SMITH (KURT ROBERT) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 11, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001135-MR
KURT ROBERT SMITH
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROGER L. CRITTENDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00693
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: MOORE AND WINE, JUDGES; HENRY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
HENRY, SENIOR JUDGE: Kurt Robert Smith appeals from a judgment of the
Fayette Circuit Court denying his Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr)
11.42 motion for post-conviction relief. Smith was convicted of wanton murder
for the death of his infant son, Blake Smith, and sentenced to a maximum term of
1
Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
life in prison. Smith alleges that his trial counsel was deficient because she failed
to: (1) investigate his mental health by using a mental health expert to conduct a
psychological evaluation; and (2) investigate and provide readily available
mitigation evidence at sentencing. After our review, we affirm.
Relevant Facts and Procedural History
At trial, Smith testified to the following facts: At approximately 4:00
a.m. on March 21, 2001, Smith awoke to the crying of his six-week-old son, Blake.
Smith was only seventeen years old at the time and was staying with the infant at
his parents’ home.2 Blake, who had just undergone surgery for a digestive ailment,
had been crying and vomiting throughout the evening. Unable to calm Blake and
exhausted from the child’s repeated crying, Smith “lost it” and shook the baby
back and forth before dropping him to the floor. Blake cried momentarily and then
appeared to go to sleep. Unaware that he had caused serious harm to Blake, Smith
put the infant back in his bassinet and did not check on him again until the
following morning, when he discovered that Blake “had lost his color” and that his
lips had turned purple and blue. At that point, Smith realized that he had injured
the infant.
Smith’s mother testified that at approximately 8:00 a.m., she heard a
“normal” cry from Blake and assumed that he was okay. However, at
approximately 11:00 a.m., she came downstairs after hearing an “abnormal” cry
from Blake and found Smith holding the infant, who appeared to be having
2
Blake’s mother was also a minor, and she was living with her parents at the time of the events
in question. The two took turns caring for Blake.
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difficulty breathing. She testified that Smith told her that he did not know what
was wrong with the infant. She subsequently called 911. On March 23, 2001,
Blake was pronounced dead. Medical personnel at the hospital began to suspect
the infant had died as the result of abuse and reported their suspicions to police,
who began an investigation of Smith. Medical evidence conclusively established
that the infant had suffered fatal head injuries that were consistent with shakenbaby syndrome and blunt force trauma. He had also sustained serious bruising
throughout his body.
On July 2, 2001, the Fayette County Grand Jury indicted Smith on one
count of murder pursuant to KRS 507.020. Because Smith was seventeen years
old at the time, the proceedings against him began in the Fayette District Court.
However, pursuant to KRS 640.010, Smith was then transferred to the Fayette
Circuit Court as a youthful offender. Smith pled “not guilty” to the charge, and the
case proceeded to trial on January 28, 2002.
At trial, Smith testified to the facts provided above and admitted that
he had caused his infant son’s death. Throughout the course of the proceeding, the
Commonwealth spent a considerable amount of time attacking Smith’s honesty
and his previous questionable conduct towards Blake. There was testimony that
Smith had previously screamed at Blake and that on a prior occasion while in
Smith’s care, Blake sustained a bruised nose that Smith attributed to an “accidental
elbow.” The Commonwealth also produced evidence that Blake had attempted to
conceal his guilt in the incident. In his initial interview with police, Smith stated
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that he had awakened early and changed Blake’s diaper before going back to sleep
until approximately 10:50 a.m., when he heard Blake crying and noticed his
injuries. Smith professed to have had no idea how those injuries occurred.
However, evidence was then presented of a subsequent interview in which Smith
told police that Blake had accidentally fallen from his lap onto a concrete/tile floor.
