HAGER (GENEVA) VS. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 16, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-002599-MR
GENEVA HAGER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. CLARK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-02482
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER, MOORE AND THOMPSON, JUDGES.
MOORE, JUDGE: Geneva Hager1 appeals from a jury verdict rendered after a
two-week trial in Fayette Circuit Court deciding that Allstate Insurance Company
did not violate Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 304.12-230, Kentucky’s Unfair
Claims Settlement Practices Act. Hager brings numerous issues on appeal.
1
Generally, we will refer to the Appellant as Hager.
Having heard oral arguments and after a thorough review, we find no error at the
trial court level sufficient for the relief sought by Hager.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Hager raises approximately twenty claims of error and numerous subissues as to the trial court proceedings and rulings in this case. Given the size of
the record, which contains over 9,300 pages, countless exhibits, numerous
depositions, a multitude of hearings, seemingly limitless sidebar hearings, two
weeks of trial testimony, and a history spanning nearly ten years, it is fortunate for
our review that Hager has not challenged the jury verdict as being against the
weight of the evidence. Consequently, despite the fact that both parties have set
out in great detail the underlying facts of this matter, the Court need not recite
page-upon-page of the convoluted facts of the underlying case for resolution of the
appeal.
We appreciate the parties’ respective briefs because their efforts were
very helpful to the Court to grasp what at first appears to be a complex case. But
when fully digested, the matter as litigated on appeal is not nearly as complex as
the facts at first make it appear. Accordingly, despite the numerous claims before
this Court, only one issue concerns a directed verdict, and that issue can be easily
resolved by our analysis. Thus, our review is limited to those rulings and
procedural claims of errors brought by Hager, which are preserved on the record,
correctly cited thereto and for which proper authority has been given.
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For the reasons stated above, Hager’s appellate posture only requires
that the Court set forth the most basic facts of this matter for its resolution. As
additional facts are required for review on the claims, they will be presented later
in the analysis.
The action is based on a bad faith claim, upon which Allstate
prevailed at trial. Its genesis is an accident that occurred on July 10, 1997.
Thomas LaPointe, who was insured by Allstate, rear-ended the Hagers’ vehicle.
Mr. Hager, Geneva’s husband, was driving, and Geneva Hager was a passenger.
According to LaPointe’s recorded statement of the accident, his brakes failed as he
approached the Hagers’ truck. In response, he shifted his vehicle from second gear
to first gear and turned off the motor. While in second gear, LaPointe estimated
that he was going approximately fifteen miles per hour. After gearing down, he
thought he was going around five miles per hour when he rear-ended the Hager
vehicle. LaPointe described the impact like unexpectedly hitting a speed bump.
At first, Mr. Hager corresponded with Allstate regarding both the
Hagers’ claims, but later the Hagers retained attorney Paul S. Kaplan to represent
them in their claim against LaPointe. In a letter dated December 5, 1997, Kaplan
wrote to Allstate that all further communications regarding the accident should be
sent to his office.
Within a short time after the accident, Allstate determined that it was
reasonably clear its insured was liable. Thus, liability was not at issue. The issue
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became at what point in the underlying claim procedures Allstate had the necessary
documentation and information regarding Geneva Hager’s claim to make a timely
and reasonable determination of how and under what procedures her claim should
be evaluated.
Hager argues in her brief that her case was handled in Allstate’s
Minor Impact Soft Tissue (“MIST”) unit. MIST claims involve accidents with
little or no damage to the vehicles, occurring at a low rate of speed, with no
discernable physical injury. According to the Allstate documents, “MIST files are,
by definition, suspected of consisting of no, or minor injury based on impact.”
Early recognition of MIST claims include: damages of $1,000 or less; no sheet
metal or frame damage; no visible damage indicated by the insured or the police
report; soft tissue injuries; no pre-existing conditions to the same bodily area as the
complaints arising from the accident; and no objective findings such as confirmed
herniation, confirmed bulges, lacerations, scarring, fractures, etc.
Regardless of how convoluted the parties may try to make the issue, at
the time of receiving Kaplan’s letter, the record supports that Allstate knew only
that Hager had been taken to the emergency room by ambulance and, based on
LaPointe’s earlier referenced statement, that it was a minor accident. At that time,
because the accident appeared to be minor, the claim initially fell into the MIST
category. It was given to Allstate claim handler, Sarah Howard, who handled
attorney-represented claims in the MIST unit.
