LAWYERS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF KENTUCKY VS. STEWART (PAUL)
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 20, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000114-MR
LAWYERS MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF KENTUCKY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KNOX CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN KNOX MILLS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00320
PAUL STEWART
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: NICKELL AND WINE, JUDGES; HARRIS, SENIOR JUDGE.
WINE, JUDGE: Lawyers Mutual Insurance Company of Kentucky (“Lawyers
Mutual”) appeals a final order of the Knox Circuit Court denying its motion for
enforcement of a supersedeas bond against the surety thereon. The issue presented
is whether a surety upon a supersedeas bond can escape liability thereon without
further order of the court when its principal purpose has been extinguished. For
the reasons set forth herein, we find that a surety cannot be bound when a
supersedeas bond fails to stay execution of a judgment.
Background
On December 23, 2003, Jeffrey Stewart obtained a loan from First
National Bank & Trust of London (“First National”) in the principal amount of
$83,604.00. He executed a promissory note (the “note”) wherein he promised to
repay said amount with interest by June 23, 2004. The note was secured by a real
estate mortgage encumbering certain real property in Knox county (the “subject
property”) owned by Jeffrey Stewart and his wife, Amy Stewart, (hereinafter
“Jeffrey” and “Amy,” respectively). Although only Jeffrey signed the note, both
Jeffrey and Amy executed the real estate mortgage.
Thereafter, Jeffrey failed to repay the amount due under the note, and
First National commenced an action on July 5, 2007, to enforce the mortgage.
Jeffrey was served on July 12, 2007 and Amy was served by warning order
attorney on October 11, 2007. First National then assigned its mortgage interest to
Lawyers Mutual by an assignment of mortgage dated September 28, 2007. On or
about December 28, 2007, Jeffrey and Amy filed an answer, generally denying the
allegations in the complaint. On January 4, 2008, Lawyers Mutual was substituted
as plaintiff in the action. Also on January 4, 2008, the court entered a Default
Judgment and Order of Sale against Jeffrey and Amy in the amount of $89,486.58,
plus interest and costs associated with judicial sale. Subsequently, on February 18,
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2008, sale of the property was scheduled by the Knox County Master
Commissioner for March 7, 2008, at 1:00 p.m.
On January 14, 2008, Jeffrey and Amy filed a timely motion pursuant
to Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 59.05, and alternatively pursuant to
CR 55.02 or 60.02, to set aside the Default Judgment and Order of Sale. They also
moved for leave to file an answer out of time, alleging the mortgage had been paid.
Neither the Stewarts nor their counsel appeared on the scheduled hearing date of
February 1, 2008. As of March 3, 2008, the trial court had not ruled on the motion.
As such, Jeffrey and Amy filed a “Motion to Cancel Sale” on the grounds that the
pending CR 59.05 motion would operate to stay execution of the judgment. The
motion came on for hearing on the morning of March 7, 2008, and was denied by
the Knox Circuit Court, as was the CR 59.05 motion.
Thereafter, later in the morning on March 7, 2008, Jeffrey and Amy
filed a timely notice of appeal.1 Simultaneously therewith, they filed a supersedeas
bond upon which Jeffrey’s father, Paul Stewart (“Paul”), was named as surety to
prevent judicial sale of the subject property pending appeal. Copies of the notice
of appeal and supersedeas bond were personally delivered to the Master
Commissioner on the day of sale.
Although there was no formal order of the trial court, and although
CR 62.03 states that a supersedeas bond shall be effective from the moment it is
“approved by the court or clerk”, the judicial sale proceeded on March 7, 2008.
1
This appeal was later dismissed upon the request of the appellants thereto, Jeffrey and Amy Stewart.
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The notice of appeal and supersedeas bond were delivered to the Master
Commissioner more than an hour-and-a-half prior to the sale. The Master
Commissioner contacted the then-presiding judge (Honorable Judge Messer, now
retired), who instructed the Master Commissioner to proceed with the sale and
disregard the supersedeas bond.2 The subject property was then sold at judicial
sale and, as is often the case, failed to garner the amount due and owing under the
note. Indeed, the high bid for the property was only $1,000.00.
