WAGNER (BRAD) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: NOVEMBER 25, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001813-MR
BRAD WAGNER, A.K.A. LESTER JOE
BRADLEY WAGNER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES L. BOWLING, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00130
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; THOMPSON, JUDGE; HARRIS,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
THOMPSON, JUDGE: Brad Wagner, a.k.a. Lester Joe Bradley Wagner, appeals
from an order of the Bell Circuit Court revoking his conditional discharge. He
alleges that the three-year conditional discharge provision of KRS 532.043,
applicable to sex offenders, does not apply because he was not informed of the
1
Senior Judge William R. Harris sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
provision when he entered his guilty pleas nor was it included in the judgments and
convictions. He further alleges that because he filed an RCr 11.42 motion against
his trial counsel who also represented him at the revocation hearing, the trial court
should have sua sponte held that counsel had a conflict of interest warranting
removal. Based on existing precedent, we reject both contentions.
In 2001, Wagner was charged with numerous crimes, including rape
in the second degree and sodomy in the second degree based upon sexual acts
committed against a thirteen-year-old girl. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Wagner
entered a plea of guilty to various crimes, including the rape and sodomy charges.
On April 26, 2002, the trial court entered its final judgments and convictions and
Wagner was sentenced to a total of seven-years’ imprisonment. No direct appeal
was filed.
In early 2003, Wagner filed a CR 60.02 motion claiming that he was
unaware of the sex offender treatment program requirement for parole eligibility at
the time he entered his plea. His motion was denied and no appeal was filed. In
May 2003, he filed a successive CR 60.02 motion alleging that the trial court failed
to consider probation in his sentencing, which was denied. Subsequently, he filed
an RCr 11.42 motion alleging that counsel was ineffective, which was also denied.
He unsuccessfully appealed both orders to this Court. A third CR 60.02 motion
followed, which was denied. A second RCr 11.42 motion filed in October 2003,
was also denied. Wagner appealed, and this Court affirmed. Subsequently,
Wagner filed a motion for a transcript of the grand jury proceedings that was
-2-
denied and, in a published opinion, this Court affirmed the denial. Wagner v.
Commonwealth, 247 S.W.3d 540, 541 (Ky.App. 2008).
On October 21, 2007, Wagner was released from prison and placed on
three-years’ conditional discharge pursuant to KRS 532.043 which, at the time of
Wagner’s pleas, provided:
(1) In addition to the penalties authorized by law, any
person convicted of, pleading guilty to, or entering an
Alford plea to a felony offense under KRS Chapter 510,
529.100 involving commercial sexual activity, 530.020,
530.064(1)(a), 531.310, or 531.320 shall be subject to a
period of conditional discharge following release from:
(a) Incarceration upon expiration of sentence; or
(b) Completion of parole.
(2) The period of conditional discharge shall be three (3)
years.2
In August 2008, a special supervision report was submitted outlining
twenty-two new arrests that occurred between February 2008 and June 2008. At
his hearing to revoke his conditional discharge, Wagner did not deny the
commission of the offenses but argued that he was not subject to conditional
discharge because he was not informed of the three-year conditional discharge at
his sentencing and the provision was not included in the trial court’s judgments. In
response, the Commonwealth pointed out that when Wagner was released, he was
notified of the unconditional discharge and acknowledged that he had been
conditionally discharged for three years. The trial court found that Wagner was
2
KRS 532.043 now provides for a conditional discharge period of (5) five years.
-3-
sufficiently apprised of his conditional discharge and revoked Wagner’s
conditional discharge.
Wagner contends that the trial court was required to advise him that
he was subject to the three-year conditional discharge provision contained in KRS
532.043 and, had he been so informed, he would not have entered the guilty pleas.
He relies on RCr 11.04 which requires that a judgment of conviction set forth “the
plea, the verdict or findings, the adjudication and sentence . . . .” We disagree.
