EMBREY (BRYSON) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: AUGUST 21, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000535-MR
BRYSON EMBREY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MUHLENBERG CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID H. JERNIGAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CR-00168
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, KELLER, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: Bryson Embrey appeals from a judgment of the Muhlenberg
Circuit Court sentencing him to seven years’ imprisonment in accordance with a
guilty plea to four counts of obtaining a controlled substance by fraud, subsequent
offense. Prior to pleading guilty, Embrey filed a motion to prohibit the
Commonwealth from introducing certain evidence at trial concerning wrongful
acts that took place outside of Kentucky and after the offenses outlined within the
subject indictment. The circuit court found that evidence of those acts could be
admitted for the purpose of establishing a common goal or scheme pursuant to
Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 404(b)(1). Embrey subsequently entered a
conditional guilty plea to the four controlled substance charges. In doing so, he
reserved the right to appeal the aforementioned evidentiary ruling. After review,
we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the
wrongful act evidence could be introduced at trial. Therefore, we affirm.
On October 19, 2007, the Muhlenberg County grand jury indicted
Embrey on four counts of obtaining a controlled substance by fraud, subsequent
offense, in violation of Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.140, and on one
count of being a first-degree persistent felony offender in violation of KRS
532.080. The indictment specifically stated that between October 13, 2006, and
July 27, 2007, Embrey fraudulently obtained, on four separate occasions,
prescriptions for controlled substances from practitioners within the
Commonwealth of Kentucky. Embrey pled “not guilty” to each count and was
released on bail.
Prior to the scheduled trial date, the Commonwealth informed Embrey
that it intended to introduce at trial certain pharmacy records showing that Embrey
had been prescribed controlled substances by a minimum of thirteen different
physicians in five different states and that he had received controlled substances
from at least thirteen different pharmacies. The Commonwealth sought to
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introduce these records pursuant to KRE 404(b)(1) because they purportedly
established Embrey’s use of out-of-state doctors and pharmacies in a manner
similar to the allegations set forth in the indictment. Thus, they were proof of
motive, preparation, plan, or absence of mistake or accident.
After being informed of the Commonwealth’s intentions regarding the
pharmacy records, Embrey filed a motion in limine to prevent the Commonwealth
from introducing these records into evidence at trial. The circuit court
subsequently held a hearing on the matter. Embrey argued that, because the
records were related to uncharged acts or alleged acts of wrongdoing that had
occurred outside of Kentucky and outside of the time frame of the events set forth
in the indictment, they could not be used as evidence. He also argued that the
probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
Following the hearing, Embrey’s motion in limine was denied on the grounds that
the records could be used as evidence of a plan or scheme on Embrey’s part.
Embrey subsequently entered into a conditional guilty plea as to the four controlled
substance charges, 1 reserving his right to appeal the circuit court’s decision
regarding the pharmacy records. This appeal followed.
Embrey raises three issues on appeal: 1) whether the circuit court
performed the proper evidentiary analysis in regards to the pharmacy records prior
to admitting them for trial; 2) whether the circuit court erred in allowing the
evidence in question to be presented to the jury because the records concerned
1
The persistent felony offender charge was dismissed as part of the plea agreement.
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wrongful acts that took place after the time frame outlined within Embrey’s present
indictment; and 3) whether the circuit court’s use of Wonn v. Com., 606 S.W.2d
169 (Ky. App. 1980), as a basis for its decision regarding the pharmacy records
creates reversible error.
When reviewing issues regarding evidence, this Court’s standard of
review is whether there has been an abuse of discretion. Com. v. English, 993
S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). To determine whether there has been an abuse of
discretion, this Court must determine whether the trial judge’s decision regarding
the evidence “was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal
principles.” Id.
The first issue presented by Embrey is whether the circuit court
abused its discretion when it allegedly failed to perform a proper evidentiary
analysis prior to admitting the pharmacy records for trial. According to Embrey,
the circuit court failed to perform a proper evidentiary analysis because it failed to
balance the probative value of the pharmacy records against the potential prejudice
to the accused. However, we disagree with Embrey and hold that the circuit court
did perform a proper evidentiary analysis.
Generally, evidence of the commission of other crimes is not
admissible to prove that the accused has a criminal disposition. However, an
exception exists under KRE 404(b)(1) that allows such evidence to be presented to
the jury if it is offered for the purpose of establishing “motive, intent, knowledge,
identity, common plan or scheme, or absence of mistake or accident.” Anderson v.
