputes
arose between the parties concerning the quality of the
work and Kessler's billing practices. In light of the
disagreements, the Petzolds refused to pay Kessler. The
efforts of the parties to resolve their differences failed.
On October 14, 2002, Kessler filed suit against the
Petzolds in Fayette Circuit Court seeking amounts it
believed were owed by the Petzolds under the contract.
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The Petzolds filed a counterclaim asserting various
causes of action relating to fraud, violations of the
applicable building codes, and violations of Kentucky's
Consumer Protection Act. Protracted litigation followed.
The parties waived their respective rights to a jury trial,
and a four-day bench trial was held from August 29,
2005, to September 1, 2005, presided over by Judge
Goodwine.
On February 3, 2006, Judge Goodwine entered an
opinion, order, and judgment. The judgment dismissed
Kessler's claims against the Petzolds; awarded the
Petzolds $21,668.00 upon their claim for building code
violations; awarded the Petzolds $8,466.00 upon a
finding that Kessler breached its duty of good faith and
fair dealing, but dismissed the underlying fraud claim;
dismissed the Petzolds [sic] claims for damages for other
construction defects, for violation of the Consumer
Protection Act, and for the loss of the use and enjoyment
of their residence; and found that the Petzolds were
entitled to recover their attorney fees and expenses,
expert fees and expenses, and costs. Both parties
thereafter filed motions to alter, amend, or vacate. On
May 2, 2006, the trial court entered an order denying
Kessler's motion to amend, sustaining the Petzolds'
motion to amend, and finalizing the award of
$106,024.59 for attorney fees and expenses and
$5,367.60 for expert fees. Both parties appealed the trial
court's rulings to the Court of Appeals.
Id. at 469.
II. Kessler Homes’ Appeal
In its first assignment of error, Kessler Homes contends the trial court
erred in its award of attorney and expert fees to the Petzolds. An award of fees
shall not be set aside unless there is an abuse of discretion. Ford v. Beasley, 148
S.W.3d 808, 813 (Ky. App. 2004) (citing King v. Grecco, 111 S.W.3d 877, 883
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(Ky. App. 2002)). Upon careful review, we affirm the trial court’s award of expert
fees but vacate its award of attorney fees.
Kessler Homes concedes that the trial court was authorized to award
attorney and expert fees to the Petzolds under Kentucky Revised Statues (KRS)
198B.130(1), which establishes a private right of action for persons damaged by
building code violations. The Petzolds alleged, and the trial court found, that
Kessler Homes violated building codes by constructing a defective roof on the
Petzolds’ home. Kessler does not appeal this ruling. Awards under KRS
198B.130(1) “may include damages and the cost of litigation, including reasonable
attorney's fees.” Id.
Kessler Homes maintains, however, that KRS 198B.130(1) should not
be considered on appellate review because “it appears the trial court did not award
attorney or expert fees based upon the building code violation for the roof.”
(Emphasis in original). Upon review of this record, we disagree with Kessler’s
interpretation of the trial court’s order.
While the order did fail to cite specifically to KRS 198B.130(1), the
trial court’s order repeatedly referenced the Petzolds’ motion for attorney fees.
The Petzolds’ motion cited KRS 198B.130 as authority for the trial court’s exercise
of discretion. Moreover, a reasonable reading of the order establishes that the trial
court did consider the damages incurred as a result of the building code violation in
its calculation of the attorney and expert fees award. Accordingly, we reject
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Kessler’s argument that the trial court failed to consider KRS 198B.130(1) in its
ruling.
Kessler Homes argues in the alternative that even if the trial court did
utilize the discretion granted to it under KRS 198B.130(1), the trial court erred in
failing to apportion attorney and expert fees between the various claims and
defenses asserted by the Petzolds. The general rule regarding the apportionment of
fees is set forth in Young v. Vista Homes, Inc., 243 S.W.3d 352 (Ky. App. 2007).
That rule provides as follows:
Generally, attorney fees must be apportioned between
claims for which there is statutory authority for an award
of attorney fees and those for which there is not. But
where all of plaintiff's claims arise from the same nucleus
of operative facts and each claim was “inextricably
interwoven” with the other claims, apportionment of fees
is unnecessary.
Id. at 368.
The trial court did make an apportionment of fees in this case. As to
its apportionment of the expert’s fee, the trial court found as follows:
The Court finds that the major portion of the Petzolds’
construction defect claim related to the roof and its
replacement cost. Therefore, 90% of Pasha’s fees will be
awarded.