Upon conclusion of the trial, Smith was found guilty of wanton
murder and sentenced to life in prison. His conviction was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Kentucky in an unpublished opinion. Smith v. Commonwealth,
No. 2002-SC-0293-MR. On April 15, 2005, Smith filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to RCr 11.42 in the Fayette Circuit Court. He alleged
that the performance of his trial counsel, Honorable Pam Ledgewood, was
deficient to the point that the outcome of his trial was affected, and Ledgewood
had therefore rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Smith specifically
contended that Ledgewood was ineffective for three reasons: 1) she had failed to
object to erroneous jury instructions as they related to his defense of extreme
emotional disturbance and the definition of intent; 2) she had failed to obtain a
psychological evaluation and to engage medical experts to analyze Smith’s mental
health; and 3) she had failed to investigate and to provide readily available
mitigation testimony during the sentencing phase of trial.
Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the Fayette Circuit Court
entered an order denying Smith’s RCr 11.42 motion. That decision was then
appealed to this Court. On April 13, 2007, in Smith v. Commonwealth, No. 2006-4-
CA-000064-MR, we reversed the circuit court’s order and remanded the case with
instructions that an evidentiary hearing be held on the issues of defense counsel’s
failure to obtain a mental health evaluation and to call witnesses during the
sentencing phase to mitigate Smith’s punishment. We explained our decision as
follows:
Even if not legally incompetent, Smith contends that
counsel should have pursued further investigation into his
mental status. His prior school and juvenile records, poor
attitude, substance abuse and unhappy home life, he
points out, were all facts known to counsel and should
have caused her to have a psychological evaluation
conducted. He also contends that the evidence of his
troubled life should have been introduced at his
sentencing which would have resulted in a sentence less
than life.
Smith’s allegation cannot be clearly refuted by the record
and he is, therefore, entitled to a hearing. Smith took the
stand and confessed to his crime leaving only the degree
of guilt and his punishment to be decided by the jury.
Under the circumstances, Smith’s mental status and
background were the only conceivable evidence that
could have mitigated his punishment. An investigation
of counseling records ordered in two prior dispositional
reports may raise questions or present grounds to justify a
mental evaluation. There is no indication in the record if
defense counsel conducted an investigation into Smith’s
mental status nor is there an explanation from counsel as
to why she did not present evidence of his troubled
childhood in mitigation. Without conducting an
evidentiary hearing, the trial court nevertheless
concluded that the failure to present such evidence was
trial strategy.
While this court will not second-guess counsel’s trial
strategy, the record does not conclusively establish that
counsel’s failure to have [a] psychological evaluation
performed or to present evidence concerning Smith’s
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childhood was part of a strategic plan. We, therefore,
order that an evidentiary hearing be held to determine
whether the counsel’s decision was “trial strategy or an
abdication of advocacy.” Hodge v. Commonwealth, 68
S.W.3d 338 (Ky. 2001). Once that determination is made
and if it be found that counsel’s advocacy was deficient,
the trial court is then to make a finding as to what
mitigating evidence was available to counsel. Finally,
the trial court must determine whether there is a
reasonable probability that the jury would have weighed
the mitigating and aggravating factors differently. Id. at
345.
As a result of this Court’s decision, the Fayette Circuit Court set
Smith’s RCr 11.42 motion for an evidentiary hearing to be held on August 24,
2007. On the date of the hearing, Smith filed a motion asking for expert funds so
that he could retain a mental health expert. The court held this motion in abeyance
after deciding to first hold a hearing on the issue of whether Ledgewood’s decision
not to employ a mental health expert was “trial strategy or an abdication of
advocacy.” If the court determined that the decision was not based on trial
strategy, then it would consider the motion for expert funds and hold another
hearing on the remaining issues. The court subsequently rescheduled the matter
for a hearing to be held on October 4, 2007.
At the evidentiary hearing, Smith first called Pam Ledgewood to the
stand to explain her trial strategy. Ledgewood was admitted to the bar in 1984 and
began her career doing criminal defense work for Legal Aid in Fayette County.
She then opened her own private law firm and concentrated her practice in
representing criminal defendants. Ledgewood knew Smith prior to her
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representation of him in the present case because she had previously represented
him – and earned an acquittal – in a case where he had been charged with
marijuana possession.
