FINCK (MICHAEL STEPHEN) VS. FINCK (WILMA MARLENE)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: NOVEMBER 20, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-002023-MR
MICHAEL STEPHEN FINCK
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS B. MERRILL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-FC-003618
WILMA MARLENE FINCK
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, MOORE, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
VANMETER, JUDGE: Michael S. Finck appeals from an order entered by the
Jefferson Circuit Court, Family Division, regarding his child support obligation.
We affirm.
Michael and appellee Wilma Marlene Finck divorced in 1997. The
parties were awarded joint custody of their two sons, who initially spent equal time
with each parent. In 2003 and 2005 the court entered child support orders
pertaining to the older child, who at that time was living exclusively with Wilma.
However, the court declined to enter a support order pertaining to the younger
child, who continued to split his time between the parties.
In January 2008, Wilma filed a motion seeking child support for the
younger child,1 claiming that he primarily resided with her. Michael disagreed,
asserting that the child continued to divide his time between the parties. After a
hearing the trial court concluded, for purposes of the motion, that the younger child
in fact still split his time between the parties. The trial court found, and the parties
do not dispute, that Wilma earned $40,000 per year or $3333.33 per month.
Michael, who derived his income through owning and renting real estate, provided
the court with a copy of his 2006 federal income tax return which reflected a gross
annual income of $55,096 after the deduction of losses, depreciation and other
expenses. However, the court rejected Michael’s deduction of depreciation costs
for purposes of calculating child support, noting that in a January 2008 real estate
loan application, Michael
reported gross monthly income in the amount of
$9,330.38 per month, and said document was filed “not
jointly” indicating, further, that the gross monthly income
reported is purported to be that of [Michael] alone.
Further, [Michael’s] income tax return from 2006 reflects
revenues, profits, etc. which appear to be consistent with
the amount reported on the loan application.
1
At this point the younger child was fifteen years old, while the older child was twenty-one.
-2-
The court concluded that the best evidence of Michael’s income was the $9,330.38
figure used in his “attempt to secure a sizable loan just months prior to this
hearing[.]” The court therefore used that figure when calculating the parties’
relative child support obligations and directing Michael to pay Wilma $497 per
month. This appeal followed.
First, Michael contends that the trial court abused its discretion when
calculating his gross monthly income at $9,330.38. He alleges that although
applicable underwriting guidelines permitted depreciation expenses to be added
back into his income for purposes of qualifying for an FHA loan, KRS2
403.212(2)(c) required the court to deduct depreciation expenses from his income
when calculating child support. We disagree.
KRS 403.212(2)(c) provides in part that for purposes of calculating
child support, gross income should be calculated as
gross receipts minus ordinary and necessary expenses
required for self-employment or business operation.
Straight-line depreciation, using Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) guidelines, shall be the only allowable
method of calculating depreciation expense in
determining gross income. . . . Income and expenses
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be
carefully reviewed to determine an appropriate level of
gross income available to the parent to satisfy a child
support obligation. In most cases, this amount will differ
from a determination of business income for tax
purposes.
Although straight-line depreciation expenses therefore may be deducted when
determining gross income for purposes of calculating child support, we are not
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-3-
persuaded by Michael’s argument that KRS 403.212(2)(c) mandates the deduction
of such expenses. Indeed, the statute expressly cautions the trial court to “carefully
review” evidence of self-employment income and expenses in order to determine a
parent’s available gross income, noting that usually the amount available will
differ from the parent’s business income for tax purposes.
Here, Michael’s 2006 federal tax return shows a total rental income of
$271,375. He spent a total of $173,671 on nonrefundable, out-of-pocket expenses
such as repairs, supplies, taxes, utilities, insurance, mortgage interest, and legal or
professional fees. He then deducted another $42,608 as real estate depreciation
expenses, leaving him with a reportable rental income of $55,096. Other than the
self-reporting provided by his January 2008 loan application, nothing in the record
suggests that Michael’s 2007 income differed significantly from his 2006 income.
Michael admitted below that the applicable FHA underwriting
guidelines allowed depreciation expenses to be added back into his income for
purposes of calculating his loan eligibility. Such provisions support the conclusion
that real estate depreciation expenses may constitute paper losses without reducing
an owner’s actual income. See generally Louise E. Graham, James E. Keller,
Domestic Relations Law § 24:21 (2d ed. 2002). Here, the addition of Michael’s
depreciation expenses to his 2006 reported rental income yields a total of $97,704.
Similarly, the inclusion of depreciation expenses in his January 2008 loan
application yielded a yearly income of $111,964.56. Given the absence of
evidence to show that Michael’s available income was actually lessened by
-4-
reportable real estate depreciation amounts, the trial court did not err by calculating
child support based on total income of $9,330.38 per month or $111,964.56 per
year.
Michael also contends that the trial court erred by finding that his
child support obligation was subject to modification based upon “a material change
in circumstances that is substantial and continuing[,]” as required by KRS
403.213(1). We disagree.
Pursuant to KRS 403.213(2),
[a]pplication of the Kentucky child support guidelines to
the circumstances of the parties at the time of the filing of
a motion or petition for modification of the child support
order which results in equal to or greater than a fifteen
percent (15%) change in the amount of support due per
month shall be rebuttably presumed to be a material
change in circumstances.
As the parties originally agreed to equally share time with the children, neither the
property settlement agreement nor the original final judgment required the
payment of child support. In August 2003, the court awarded child support only as
to the older child, as he was living exclusively with Wilma. According to the
record, in 2003 Wilma grossed $36,756 per year, while Michael grossed $55,344
per year.
As discussed above, in May 2008 the trial court found that Wilma
earned $40,000 per year, while Michael earned $111,964.56 per year. Thus, while
Wilma’s yearly income increased by several thousand dollars between 2003 and
2008, Michael’s income more than doubled in the same time period. As a result,
-5-
according to the child support guidelines set out in KRS 403.212, the parties’ total
monthly child support obligation was $1,123, of which Michael’s share was $896.
Offsetting Michael’s obligation against Wilma’s share of $313, the court correctly
calculated that Michael was obligated to pay Wilma child support of $497 per
month for the younger child. KRS 403.212(6).
The record shows that in 2003, the parties’ respective child support
obligations were totally offset against one another insofar as the younger child was
concerned. However, Michael was ordered to pay child support at the rate of $628
per month for the older child, who was living exclusively with Wilma. For
purposes of this appeal, whether we calculate Michael’s 2003 monthly child
support obligation for the younger child at $0, at $628, or at any point in between,
a 15% increase in the 2003 obligation amounts to considerably less than the 2008
calculation of Michael’s child support obligation for the younger child. Thus,
Michael’s claim that the evidence did not support a finding of a substantial,
continuing and material change in circumstances, reflected by a 15% change in the
amount of child support due each month, lacks merit.
The order of the Jefferson Circuit Court, Family Division, is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
-6-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Paul V. Hibberd
Louisville, Kentucky
Harold L. Storment
Louisville, Kentucky
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.