WHITTON (MICHAEL B.) VS. WEIS (SCOTT), ET AL.
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RENDERED DECEMBER 18, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001278-MR
MICHAEL B. WHITTON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE A. C. MCKAY CHAUVIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-002372
SCOTT WEIS;
JOHN DOE #1, Aider and Abettor to Scott Weis; and
JOHN DOE #2, Aider and Abettor to Scott Weis
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: LAMBERT, MOORE, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
MOORE, JUDGE: Michael B. Whitton1 appeals the Jefferson Circuit Court’s
1
We note that Whitton’s last name was spelled “Whitten” in the briefs filed in this case, but
because it was spelled “Whitton” in the notice of appeal, we will use that spelling in this opinion.
orders2 granting summary judgment in this civil action involving allegations of
fraud, perjury, forgery, and unjust enrichment. After a careful review of the
record, we affirm because there is no civil cause of action for perjury committed by
a witness or a party and the remainder of Whitton’s claims are barred by the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Whitton and Scott Weis co-owned two companies: Consumer Cable
Inc. (CCI) and High Power Technical Services, Inc. (HPTS). Whitton alleged in
his complaint filed in this case that Dish Network wanted HPTS to become a
Regional Service Provider for Dish, handling installations and service for Dish’s
retail stores in Kentucky and Indiana. However, in order for Dish to give HPTS a
contract, which included a non-compete clause, Dish allegedly wanted proof that
HPTS and CCI were separate and distinct, so Dish requested proof that Whitton
had sold his shares in HPTS to Weis. Thus, a document entitled “Second Meeting
of the Principles [sic] and Directors of [HPTS]” was created. This document
essentially consisted of corporate meeting minutes. The document stated as
follows:
The second meeting of the principles [sic] and directors
of [HPTS] took place on May 17, 1999 at the corporate
office located at 914 A1 North English Station Rd.[,]
Louisville, KY 40223.
The Two – (2) directors of the Corporation Scott A. Weis
and Michael B. Whitton announced that all shares of the
2
There was an initial order granting partial summary judgment and a subsequent order granting
summary judgment on the remainder of Whitton’s claims.
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Corporation held by Michael Whitton have been sold to
Scott A. Weis.
Scott Weis announced that he should serve as President
and Treasurer of the Corporation, and be the sole
director.
Michael Whitton after selling all interest in [HPTS] did
resign as Vice President.
The foregoing constitutes a record of the action taken on
May 17, 1999 by Scott A. Weis and Michael B. Whitton.
Whitton contended in his complaint that he was “induced by fraud and deceit to
sign this document” in which he attested “to a non-existent event.”3
Whitton asserted that, after he signed the false corporate meeting
minutes, his signature from that document was photocopied onto a Buy-Sell
Agreement dated May 17, 1999, which was provided to Dish. That agreement
stated that Weis sold his shares in CCI to Whitton, making Whitton the sole owner
of CCI. Whitton, in turn, sold his shares in HPTS to Weis, making Weis the sole
owner of HPTS. Whitton contended in his complaint filed in this case that his
signature on the buy-sell agreement was forged.
Prior to the lawsuit at issue in this appeal, another lawsuit was filed in
Jefferson Circuit Court which was captioned MJM Advanced Communications,
Inc. v. Consumer Cable, Inc, case number 01-CI-03953. In that case, Whitton was
3
We find it interesting that Whitton claims he knew at the time he signed the “Second Meeting
of the Principles [sic] and Directors of [HPTS]” that the document was false, yet he asserts that
Weis’s act of convincing him to sign the false document was a criminally fraudulent act on
Weis’s part. We note that, under Whitton’s version of the facts of this case, Whitton’s act of
signing the document as a means of getting Dish to enter into a contract with HPTS, even though
Whitton admits knowing the document was false at the time he signed it, appears to itself be
fraudulent.
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a third-party plaintiff/third-party defendant, and he alleged in his third-party
complaint that Weis, who was a third-party defendant in that case, had on or about
May 17, 1999, “forged, created or manipulated by photocopying machine or
otherwise fraudulently obtained the signature of . . . Whitton, on a document called
buy/sell agreement.” Whitton further contended that “Weis, in forging or
otherwise fraudulently obtaining the said signature of Third Party Plaintiff,
Whitton, was intentional or reckless,” and that as a result of this “outrageous
conduct, . . . Whitton[] suffered emotional distress.”
The circuit court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
judgment in the MJM case. The court noted that, in regard to the corporate
meeting minutes,
[w]hile Mr. Whitton testified that this document was
signed in an effort to defraud another business entity and
was intended to have no legal effect, the Court finds no
other evidence or documentation to support Mr.
