WILDCAT PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, LLC VS. REUSS (STEPHANIE), ET AL.
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 11, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-002290-MR
WILDCAT PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, LLC
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KIMBERLY N. BUNNELL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-05238
STEPHANIE REUSS; MARY MARTHA
MCGEEHAN; LINDSAY FRANZEN; JENNA
STEVENS; CARL THOMAS FRANZEN;
TOM REUSS; AND DOUG GRAFF
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; MOORE, JUDGE; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
LAMBERT, SENIOR JUDGE: Wildcat Property Management, LLC appeals from
the November 13, 2008, order of the Fayette Circuit Court dismissing its action
1
Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
against Stephanie Reuss, Carl Thomas Franzen, Lindsay Franzen, Doug Graff,
Mary Martha McGeehan, Tom Reuss, and Jenna Stevens for lack of prosecution.
For failure of the trial court to support its dismissal with appropriate findings, we
reverse and remand.
In December 2005, Wildcat filed a civil action against appellees,
seeking damages for unpaid rent.2 A few months later, Wildcat moved for a trial
date. Prior to trial, the parties were ordered to attend a pretrial conference, and
mediation was required prior to the date of the scheduled pretrial conference.
Thereafter, Wildcat’s original counsel, John Schrader, was elected Family Court
Judge for the Fayette Circuit Court. However, no motion to withdraw as counsel
or to substitute new counsel appears in the record.
On January 25, 2008, notice was given to the parties to show cause
why the action should not be dismissed for the reason that no steps had been taken
in the previous year. A month later, an order was entered allowing the action to
remain on the docket for 60 days. On April 24, 2008, Wildcat filed a motion for an
extension of time and a motion for Kathryn Walton to withdraw as counsel. The
trial court allowed Ms. Walton to withdraw and Wildcat was given 30 days to
secure counsel and resolve the matter. On June 2, 2008, Bobby Wombles filed his
notice of appearance as counsel for Wildcat, and a few months later, a notice of
substitution of counsel Charles Ward was filed by Wildcat. Finally, on October
2
The original defendants in the action were Stephanie Ruess, Mary Martha McGeehan, Lindsay
Franzen, and Jenna Stevens. On February 7, 2006, Wildcat was given leave to file an amended
complaint and it did, including Carl Thomas Franzen, Tom Reuss, and Doug Graff as defendants.
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24, 2008, Appellee, Lindsey Franzen, filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice due
to the lack of prosecution by Wildcat. Wildcat filed a response, the motion was
heard, and on November 13, 2008, the court entered an order dismissing the case
with prejudice. This appeal followed.
The first issue is whether the underlying action was dismissed
pursuant to CR3 41.02, CR 77.02, or Fayette Local Rule 25. The uncertainty arises
from the language of Franzen’s motion, which states “the Defendant . . . pursuant
to Rule 25 of the Fayette Circuit Court Rules, moves the Court for an Order of
Dismissal, with prejudice, due to the lack of prosecution by the Plaintiff.”
(Emphasis added). The uncertainty is amplified by the trial court’s failure to
identify which rule it relied on for dismissal. Wildcat argues that the trial court
was without legal authority to dismiss the underlying action with prejudice for lack
of prosecution pursuant to CR 77.02(2) and/or Local Rule 25, because both of
those rules provide only for dismissal without prejudice.
Fayette Local Rule 25 states:
[w]hen any action has remained on the Civil Docket for
one year without any step being taken indicating an
intention to prosecute, the action may be dismissed for
want of prosecution on motion of either party or on the
Court’s own motion.
Rule 25 is virtually the same as CR 77.02(2), which states:
[a]t least once each year trial courts shall review all
pending actions on their dockets. Notice shall be given
3
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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to each attorney of record of every case in which no
pretrial step has been taken within the last year, that the
case will be dismissed in thirty days for want of
prosecution except for good cause shown. The court
shall enter an order dismissing without prejudice each
case in which no answer or an insufficient answer to the
notice is made.
Commonly referred to as “housekeeping rules,” CR 77.02, and its local
counterpart, Fayette Local Rule 25, are a means to expedite the removal of
unprosecuted cases from court dockets. Construing CR 77.02(2), this Court has
said:
Under the plain language of the rule, the trial court is
required once a year to review its cases and dismiss those
in which no pretrial steps have been taken in the
preceding year unless good cause is shown. Notably,
however, the rule provides that cases shall be dismissed
“without prejudice.”
