ADKINS (JAMES) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 30, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000359-MR
JAMES ADKINS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM OHIO CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RONNIE C. DORTCH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CR-00033
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: MOORE AND WINE, JUDGES; HENRY, SENIOR JUDGE.
WINE, JUDGE: James Adkins (“Adkins”) appeals to this court from his
conviction in the Ohio Circuit Court for first-degree trafficking in a controlled
substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. On appeal he argues that the trial
court (1) improperly excluded “reverse 404(b)1 evidence” by refusing to admit the
indictment of an alleged alternative perpetrator, (2) abused its discretion by
allowing him to publish his “key” piece of evidence to the jury only once, and (3)
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Kentucky Rule of Evidence 404(b).
erroneously omitted the word “unlawfully” from the jury instruction for the charge
of first-degree trafficking, thus failing to instruct the jury on his defense. We
reverse and remand on the third ground. However, we will address all issues as
each is capable of repetition on retrial.
Background
On March 16, 2007, Sergeant Tracy Beatty (“Beatty”) of the Ohio
County Sherriff’s Department went to the home of Adkins’s brother to serve a
warrant for Adkins’s arrest on an unrelated charge. Beatty requested that Adkins
come out of the residence. Adkins reluctantly came out of the residence and
Beatty informed him that he had a warrant for his arrest. After arresting Adkins,
Beatty noticed a bulge in Adkins’s pocket. Beatty asked Adkins what the bulge
was and Adkins replied that he did not know. Beatty then turned out Adkins’s
pocket and a white sock fell to the ground. Beatty testified that the sock contained
two baggies containing a white crystalline substance and two devices commonly
used to snort or smoke methamphetamine.
The substance was later determined by the Kentucky State Police
Crime Lab to be methamphetamine. Tommy Oakes (“Oakes”), a crime lab
technician, testified that one of the baggies contained 13.855 grams of
methamphetamine and the other contained 2.574 grams of methamphetamine.
Greg Huffman (“Huffman”), a detective with the Kentucky State Police Drug
Enforcement Special Investigations Unit, testified that seventeen grams is “quite a
bit” of methamphetamine. Huffman further testified that seventeen grams is more
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than you would typically see in someone’s possession for personal use, and that the
drug was usually sold in increments of one to three grams.
An Ohio County jury found Adkins guilty of first-degree trafficking in
a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. He was sentenced to
five years for the trafficking conviction and twelve months for the possession of
drug paraphernalia conviction. The sentences were to run concurrently for a total
of five years. This appeal followed.
Analysis
A. Admissibility of Edge’s Indictment
We begin by addressing Adkins’s first ground for relief that the trial
court erred by denying his request to introduce “reverse 404(b)” evidence.
Specifically he contends that the trial court erred by refusing to admit the
Commonwealth’s indictment against Nathan Edge (“Edge”). Edge was a friend of
Adkins’s brother. Adkins contends that Edge was an alternative perpetrator in the
crimes he was charged with committing, and therefore, Edge’s indictment was
relevant to his defense. The indictment charging Edge included one count of firstdegree trafficking in a controlled substance (firearm enhanced), one count of firstdegree possession of a controlled substance (firearm enhanced), one count of
possession of drug paraphernalia (firearm enhanced), one count of second-degree
fleeing or evading the police, one count of tampering with physical evidence, one
count of resisting arrest, one count of possession or use of a radio that sends or
receives police messages, and three counts of wanton endangerment.
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We review evidentiary errors for abuse of discretion. Anderson v.
Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 117, 119 (Ky. 2007). Thus, we will not reverse
absent a finding that the “trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair,
or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Id.
Adkins claims that Edge dropped a sock full of drugs in his driveway
on March 16, 2007 as he was getting into his pickup truck. Jeff Peach (“Peach”)
testified at trial that he was at a cookout at Adkins’s house on the day in question.
He testified that Edge stopped his truck at the end of the driveway as he was
leaving the Adkins’s brothers’ house in order to fix a tarp over the back of the
pick-up truck. Peach did not observe anything fall out of Edge’s pocket.
However, another witness, Julie McCarthy (“McCarthy”), testified that she was
also at the cookout on March 16, 2007 and that she saw Edge knock a trash can
over while speeding out of the driveway. She further testified that Edge stopped at
the end of the driveway to fix a tarp covering the back of his pick-up truck. She
saw something drop as Edge was getting back into his truck. She also testified that
she observed Ethan, Adkin’s young son, pick up a dirty syringe near the end of the
driveway later that day. John Richardson (“Richardson”), another witness, stated
that he heard Edge’s tires spin as he left the property. However, Richardson did
not personally observe Edge leave. Although he did not observe Edge leave,
Richardson testified that he observed Ethan pick up a dirty syringe near the end of
the driveway that day.
