WILSON (AARON A.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: OCTOBER 2, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000577-MR
AARON A. WILSON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KAREN LYNN WILSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CR-00035
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; THOMPSON, JUDGE; HARRIS,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE: Aaron Wilson appeals his conviction for assault from
the Henderson Circuit Court. After our review, we affirm.
On December 19, 2006, Wilson’s mother asked him to retrieve her car
keys from his brother, who had been taken to jail by police the night before.
Wilson’s neighbor, a seventy-eight-year-old woman, volunteered to give Wilson
1
Senior Judge William R. Harris sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580
and his sister a ride to the jail. On the return trip from the jail, Wilson attacked his
elderly neighbor and friend, beating and stabbing her. She sustained brutal
injuries, including a cut jugular vein that required hospitalization in the intensive
care unit.
Wilson is a schizophrenic, and he claims that the attack was induced
by voices in his head that called him names. Hence, at trial, he presented an
insanity defense. A jury found him guilty but mentally ill of first-degree assault.
He received a sentence of seventeen years in prison. This appeal follows.
The principal issue before us on appeal is whether the trial court erred
in excluding expert witness testimony concerning Wilson’s state of mind at the
time of the assault. Wilson had sought a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity
rather than a verdict of guilty but mentally ill.
Accordingly, his defense to the assault charge was that he was insane
at the time that the assault occurred. Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 504.060(5)
defines insanity as the “lack of substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality of one’s conduct or to conform one’s conduct to the requirements of
law[.]” If this requirement is met, a person is not criminally culpable for crimes he
commits. KRS 504.020(1).
During direct examination, Wilson asked Dr. Robert Sivley if, in his
opinion, Wilson could conform his conduct to the law – a question that mirrored
the statutory definition of insanity and thus amounted to an evaluation of Wilson’s
-2-
sanity. The prosecution objected, and the court asked Wilson to rephrase his
question. Wilson asked the question again, and he was asked to rephrase once
more. The second time, however, Wilson did not rephrase the question and moved
on to another line of questioning.
During redirect examination, Wilson pursued his original question as
to insanity and asked the expert if Wilson had a mental illness. When Dr. Sivley
answered in the affirmative, Wilson then asked, “And would that condition cause
him to have any difficulty controlling his behavior?” The expert said, “I opine that
it probably did. . . . My opinion is that he was acting on beliefs that were totally
unreal based on his psychotic disorder.” This answer conveyed the precise
information that Wilson had tried to elicit in direct examination. Therefore,
Wilson’s argument that the testimony was erroneously excluded is moot, and we
decline to address it further.
Wilson also argues that it was improper for the court to admit into
evidence photographs of the crime scene and of the victim’s injuries because he
had offered to stipulate the severity of the injuries. He contends that the
photographs were inflammatory and prejudicial. The contested photographs
depicted the bloody vehicle and close-up views of the victim’s injuries.
Stipulation is not a permissible means of circumventing admission of
evidence to which a party objects. Our Supreme Court has made it clear that “the
prosecution is permitted to prove its case by competent evidence of its own
choosing, and the defendant may not stipulate away the parts of the case that he
-3-
does not want the jury to see.” Barnett v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 98, 103
(Ky. 1998).
Kentucky’s general rule is that photographs are not rendered per se
inadmissible either by the heinous nature of the crime or by the gruesome nature of
photographs. Brown v. Commonwealth, 558 S.W.2d 599, 605 (Ky. 1977). The
only exception to the rule focuses on whether side effects involving causes other
than the crime itself (such as animal mutilation, autopsy, or decomposition) have
occurred so as to “arouse passion and appall the viewer.” Clark v. Commonwealth,
833 S.W.2d 793, 794 (Ky. 1992), as modified on denial of rehearing.
In the case before us, the photos do not depict any visible alteration to
the victim or the vehicle that would cause them to fall within the exception. They
are relevant to prove the seriousness of the victim’s injuries. As the
Commonwealth points out, the images are portrayed in a clinical manner. We note
that even video and audio recordings of death scenes have been held admissible at
trial. See Pollini v. Commonwealth, 172 S.W.3d 418 (Ky. 2005); Young v.
Commonwealth, 50 S.W.3d 148 (Ky. 2001). Under established precedent, we
conclude that the trial court committed no error in admitting the photographs into
evidence.
Accordingly, we confirm the conviction of Aaron Wilson by the
Henderson Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
-4-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Samuel N. Potter
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
David W. Barr
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.