Whitton’s assertion. Mr. Whitton’s explanation that the
execution of this document was necessary to obtain a
contract from Dish Network to become a regional service
provider (“RSP”) was also contradicted by Mr. Weis’s
testimony that Dish Network did not even have an RSP
program for approximately one year after the signing of
the document on May 17th, 1999.
The circuit court in MJM also noted that Whitton acknowledged
having signed a particular letter in which he stated that “[CCI] accepts this
summons and the judgment of the Court, but please delete [HPTS] from this
summons as the two companies have no connection and are under totally different
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ownership.” Further, the court found that in another case, Edwards v. High Power
Technical, Jefferson Circuit Court, case number 00-CI-02373,
Mr. Whitton acknowledged that he had been a part owner
of [HPTS] but that he was not an employee, officer or
director of [HPTS] in November of 1999. He also
acknowledged that the Buy/Sell Agreement . . . was
signed in May of 1999. Interestingly, he never indicated
that he had not signed the agreement himself but did note
that “I never had anything to do with [HPTS] financially
because it was [Weis’s].”
The court noted that one exhibit
substantiate[d] that Mr. Whitton did pay Mr. Weis
approximately $62,500.00, the purchase price [under] the
Buy/Sell Agreement.
Furthermore, the parties’ behavior following the May,
1999, Buy/Sell Agreement demonstrates that Scott Weis
was no longer an owner of [CCI]. Mr. Whitton executed
the Dealer Agreement with Knight Protective Industries
in November of 2000. He acknowledged that he filled
out the application and signed it. While the application
asked for information regarding “principal owners,
stockholders and officers” of [CCI], the only name listed
was that of Mr. Whitton. The same was true of an
Authorized Dealer Agreement and Owner Guarantee
executed by Mr. Whitton on behalf of [CCI] on
December 18th, 2000. While Mr. Whitton tried to
explain that there was no room on these documents to list
other owners, the documents themselves belie this.
Thus, the circuit court in the MJM case concluded that “the Buy/Sell
Agreement of May, 1999, was a valid and effective transfer of Mr. Whitton’s
ownership in [HPTS] to Mr. Weis,” and ordered Whitton to pay Weis damages
because Whitton’s “continued assertions of ownership constituted a material
breach of the Buy/Sell Agreement.”
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Whitton subsequently filed his complaint in the case presently before
us. In his complaint, Whitton asserted the following claims: (a) Weis fraudulently
induced him to sign false and misleading corporate meeting minutes; (b) Weis
prepared and filed a fraudulent Buy/Sell Agreement by forging Whitton’s signature
on the agreement; (c) Weis and/or a John Doe defendant committed perjury and
suborned perjury with respect to a fraudulent and forged Buy/Sell Agreement; (d)
Weis and John Doe defendants are jointly and severally liable for civil damages to
him pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 446.070 for violations of
criminal statutes concerning perjury and forgery; (e) Weis was unjustly enriched
by the fraudulent and illegal acts of himself and his agents, and he is therefore
liable to Whitton for such unjust enrichment; and (f) Whitton is entitled to punitive
damages for the fraudulent actions of Weis and his co-defendants.
Weis moved to dismiss Whitton’s claims. The circuit court treated the
motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment because the court reviewed
evidence in ruling on the motion. The court granted the motion in part and denied
it in part. Specifically, the circuit court found that Whitton’s fraud claims arose
“from the same transactions or occurrences that were litigated in the MJM case;
that is: the fraudulent creation of the agreement.” Thus, the court held that
Whitton’s fraud claims were barred by res judicata. The court further held that the
“issue of fraud surrounding the creation of the agreement [was] also barred by the
application of the collateral estoppel doctrine” because the “court hearing the MJM
case made a specific finding that the agreement was a valid and binding document
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and, in so doing, considered allegations of fraud and forgery in the preparation of
that document and in its subsequent use at trial.” Thus, summary judgment was
granted concerning Whitton’s fraud and forgery claims.
However, the court denied Weis’s motion for summary judgment
regarding Whitton’s civil claim for perjury through KRS 446.070, which was
based on Weis’s alleged perjury during the MJM litigation.
Weis subsequently filed a renewed motion to dismiss concerning
Whitton’s civil claim for perjury, which the court treated as a renewed motion for
summary judgment because the court had previously reviewed evidence when it
issued its initial order granting summary judgment in part and denying it in part.