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Adkins’s defense is largely in agreement with McCarthy and
Richardson’s version of the events. He testified that he went to check the mailbox
at the end of the driveway that day when his young son picked up a dirty syringe
from the ground. Adkins had previously contacted the sheriff’s department about
finding used syringes in his driveway.2 Adkins immediately removed the needle
from the boy’s hand and then observed something white lying on the ground. He
testified that he picked up the object and discovered its contents. He further
testified that he walked back to his brother’s house3 at that time and confronted
him about the drugs, warning that he was going to report Edge to the police. The
drugs were still in Adkins’s pocket when Sgt. Beatty arrived shortly thereafter to
arrest him.
Adkins sought to introduce the indictment against Edge as evidence
supporting his theory that Edge had dropped the drugs in his driveway that day.
Adkins argued that the indictment established motive.4 The Commonwealth
claimed that the only purpose for admitting the indictment would be to argue that
Edge had trafficked drugs on other occasion(s) and thus, that the drugs must have
belonged to him on that occasion. The Commonwealth posited that such evidence
was properly excluded under KRE 404(b) because the defense’s argument that the
2
Adkins’s phone records were introduced at trial to support this contention.
3
Adkins’s brother’s house was located on the same plot of land. The two residences shared a
common driveway.
4
Opportunity was shown by the fact that Edge was on the property that day.
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indictment establishes “motive” was nothing more than a subterfuge to show
Edge’s conformity with character based upon prior bad acts.
Our courts have held that a defendant has a right to produce evidence
to show that a third party, an “alleged alternative perpetrator” (“aaltperp”),
committed the crime for which the defendant was accused. Beaty v.
Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 196, 208 (Ky. 2003). However, evidence is not
admissible merely because it tends to show that an aaltperp committed the offense.
Id. Indeed, evidence of motive or opportunity alone is insufficient to guarantee
admissibility. Id. Moreover, the evidence must be relevant and survive the
application of KRE 403 (meaning that its probative value cannot be substantially
outweighed by “confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or . . . undue
delay.”) KRE 403.
The Kentucky Supreme Court, following the federal circuits, has held
that the standard for “reverse 404(b)” evidence is lower than the standard for
regular KRE 404(b) evidence. Blair v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 801, 810 (Ky.
2004). The reason for the lower standard is that the danger of prejudice that exists
when the Commonwealth is introducing evidence against a criminal defendant
does not exist when a criminal defendant is introducing evidence that an aaltperp
committed an offense. U.S. v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1404 (3rd Cir. 1991). While
we recognize that the standard is lower, and that the indictment against Edge may
have met the lower standard, a trial court is not obliged to admit every piece of
evidence that may inculpate a third party. As our Supreme Court has said,
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“evidence is not admissible simply because it would tend to prove that another
person was the perpetrator.” Fields v. Commonwealth, 274 S.W.3d 375, 401 (Ky.
2008). Rather, a criminal defendant’s due process rights are not infringed by every
limitation placed on the admission of such evidence. Id. A criminal defendant’s
constitutional rights are violated only where the exclusion of such evidence
“significantly undermine[s] fundamental elements of the defendant’s defense.” Id.,
quoting United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 315, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 1267-68, 140
L.Ed.2d 413 (1998).
Here, the trial court exercised its discretion to exclude the indictment
against Edge. Although the trial court excluded the indictment, Adkins presented
ample other evidence to support his theory that Edge was the true owner of the
drugs. Indeed Adkins and three other witnesses testified to Edge being at the
house that day, two of whom testified that Edge dropped something on the
driveway. Throughout the trial, defense counsel injected the idea that Edge had
dropped the sock full of drugs in Adkins’s driveway that day. Further, defense
counsel published a statement by Chris Gilstrap (“Gilstrap”), who shared a jail cell
with Adkins and Edge after Adkins’s arrest. The published statement noted that
Gilstrap overheard a conversation between Adkins and Edge wherein Edge made
an admission that the drugs were his. Namely, Edge “thanked” Adkins for not
“ratting him out” over the drugs he dropped at his house. Moreover, Adkins’s
counsel made his theory of the case clear in both opening and closing statements.
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Thus, it does not appear that Adkins’s position was significantly undermined by
the exclusion of Edge’s indictment. As such, we do not reverse on this ground.