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A series of correspondence was exchanged between Hager’s attorney
and Allstate’s claim adjusters. The record is replete with requests from Allstate for
information from Kaplan regarding Hager’s medical records, history, treatment,
prior conditions, etc. While Kaplan supplied some documentation to Allstate, he
responded that it was his policy not to have his clients sign medical releases in
cases such as this.
The record is undisputed that Allstate made a number of attempts to
get documentation regarding Hager’s damages. For example, in Howard’s claims
diary, dated January 5, 1998, she wrote that she and Kaplan had discussed the
Hagers’ loss. Kaplan would talk to his clients but said “our [Allstate’s] reputation
proceed[ed] us, so [they] may wait until we are in suit.” (Capitalization changed.).
Howard continued to request documentation from Kaplan to evaluate Geneva
Hager’s claims. While Kaplan supplied some of the documents, Howard wrote, in
a letter dated May 13, 1998, that she had reviewed the documentation provided
thus far. However, to properly review the claim, Howard still needed the
emergency room records, where Hager was treated after the accident; the family
physician’s records (both before and after the accident); a number of medical
billing records; the complete PIP file; and all wage and disability verification.
Thereafter, Howard took an extended medical leave. In the interim, however, it is
undisputed that Kaplan did not provide the documentation Howard requested.
While Howard was on leave, another adjuster, Debbie Niemer,
reviewed the file. In an entry in the claims diary, dated June 20, 1998, she noted
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that she received a telephone call from Kaplan requesting policy limits because (1)
Geneva Hager had an objective injury; (2) she had an assessed 11 percent
impairment; and (3) the PIP carrier’s IME agreed with the diagnosis. Kaplan
relayed to Niemer that he would “not go into detail and indicated that if we were
unable to evaluate this claim at policy limits before the statute [of limitations ran,]
he would file suit[.] I advised that we would continue to investigate this matter[;]
we would require prior medical history and perhaps our own IME on the case[.]
He indicated that he would still file suit[.] I advised we would handle
accordingly.” (Capitalization changed).
In an entry dated July 6, 1998, Niemer wrote that Kaplan had
contacted her again regarding evaluation of the claim. Niemer also wrote that the
claim was not ready for an evaluation because medical records and loss
information were still missing. At that time, given additional information and
photographs of the automobiles that Allstate received, Niemer did agree with
Kaplan that it was not a minor impact case, as damage was shown to the rear cab
panels, the tailgate, and the front of the Hagers’ vehicle. The type of damage
shown on the Hager vehicle took the claim outside of the qualifiers for the MIST
unit. Thus, the claim was transferred out of the MIST unit.
In July of 1998, Ben Urso, a senior adjuster who had been with
Allstate for thirty years, was assigned to Hager’s claim. Urso was not an adjuster
in the MIST unit. According to Urso’s testimony, due to the lack of the requested
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documentation while Howard and Niemer had the claim and prior to it being
transferred to him, Hager’s claim was never evaluated in the MIST unit.
Kaplan filed suit on behalf of the Hagers against LaPointe in July of
1998. Allstate provided counsel for LaPointe, its insured. Thereafter, discovery
commenced in the case. Both Hager and LaPointe sought through discovery
requests information they had not received during the claims process.
Ultimately, according to Allstate, once it received the documentation
it requested relevant to Hager’s claim for proper evaluation, it offered policy limits
prior to the trial in this matter. Shortly thereafter, Kaplan amended the complaint
to add a bad faith claim against Allstate. The Hagers and LaPointe settled their
suit, but the circuit court ordered that Allstate shall remain as a defendant in the
action. Later Hager filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint,
which included a reference to a class action against Allstate. The court granted this
motion on June 16, 2000. Thereafter, Hager filed two additional amended
complaints regarding more specific allegations against Allstate to form a
foundation for the class action suit. The last amended complaint was the fourth
one, which was granted on November 30, 2004.
Regarding the class action, it was comprised of individuals whose
claims were subject to the MIST claims-handling process. After a motion to
certify the class was filed, the trial court timely denied the motion for lack of
commonality and typicality on October 31, 2006. Hager was the only named
plaintiff in the action. Shortly after the motion for class certification was denied,
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Hager filed a motion to notify the putative class members of the denial of class
certification. The trial court timely ruled that notice was not required under the
facts of this case. After this ruling, Hager has not cited to this Court any additional
proceedings relevant to the class action.
