BOYKIN (TERRANCE) VS. MILLER (SIDNEY)

 Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 11, 2009; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2008-CA-001237-MR TERRANCE BOYKIN v. APPELLANT APPEAL FROM BOYLE CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE DARREN W. PECKLER, JUDGE ACTION NO. 06-CI-00106 SIDNEY MILLER, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER, NORTHPOINT TRAINING CENTER; AND JAMES NAPIER, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER, NORTHPOINT TRAINING CENTER APPELLEES OPINION AFFIRMING ** ** ** ** ** BEFORE: ACREE AND LAMBERT, JUDGES; HARRIS,1 SENIOR JUDGE. HARRIS, SENIOR JUDGE: Terrance Boykin appeals pro se from an order of the Boyle Circuit Court granting summary judgment dismissing his claims against the 1 Senior Judge William R. Harris sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 21.580. appellees, Sidney Miller and James Napier, correctional officers at Northpoint Training Center, a facility of the Kentucky Department of Corrections. From the record and briefs we discern that the facts pertinent to this appeal are these: Boykin, an inmate at Northpoint, was observed by Napier to have redness in his eyes, possibly indicative of drug use. Boykin was taken to the operations office, out of sight and sound of other inmates and staff, and was asked to produce a urine sample, which he did. Napier deemed the sample insufficient, and acting in accordance with Department of Corrections policies and procedures2 governing inmate drug testing, Miller directed Boykin to produce a further urine sample and opted to detain Boykin in the office until the second urine sample was produced. The prison policy3 authorized officers to detain Boykin for up to three hours for the collection of the requested urine sample, and provided that failure to produce a sample within that time would result in a disciplinary charge of refusing or failing to submit to a drug urinalysis test. At some point4 during his three-hour detention, Boykin told Napier that he felt the need to defecate and requested permission to use the toilet. Napier feared that allowing Boykin to defecate would result in dilution of his urine sample, and denied the request. At Boykin’s request appellee Miller (Napier’s 2 501 KAR 6:020. 3 Boykin does not challenge the validity of the prison policy. 4 Napier claims this occurred five minutes before the end of the three-hour detention; Boykin claims it occurred much earlier in the detention. -2- supervisor) was called in. He also considered and denied Boykin's request to use the toilet. Thereafter, nature took its course. Boykin produced a urine sample,5 and in the process, defecated in his trousers. He was taken to his dormitory and allowed to shower. After his administrative grievance against the appellees was resolved by an informal resolution in which Boykin indicated satisfaction, he sued the appellees in Boyle Circuit Court, claiming that their conduct denied him substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. In granting the summary judgment under review, the Boyle Circuit Court rejected these assertions and further held that the appellees were entitled to qualified immunity. Because we are reviewing a summary judgment, and because we have determined that there are no material issues of fact, our review is de novo. Lach v. Man O’War, LLC, 256 S.W.3d 563, 567 (Ky. 2008). Although Boykin argues his substantive due process and cruel and unusual punishment claims separately, the United States Supreme Court in Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1088, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986), has held that the Eighth Amendment is the “primary source of substantive protection” to a convicted prisoner (as opposed to “pretrial detainees or persons enjoying unrestricted liberty”), and that “the Due Process Clause affords . . . no greater protection than does the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.” Therefore, the 5 The sample was produced within the three-hour time limit and was negative for drugs, so no disciplinary action was taken against Boykin. -3- trial court did not err in limiting its analysis of Boykin’s claims to the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment clause because Whitley v. Albers dictates that Boykin’s substantive due process rights are subsumed by his Eighth Amendment rights. In determining whether the appellees’ conduct, viewed in the light most favorable to Boykin, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, we believe the present case can be distinguished from those where prison officials are accused of using excessive force against a prisoner or wrongfully denying medical attention to a prisoner. Boykin makes no assertion of force being used against him, and states in his brief that he “does not complain of any special medical conditions.” Instead, the issue before us, as we perceive it, is whether the appellees’ implementation of the prison’s drug testing policy by denying Boykin access to a toilet so as to prevent dilution of his urine sample was a reasonable exercise of their control of Boykin’s activities while the drug testing detention was ongoing. None of the cases cited by Boykin or by the appellees involve such a factual scenario, nor has our research yielded any reported decisions on