The expert in this case was Sasan Pasha, a structural engineer who testified
regarding construction defects at the Petzolds’ home. In light of the above finding,
we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s apportionment of Pasha’s fee.
Kessler’s argument to the contrary is without merit.
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Upon review of the trial court’s apportionment of attorney fees,
however, we are unable to determine whether the trial court’s ruling is in
compliance with the guidelines set forth in Young. Accordingly, we must vacate
the trial court’s attorney fee award and remand this matter for specific findings and
conclusions that are consistent with Young.
In support of its order awarding the Petzolds eighty percent (80%) of
their attorney fees, the trial court referenced the Petzolds’ successful defense of the
contract claim and the significant amount of labor and time their counsel utilized in
the review and prosecution of the billing claims. The trial court went on to
conclude that “[i]t would be difficult for any practicing attorney to detail billing
hours to the extent of deciphering which hour was spent on a particular issue,
particularly once that matter proceeded to trial.”
Yet, under Young, practicing attorneys can and must detail the billing
hours spent on issues not arising from the same nucleus of operative facts which
provided grounds for the attorney fee award. Such a requirement, we believe, is
not unduly burdensome since attorneys need not detail hours spent on those issues
which are “inextricably interwoven” with eligible claims. Id. In this case, any
time spent on issues related to the billing practices of Kessler Homes must and can
be apportioned as they do not arise from the operative facts which comprised the
KRS 198B.130 building code violation.
Kessler Homes argues that apportionment in cases such as these must
involve mandatory deductions for every claim or defense that was either
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unsuccessful or not eligible for an award of fees. Thus, if the party claiming
attorney and expert fees asserted ten (10) claims or defenses, but only two (2) were
successful and eligible for fees, then that party would only be entitled to twenty
percent (20%) of their attorney fees.
We reject such an inflexible formulation of the Young apportionment
rule. As set forth in Young, fees generated from any claim arising out of the “same
nucleus of operative facts” need not be apportioned, regardless of whether the
claim was successful or eligible for a fee award. Id. We believe this reasoning
necessarily applies to defenses, also. Accordingly, on remand, we direct the trial
court to make its award based on the differing sets of operative facts and not on the
ratio of claims or defenses deemed “eligible” versus those that are deemed
“ineligible.”
Kessler Homes next contends the trial court erred in dismissing its
complaint for breach of contract. The parties contracted for a high-end custom
built home. The Petzolds agreed to pay the cost of the build, plus a twelve percent
(12%) builder’s fee. Kessler Homes maintained that the total amount owed to it
was $569,725.66, excluding the deck, and that the Petzolds only paid $540,273.80
of that amount. Thus, it sought $29,451.86 in damages for breach of contract.
The Petzolds denied owing Kessler Homes any additional money.
They further contended that the billings rendered by Kessler Homes were so
flawed that they were not obligated to pay any additional money unless Kessler
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Homes could substantiate the amount actually owed on the home. The Petzolds
also filed counterclaims, including several alleged instances of fraudulent billings.
After considering the evidence presented, the trial court determined
that Kessler Homes failed to prove that the actual cost of construction plus the fee
owed to it was in excess of the amount paid by the Petzolds. See Estes v. Grissom,
490 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Ky. 1972) (burden of proof as to amount due under contract
lies with party seeking damages). In making this determination, the trial court
found that the evidence presented by Kessler Homes was not credible or
trustworthy. Findings regarding credibility or trustworthiness are reviewed for
clear error. Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01.
In presenting evidence to support its claim, Kessler Homes failed to
submit any documentation regarding the actual cost of construction, such as
canceled checks or subcontractor invoices. Rather, it only produced internal
“billing records.” These records documented all of the charges that were billed to
the Petzolds by Kessler Homes. After considering the testimony of Mr. and Mrs.
Kessler as to how they generated these “billing records,” the trial court determined
that the “internally generated documents without supporting or corroborating
documentation” were not trustworthy. The trial court was “disturbed by the fact
that it would take an internal bookkeeper in excess of months to reconcile the
books of his or her own company.”
Kessler Homes argues that the trial court’s finding regarding the
trustworthiness of its documentation is clearly erroneous. In support of this
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argument, it contends that it did not introduce “the thousands of invoices from all
of the subcontractors and vendors” because it relied on two “judicial admissions”
made by the Petzolds.
The first alleged admission was a statement made by the Petzolds’
attorney during a pretrial hearing. In addressing the Petzolds’ fraudulent billing
claims, Kessler’s attorney requested that he be given advanced notice of all of the
Petzolds’ specific disputes because his client needed time to research these
disputes prior to trial. The Petzolds’ attorney replied that it was her belief that
such notice had been given. Kessler Homes now argues for the first time on appeal
that this statement should be construed as a complete admission of liability for all
charges made by Kessler Homes that were not specifically disputed by the Petzolds
as fraudulent.