Concerning Weis’s renewed motion, the court this time granted Weis’s motion for
summary judgment regarding Whitton’s civil claim for perjury because the court
found that Kentucky does not recognize a civil action for damages based on the
perjured testimony provided by a witness or party during litigation. The court
further noted that the alleged perjured testimony “was and is covered by the
judicial proceeding privilege.” Thus, Weis’s motion was granted.
Whitton now appeals the circuit court’s orders granting Weis’s
motions for summary judgment. Whitton asserts the same claims that he brought
in the circuit court, but he does not reassert the claim of unjust enrichment that he
raised there, so his unjust enrichment claim is waived on appeal. See Grange Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Trude, 151 S.W.3d 803, 815 (Ky. 2004).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
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“The standard of review on appeal of a summary judgment is whether
the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to any material
fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996). “The record must be
viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary
judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his favor.” Steelvest, Inc. v.
Scansteel Serv. Ctr. Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991). “Even though a trial
court may believe the party opposing the motion may not succeed at trial, it should
not render a summary judgment if there is any issue of material fact.” Id. Further,
“the movant must convince the court, by the evidence of record, of the
nonexistence of an issue of material fact.” Id. at 482.
III. ANALYSIS
A. CLAIM OF FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT IN SIGNING MEETING
MINUTES
Whitton first alleges that Weis fraudulently induced him to sign false
and misleading corporate meeting minutes, and that his signature on that document
was in turn used to forge Whitton’s signature on the May 1999 Buy/Sell
Agreement. However, Whitton acknowledges that he knew the meeting minutes
were false at the time he signed them. Furthermore, this is a claim that should
have been brought in the MJM action, when Whitton originally alleged that Weis
had forged his signature on the Buy/Sell Agreement.
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“Res judicata is a doctrine that bars subsequent suits between the
same parties and their privies on a cause of action that was previously decided
upon its merits.” Buis v. Elliott, 142 S.W.3d 137, 139 (Ky. 2004).
Res judicata is generally thought of as consisting of two
subparts. Claim preclusion bars a party from re-litigating
a previously adjudicated cause of action and entirely bars
a new lawsuit on the same cause of action. . . . Issue
preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, bars a party
from re-litigating any issue actually litigated and finally
decided in an earlier action.
Id. at 140 (internal quotation marks omitted). Res judicata “may be used to
preclude entire claims that were brought or should have been brought in a prior
action.” City of Covington v. Board of Trustees of Policemen’s and Firefighters’
Ret. Fund, 903 S.W.2d 517, 521 (Ky. 1995).
Both Whitton and Weis were parties to the MJM action, and this claim
of fraud should have been brought in that action when Whitton contended that
Weis had forged his signature on the Buy/Sell Agreement. Accordingly, this claim
is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
B. CLAIM THAT WEIS FORGED WHITTON’S SIGNATURE ON
BUY/SELL AGREEMENT
Whitton next asserts that Weis prepared and filed a fraudulent
Buy/Sell Agreement by forging Whitton’s signature on the agreement. However,
as noted by the circuit court, this claim was previously litigated in the MJM action,
when a decision was made on the merits of this claim. Consequently, this claim is
also barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. See Buis, 142 S.W.3d at 140.
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C. CLAIM THAT WEIS AND/OR A JOHN DOE DEFENDANT
COMMITTED PERJURY AND SUBORNED PERJURY WITH RESPECT
TO THE BUY/SELL AGREEMENT
Whitton also alleges that Weis and/or a John Doe defendant
committed perjury and suborned perjury with respect to the May 1999 Buy/Sell
Agreement, which Whitton contends was fraudulent and forged. Specifically,
Whitton contends that Weis coerced an employee, Bruce Schoeff, into testifying
during the MJM proceedings that Schoeff witnessed both Weis and Whitton sign
the Buy/Sell Agreement at issue.
Schoeff testified in October 2002 during the MJM proceedings that he
had witnessed both Whitton and Weis sign the Buy/Sell Agreement. Schoeff
thereafter remained an employee of HPTS until he was terminated in January 2006
for reasons that Schoeff did not want to discuss during his deposition in the present
matter. Approximately seven months after his termination from Weis’s
employment at HPTS, Schoeff testified in his deposition in the present case that he
had lied in the MJM proceedings when he said that he had witnessed Weis and
Whitton sign the Buy/Sell Agreement. In fact, he attested in his deposition that he
had not seen either of them sign the document. Schoeff explained that the reason
why he lied initially was because his only income came from Weis, and Weis told
him that if Schoeff did not testify that he saw Whitton sign the agreement,
Schoeff’s employment would be terminated. Thus, Schoeff testified that he lied to
save his job at the time, and he remained an employee of HPTS for several more
years thereafter, until his employment was ultimately terminated in January 2006.
