NELSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION () VS. FORTE (GENE A.), ET AL.
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 9, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001958-MR
NELSON COUNTY BOARD
OF EDUCATION
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM NELSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES C. SIMMS III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-00625
GENE A. FORTE, INDIVIDUALLY
AND AS ADMINISTRATOR OF
THE ESTATE OF CAROLE FORTE;
AND THE KENTUCKY BOARD
OF CLAIMS
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: FORMTEXT COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; NICKELL AND TAYLOR,
JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE: Nelson County Board of Education (Board of Education)
brings this appeal from an October 15, 2008, order of the Nelson Circuit Court
which vacated and remanded the Kentucky Board of Claims’ final order dismissing
an action filed by Gene A. Forte, individually and as administrator of the Estate of
Carole Forte (collectively referred to as appellees). We affirm.
Carole Forte was a teacher at Cox Creek Elementary School in Nelson
County, Kentucky. On May 19, 2006, while exiting the school’s parking lot, the
wind blew a gate into Carole’s vehicle. The gate struck Carole in the head, and she
died from her injuries.
On May 16, 2007, appellees filed a tort action in the Nelson Circuit
Court (Action No. 07-CI-00164 consolidated with Action No. 07-CI-00338)
alleging negligence against, inter alios, the Nelson County Board of Education.
The Board of Education raised the defense of immunity and argued that the tort
action should be dismissed. While the tort action was pending in circuit court,
appellees also filed an action with the Board of Claims on April 23, 2008.
Therewith, appellees also filed a “Motion to Hold in Abeyance Pending
Completion of Civil Action in Nelson Circuit Court.” In that motion, appellees
specifically stated:
If it is ultimately determined in the tort civil action
in Nelson Circuit Court that [appellees’] claims are
barred by immunity and/or KRS 342.700, a cause of
action before this Board would then accrue. However, if
it is determined that the tort action is not so barred,
[appellees’] claims would continue through that action,
with no cause of action accruing before the Board.
In response, the Board of Education filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the
statute of limitations had expired and that appellees’ action was time-barred. By
final order entered June 19, 2008, the Board of Claims dismissed appellees’ action.
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It reasoned that the action was time-barred under Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 44.110(1) as having been filed more than one year from the date the action
accrued.
Thereupon, appellees sought review in the Nelson Circuit Court
(Action No. 08-CI-00625). Appellees argued that the Board of Claims improperly
dismissed the action as time-barred under KRS 44.110(1). The circuit court
agreed. The circuit court vacated and remanded the Board of Claims’ final order
dismissing appellees’ claim as time-barred. The circuit court believed the tolling
provision of KRS 413.270 should have been considered by the Board of Claims.
This appeal follows.1
Judicial review of a Board of Claims’ decision is controlled by KRS
44.140. Subsection 5 of KRS 44.140 provides:
On appeal no new evidence may be introduced, except as
to fraud or misconduct of some person engaged in the
hearing before the board. The court sitting without a jury
shall hear the cause upon the record before it, and dispose
of the appeal in a summary manner, being limited to
determining: Whether or not the board acted without or
in excess of its powers; the award was procured by fraud;
the award is not in conformity to the provisions of KRS
44.070 to 44.160; and whether the findings of fact
support the award. The court shall enter its findings on
the order book as a judgment of the court, and such
judgment shall have the same effect and be enforceable
as any other judgment of the court in civil causes.
1
After the notice of appeal was filed in the Court of Appeals, the Nelson Circuit Court entered a
summary judgment in Action No. 07-CI-00164 consolidated with Action No. 07-CI-00338,
dismissing the tort action against the Nelson County Board of Education (Board of Education)
upon the basis of governmental immunity.
-3-
KRS 44.140(5). And, our review of the circuit court’s decision is guided by KRS
44.150 and shall proceed “under the same conditions and under the same practice
as appeals [that] are taken from judgments in civil causes rendered by the Circuit
Court[.]” KRS 44.150. As an appellate court, we review legal issues de novo.
Allen v. Devine, 178 S.W.3d 517 (Ky. App. 2005).
The Board of Education contends that the circuit court erroneously
vacated the final order of the Board of Claims. The Board of Education argues that
appellees’ claim was time-barred under KRS 44.110(1) and that the circuit court
erred by holding otherwise. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we disagree.