Ledgewood acknowledged at the outset of her testimony that she had
had difficulty coming up with an effective defense in this case because the facts
and medical evidence all pointed to Smith being at fault in Blake’s death. This
difficulty was exacerbated by the fact that Smith had given two prior statements to
police that were “extremely harmful” because they were largely contradictory and
untruthful. Ledgewood testified that she spent a considerable amount of time
talking to Smith and trying to elicit from him a clear idea of what exactly had
happened. However, she felt that he was never completely honest with her and
that what he had told her did not conform to the evidence presented by the
Commonwealth at trial.
Ledgewood further indicated that she typically talked to as many
people as possible when it came to her pre-trial investigations and that this case
was no different. She specifically remembered talking to Smith’s mother, father,
stepmother, sister, stepbrother, and a number of other family members and friends.
She also reviewed a number of items relating to Smith’s background and history,
including custodial evaluations, his parents’ divorce file, his school records,
juvenile transfer documents, and dispositional reports from Smith’s two previous
juvenile convictions.
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Ledgewood ultimately ascertained that Smith had been “extremely
pleased” when he learned that he was going to have a son and that he had made
efforts to become more responsible – including working two jobs and making
efforts to improve his parenting skills. She believed that Smith had simply been
too young and immature to care for an infant – particularly one with medical
problems – and that the pressure of living up to the task had ultimately
overwhelmed him to the point where he finally “snapped” and took it out on the
child. Ledgewood believed that the jury might be sympathetic to such an
explanation. Accordingly, her strategy at trial was to humanize Smith by showing
that he had been trying his best as a parent and to allow him to show genuine
remorse about what he had done. Ledgewood believed that this strategy ultimately
failed, however, because Smith was a “disaster” as a witness and his story never
truly harmonized with the evidence, which allowed the Commonwealth to attack
his credibility and honesty.
When asked about whether she had ever considered consulting with a
mental health expert to explore some issues that had been raised in Smith’s
juvenile record, Ledgewood testified that such a consideration is made in every
case she handles. However, she indicated that she never saw anything in this
particular case that led her to believe that Smith was suffering from a “mental
illness” as understood by Kentucky law, so she made a conscious decision not to
pursue that avenue of defense and never seriously considered employing a mental
health expert. Instead, she believed that the information she had gathered in her
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investigation reflected that Smith had merely exhibited classic antisocial behavior.
Ledgewood explained that Smith was adamant that he did not have any mental
health issues, and his family gave her no indication that a mental health evaluation
might be necessary. Ledgewood further testified that she had “feelers” out at the
institution where Smith was incarcerated and received no information indicating
that he should be evaluated for mental health problems.
Ledgewood further explained that she was especially concerned,
given the highly-charged and emotional nature of the case, of putting into evidence
anything that would allow the Commonwealth additional opportunities to attack
Smith on cross-examination. This included evidence relating to Smith’s general
mental state. For example, dispositional reports indicated that Smith had been
undergoing counseling and that he had had issues as a result of his parents’
troubled marriage and divorce, but they also contained examples of angry
outbursts, criminal convictions, and general maladaptive behavior on his part.
Ledgewood was concerned that opening the door to such evidence by raising the
issue of Smith’s mental health would diminish any sympathy the jury might have
for him. Ledgewood was especially concerned about one particular incident in
which Smith became angry at school and proceeded to pick up and slam a table,
believing that it would be very easy for the jury to make a connection between that
incident and Blake’s death. Accordingly, she sought to keep as much of this
damaging information as possible out of evidence and to focus her defense on
Smith’s efforts to be a responsible parent despite his youth and immaturity.
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Ledgewood ultimately acknowledged that evidence relating to Smith’s troubled
home life and mental state might have had a mitigating effect, but she believed that
the potentially harmful effect of other information that would be allowed into
evidence as a result was too great to ignore or risk. Because of this fear,
Ledgewood also ultimately decided not to present witnesses during the penalty
phase of trial.