Hager’s individual bad faith claim proceeded to trial in October of
2007. After a two-week trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Allstate.
Hager now appeals a number of rulings by the trial court, but does not attack the
jury’s verdict as being against the weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we will
review each claim presented by Hager where properly preserved, as supported by a
preservation statement and proper citation to the record, and where supported by
authority in accordance to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 76.12. See
Cherry v. Augustus, 245 S.W.3d 766, 781 (Ky. App. 2006).
ANALYSIS
1. Hager’s claim regarding her entitlement to a directed verdict on judicial
estoppel regarding the “McKinsey documents” is not properly before the
Court.
Hager’s first claim of error is not properly before this Court. In her
statement of preservation, she claims to have preserved the issue of judicial
estoppel regarding documents referenced as the “McKinsey documents”2 when her
2
We are highly cognizant of Hager’s claims regarding the importance of the McKinsey
documents and her belief that they form the foundation for the practices of which she maintains
form the basis of her bad faith claim. Nonetheless, this issue is not properly before the Court.
Accordingly, we need not recite the facts or allegations surrounding the McKinsey documents
other than to note that they were documents generated after McKinsey & Company was retained
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counsel moved for a directed verdict. This Court has reviewed both parties’
motions for directed verdict near the end of Hager’s case in their entirety.3 During
these arguments, Hager’s counsel did not argue in any manner whatsoever that
Hager was entitled to a directed verdict based on judicial estoppel.
CR 50.01 states that ‘A motion for a directed verdict
shall state the specific grounds therefor.’ The primary
purpose of the Rule is to fairly apprise the trial judge as
to the movant’s position; and also to afford opposing
counsel an opportunity of arguing each ground before the
judge makes his ruling. The attention of the trial judge
can thus be focused on possible reversible errors, which
might otherwise be obscure with only a general motion
for a directed verdict. In the absence of a statement of
the specific grounds for a motion for a directed verdict,
this Court normally will not consider the question of the
denial of the motion. Clay, CR 50.01; 5 Moore's Federal
Practice, Par. 50.04 (2nd Ed. 1951).
Carr v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 301 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Ky. 1957) (emphasis added
in Carr); see also Whitesides v. Reed, 306 S.W.2d 249, 250 (Ky. 1957). Hager has
not cited this Court to anywhere else in the record where she preserved this issue.
We are not obligated, nor will we, search this vast record to try to otherwise locate
where this issue may have been preserved. See Phelps v. Louisville Water Co., 103
S.W.3d 46, 53 (Ky. 2003); Robbins v. Robbins, 849 S.W.2d 571, 572 (Ky. App.
1993). Accordingly, despite Hager’s claims that she was entitled to a directed
verdict regarding judicial estoppel, she failed to state this as a basis for a directed
by Allstate to conduct a review of Allstate’s claim handling procedures and practices.
3
There were two more depositions for Hager’s case to be played for the jury at the time both
parties moved for a directed verdict. Hager’s counsel informed the circuit court that these
depositions were not dispositive and would not have an impact on the court’s decision on
directed verdict. Accordingly, the court heard the motions.
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verdict before the trial court. Thus, she has waived this issue.
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification.
Before discussion of the merits of Hager’s arguments under class
certification, we address Allstate’s arguments that Hager does not have standing to
appeal this issue due to losing at trial on her individual claim. While at the outset
this argument may appear to have validity, persuasive case law holds otherwise.
A seminal case on this issue is United States Parole Commission v.
Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 100 S. Ct. 1202, 63 L. Ed. 2d 479 (1980), wherein the
Court held that
an action brought on behalf of a class does not become
moot upon expiration of the named plaintiff’s substantive
claim, even though class certification has been denied.
The proposed representative retains a “personal stake” in
obtaining class certification sufficient to assure that Art.
III values are not undermined. If the appeal results in
reversal of the class certification denial, and a class
subsequently is properly certified, the merits of the class
claim then may be adjudicated. . . .
445 U.S. at 404, 100 S. Ct. at 1212-13.
In its decision, the Supreme Court relied on several principles,
including the fact that the issue of denial of class certification is simply one issue
to be litigated, so it stands to reason that it should be appealable. Id., 445 U.S. at
399-400, 100 S. Ct. at 1205. The Court also relied on the fact that, at that time
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (F.R.C.P.) 23, the denial of class action
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certification was interlocutory and not appealable.4 Id., 445 U.S. at 399, 100 S. Ct.
at 1210. The Court noted that there remained “‘the prospect of prevailing on the
merits and reversing an order denying class certification.’” Id. (quoting Coopers
& Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469, 479, 98 S. Ct. 2453, 2459, 57 L. Ed. 2d
351 (1978)). Thus, while the merits of a plaintiff’s claim may be extinguished at
the trial court level, “‘it does not follow that this circumstance would terminate the
named plaintiff’s right to take an appeal on the issue of class certification.’” Id.,
445 U.S. at 402, 100 S. Ct. at 1211 (quoting Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v.
Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333, 100 S. Ct. 1166, 1117, 63 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1980)).