On March 8, 2008, the morning after the sale, Paul, Jeffrey and Amy
filed a written “Withdrawal of Supersedeas Bond” that stated as follows:
1. The judicial sale of the property that is the subject of
this action (consisting of Lot Number 62 of Unit 2 of
Block A of the Stephen Trace Subdivision in Knox
County, Kentucky) was scheduled at 1:00 p.m. on March
7, 2008.
2. We filed the supersedeas bond at 11:12 a.m. on the
same date to prevent the judicial sale of said property.
3. Notwithstanding the timely filing of the supersedeas
bond, the Court directed the master commissioner Paul
Baker to disregard the bond and sell the property
anyway.
4. The Court having disregarded the supersedeas bond,
the purpose for filing the bond is now moot and we
hereby WITHDRAW the bond and same is null and void
and shall have no further effect.
2
Judge Messer apparently instructed the foreclosure sale to commence despite the supersedeas bond on
the grounds that the bond was ineffective to terminate the sale because a final and appealable order had
not been entered at that time. However, the court had entered a default judgment and order of sale against
the appellee more than two months prior, and the CR 59 motion had been denied by the court that
morning. As such, we are at a loss for why the court believed there had been no final and appealable
order. Moreover, if the CR 59.05 motion had not been denied—and thus was not final at the time— then
it would have operated as a stay itself. Regardless, the question was not one for the trial court, as a
supersedeas is binding and effective until the appellate court (rather than the trial court) decides whether
the appeal has been properly prosecuted. See, Daugherty v. Ringo, 1 Ky.L.Rptr 272, 1880 WL 7377
(1880).
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Also on that date, Jeffrey assigned his father Paul his statutory right of redemption.
Lawyers Mutual did not object to the withdrawal of the bond at that time.3
On March 18, 2008, Lawyers Mutual filed objections/exceptions to
the Commissioner’s sale, citing that there was an inadequate appraisal, that the
supersedeas bond should have stayed enforcement of the judgment, and that the
sale brought such an inadequate price as to “shock the conscience” of the court.
Thereafter, on April 3, 2008, Jeffrey filed a response to Lawyers Mutual’s
exceptions to the Commissioner’s sale. Additionally, Paul filed a notice of his
exercise of the statutory right of redemption (under KRS 426.530), tendering the
amount of $1,005.19 therewith (representing the amount of sale plus 10% interest
thereon from the date of sale).
On May 8, 2008, the trial court entered an order denying Lawyers
Mutual’s exceptions to the sale, finding that the appraisal was not inadequate, that
Lawyers Mutual inexplicably failed to have a representative present to represent its
interest, that there were no other irregularities affecting the sale, and that price
alone is not sufficient grounds for setting aside a judicial sale. On June 6, 2008,
the trial court entered an order directing the Master Commissioner to execute a
deed to Paul based upon his exercise of the statutory right of redemption.
On October 15, 2008, Lawyers Mutual filed a “Motion for Judgment
Against Surety” seeking to hold Paul liable for the deficiency after the sale as
surety on the supersedeas bond filed on March 7, 2008. Jeffrey filed a response
3
Jeffrey transferred his right of redemption to Paul pursuant to KRS 426.530.
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noting that Paul was not, and had never been, a party to the action,4 that he had not
been served at his proper address, and that the principal purpose of the supersedeas
bond was extinguished when the sale was not stayed pursuant to CR 62.03.
Lawyers Mutual’s motion was withdrawn for failure to serve Paul at his proper
address. Said motion was re-filed on December 5, 2008. On January 6, 2009, the
trial court (Honorable John Knox Mills now presiding) denied Lawyers Mutual’s
motion, stating as follows:
The Court finds and concludes that it would be unfair and
inequitable, and constitute manifest injustice, to enforce
the supersedeas bond against the surety, Paul Stewart, on
this record.
Lawyers Mutual now appeals this order.
Analysis
The sole question presented on review is whether a surety on a
supersedeas bond can voluntarily withdraw such bond without an order of the court
where the principal purpose of the bond has been extinguished, or restated,
whether a supersedeas bond can be enforced against the surety where the bond fails
to stay execution of the judgment. Lawyers Mutual argues that Paul is bound as
surety because a surety is obligated to pay under a supersedeas bond whenever the
appellate court affirms the trial court or dismisses the action. For the following
4
However, under CR 73.07, Paul Stewart, by entering into a supersedeas bond as surety, submitted to the
jurisdiction of the Knox Circuit Court and effectively agreed that his liability could be enforced by
motion without the necessity of an independent action.