The basis of Wagner’s argument is that the imposition of the threeyear conditional discharge is discretionary with the trial court and, therefore, does
not apply without its explicit inclusion in the sentence imposed. He cites language
in Purvis v. Commonwealth, 14 S.W.3d 21, 23 (Ky. 2000), wherein the Court
stated that “KRS 532.043 provides for the possibility of an additional three-years’
imprisonment after a convicted defendant has completed his sentence.” A closer
examination of the Court’s language reveals that the “possibility” of an additional
three-years’ imprisonment exists because the defendant may violate the terms of
the conditional discharge, not because its imposition is discretionary.
Moreover, we need only cite the pertinent language of this Court in
Jones v. Commonwealth, 200 S.W.3d 495, 496-497 (Ky.App. 2006), where we
held that regardless of its omission in the court’s judgment, the defendant is
automatically subject to the period of conditional discharge. We explained:
Under the amended version of the statute, a three year
period of conditional discharge was not imposed by the
trial court as a part of Jones's sentence. Instead, upon her
-4-
conviction as a sex offender sentenced in 2001, Jones
automatically became subject to the period of conditional
discharge as a matter of law. Therefore, the omission of
any mention of the statute or of its requirements in the
court's written judgment is not erroneous. Jones is bound
by its provisions.
Id. (emphasis original). Therefore, Jones was automatically subject to the period
of conditional discharge.
Wagner contends that even if mandated by the statute, had he known
that he was subject to the conditional discharge statute, he would not have entered
a plea of guilty to the sex-related offenses. His claim is quintessentially a
collateral attack wherein he asserts that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently
and voluntarily entered. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23
L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).
We have repeatedly warned that the structure provided in Kentucky
for attacking the final judgment of a trial court in a criminal case is “not haphazard
and overlapping, but is organized and complete” and that the final disposition of an
RCr 11.42 motion concludes all issues that were or could have been presented in
that proceeding. Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Ky. 1983).
Wagner filed multiple RCr 11.42 motions and CR 60.02 motions. In his
memorandum filed in support of his RCr 11.42 motion on October 31, 2003, he
specifically presented the issue to the trial court when he stated:
While parole parameters do not constitute an issue that
would constitute a claim for ineffective counsel, (parole
being considered a collateral consequence, as opposed to
a direct consequence of the plea and sentence) the fact
-5-
that neither Movant’s counsel nor the Court, nor the
Commonwealth, informed the Movant that he would
have to serve three additional years on probation after the
completion of the indeterminate felony sentence, was an
error that could be actuality (sic) considered a “palpable
error.” (emphasis original).
Because the issue of whether Wagner’s guilty plea was voluntary was presented in
his RCr 11.42 motion, he cannot reargue the same basis for relief. We, therefore,
reject any claim that his guilty pleas to the sex-related offenses were not
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently entered.
Wagner’s final contention is premised on the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution and Sections Two and Eleven of the
Kentucky Constitution. He argues that the trial court was sua sponte required to
remove his appointed counsel because there was a conflict of interest.
The United States and Kentucky Constitutions demand that the right
to effective assistance of counsel encompass the right to counsel that is free from
conflict of interest. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d
220 (1981). However, to justify removal, there must be an actual conflict that
adversely affects the performance of the attorney. Kirkland v. Commonwealth, 53
S.W.3d 71, 75 (Ky. 2001).
Wagner claims that the RCr 11.42 motion alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel created a conflict of interest. We can find no authority that
the filing of an RCr 11.42 motion, as a matter law, is sufficient to create an actual
conflict of interest so that the trial court is required to sua sponte remove appointed
-6-
counsel. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has held that no actual conflict of
interest was created between a defendant and his trial counsel when the defendant
filed a bar complaint against his trial counsel. Shegog v. Commonwealth, 142
S.W.3d 101, 105 (Ky. 2004).
Likewise, we conclude that an RCr 11.42 motion that alleged
ineffective assistance of counsel does not disqualify counsel from future
representation of the defendant. A defendant is not entitled to dismissal of his
counsel and the appointment of a substitute counsel except for adequate reasons or
a clear abuse by counsel. Fultz v. Commonwealth, 398 S.W.2d 881, 882 (Ky.
1966). Wagner failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that there was an actual
conflict of interest to warrant counsel’s removal; therefore, we find no error.
The order of the Bell Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Roy A. Durham
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Christian K. R. Miller
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.