The second alleged judicial admission was set forth in the Petzolds’
answer to Kessler’s complaint. In its complaint, Kessler Homes alleged that the
contract between the parties was “cost plus.” The Petzolds disagreed, alleging in
their answer that the contract between the parties was “fixed price.” The answer
further stated that the Petzolds had paid in excess of this “fixed price” and that all
such sums should be refunded to them. The trial court eventually found in
Kessler’s favor, ruling the contract to be “cost plus.”
The record contains a good faith estimate for the total price for the
home at $571,899.62. However, in its final order the trial found the Petzolds had
only paid a total of $546,573.80. In light of the statements made in the Petzolds’
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original answer to their complaint, Kessler Homes alleges that the Petzolds should
be deemed to have admitted owing at least $25,325.82 on the contract.
The Petzolds counter that Kessler’s arguments are without merit, and
in any event, they are unpreserved since Kessler Homes never presented them to
the trial court. See Regional Jail Authority v. Tackett, 770 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Ky.
1989) (“The Court of Appeals is without authority to review issues not raised in or
decided by the trial court.”). For the reasons set forth herein, we agree on both
fronts.
A judicial admission is “a formal act done in the course of judicial
proceedings which waives or dispenses with the necessity of producing evidence
by the opponent and bars the party himself from disputing it.” Goldsmith v. Allied
Bldg. Components, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 378, 380 (Ky. 1992) (citing Sutherland v.
Davis, 286 Ky. 743, 151 S.W.2d 1021 (1941)). Judicial admissions are to be
“narrowly construed . . . in light of all conditions and circumstances proven in the
case.” Reece v. Dixie Warehouse and Cartage Co., 188 S.W.3d 440, 448 (Ky.
App. 2006) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
As to the first alleged admission, it is obvious from this record that the
statement made by the Petzolds’ attorney at the pretrial hearing in no way
constituted a deliberate or unequivocal waiver of Kessler’s burden to produce
evidence demonstrating the amount due under the contract. See George M. Eady
Co. v. Stevenson, 550 S.W.2d 473, 473-474 (Ky. 1977). Kessler’s protestations to
the contrary seem disingenuous, at best, since it never mentioned the alleged
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admission at trial. If Kessler Homes truly believed the Petzolds had admitted
partial liability, it would have simply moved for a directed verdict as to the
amounts not specifically disputed by the Petzolds. It did not do this and, thus, we
reject Kessler’s argument as being unpreserved and without merit.
The second alleged admission is also unpreserved and without merit.
Once the contract was ruled “cost-plus,” it became Kessler’s burden to establish a
prima facie case of its actual costs of construction. See Estes v. Grissom, 490
S.W.2d at 493; H.C. Whitmer Co. v. Richardson, 271 Ky. 112, 111 S.W.2d 577,
579 (1937) (“When the company established its account and the balance due, the
burden then shifted to defendants to establish payment, satisfaction, or that the
account was incorrect”). The fact that the Petzolds initially defended the suit under
a “fixed price” theory of the case does not constitute a waiver of Kessler’s burden.
Kessler Homes next argues that their billing records were sufficient to
establish a prima facie claim of breach of contract. The trial court specifically
found that such a prima facie case was not made due to the untrustworthiness of
the documentation submitted by Kessler Homes. Upon review of this record, we
discern no reversible error.
In addition to Kessler’s refusal to produce any evidence to corroborate
the “billing records” submitted at trial, the trial court found that many of Kessler’s
billings were either incorrect or altered. The unreliability of Kessler’s internal
records was further demonstrated by numerous instances in which two different
versions of the same billing invoice were presented at trial. Kessler Homes
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admitted billing the Petzolds for many costs that had never actually been incurred.
When asked to explain the discrepancies, Kessler’s officers presented inconsistent
and contradictory testimony. Upon consideration of the totality of this evidence,
we agree with the trial court that Kessler’s internal billing records were not
sufficient to meet its burden in this case. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s
determination that Kessler Homes failed to produce a prima facie claim of breach
of contract.
In its final argument addressing this issue, Kessler Homes contends
that it “presented substantial evidence showing that the deck was a separate fixed
price contract and that the Petzolds did not pay the full amount owed on the deck.”