Following Ledgewood’s testimony, Smith called four other witnesses
– an elementary school guidance counselor, his mother, his sister, and a family
friend – whom he claimed would have given pertinent mitigation testimony had
Ledgewood actually used any witnesses during the penalty phase of trial. These
witnesses all testified to Smith’s troubled relationship with his parents and the
negative effect that their divorce had had on him as he was growing up.
After the hearing, the circuit court concluded that Ledgewood did not
provide deficient representation and that the errors complained of were based upon
strategic trial decisions. It consequently denied Smith’s motion for RCr 11.42
post-conviction relief. The court explained its decision as follows:
The Petitioner was represented by experienced
criminal defense counsel, Pam Ledgewood. Counsel
testified during the evidentiary hearing that she was
familiar with the Defendant from representing him in
juvenile court and, based upon her discussions with Mr.
Smith and observations of his behavior saw no reason for
a mental health evaluation. The defendant testified at
trial and gave no indication to either trial counsel or the
Court that a mental health evaluation was called for. The
evidence of Defendant’s problems at school, home or
juvenile court are certainly areas that, once opened, could
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have had a negative impact upon the Defendant’s case.
Defense Counsel also testified she investigated the case
and was informed of the likely testimony that could have
been elicited for mitigation purposes during the
sentencing phase of the trial. The problem with the
mitigation testimony was that it conflicted with the
Defendant’s statement of the case. Counsel’s strategy
was to elicit as much sympathetic testimony during the
guilt phase of the trial in keeping with the Defendant’s
testimony and not to “open doors” for the
Commonwealth to produce contradictory evidence. The
fact that the Defendant’s testimony did not mesh with the
Commonwealth’s proof was a major factor in
determining how the Defense could proceed.
Smith subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, which was also denied by
the circuit court. In its order of denial, the court reiterated that Ledgewood’s
testimony reflected that she was aware of “damaging material” in Smith’s record
that could be used against him by the Commonwealth if she “opened the door” by
introducing evidence relating to his mental health. This appeal followed.
Issues
Smith raises two primary arguments on appeal: (1) that his trial
counsel was ineffective due to her failure to consult with any mental health
experts; and (2) that his trial counsel did not effectively seek out and use readily
available mitigation testimony during the sentencing phase of trial. Smith
contends that both errors deprived him of the right to effective counsel assured to
him under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Sections 11
and 14 of the Kentucky Constitution.
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In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court set forth a two-pronged
analysis to be used in determining whether the performance of a convicted
defendant’s trial counsel was so deficient as to merit relief from that conviction.
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s
performance was deficient. This requires showing that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
whose result is reliable.
Id., 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. Ultimately “[t]he burden is upon the
accused to establish convincingly that he was deprived of some substantial right
which would justify the extraordinary relief afforded by the post-conviction
proceedings provided in RCr 11.42.” Dorton v. Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 117,
118 (Ky. 1968).
In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance, the court
must focus on the totality of evidence before the judge or
jury and assess the overall performance of counsel
throughout the case in order to determine whether the
identified acts or omissions overcome the presumption
that counsel rendered reasonable professional assistance.
Simmons v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 557, 561 (Ky. 2006), overruled on other
grounds by Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009). With these
general considerations in mind, we turn to Smith’s arguments.
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Smith first contends that Ledgewood’s performance was deficient
because of her failure to consult with any mental health experts and to more fully
consider utilizing a mental health defense in an effort to explain Smith’s actions to
the jury. He essentially argues that Ledgewood abdicated her responsibility to
thoroughly investigate and evaluate his case before determining that she would not
employ a defense based on his possible mental health issues.