There remains the issue of whether Hager has a personal stake in the
outcome of the litigation sufficient that there exists a case or controversy for the
Court to resolve. In Geraghty, the Court determined a review of the personal stake
must be undertaken, requiring consideration of “the purpose of the case-orcontroversy requirement.” 445 U.S. at 402, 100 S. Ct. at 1212. In the context of a
class action, the considerations are different from traditional cases.
Although the named representative receives certain
benefits from the class nature of the action, some of
which are regarded as desirable and others as less so,
these benefits generally are the byproducts of the classaction device. In order to achieve the primary benefits of
class suits, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure give the
proposed class representative the right to have a class
certified if the requirements of the Rules are met. This
“right” is more analogous to the private attorney general
concept than to the type of interest traditionally thought
4
F.R.C.P. 23 has since been amended to allow for an interlocutory appeal in federal courts of the
grant or denial of class certification.
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to satisfy the “personal stake” requirement. See Roper,
445 U.S. at 338, 100 S.Ct at 1173-1174.
Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 403, 100 S.Ct. at 1212 (note omitted).
Numerous courts have held in accord with Geraghty. For example,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has decided that, pursuant
to Geraghty, “a named plaintiff who has lost her individual claims on the merits
has standing to appeal the denial of class certification.” Alexander v. Gino’s, Inc.,
621 F.2d 71, 73 (3d Cir. 1980).
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that where a named
plaintiff’s “individual claim was decided against her at the trial level and is not
moot on appeal,” she had “standing to appeal the individual adverse determination
and in so doing” was permitted to “appeal interlocutory orders [such as an order
denying class certification] decided against her below.” Anderson v. City of
Albuquerque, 690 F.2d 796, 798-99 (10th Cir. 1982). The Court noted that “(A)n
order denying class certification is subject to effective review after final judgment
at the behest of the named plaintiff. . . .” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Therefore we are persuaded that Hager has standing to appeal the
circuit court’s denial of class certification, despite having lost on the merits at the
trial court. However, we review a circuit court’s denial of class certification for an
abuse of discretion. See Sowders v. Atkins, 646 S.W.2d 344, 346 (Ky. 1983).
The class Hager sought to certify involved individuals whose claims
were evaluated by Allstate’s MIST unit. The trial court in this case found that
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Hager lacked the typicality and commonality required for her to qualify as the class
representative, and we do not find an abuse of discretion in that decision.
To satisfy the typicality requirement, the representative
plaintiff’s interests must be aligned with those of the
class. . . . [A] plaintiff’s claim is typical if it arises from
the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives
rise to the claims of other class members, and if his or her
claims are based on the same legal theory.
Powers v. Hamilton County Public Defender Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 618 (6th Cir.
2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The commonality requirement is
satisfied if there is a single factual or legal question common to the entire class.”
Powers, 501 F.3d at 619. “To have standing to sue as a class representative it is
essential that a plaintiff must be a part of that class, that is, he must possess the
same interest and suffer the same injury shared by all members of the class he
represents.” Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,
216, 94 S.Ct. 2925, 2930, 14 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1974).
The trial court noted that Hager’s claim was not denied by Allstate
and that although it was “initially valued at far less than the ultimate settlement[,]
Plaintiff’s claim was settled by Defendant tendering policy limits.” Based on the
record, we agree with the trial court that a “basic flaw[] in satisfying the
commonality and typicality requirements is the undisputed evidence that Plaintiff’s
claim, though initially classified as a MIST claim upon initial notification to
Defendant, was eventually removed from the MIST classification and resolved in a
non-MIST procedure.”
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Hager’s claim initiated in the MIST unit was based on the only
information Allstate had: LaPointe’s statements regarding the accident and limited
information regarding Hager’s medical condition, treatment, history, etc. Once
Allstate received information that the damage to the vehicle was more severe than
what the MIST unit was intended to cover, it was transferred out of the MIST unit.