Under KRS 44.110(1), an action in the Board of Claims must be filed
within one year from the date the action accrued. In our case, appellees’ action
against the Board of Education “accrued” on May 19, 2006 (the date of Carole’s
accident). The record demonstrates that appellees filed the action against the
Board of Education in the Board of Claims on April 23, 2008. At first glance,
appellees’ action would appear to be untimely filed under the statute of limitations
contained in KRS 44.110(1). However, our inquiry cannot end with KRS
44.110(1). Rather, we must determine whether the tolling provision of KRS
413.270(1) may operate to save appellees’ action in the Board of Claims. Stated
differently, we are faced with the singular legal question of whether KRS 413.270
is applicable to an action filed in the Board of Claims.
-4-
The interpretation of a statute presents a question of law, and our
review proceeds de novo. City of Worthington Hills v. Worthington Fire Prot.
Dist., 140 S.W.3d 584 (Ky. App. 2004). KRS 413.270 reads:
(1) If an action is commenced in due time and in good
faith in any court of this state and the defendants or any
of them make defense, and it is adjudged that the court
has no jurisdiction of the action, the plaintiff or his
representative may, within ninety (90) days from the
time of that judgment, commence a new action in the
proper court. The time between the commencement of
the first and last action shall not be counted in applying
any statute of limitation.
(2) As used in this section, “court” means all courts,
commissions, and boards which are judicial or quasijudicial tribunals authorized by the Constitution or
statutes of the Commonwealth of Kentucky or of the
United States of America.
Under KRS 413.270(1), an action that is timely filed in good faith but later
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction may be refiled in the proper court within ninety
days. KRS 413.270(2) defines “court” as including all “boards” exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial authority as authorized by this Commonwealth’s statutory law.
Here, it is axiomatic that the Board of Claims qualifies as a “board”
within the meaning of KRS 413.270(2). The Board of Claims was created by
legislative enactment and certainly exercises judicial or quasi-judicial authority.
Thus, we hold that the term “court” as used in KRS 413.270(1) is broad enough to
include the Board of Claims. Concomitantly, we also conclude that the tolling
provision of KRS 413.270(1) is applicable to an action filed in the Board of
Claims.
-5-
In the case sub judice, a dismissal of the tort action by the Nelson
Circuit Court upon immunity grounds may certainly be tantamount to a dismissal
for lack of jurisdiction under KRS 413.270, thus arguably triggering the tolling
provision of KRS 413.270(1).2 However, the Board of Claims’ dismissal of the
instant action with prejudice would potentially bar appellees from later refiling an
action in the Board of Claims under the tolling provision of KRS 413.270(1).3 As
such, the circuit court was understandably troubled by the Board of Claims’
dismissal of appellees’ action. We, thus, do not believe the circuit court erred by
vacating and remanding to the Board of Claims. Upon remand to the Board of
Claims, we think the Board of Claims should reconsider its dismissal in light of the
tolling provision of KRS 413.270(1).4
We view any remaining issues raised by the Board of Education as
either moot or without merit.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Nelson Circuit Court is
affirmed.
2
By separate order, this Court granted the Board of Education’s Motion for Leave to File
Additional Papers. These papers are actually a Summary Judgment entered by the Nelson
Circuit Court on August 7, 2009, dismissing the tort action (Action No. 07-CI-00164
consolidated with Action No. 07-CI-00338) against the Board of Education on immunity
grounds.
3
Kentucky Revised Statutes 44.160(2) provides that a “final determination of the [B]oard [of
Claims] shall be given the same res judicata and collateral estoppel effect as any other judicial
determination[.]”
4
Although the circuit court relied upon the Court of Appeals’ opinion in Commonwealth v.
Douglas (Appeal No. 2007-CA-000647-MR), we note that the Supreme Court ordered the
Douglas opinion not to be published by an August 19, 2009, order denying discretionary review
(Action No. 2008-SC-000592-D). We, therefore, do not think it proper to consider it when
reaching the merits of this appeal under Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure 76.28(4)(c).
-6-
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
Charles H. Cassis
Aaron J. Silletto
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLEES:
Larry D. Raikes
Bardstown, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
Aaron J. Silletto
Louisville, Kentucky
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