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Whitton asserts that Weis and/or a John Doe defendant are, therefore,
liable for damages to Whitton caused by their perjury or subornation of perjury.
However, “[i]t is the general rule that a civil action for damages will not lie for
perjury made during litigation either by a party or a witness.” Lawson v. Hensley,
712 S.W.2d 369, 370 (Ky. App. 1986). This is because such testimony “given in
the course of a judicial proceeding is privileged.” Reed v. Isaacs, 62 S.W.3d 398,
399 (Ky. App. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the false
statement must be relevant and pertinent to the judicial proceeding for the judicial
proceeding privilege to attach. See Smith v. Hodges, 199 S.W.3d 185, 193 (Ky.
App. 2005).
Because one of the issues in MJM involved whether the Buy/Sell
Agreement was fraudulent and whether Whitton’s signature on it was forged,
Schoeff’s testimony that he witnessed Whitton sign the document constituted a
false statement that was relevant and pertinent to the judicial proceedings in MJM.
Thus, the judicial proceeding privilege attaches, and this claim lacks merit.
D. CLAIM FOR DAMAGES UNDER KRS 446.070 FOR PERJURY AND
FORGERY
Whitton next contends that Weis and John Doe defendants are jointly
and severally liable for civil damages to him pursuant to KRS 446.070 for
violations of criminal statutes concerning perjury and forgery. With respect to this
claim, we first note that Whitton should have brought his claim concerning the
violations of the forgery statutes in the MJM case, but he did not do so. Covington,
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903 S.W.2d at 521. Accordingly, the forgery aspect of this claim is barred by res
judicata.
Regarding the perjury aspect of this claim, KRS 446.070 provides as
follows: “A person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the
offender such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation, although a
penalty or forfeiture is imposed for such violation.”
In Heavrin v. Nelson, 384 F.3d 199 (6th Cir. 2004), Heavrin argued
that “notwithstanding the judicial-proceeding privilege, [KRS] 446.070 allows
civil recovery for” perjury. Heavrin, 384 F.3d at 203. The Sixth Circuit held:
To accept Mr. Heavrin’s argument that K.R.S. 446.070
authorizes civil recovery in the circumstances presented
here, we would have to conclude that the statute
abrogates the judicial-proceeding privilege. But
Kentucky courts have consistently recognized the
privilege notwithstanding K.R.S. 446.070. Kentucky
Statute 466, an almost identical forebear of K.R.S.
446.070, is a “very old” statute; it was cited by the
highest court of Kentucky as early as 1900. [State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Reeder, 763 S.W.2d
116, 118 (Ky. 1988)]. Yet, as we have seen, the judicialproceeding privilege has remained vital in Kentucky. . . .
Reed v. Isaacs, 62 S.W.3d 398, 399 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000)
(no civil action for lying to grand jury), and Lawson v.
Hensley, 712 S.W.2d 369, 370 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986) (no
civil action for perjury). It is true that these decisions do
not expressly hold that the judicial-proceeding privilege
survives K.R.S. 446.070. Having found no case in which
the statute was held to trump the privilege, however, we
are unwilling to reject what is implicit in the cited
decisions.
Heavrin, 384 F.3d at 203.
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We find the rationale in Heavrin highly persuasive and hold that the
judicial proceeding privilege survives KRS 446.070 given Kentucky’s long and
well-settled adherence to the American Rule. Under the American Rule an
absolute privilege applies to statements made during the course of judicial
proceedings. See Smith, 199 S.W.3d at 189-90. “[S]uch statements are privileged
when pertinent and relevant to the subject under inquiry, however false and
malicious such statements may be.” Id. at 190. Thus, Whitton’s claim for
damages for perjury pursuant to KRS 446.070 lacks merit.
E. CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR FRAUD
Finally, Whitton asserts that he is entitled to punitive damages for the
fraudulent actions of Weis and his John Doe co-defendants. However, Whitton
should have brought this claim in the MJM case, when he initially asserted his
fraud claims, but he failed to raise this claim at that time. Covington, 903 S.W.2d
at 521. Consequently, this claim is barred by res judicata.
Accordingly, the orders of the Jefferson Circuit Court are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
J. Fox DeMoisey
Louisville, Kentucky
Perry Adanick
Louisville, Kentucky
Jonathan E. Breitenstein
Louisville, Kentucky
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