Nothing cited in the record illustrates that once this documentation was received, it
was not properly transferred out of the MIST unit. Further, we agree with the trial
court that nothing in the record disputes that when Hager’s claim was in the MIST
unit, Hager’s claim was not evaluated. The period the claim spent in MIST was
during an extended document-gathering phase, and as the record bears out, Hager
did not turn over a number of documents during that time for an evaluation of her
claim. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding
that Hager’s claim was not typical or common of MIST claims, resulting in a
denial of class certification.
3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that notice of its
decision denying class certification was not required to be given to putative
class members.
Hager contends that, pursuant to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’s
decision in Doe v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 407 F.3d 755
(6th Cir. 2005), notice is required to be provided to putative class members even
when class certification is denied by the trial court. Hager argues that the trial
court erred in failing to order this notice.
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To rebut Hager’s reliance on Doe, Allstate attacks Doe on three
fronts. First, Allstate argues that the events and the law applied in Doe were prior
to the 2003 revisions to F.R.C.P. 23(e), and it is, therefore, inapplicable. Allstate
explains that prior to 2003, the notice provision of F.R.C.P. 23(e) was identical to
the Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 23.05,5 and “a majority of courts and
the great weight of authority interpreted ‘dismissal’ in the rule as ‘voluntary
dismissal,’ and ‘held that the rule’s provisions did not apply when the dismissal
was not voluntary.’” (Allstate’s Br. at p. 19 (quoting 7B Charles Alan Wright et
al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1797, at 72 (3d ed. 2005))). Allstate quotes
Wright and Miller as providing that “those courts concluded, appropriately, that
because an involuntary dismissal presumably could not involve collusion or benefit
the representative plaintiffs at the expense of the remaining class members, the
protection afforded by giving notice to the absentees was not required.” Allstate
notes that “[i]n 2003, [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 23(e) was amended to
clarify that it only applies to ‘voluntary dismissals’ and only to a ‘certified class,’”
and Allstate argues that this “clarification similarly illuminates the meaning of
[Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure] 23.05.”
In Doe, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals quoted the former version
of F.R.C.P. 23(e)(1)(B), i.e., the version of the Rule before it was amended in
2003, as having “provided that a class action shall not be dismissed or
5
Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 23.05 provides: “A class action shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or
compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.”
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compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed
dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner
as the court directs.” Doe, 407 F.3d at 761 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Comparing the former version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) with the
current Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 23.05 reveals that Allstate’s argument is
correct to the extent that it states that Kentucky’s current rule mirrors the former
version of the federal rule. This leads to the second argument advanced by
Allstate.
The second attack Allstate launches against Doe is that it is
inapplicable because it was resolved under the prior version of F.R.C.P. 23(e). We
disagree because the notice provision in the prior version of the federal rule is
identical to Kentucky’s current CR 23.05. Thus, cases interpreting and applying
the prior version of the federal rule, including Doe as persuasive authority, will aid
in our interpretations and understanding of CR 23.05.
Allstate asserts as its third point that Doe is inapplicable because it
involved a voluntary dismissal, unlike the facts in this appeal. Courts interpreting
the prior version of F.R.C.P. 23(e) have typically held that prejudice to the putative
class must be considered when evaluating whether a court should exercise its
discretion to order notice.
Certainly there is a logical argument that in the absence of an order
certifying a class, no class exists to notify. We find persuasive See Salantino v.
Chase, 939 A.2d 482, 489 (Vt. 2007) that this reading is “unduly restrictive and
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contrary to the court’s role as protector of absent class members’ interests.”
(Citation omitted). The Court in Salantino cited the Advisory Committee Notes to
F.R.C.P. 23 stating that “‘[w]hether the court should require notice to be given to
members of the class of its intention to make a determination [of class
certification], or of the order embodying it, is left to the court’s discretion under
subdivision (d)(2).’” 939 A.2d at 490-91 (quoting F.R.C.P. 23, Advisory
Committee Notes).
“Case law addressing pre-certification notice generally takes a flexible
approach framed by two guiding principles: (1) the lack of collusion or bad faith,6
and (2) the existence of any reasonable reliance interest by the absent class
members.” Griffith v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone, LLP, 241 F.R.D. 600, 602 (S.D.