B. Publication of Gilstrap’s Statement to the Jury
We now address Adkins’s allegation of error that the trial court
impermissibly refused to allow him to publish Gilstrap’s statement to the jury more
than one time. Adkins argues that while the trial court had discretion to restrict the
defense to one publication of the statement to the jury, such a restriction would
also have had to been placed on the Commonwealth. However, we find Adkins’s
argument to be without merit as he never requested to publish the statement to the
jury more than once. A party must make known to the trial court the action he
desires. Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (“RCr”) 9.22. Indeed, here,
Adkins received what he requested: publication of the statement to the jury. We
will not dissect whether the trial court should have allowed further publication
when same was never requested at trial.
C. Omission of the word “unlawful” from the jury instructions
Finally, we consider Adkins’s argument that the trial court erred by
denying his request to insert the word “unlawfully” into the instruction for
trafficking in a controlled substance. The instructions read as follows:
You will find the Defendant, James David Adkins, guilty
of Trafficking in a Controlled Substance in the First
Degree under this instruction, if and only if, you believe
from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the
following:
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1.) That in this county on or about March 16, 2007,
and before the finding of the Indictment herein, he had in
his possession a quantity of methamphetamine
AND
2.) That he knew the substance so possessed by him
was methamphetamine
AND
3.) That he had the methamphetamine in his
possession with the intent to sell, distribute or dispense it
to another person.
Adkins sought to have the word “unlawfully” inserted into the first
subsection of the instruction, so that the instruction would read: “You will find the
Defendant . . . guilty . . . if you believe . . . he unlawfully had in his possession a
quantity of methamphetamine.” Adkins argues that the word “unlawfully” was
necessary in the instruction because his defense was that the drugs belonged to
Edge and that he intended to turn them over to police. Adkins also argued that the
word “unlawfully” appears in Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 218A.1412, the
applicable statute for trafficking in a controlled substance. KRS 218A.1412 reads
in pertinent part:
A person is guilty of trafficking in a controlled substance
in the first degree when he knowingly and unlawfully
traffics in: a controlled substance, that is classified in
Schedules I or II which is a narcotic drug . . .
(emphasis added). Adkins argues that the entire theory of his defense was
predicated upon the idea that he possessed the drugs lawfully, with the intent to
turn them over to police. Further, he argues that the language in the instruction
requiring that the defendant must have intended to “sell, distribute or dispense [the
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drugs] to another person” was misleading as Adkins’s defense was that he intended
to give (or “dispense”) the drugs to police.
The Commonwealth aptly points out that the jury instructions used in
this case are identical to instructions that have been previously approved by our
courts in trafficking cases. See e.g., Burnett v. Commonwealth, 31 S.W.3d 878
(Ky. 2000). Moreover, we recognize that the instructions mirror the model
instruction found in Cooper’s Kentucky Instructions to Juries. 1 Cooper, Kentucky
Instructions to Juries §9.11B. However, the analysis does not end here.
It has been a long-standing principle in this Commonwealth that a
defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case. See, e.g., Gossett
v. Commonwealth, 90 S.W.2d 730, 731 (Ky. 1936); Sexton v. Commonwealth, 252
S.W.2d 415 (Ky. 1952); Ragland v. Commonwealth, 421 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Ky.
1967). Initially, the rule was “that an accused person is [always] entitled to have
an affirmative defense submitted by a concrete instruction.” Scott v.
Commonwealth, 224 S.W.2d 458, 459 (Ky. 1949). However, the rule has been
modified over the years so that an accused is entitled to have the jury instructed on
a defense only where it “is reasonably deducible from the evidence.” Fredline v.
Commonwealth, 241 S.W.3d 793, 797 (Ky. 2007). Indeed, an instruction is only
proper where there is “some evidence justifying a reasonable inference of the
existence of a defense.” Grimes v. McAnulty, 957 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Ky. 1997).
In the present case, one cannot deny that there was more than enough
evidence introduced so that one might reasonably infer that the drugs were not
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unlawfully in Adkins’s possession. As previously noted in our analysis of the
exclusion of Edge’s indictment, extensive evidence was produced in this case that
supported Adkins’s defense that the drugs belonged to Edge and that he did not
possess them unlawfully. Regardless of the court’s opinion of the defendant’s
position, any theory of the case which is supported by the evidence must be
submitted to the jury. See Mishler v. Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d 676, 680 (Ky.
1977). Because the instructions failed to include any language which might
encapsulate Adkins’s defense, we reverse the judgment and sentence of the Ohio
Circuit Court. See, e.g., Mondie v. Commonwealth, 158 S.W.3d 203, 209-210 (Ky.
2005) (failure to instruct the jury on a lawful defense is reversible error).
Conclusion
In consideration of the foregoing, we reverse the judgment and
sentence of the Ohio Circuit Court and remand for a new trial.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jamesa J. Drake
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Jason B. Moore
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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