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reasons, we must disagree with Lawyers Mutual and, therefore, affirm the trial
court.
Lawyers Mutual argues that the supersedeas bond does not actually
state the purported purpose Paul, Jeffrey and Amy recited in the Withdrawal of
Supersedeas Bond, namely: “to prevent the judicial sale of [the subject] property.”
However, the purpose of any supersedeas bond is always to stay execution of a
judgment pending appeal. CR 62.03, CR 73.04. Indeed, that is its basic function.
Id. See also, 30 AM.JUR.2D Executions and Enforcement of Judgments §36 (2005).
(The sole purpose of a supersedeas bond “is to preserve the status quo pending
appeal so that the appellant may reap the benefit of a potentially meritorious
appeal.”).
Here, the supersedeas bond did not stay execution of the judgment and
the subject property was sold at Commissioner’s sale. As the supersedeas bond
failed to stay execution of the judgment, the surety was deprived of the benefit of
his bargain. See, e.g., Thompson v. Henson, 307 Ky. 61, 209 S.W.2d 849 (1948)
(“Quid pro quo” is the veritable mainspring of legal contract). Moreover, it is a
long-standing principle under the law of suretyship that “any change whatever in
the contract for the performance of which the guarantor is liable . . . discharges the
guarantor from liability.” United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. United States,
191 U.S. 416, 423, 24 S.Ct. 142, 48 L.Ed. 242 (1903).
It is irrelevant for the purpose of our decision today that Lawyers
Mutual did not receive an amount sufficient at foreclosure sale to satisfy the note.
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The purpose of real estate mortgages is to allow lenders the option of foreclosure
to satisfy indebtedness on promissory notes in the event of default. However, the
courts can be no guarantor to the holders of mortgages or other security interests
that they will be able to recoup the amount of indebtedness therefrom. We note
that Lawyers Mutual still holds a judgment against Jeffrey. In situations where a
lender is left with an unsecured debt, a lender may resort to such other methods as
prescribed by law for the enforcement of judgments (including garnishment). See,
e.g. KRS 425.501, et. seq. and KRS 427.005 et. seq. Although the money raised at
judicial sale was insufficient to satisfy the amount due and owing under the note,
Lawyers Mutual is left only with the methods the law will allow to collect its now
unsecured debt.
A surety cannot be bound by a supersedeas bond where its principal
purpose –to stay execution of the judgment—is thwarted. Surely, when this
occurs, the bond is unenforceable. See, e.g., 72 C.J.S. Principal and Surety
§120(b) (“A surety on a forthcoming bond is released if the creditor seizes and
sells the property for which the bond was given.”). While the surety to a
supersedeas bond agrees to pay the judgment amount in the event the appeal is
unsuccessful or is dismissed by the appellate court, a surety cannot be bound
where there is a complete lack of performance of the underlying contract (i.e.
forbearance of execution pending appeal). Indeed, it appears that an underlying
condition to any supersedeas bond is that the judgment be stayed pending appeal.
See, e.g., Horn v. Ranier, 560 S.W.2d 233, 235 (Ky.App. 1977) (If it is apparent
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“from the nature of the contract and the surrounding circumstances [that] the
parties from the beginning must have known that it could not be fulfilled unless . . .
some particular thing or condition of things exist[ed] . . . and such ... existence as
the foundation of what was to be done . . . the contract is to be construed as subject
to an implied condition.”). Accordingly, we hold that when there has been an
execution of judgment in disregard of a supersedeas bond, it would be
unconscionable, indeed unjust and inequitable, to enforce it as against the surety.5
Thus, we affirm the order of the Knox Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLEE:
Darrell L. Saunders
Corbin, Kentucky
Ralph W. Hoskins
Corbin, Kentucky
5
We note that had Lawyers Mutual appealed the validity of the sale based upon the fact that the trial
court did not have discretion to disregard the supersedeas bond, the result may have been different.
However, Lawyers Mutual did not appeal the trial court’s denial of its motion to set aside the sale, but
instead appealed the trial court’s denial of their motion for judgment against the surety.
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