ROSKIE (WILLIAM GLEN) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 25, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001466-MR
WILLIAM GLEN ROSKIE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARLAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RUSSELL D. ALRED, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00008
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; THOMPSON, JUDGE; HARRIS,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
HARRIS, SENIOR JUDGE: William Roskie appeals from a Harlan Circuit Court
order denying his motion to dismiss his indictment pursuant to the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers (IAD). The sole question before us is whether Roskie
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Senior Judge William R. Harris sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
waived his right to have final disposition of his case within 180 days by accepting
a trial date that would occur after the time period lapsed. After reviewing the
briefs and the record, we affirm.
On January 29, 2004, Roskie was indicted on four counts of firstdegree trafficking in a controlled substance for allegedly selling oxycontin to an
undercover police officer. Following the indictment, Roskie was lodged in the
Northeast Correctional Complex in Tennessee to serve a sentence of imprisonment
on unrelated charges. Mr. Roskie claims that he invoked his rights under the IAD
on March 16, 2007. Roskie was transported back to Harlan County in May 2007
and was arraigned in June. At a pre-trial conference held on August 2, 2007,
Roskie agreed to schedule trial for October 16, 2007. Prior to the date, the parties
reached an agreement and scheduled a plea on October 18, 2007.
On October 11, 2007, Roskie filed a motion to dismiss under the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers. After holding a hearing on the issue, the trial
court overruled Roskie’s motion. Roskie entered a conditional plea on December
14, 2007, reserving the right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to
dismiss. Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 8.09. This appeal follows.
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers clearly sets forth the rights of
defendants who are subject to the statute. Article III of the IAD, KRS 440.450,
provides:
(1) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of
imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a
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party state, and whenever during the continuance of the
term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party
state any untried indictment, information or complaint on
the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the
prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred
eighty (180) days after he shall have caused to be
delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate
court of the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction written
notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request
for a final disposition to be made of the indictment,
information or complaint[.]
Although a defendant has the right to be brought to trial within 180
days of providing notice of his imprisonment in another state, defense counsel may
waive this right on behalf of the defendant. New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 115,
120 S.Ct. 659, 664, 145 L.Ed.2d 560 (2000). The United States Supreme Court, in
New York v. Hill, stated:
Scheduling matters are plainly among those for
which agreement by counsel generally controls. This
case does not involve a purported prospective waiver of
all protection of the IAD’s time limits or of the IAD
generally, but merely agreement to a specified delay in
trial. When that subject is under consideration, only
counsel is in a position to assess the benefit or detriment
of the delay to the defendant’s case. Likewise, only
counsel is in a position to assess whether the defense
would even be prepared to proceed any earlier.
Requiring express assent from the defendant himself for
such routine and often repetitive scheduling
determinations would consume time to no apparent
purpose. The text of the IAD, moreover, confirms what
the reason of the matter suggests: In allowing the court
to grant “good-cause continuances” when either
“prisoner or his counsel” is present, it contemplates that
scheduling questions may be left to counsel. [Emphasis
in original, citation omitted].
Id.
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Roskie further argues that the failure of the trial court and the
Commonwealth’s Attorney to recognize that he was in custody and eligible for
rights under the IAD negates his attorney’s waiver of rights. In light of New York
v. Hill, we find that this argument is without merit.
Our review of the record does not convince us that Roskie properly
notified the Commonwealth’s Attorney and Harlan Circuit Court of his place of
imprisonment and of his request for final disposition of his Harlan County charges
in accordance with the IAD. But assuming that he did so, we conclude that New
York v. Hill, supra, is controlling and dispositive. Roskie, through his counsel,
waived his right to trial within 180 days by agreeing to the October trial date.
Accordingly, the Harlan Circuit Court’s order is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Shannon Dupree
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Julie Scott Jernigan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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