RICE (SONIA L.) VS. STEELE (DAVID R.)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 18, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000308-MR
AND
NO. 2008-CA-000332-MR
SONIA L. RICE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEVEN R. JAEGER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-02036
DAVID R. STEELE, ADMINISTRATOR
WITH WILL ANNEXED OF THE ESTATE
OF DOROTHY STEPHENS, DECEASED
APPELLEE
AND
DAVID R. STEELE, ADMINISTRATOR
WITH WILL ANNEXED OF THE ESTATE
OF DOROTHY STEPHENS, DECEASED
v.
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEVEN R. JAEGER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-02036
SONIA L. RICE; BOBBY LEE
VANCE; AND JAMES EVERETT RICE, JR.
CROSS-APPELLEES
OPINION
DISMISSING IN PART; VACATING IN PART
AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE AND LAMBERT, JUDGES; HARRIS,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
LAMBERT, JUDGE: Sonia Rice appeals the dismissal of five of her six claims
against David R. Steele, as Administrator of the Estate of her mother, Dorothy
Stephens (hereinafter “the Estate”). The Estate cross-appeals the partial summary
judgment entered in favor of Sonia on her claim for restitution of funeral expenses.
The Estate additionally moves this Court to dismiss Sonia’s appeal for failure to
join necessary parties. For the reasons stated herein, we grant the Estate’s motion
to dismiss Sonia’s appeal, and we vacate and remand the partial summary
judgment entered in favor of Sonia.
Dorothy Stephens died October 19, 2002, testate and the sole owner
of real estate at 1101 Lee Street, Covington, Kentucky. The real estate was the
only asset of her estate. Sonia lived with her mother, Dorothy, on Lee Street from
1980 until Dorothy’s death in 2002. Sonia paid no rent.
On August 11, 1998, Dorothy purchased a $7,000.00 life insurance
policy from United of Omaha Life Insurance Company, designating Sonia as the
beneficiary. After Dorothy’s death, Sonia made funeral arrangements and paid for
the expenses out of the proceeds of the life insurance policy.
1
Senior Judge William R. Harris, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
-2-
On April 21, 2003, Sonia’s attorney filed a statement of claims with
the Estate asserting Sonia was due $143,730.58. The statement claimed: (1)
$6,844.00 for paid funeral expenses; (2) 2002 State and County real estate tax for
the property on Lee Street in the amount of $535.91; (3) 2002 city real estate tax in
the amount of $213.46; (4) delinquent real estate taxes in the amount of $4,439.81;
(5) $26,797.40 representing funds allegedly belonging to Sonia used by Dorothy to
purchase the Lee Street property; and (6) $104,900.00 for compensation for
services rendered in the care of Dorothy. The Estate denied all claims.
On August 6, 2003, Sonia filed a complaint in Kenton Circuit Court
for the monetary claims against the Estate. On May 2, 2007, Sonia filed a motion
for summary judgment on all counts. The court granted partial summary judgment
in Sonia’s favor, finding that she was entitled to restitution of the funeral expenses,
but the court dismissed her remaining claims. This appeal followed.
The Estate first argues that Sonia’s appeal should be dismissed for
failure to join necessary parties. Sonia admits in her response to the motion to
dismiss that she did not specifically join her siblings, Bobby Vance and James
Everett Rice, Jr., in her appeal as they “are heirs of the estate and thus a claim
against the estate would include them.” This is patently incorrect.
The Kentucky Supreme Court characterizes a necessary party as one
whose interest would be divested by an adverse judgment. See West v. Goldstein,
830 S.W.2d 379 (Ky. 1992). In an order entered January 23, 2004, the trial court
compelled Sonia to join the other heirs, devisees, and creditors of the estate as
-3-
necessary parties to her claim. Service was subsequently rendered to those
necessary parties, and the record clearly reflects that Bobby Vance and James
Everett Rice, Jr., were named defendants in the court below.
Thus, James and Bobby in their individual capacities were
indispensable parties, an appeal could not be taken without naming them in their
individual capacities, and the notice of appeal is, therefore, defective on its face.
See Slone v. Casey, 194 S.W.3d 336, 337 (Ky. App. 2006). It is well-established
that failure to specifically name an indispensable party in the notice of appeal
results in dismissal of the appeal. Ky. R. Civ. P. 19.02; City of Devondale v.
Stallings, 795 S.W.2d 954 (Ky. 1990). We hereby grant the Estate’s motion to
dismiss Sonia’s appeal for failure to join necessary parties.
The only remaining argument by the Estate is that the trial court erred
in granting partial summary judgment on Sonia’s claim of restitution relief for
funeral expenses of $6,844.00. The Estate argues that the motion for summary
judgment was not served on all necessary parties; therefore the judgment should be
vacated and remanded. We agree with the Estate.
As discussed previously, in an order entered January 23, 2004, the
trial court compelled Sonia to join the other heirs, devisees, and creditors of the
estate as necessary parties to her claim. The motion for summary judgment was
filed on March 2, 2007, and failed to name James or Bobby.
“An indispensable party is one whose absence prevents the Court
from granting complete relief among those already parties.” Milligan v. Schenley
-4-
Distillers, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Ky. App. 1979) (overruled on other
grounds). The trial court had already determined James and Bobby were
indispensable parties, and it wrongfully ruled on a motion that failed to serve
necessary parties. Hence, it is necessary to vacate the partial summary judgment in
favor of Sonia with directions to join the necessary parties in any further motion
for summary judgment on the limited issue of restitution relief for funeral
expenses. All other issues of the motion for summary judgment have been
dismissed per our analysis above.
We accordingly dismiss Sonia’s appeal in its entirety, and we vacate
and remand the partial summary judgment for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT/CROSS
APPELLEE SONIA L. RICE
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSS
APPELLANT DAVID R. STEELE
Patrick E. Moeves
Brian Dean Russell
Ft. Wright, Kentucky
Ronald L. McDermott
Covington, Kentucky
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.