Ohio 2007) (citing Doe, 407 F.3d at 762-64). Consequently, “Rule 23(e) applies in
a precertification context where putative class members are likely to be
prejudiced.” Doe, 407 F.3d at 764; see also, Salantino, 939 A.2d at 490 (stating
that the bulk of cases which have reviewed this issue have allowed discretionary
application of the notice requirement to an uncertified class under Rule 23 where
prejudice is shown to a putative class).
In Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298 (4th Cir. 1978), the issue was
whether notice was required to be provided to absentee putative class members
before the trial court was permitted to approve a proposed settlement. On appeal in
that case, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held as follows:
6
Given that this case was resolved by jury trial, the issue of collusion or bad faith (in the context
of the disposition of a case filed as a class action) is not relevant to our analysis.
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[N]o notice to purported class members is required upon
the filing of a class action. Therefore, any reliance
produced by such a filing arises as a consequence of such
persons learning of the action through the news media or
some other secondary source. The danger of reliance is
thus generally limited to actions that would be considered
of sufficient public interest to warrant news coverage of
either the public or trade-oriented variety. Also, reliance
can occur only on the part of those persons learning of
the action who are sophisticated enough in the ways of
the law to understand the significance of the class action
allegation. Because this reliance interest is often thought
to be so speculative as to warrant little or no
consideration, a court should consider the relevant facts
and circumstances in order to determine whether the
possible reliance interest of the absent putative class
members in the particular case is sufficiently realistic to
make necessary class notice.
Shelton, 582 F.2d at 1315 (internal quotation marks omitted).
We find the analysis in Salatino persuasive regarding (1) the potential
hazards in ordering discretionary notice when class certification is denied and (2)
factors to consider regarding whether the putative class members are prejudiced.
The Court in Salatino thoroughly reviewed the issues, therefore its examination is
worthy of repeating herein as persuasive authority.
Ordering notice to putative class members-in addition to
precipitating litigation of notice issues-imposes
substantial time burdens and costs on the parties and the
courts. . . . Notice can “be an exceedingly costly burden,
and many times it is not necessary to protect the class.”
Glidden v. Chromalloy Am. Corp., 808 F.2d 621, 627
(7th Cir. 1986). Additionally, many courts have
recognized that ordering notice to putative class members
absent evidence of reliance would promote barratry and
could suggest that the court had made merits-based
determinations about the action. Street [v. Diamon
Offshore Drilling, No. 00-1317] 2001 WL 883216, at *1
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[(E.D. La. July 30, 2007)]; Marian Bank v. Elec.
Payment Servs., Inc., No. 95-614-SLR, 1999 WL
151872, at *2 (D. Del.1999); Rineheart [v. Ciba-Geigy
Corp.] , 190 F.R.D. [197] at 201 [(M.D. La 1999)];
Maddox & Starbuck, Ltd. v. British Airways, 97 F.R.D.
395, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Cherner v. Transitron Elec.
Corp., 201 F.Supp. 934, 936 (D. Mass. 1962). The
Advisory Committee warned that notice “should not be
used merely as a device for the undesirable solicitation of
claims.” F.R.C.P. 23, Advisory Committee Notes.
Given these countervailing interests, notice of classcertification denial is only appropriate when the denial
may “affect adversely the rights of individuals not before
the court.” Pearson [v. Ecological Science Corp.], 522
F.2d [171] at 177 [5th Cir. 1975)].
The main reason to order notice after denial of class
certification is to ensure that putative members are not
unfairly prevented from having their claims heard. While
a pending class action does not bar individuals from
filing separate claims, they may refrain from doing so
and rely on the class action to protect their interests. To
promote this practice, which furthers efficiency of
litigation and helps avoid unnecessary filings, the filing
of a class action tolls the statutes of limitation for the
class claims of all putative class members. Am. Pipe &
Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. [538] at 551, 553-54, 94
S.Ct. 756 [(1974)]. But once a court denies class
certification, the statutes of limitation run again. Crown,
Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 354, 103 S.Ct.
2392, 76 L.Ed.2d 628 (1983). The concern expressed by
the . . . plaintiffs here is that if these individuals do not
learn that class certification has been denied[,] they will
not know that the limitation period is again running, and
they may miss the opportunity to have their claims
adjudicated.
While some potential plaintiffs may lose their chance to
litigate by letting the statutes of limitation expire on their
claims . . ., absent a showing of reliance on the pending
action, there is no risk that putative class members will
be prejudiced if the court does not approve of notice that
it has denied class certification. The [lower] court
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suggests that merely restarting the running of the statutes
of limitation prejudices class members. But rather than
being prejudiced, putative class members benefitted from
the American Pipe rule, which tolled the statutes of
limitation while the class action was pending. Bantolina
v. Aloha Motors, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 26, 32 (D. Haw. 1977).