Smith points to a number of “signs of a troubled juvenile” that were
presented throughout his juvenile record. A December 12, 2007, dispositional
report indicated that Smith’s “attitude, current school difficulties and the fact that
both sets of charges were related to drug issues, are of concern.” The report also
indicated that Smith should “continue with counseling so that his feelings and
attitude can be addressed, as well as working on effective communication within
the family.” It further noted that Smith “exhibited a great deal of bravado and an
almost obstinate attitude” and that he “was unhappy at home.” A later
dispositional report addressed the same concerns and emphasized Smith’s apparent
substance abuse problems. Smith argues that this information should have put
Ledgewood on notice that his mental health status should have been explored
through a psychological evaluation so as to provide the jury with an explanation
for his actions.
“On appeal, the reviewing court looks de novo at counsel’s
performance and any potential deficiency caused by counsel's performance.”
Brown v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 490, 500 (Ky. 2008). In assessing whether
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counsel’s performance was deficient under the first prong of the Strickland test, we
must consider whether her alleged acts or omissions were outside the wide range of
prevailing professional norms based on an objective standard of reasonableness.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65. In conducting our review,
we must consider the decisions of trial counsel with great deference and employ “a
strong presumption that the conduct of counsel is within the acceptable range of
reasonable and effective assistance.” Commonwealth v. Tamme, 83 S.W.3d 465,
470 (Ky. 2002); Harper v. Commonwealth, 978 S.W.2d 311, 314-15 (Ky. 1998).
Thus, in order to prevail, a defendant “must overcome the presumption that, under
the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial
strategy.’” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065 (citation omitted).
Ledgewood testified that she was fully aware of the aforementioned
dispositional reports and Smith’s behavioral issues. Indeed, she acknowledged that
the acrimonious relationship between Smith’s parents had resulted “in a lot of
conflict and damage” to him and that he had begun to exhibit increasingly out-ofcontrol behavior as he had gotten older. However, Ledgewood made a conscious
decision not to pursue Smith’s mental state as an avenue of defense because she
did not believe that Smith showed signs of mental illness as understood by
Kentucky law. Moreover, she was concerned that putting information into
evidence that might support such a defense – Smith’s troubled relationship with his
parents, for example – would irretrievably damage her efforts to portray Smith as a
sympathetic figure who had simply “lost it” as a result of his frustration and
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inexperience in dealing with an infant. Ledgewood was particularly worried that
introducing evidence relating to Smith’s mental state would open the door for the
Commonwealth to present its own evidence of incidents in which Smith had
demonstrated outbursts of rage and generally defiant and anti-social behavior. As
indicated, during one such instance, Smith picked up and slammed a table when he
was asked to leave a classroom during school. Ledgewood was concerned that it
would have been easy for the jury to connect such behavior with Blake’s death.
The circuit court concluded that Ledgewood did not abuse her
professional discretion by not pursuing a mental health defense or by not
investigating the possibility any further because these were “strategic trial
decisions.” We find no error in this conclusion. Strickland holds that defense
counsel is obligated “to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at
691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066; see also Haight v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436, 446
(Ky. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279
S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009). An alleged failure to adequately investigate a case “must
be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy
measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104
S.Ct. at 2066; see also McQueen v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 694, 700 (Ky.
1986). “A reasonable investigation is not an investigation that the best criminal
defense lawyer in the world, blessed not only with unlimited time and resources,
but also with the benefit of hindsight, would conduct.” Haight, 41 S.W.3d at 446.
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Ledgewood testified that she decided not to investigate and pursue a
defense based on Smith’s mental health because she saw no indications that he
suffered from mental illness in her conversations and interactions with him and his
family. We acknowledge that this explanation, standing alone, might not suffice to
explain Ledgewood’s failure to more thoroughly investigate a mental health
defense in this case.