point. We believe the most analogous Eighth Amendment cases are those involving prison conditions, where the cruel and unusual punishment test is summarized in Hadix v. Johnson, 367 F.3d 513, 525 (6th Cir. 2004),6 as a twopronged test. The first (objective) prong requires a plaintiff to establish that a single, identifiable necessity of civilized human existence is being denied him; the 6 The Hadix opinion cites a line of United States Supreme Court cases establishing what sort of conduct or condition is required to amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. -4- second (subjective) prong requires the plaintiff to show that prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Commenting on the first prong, the court in Hadix observed that “extreme deprivations” are required, and that “[h]arsh and uncomfortable prison conditions” do not automatically create an Eighth Amendment violation. Commenting on the second prong, the Court in Hadix observed that it requires that the defendant prisoner official must be “aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists[,]” and that he draw such inference from those facts. Id. quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1979, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). Applying this test to the present case, and assuming arguendo that Boykin has satisfied the first prong,7 Boykin has not shown that the appellees were aware of any facts which would support an inference that they were aware that he faced a risk of serious harm. Boykin has also failed to show that the appellees drew such inference, even if they had such awareness. Therefore, Boykin fails to satisfy the second prong of the test. Boykin’s humiliation and anger at being denied use of the restroom, and consequently soiling himself, is understandable, 7 This is a generous assumption, since courts which have dealt with denial of restroom facilities to prisoners in other factual contexts have concluded that no Eighth Amendment violation was established. See Parter v. Valone, 2006 WL 3086900(E.D.Mich. 2006); Simpson v. Overton, 79 Fed.Appx. 117 (6th Cir. 2003); Cunningham v. Eyman, 17 Fed.Appx. 449 (7th Cir. 2001); Walters v. Curtin, 2008 Westlaw 4756022 (W.D.Mich. 2008); and Robinson v. Zavaras, 2008 Westlaw 582190 (D.Colo. 2008). Glaspy v. Malicoat, 134 F.Supp.2d 890 (W.D.Mich. 2001), is distinguishable because there it was a prison visitor, rather than an inmate, who was denied access to a restroom. -5- but is a far cry from the “serious harm” required to establish an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment violation. Since it is our determination that the trial court properly concluded that Boykin failed to show any violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, we do not reach the issue of whether the appellees were entitled to qualified immunity. We also conclude that the trial court properly rendered summary judgment. The only factual issues which Boykin poses as rendering summary judgment inappropriate are whether his request to use the toilet was made early in his three-hour detention, or with only minutes remaining in that detention period, and whether he was taunted by other inmates and prison staff after he soiled himself. In order to preclude summary judgment, the party resisting it must demonstrate the existence of issues of fact which are both genuine and material. Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 56.03; Hibbitts v. Cumberland Valley Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 977 S.W.2d 252, 253 (Ky. App. 1998). Material facts are only those facts which might affect the outcome of an action under governing law. Talley v. Bravo Pitino Restaurant, Ltd., 61 F.3d 1241 (6th Cir. 1995); 7 Kurt A. Philipps, Jr., David V. Kramer & David W. Burleigh, Kentucky Practice, Rules of Civil Procedure Annotated Rule 56.03, at 421 (6th ed. 2006). Because we have concluded that the appellees’ denial of use of the toilet to Boykin under the circumstances of this case does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, but is -6- instead a valid exercise of their authority in implementing a valid prison drug testing policy, whether Boykin was taunted and whether he made his request to use the toilet early or late in his period of detention are not facts which might affect the outcome of his case. Therefore, we disagree with Boykin’s argument that summary judgment was inappropriate. Finally, we reject Boykin’s argument that the trial court erred in ruling on the appellees’ summary judgment motion prior to the expiration of Boykin’s time to file a responsive brief under the trial court’s scheduling order. We are confident that the trial court was capable of perceiving any distinctions between the cases which had been cited to it and we do not believe that Boykin has demonstrated any prejudice. Any error by the trial court in not awaiting its ruling until the end of the time for Boykin to file a responsive brief under the scheduling order was at most harmless error. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of Boyle Circuit Court is affirmed. ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Terrance Boykin, pro se St. Mary, Kentucky Tyra L. Redus Justice and Public Safety Cabinet Frankfort, Kentucky -7-

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.