WOLEJSZA (WILLIAM CHARLES) VS. WOLEJSZA (PATTIE MARIE)
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 18, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001570-MR
WILLIAM CHARLES WOLEJSZA
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE O. REED RHORER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-01622
PATTIE MARIE WOLEJSZA
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
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BEFORE: CAPERTON, CLAYTON, AND DIXON, JUDGES.
CAPERTON, JUDGE: William Charles Wolejsza appeals an adverse judgment
from the Franklin Family Court regarding the division of certain marital assets.
After review, we reverse and remand for additional proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.
William and Pattie Marie Wolejsza married in 1976 and separated in
2004. The parties were granted a divorce in 2005, and subsequently the trial court
entered an order dividing the marital property in 2006. The property division in
2006 included personal property, the marital residence, and William’s retirement
account. The trial court found that the property should be divided equally between
William and Pattie.
As a result of this finding, the parties entered into an agreement
whereby William would pay Pattie $85,505.54 for Pattie’s half-interest in the
equity of the marital home. William also agreed to retire immediately and exercise
a retirement benefits option, wherefrom he would receive a lump sum payment of
$181,614.60, plus a monthly retirement benefit of $2,793.99 attributable to the 377
months of the parties’ marriage, with no survivor benefits. Pattie was to receive
half of the proceeds, which included $90,807.33 of the lump sum payment and
$1,397.00 of William’s monthly benefits attributable to the parties’ marriage.
Several other property matters were also taken under submission.
After reviewing the agreement of the parties, on March 31, 2006, the
court ordered William to retire immediately and divided the equity in the marital
home and William’s retirement benefits as described above.
Unfortunately, William did not follow the court’s order and selected a
retirement option that only provided monthly benefits, in which the marital interest
amounted to $5,044.00 per month. After finding William in contempt, the trial
court ordered that William’s interest in the equity of the marital house, which
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amounted to $85,505.54, should be immediately quitclaimed to Pattie as
compensation for the loss of her anticipated share of the lump sum payment, which
amounted to $90,807.33. Furthermore, as punishment for William’s contempt, the
trial court also ordered that Pattie should receive roughly half of William’s
monthly retirement benefits, which amounted to $2,500.
William appealed this decision, and in October 2007, this Court
vacated the trial court’s division of the equity in the marital home and William’s
retirement benefits. The basis of this decision was that the trial court failed to
divide the equity and the retirement benefits in accordance with its finding that
each party should receive equal shares of the equity and retirement benefits.
Therefore, this Court remanded this case to the trial court to enter an order dividing
the marital property, specifically the marital home and the retirement benefits,
equally among the parties.
Upon remand, in January 2008, the trial court entered an order in
accordance with its previous finding, which was upheld by this Court, that each
party was to receive half of the equity in the martial home, which amounted to
$85,505.54. Subsequently in June 2008, the trial court entered another order, in
accordance with its previous finding regarding the division of marital property that
was upheld by this Court, that Pattie was to receive half of William’s retirement
benefits attributable to the marriage, which amounted to $2,500. In addition the
trial court ordered William to pay Pattie $6,178.99 upon the sale of the home in
order to compensate her for payments she made upon the home during the period
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when William was responsible for all debts regarding the marital home. This
appeal followed.
Upon appeal, William presents three issues. The first issue is whether
the trial court failed to follow this Court’s mandate set forth in the previous appeal,
Wolejsza v. Wolejsza, 2006-CA-001211-MR. The second issue is whether the trial
court’s order of June 9, 2008, lacked the necessary findings and conclusions
required by Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.190(1) and Kentucky Rules of
Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01. The third issue is whether the trial court erred by
failing to credit William for the mortgage payments he made that reduced the
outstanding principal balance on the property during the separation of the parties.
We shall only address the first and second issues as they are dispositive of this
appeal.
This Court’s opinion of October 2007, remanded the case to the trial
court stating that “the marital property must be divided so as to satisfy such
requirements.” Our Court’s use of the term “requirements” was referencing the
requirements of KRS 403.190(1) that marital property should be divided in “just
proportions”. Appellant now argues that the trial court did not make the division
of property as instructed by our earlier decision and failed to enter the necessary
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The requirements of KRS 403.190(1) as to the division of marital
property require that the trial court divide the property of the parties in just
proportions and consider all relevant factors. Civil Rule 52.01 requires a trial court
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to “find the facts specifically and state separately its conclusions of law thereon
and render an appropriate judgment . . . .” The trial court has not met the
requirements of CR 52.01 and, therefore, we cannot determine if the requirements
of KRS 403.190(1) are met. Thus, we must again remand to the trial court.
For the foregoing reasons, we hereby remand to the trial court for
entry of a judgment comporting with the requirements of KRS 403.190(1) and CR
52.01.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLEE:
Steven G. Bolton
Frankfort, Kentucky
Paul F. Fauri
Frankfort, Kentucky
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