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Com., 231 S.W.3d 117, 120 (Ky. 2007); Lambert v. Com., 835 S.W.2d 299, 302
(Ky. App. 1992). In order to be admitted under any of these exceptions, the other
criminal or wrongful acts must be relevant for some purpose other than criminal
predisposition and sufficiently probative to warrant introduction. The court
determined that these records were relevant. The probative value of the evidence
of other wrongful acts must also outweigh its potential for prejudice to the accused
at trial. Anderson, 231 S.W.3d at 120-21.
It is clear from a review of the hearing that the court did not believe
that the prejudicial effect of admitting the records outweighed the probative value
because it rejected Embrey’s reliance on caselaw that presented instances in which
wrongful acts were excluded on these grounds; further, the appellant concedes that
he provided no testimony or made no objection as to the specific acts which would
result in prejudice to him. Therefore, we hold that the circuit court did perform a
proper evidentiary analysis regarding the pharmacy records prior to allowing them
to be presented to the jury.
The second issue presented by Embrey is whether the circuit court
erred in admitting evidence of other wrongful acts when those acts took place after
the events for which Embrey was charged under the present indictment. Embrey
argues that the pharmacy records are not relevant for the purpose of establishing
common goal or scheme because they concern wrongful acts that took place at a
later date. However, we disagree with Embrey because the temporal remoteness of
certain evidence is a probative issue, not a relevancy issue. Therefore, since the
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circuit court found that the probative value of the pharmacy records outweighed its
prejudicial effect on the jury, the court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the
records into evidence.
In English, 993 S.W.2d at 943-944 the Kentucky Supreme Court
established the rules regarding the temporal remoteness of evidence. In English,
the Supreme Court reiterated that evidence of other wrongful acts was admissible
if it tended to show, among other things, common scheme or plan. Id. With
respect to evidence of a common scheme or plan, the Court held that the temporal
remoteness of that evidence in relation to the wrongful acts being prosecuted is a
probative factor that is determined by the trial judge, not a relevancy factor. Id.
Furthermore, the temporal proximity of certain evidence is not a condition of
admissibility; instead, it goes to the weight of the evidence. Id.
Therefore, since the court reviewed the issue of temporal remoteness
of the pharmacy records prior to its finding that the probative value of the records
outweighed its prejudicial effect, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting the pharmacy records into evidence.
The third issue presented by Embrey is whether the circuit court’s use
of Wonn, 606 S.W.2d at 169, as a basis for its decision regarding the pharmacy
records creates reversible error. Embrey argues that Wonn is factually
distinguishable from the present case because the acts in question there occurred
within the same time period as those for which the appellant was charged;
therefore, its use as a basis for the circuit court’s evidentiary decision creates
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reversible error. Embrey contends that the wrongful acts here were acknowledged
by the Commonwealth during the hearing to have occurred within a day or two of
the indictment itself, which occurred on October 19, 2007. Since the last incident
for which Embrey was charged occurred in July 2007, he argues that the wrongful
acts did not occur within the same time period – as in Wonn – and it was therefore
error to rely on that decision.
However, even though Embrey is perhaps correct in his observation
that Wonn is factually distinguishable, its use does not necessarily create reversible
error. “[I]f the prior wrongful act, or a particular aspect thereof, is so similar to the
charged offense as to show a modus operandi which tends to prove an element of
the charged offense, remoteness alone does not require suppression of the evidence
of the prior misconduct.” English, 993 S.W.2d at 944. The evidence in question
was asserted to be so similar to the acts for which Embrey was charged that it was
properly admissible to demonstrate intent or a common scheme – even if they
occurred a few months after the acts for which he was charged. An affidavit for a
search warrant in the record notes that Embrey had filled twenty-four different
prescriptions for controlled substances in multiple states during the time frame set
forth in the indictment. Therefore, the circuit court’s reliance on Wonn, as a basis
for its evidentiary decision regarding the pharmacy records does not create
reversible error.
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In sum, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by
allowing the pharmacy records to be presented to the jury at trial. Accordingly, the
judgment of the Muhlenberg Circuit Court is affirmed.
LAMBERT, JUDGE, CONCURS.
KELLER, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Daniel Sherman, Jr.
Greenville, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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