The trial court found that “[n]o evidence was presented that there was ever a
meeting of the minds between the parties to construct the Petzolds’ deck for a predetermined amount of money.” Kessler’s officers maintained that the contract was
oral. The trial court rejected this testimony, choosing to believe the testimony of
the Petzolds. They claimed that deck construction was simply an extension of the
original contract. Because Kessler Homes failed to present a prima facie case
establishing a breach of the original contract, the trial court ruled that no damages
were due to Kessler Homes for the construction of the deck. We discern no
reversible error in the trial court’s determination of this issue.
In its next assignment of error, Kessler Homes argues that the trial
court erred in its award of $8,466.00 in compensatory damages for breach of its
duty of good faith and fair dealing. We review a trial court’s calculation of
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damages for clear error. See Smith v. Carbide and Chemicals Corp., 226 S.W.3d
52, 57 (Ky. 2007) (calculation of damages is an issue of fact).
The trial court’s award was based on evidence presented by the
Petzolds that they had been overcharged for several cost items related to the
construction of their home. Kessler Homes does not appeal the trial court’s finding
that it overcharged the Petzolds for certain items. Rather, Kessler Homes argues
that the Petzolds failed to prove that damages were incurred from these
overcharges.
The Petzolds conceded that they did not pay for all of the amounts
billed to them. Yet, upon review of the trial court’s order, we agree with the
Petzolds that the trial court set forth sufficient findings determining that the
Petzolds did pay Kessler Homes for these overcharged items. Kessler Homes fails
to set forth anything of a specific nature which would substantially undermine
these findings. Accordingly, we discern no clear error in the trial court’s
calculation and award of compensatory damages to the Petzolds for the
overpayment of several cost items.
In its final argument, Kessler Homes contends the trial court abused
its discretion in admitting certain testimony of the Petzolds’ expert witness, Sasan
Pasha. See Clark v. Commonwealth, 223 S.W.3d 90, 95 (Ky. 2007) (trial court’s
decision to admit evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion). Pasha was a
structural engineer with twenty-one years of experience. Kessler Homes stipulated
that Pasha was qualified to testify as an expert regarding the Petzolds’ roof.
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In giving his expert testimony, Pasha opined that the Petzolds’ roof
was defective and in violation of the building code. He further opined that it
would cost $21,668.00 to replace the roof. Kessler Homes objected to the
testimony concerning roof replacement cost, arguing that Pasha’s opinion was
derived from inadmissible hearsay. Specifically, Pasha considered estimates from
two different roofing companies when formulating his opinion.
The Petzolds cited to Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 703(a),
which reads as follows:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an
expert bases an opinion or inference may be those
perceived by or made known to the expert at or before
the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence.
Id. Because Pasha testified that he customarily consults with service providers
regarding the cost of implementing various components of his structural
engineering recommendations, the trial court overruled the objection rendered by
Kessler Homes.
On appeal, Kessler Homes relies upon the unpublished case of
Hudson v. Anthony, 2004 WL 2984836 (Ky. App. 2004), to support its argument.
In Hudson, this Court held that a realtor was not qualified to testify as to the
amount of damages sustained to a home because “there was no evidence that [the
realtor] had experience in inspecting and estimating damages caused by faulty
construction.” Id. at *3. Likewise, Kessler Homes contends that Pasha, a
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structural engineer, was not qualified to testify as to the cost of replacing a roof.
Rather, he was only qualified to testify as to whether the roof was defective or not.
The Petzolds counter that Kessler Homes never challenged Pasha’s
qualifications regarding his expertise or experience in estimating replacement
costs. Rather, they only argued that use of the roofing estimates was hearsay. We
agree that Kessler’s argument regarding Pasha’s qualifications is unpreserved.
Lawrence v. Risen, 598 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Ky. App. 1980) (“An issue not timely
raised before the circuit court cannot be considered as a new argument before this
Court.”). Therefore, we will not address it.
Kessler next argues that Pasha’s opinion should be excluded because
it was based on inadmissible hearsay. In explaining how he derived his opinion
regarding replacement cost, Pasha stated that he consulted with two roofing
contractors and then averaged their estimates. He testified that he frequently
estimates replacement costs. Sometimes the estimates are derived “in-house” and
other times they are derived after consultation with third-party service providers.
Pasha maintained that the roofing estimates were only used to help him formulate
his own opinion.
Kessler Homes contends that Pasha relied too heavily on the opinion
of the roofing contractors. Because of this, it maintains that his opinion should
have been deemed inadmissible because it was simply a backhanded way of
introducing the inadmissible hearsay of the roofing contractors. In light of Pasha’s
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testimony that he customarily relied on these types of consultations in his
profession, we disagree.