However, Ledgewood went on to explain her concern that delving
into Smith’s mental state at trial would run the risk of allowing the Commonwealth
to introduce a plethora of damaging evidence against him. Therefore, she focused
on keeping as much of this information as possible out of the trial. Since
Ledgewood’s defense was predicated on portraying Smith in as sympathetic a light
as possible given that his role in Blake’s death had been firmly established, we
cannot say that this fear was an unreasonable one. While it is easy to second-guess
this strategy in hindsight, that is not the role of this Court in considering Smith’s
appeal. Parrish v. Commonwealth, 272 S.W.3d 161, 170 (Ky. 2008) (“[A]n RCr
11.42 motion is not an exercise in second-guessing counsel’s trial strategy.”);
Harper, 978 S.W.2d at 317 (“On review, as a court far removed from the passion
and grit of the courtroom, we must be especially careful not to second-guess or
condemn in hindsight the decision of defense counsel. A defense attorney must
enjoy great discretion in trying a case, especially with regard to trial strategy and
tactics.”). From our review of the record, we have little doubt that Ledgewood
made a full and conscientious effort to provide Smith with the best defense
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possible in the face of highly unfavorable facts. In doing so, she employed a
strategy that perhaps could be second-guessed in hindsight but cannot be
condemned as unreasonable or otherwise deficient. Our courts have repeatedly
held that “RCr 11.42 motions attempting to denigrate the conscientious efforts of
counsel on the basis that someone else would have handled the case differently or
better will be accorded short shrift in this court.” Penn v. Commonwealth, 427
S.W.2d 808, 809 (Ky. 1968). This case will be treated no differently.
In the end, a defendant “is not guaranteed errorless counsel, or
counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel likely to render and rendering
reasonably effective assistance.” Haight, 41 S.W.3d at 442. We agree with the
circuit court that such assistance was rendered in this case and agree that
Ledgewood’s performance was not deficient as to this issue. Therefore, Smith’s
claim of error is rejected.
Smith next argues that Ledgewood’s performance at trial was
deficient because she did not effectively seek out and use readily available
mitigation witnesses during the penalty phase of trial. At the RCr 11.42
evidentiary hearing, Smith presented four witnesses who testified about Smith’s
troubled home life and the negative effect that his parents’ divorce had had on his
mental state. When asked why she did not put any mitigation witnesses on the
stand during the penalty phase of trial to testify about these matters, Ledgewood
testified that she was fully aware of Smith’s familial issues and the issues relating
to his mental state, but she again noted her concern that by exploring Smith’s
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mental state as a possible mitigating factor, she would be allowing the
Commonwealth an opportunity to bring in evidence that would interfere with her
strategy of making Smith appear sympathetic before the jury.
For the reasons given above, we cannot say that failing to call these
witnesses constituted deficient performance. “Decisions relating to witness
selection are normally left to counsel’s judgment and this decision will not be
second-guessed by hindsight.” Foley v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 878, 885 (Ky.
2000) (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Stopher v. Conliffe, 170
S.W.3d 307 (Ky. 2005). The testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing would
have allowed the Commonwealth the opportunity to bring in evidence concerning,
among other things, Smith’s past criminal record and history of angry outbursts.
Our Supreme Court has recognized that a failure to present mitigating witnesses is
not indicative of deficient performance if that decision is the result of reasonable
trial strategy. Foley, 17 S.W.3d at 885. This includes situations in which defense
counsel “decided that the negative testimony that would be elicited might only
serve to inflame the jury and therefore decline[d] to present it.” Id. Ledgewood
clearly feared that presenting the mitigation testimony proposed by Smith risked
painting him in an even more unfavorable light before the jury. Once again, we
cannot say that this fear was an unreasonable one. Accordingly, we conclude that
the trial court did not err in finding that Ledgewood’s performance was satisfactory
as to this issue. Therefore, Smith’s claim of error is rejected.
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We finally note that Smith also raises an argument that the trial court
erred by not providing funds that would have allowed him to be psychoanalyzed by
an expert witness before the RCr 11.42 evidentiary hearing. Because we have
rejected Smith’s other claims for relief, we decline to address this issue.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Fayette Circuit Court’s
denial of Kurt Robert Smith’s motion to vacate his judgment and sentence pursuant
to RCr 11.42.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Amy Robinson Staples
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Christian K.R. Miller
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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