Restarting the limitation period does not prejudice the
putative class members; they are free now, as they have
been the entire time that the class action was pending, to
initiate an action against defendants. And unlike
dismissals or settlements of certified class actions, the
denial of class certification has no effect on any putative
class member’s legal interests. Putative class members
will only be prejudiced by not receiving notice that class
certification is denied when they are reasonably relying
on the pending class action to protect their interests. The
court’s discretion to provide notice of class certification
denial to putative class members must be exercised only
in that situation. Otherwise, the burdens, costs, and
barratry concerns surrounding notice weigh more heavily
than the need to protect an uncertified class. See, e.g.,
Maddox & Starbuck, 97 F.R.D. at 397; Elias v. Nat’l Car
Rental Sys., Inc., 59 F.R.D. 276, 276 (D. Minn. 1973);
see also Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 665 (7th Cir. 1981)
(rejecting the “absolute application” of Rule 23(e) to
provide notice in the precertification context because the
high costs and time delay of notice “may be injurious to
the interests of the putative class members”).
In this case, there were no actions by the court that could
have caused reasonable reliance by putative class
members on plaintiffs’ suit, and there is no evidence that
any class members were in fact relying on the suit. There
was never a decision in favor of class certification; the
court twice denied class certification, under two different
provisions of Rule 23. Neither the court nor the attorneys
provided notice to putative class members of plaintiffs’
class claim. Likewise, neither the court nor the attorneys
provided putative class members with notice that
plaintiffs had moved for class certification. . . .
Additionally, plaintiffs have not submitted any evidence
that the court or any of the attorneys had been contacted
about the litigation by putative class members, or that
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there are putative class members who actually relied on
the litigation. The only evidence of reliance might be
inferred from the media coverage of [the defendant], but
no actual evidence was introduced.
Salatino, 939 A.2d at 491-92.
From the foregoing analysis, we agree that whether to issue notice
when class certification is denied is discretionary with the court. In exercising its
discretion, the court must consider what evidence exists to illustrate a reliance on
the pending action and prejudice to the putative class members, as well as the cost
and judicial economy of the notice. Factors comprising evidence of whether there
is prejudice include actual knowledge by the putative class members that a class
action has been filed and reasonable reliance by the putative class members on the
class action to protect their interests.
Hager argues why she believes notice was required. Two points in her
brief are used to support this claim:
[1] Unless these class members are notified that the suit
has been dismissed, and that class certification has been
denied, they will be deprived of the opportunity to file
their own individual lawsuit.
[2] The trial court in the case sub judice distinguished the
Doe decision, finding that in Doe, there was a substantial
amount of publicity. However, the Doe court stated that
the “amount of publicity is simply one factor among
others that a district court should take into account when
considering whether putative class members are likely to
be prejudiced by a settlement. Although publicity is not
the sole deciding factor, the undersigned counsel has
never participated in any case that has garnered more
publicity than Hager’s. This case achieved national
publicity from media outlets across the nation, including
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PBS’ NOW, a TV news magazine, BusinessWeek, the
Chicago Tribune, the Kansas City Star, The TimesPicayune of New Orleans, Bloomberg Markets magazine
and an email circulated by KATA to all members
regarding this case.
Regarding the first point, Hager has not cited the Court to any
evidence in the record that any putative class members knew that the amended
complaints filed included class action allegations. She furthermore has not shown
any putative class members actually relied on her case. If the case had received
widespread publicity, a court may be within its discretion to presume reliance and
possibly prejudice.
In the second point urged on us by Hager, her counsel states that he
“has never participated in any case that has garnered more publicity than Hager’s.”
He thereafter, as quoted supra, sets out to illustrate this by citing to a string of
media outlets. Upon review, there are various obstacles to these comments.
To support these statements, Hager first cites to the record at Vol. 61,
R. 9115-9116, Exhibit B and R. 9117, Exhibit A to Hager’s “Motion to Alter,
Amend or Vacate.”7 Before addressing whether these exhibits suffice to illustrate
evidence of publicity of Hager’s case in such a degree that we must presume
putative class members were reasonably aware that it was filed as a class action
and were relying on it to such a degree that a failure to provide notice to them of
the denial of class certification prejudiced them, we must first address whether
7
This motion was actually styled as “PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO ALTER, AMEND OR
VACATE; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT; AND ALL OTHER MOTIONS” and
was filed after the judgment on November 2, 2007.