KRS 703(a) specifically provides that the “facts or data in the
particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion . . . need not be admissible
in evidence.” “Thus when the expert witness has consulted numerous sources, and
uses . . . his own professional knowledge and experience, to arrive at his opinion,
that opinion is regarded as evidence in its own right and not as hearsay in
disguise.” Buckler v. Commonwealth, 541 S.W.2d 935, 940 (Ky. 1976) (quoting
U.S. v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir. 1971)); see also Baraka v.
Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 313, 315 (Ky. 2006) (an expert’s underlying factual
assumptions are properly left for scrutiny during cross-examination); Brown v.
Commonwealth, 934 S.W.2d 242, 247 (Ky. 1996) (“[A]n expert may testify as to
what a third party said as long as that expert customarily relies upon this type of
information in the practice of his or her profession.”).
Pasha met the standards set forth above. He consulted more than one
source and then utilized his professional knowledge and experience to derive an
opinion regarding roof replacement cost. Kessler Homes was not precluded from
substantive cross-examination as Pasha was available and did testify regarding the
basis of his opinion. Any inadequacies exposed from this cross-examination
properly affected the weight of his testimony and not its admissibility.
Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s admission of
Pasha’s opinion regarding cost replacement.
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In its final argument, Kessler Homes contends that Pasha’s opinion
does not assist the trier of fact because “any person can call two roofing companies
and obtain estimates and then average the estimates.” As set forth above, Pasha
did more than just telephone roofing companies. He also used his professional
expertise and experience to review and analyze the estimates for the purpose of
formulating his own opinion. We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
determination that Pasha’s opinion was of assistance to it. See KRE 702 (expert
opinion admissible if it will assist trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue); Farmland Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 36 S.W.3d 368, 378
(Ky. 2000) (“Application of KRE 702 is addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court.”).
III. Petzolds’ Cross-appeal
In their cross-appeal, the Petzolds argue that the trial court erred as a
matter of law in dismissing their Consumer Protection Act claim. See KRS
367.110 et seq. Upon careful review of the pertinent caselaw, we must affirm the
trial court’s ruling.
The trial court determined that the holding set forth in Craig v. Keene,
32 S.W.3d 90 (Ky. App. 2000), was preclusive to the Petzolds’ claim. In Craig v.
Keene, this Court held that parties engaged in “single real estate transactions” were
exempt from the Consumer Protection Act. Id. at 91.
The Petzolds argue that hiring a general contractor to oversee the
building of a home is not a real estate transaction. We tend to agree since no
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transfer of real estate or other tangible structure occurred in this case.1 When there
is nothing tangible to inspect prior to the consummation of a sale, it is unrealistic
and inequitable to apply the doctrine of caveat emptor (the buyer beware). See
Crawley v. Terhune, 437 S.W.2d 743, 745 (Ky. 1969) (creating exception to
caveat emptor rule for the sale of new dwellings by builders).
The contract in this case involved only the prospective services of a
building contractor. This type of transaction seems expressly encompassed within
KRS 367.220(1). This statute states as follows:
Any person who purchases or leases goods or services
primarily for personal, family or household purposes and
thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or
property, real or personal, as a result of the use or
employment by another person of a method, act or
practice declared unlawful by KRS 367.170, may bring
an action under [this Act] . . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
However, as written, the Craig case is quite broad in scope and
specifically involved a contract for home construction services. 32 S.W.3d at 91.
A fair reading of the Craig case therefore mandates that the term “real estate
transactions” shall include any and all contracts for home construction services.
Id. at 92. It has been ten (10) years since this Court’s opinion was rendered and the
legislature has not seen fit to remedy this “loophole” in the Consumer Protection
Act. See Craig, 32 S.W.3d at 92 (Combs, J., concurring). Accordingly, we hold
1
The Petzolds owned the real property prior to contracting with Kessler Homes.
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that the trial court did not err as a matter of law when it ruled that our holding in
Craig v. Keene barred the Petzolds’ claim under the Consumer Protection Act.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, we hereby affirm the judgments
entered against Kessler Homes by the Fayette Circuit Court involving the
construction of Adolph and Marilyn Petzold’s home except for the court’s award
of attorney fees. That order is hereby vacated, and the matter is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. As for the Petzolds’ cross-appeal,
we hereby affirm the trial court’s dismissal of their claim under the Consumer
Protection Act.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/
CROSS-APPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES/
CROSS-APPELLANTS:
Albert F. Grasch, Jr.
Elizabeth K. Mitchell
Lexington, Kentucky
Lori B. Shelburne
Lexington, Kentucky
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