Manning v. Wilkinson, 264 S.W.3d 620, 622-23 (Ky. App. 2007) (citation
omitted). While Fayette Local Rule 25 is silent as to whether a dismissal under its
auspices is with or without prejudice, a local rule would be constitutionally infirm
if it went beyond a parallel rule in the Rules of Civil Procedure. Kentucky
Constitution § 116. Local rules must be in conformity with rules of court adopted
by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority. Accordingly, any
dismissal under Fayette Local Rule 25 would be without prejudice.
Where dismissal with prejudice is sought, CR 41.02 is the procedural
vehicle. Unlike CR 77.02(2), which allows for dismissal of a case sua sponte, CR
41.02 requires a motion. CR 41.02 provides, in relevant part:
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(1) For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply
with these rules or any order of the court, a defendant
may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim
against him.
....
(3) Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise
specifies, a dismissal under this Rule, and any dismissal
not provided for in Rule 41, other than a dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, for want of
prosecution under Rule 77.02(2), or for failure to join a
party under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication upon the
merits.
There is a great distinction in purpose and effect between the docketclearing housekeeping rules discussed hereinabove and an adjudicatory dismissal
pursuant to CR 41.02. In this case, although the motion to dismiss relied on Local
Rule 25, the order of dismissal was with prejudice and was, of necessity, pursuant
to CR 41.02. As such, the particular requirements of decisional law are applicable.
A leading case on this issue is Ward v. Housman, 809 S.W.2d 717 (Ky. App.
1991), which sets forth six nonexclusive factors for a trial court to consider and
apply as appropriate and where applicable prior to dismissal with prejudice under
CR 41.02. The Ward factors are “1) the extent of the party’s personal
responsibility; 2) the history of dilatoriness; 3) whether the attorney’s conduct was
willful and in bad faith; 4) meritoriousness of the claim; 5) prejudice to the other
party, and 6) alternative sanctions.” Id. at 719 (citing Scarborough v. Eubanks,
747 F.2d 871 (3rd Cir. 1984)). It should be understood that the Ward factors are
available for trial court consideration, but that other relevant factors should also be
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considered. A reviewing court must be informed of the trial court’s thinking for
review to be meaningful. However, not every Ward factor need be considered in
every case, nor is a non-enumerated factor unavailable for the court’s
consideration. The Supreme Court of Kentucky has recently addressed the issue of
involuntary dismissal pursuant to CR 41.02 in Jaroszewski v. Flege, ___ S.W.3d
___, 2009 WL 3517687 (Ky. 2009). Its decision is also instructive as to the proper
manner for addressing this issue.
“Dismissals for lack of prosecution pursuant to CR 41.02 and CR
77.02 are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.” Toler v. Rapid
American, 190 S.W.3d 348, 351 (Ky. App. 2006). “The test for abuse of discretion
is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or
unsupported by sound legal principles.” Sexton v. Sexton, 125 S.W.3d 258, 272
(Ky. 2004) (quoting Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999)).
This Court has held that the involuntary dismissal of a case with prejudice “should
be resorted to only in the most extreme cases,” and a reviewing court must
“carefully scrutinize the trial court’s exercise of discretion in doing so.” Polk v.
Wimsatt, 689 S.W.2d 363, 364-65 (Ky. App. 1985). Meaningful review of this
case is impossible because we do not know why the trial court decided as it did.
Accordingly, we hold that the Fayette Circuit Court failed to properly exercise its
discretion by failing to make the required findings.
Wildcat argues that even if the trial court had examined the Ward
factors, dismissal with prejudice would have been an abuse of discretion.
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However, because the trial court has not yet had an opportunity to reconsider its
ruling after a thorough analysis of all relevant factors, this argument is premature.
For the reasons stated above, the November 13, 2008, Order of
Dismissal of the Fayette Circuit Court is reversed and remanded for further
consistent proceedings.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
John N. Billings
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, LINDSAY
FRANZEN:
Cheryl H. Anderson
Lexington, Kentucky
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