-22-
these exhibits were even properly before the trial court, and hence this Court. The
timing of the exhibits must also be evaluated.
Regarding timing of the publicity (which will illustrate in part whether
there was a reasonable basis for reliance), Hager’s motion for leave to file a second
amended complaint, which included only a vague reference to a class action was
granted on June 16, 2000. Thereafter, on November 30, 2001, the trial court
granted Hager’s motion to file a third amended complaint, which included more
specific allegations regarding the class action. And, on November 30, 2004, the
court again granted leave for Hager to file a fourth amended complaint, further
specifying the allegations regarding the class action. Notably, from June 16, 2000
until the trial court denied Hager’s motion to certify the case as a class action on
October 31, 2006, no one moved to intervene in the action, no additional plaintiffs
were added, and Hager has not cited this Court to even one individual in the
putative class who contacted her regarding the litigation.
Within a few days after Hager’s motion to certify the class was
denied, she filed a motion to alter, amend or vacate the order denying class
certification and moved the court to amend the order to provide language requiring
notice to all putative class members of dismissal of the class certification at
Allstate’s expense. A hearing was held on the motion on November 17, 2006.
During the hearing, the court orally mentioned the publicity in the case, noting the
KATA reference and two or three small articles over a two or three year period in
-23-
the Lexington Herald Leader.8 The court specifically questioned Hager’s counsel
if there was other publicity in the case beyond what it had cited. One of Hager’s
attorneys replied “None that I’m aware of.” And, another referenced the website
of www.allstateinsurancesucks.com. No other publicity was cited to the trial court
at that time.
In its written order following the hearing, the trial court made the
following factual findings:
Plaintiff in her brief and reply brief suggests the language
utilized by the Sixth Circuit in Doe that due to substantial
publicity there is a danger of prejudice to putative class
member[s] if there is not notification to them of the
denial of class certification. The Court finds this
unpersuasive. It is the Court’s observation that there has
been little publicity generated by this case as compared to
Doe. The fact that some media outlets have contacted
Plaintiff’s counsel and KATA (Kentucky Academy of
Trial Attorneys) has taken an interest in this case through
conferences and its publication does not rise to the level
of substantial publicity. Plaintiff’s reference to the web
site www.allstatesucks.com is misplaced. It was argued
to the Court in 1998 or 1999, is [sic] a discovery dispute
over documents, that this web site was essentially a
plaintiff’s web site utilized for the purposes of sharing
information and documents obtained through discovery
in various lawsuits, including ones similar herein, across
the country. The Court does not believe the creation of
such a web site rises to the level of substantial publicity
as the Sixth Circuit made reference in its decision in Doe.
Further, the taint of collusion does not exist in as much as
the underlying case is not being settled out from under
them as was the concern in Doe.
***
8
If these articles exist in the record, Hager has not given the Court a citation to the record where
they can be located. In reviewing the motions and orders regarding this issue, the Court did not
locate these articles for its own review.
-24-
The Court cannot find, based upon the record before the
Court any taint or prejudice adversely affecting the rights
of the putative class members.
Consequently, the trial court found that the record at the time of its
ruling did not support a finding of publicity sufficient that putative class members
would be prejudiced in the absence of notice. Thus, the trial court, in exercising its
discretion, ruled that notification was not warranted in the case at hand due to the
lack of publicity. After this ruling, Hager did not move the Court again for
certification of the class and did not file any further exhibits regarding publicity
before judgment was entered in this case.
Having set forth what evidence was before the trial court when it
made its ruling on notice and what evidence existed on the issue prior to judgment,
we now focus on the exhibits offered to this Court as proof of publicity and
prejudice to the putative class members. These exhibits cited in Hager’s appellate
brief were attached to her post-judgment motion styled as “PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO ALTER, AMEND OR VACATE; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT; AND ALL OTHER MOTIONS.”
Consequently, they appeared in the record for the first time on November 2, 2007,
which was over a year after the court denied Hager’s motion for class certification
and her motion seeking notice of the denial of class certification to the putative
class members. Hager placed these exhibits in the record after judgment was
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rendered, despite the fact that the exhibits were not relevant to the issues presented
at trial or to any issue that could serve as the basis for the relief from the judgment.
Moreover, in her post-judgment motion, Hager sought to bring in virtually every
grievance she had with the trial court’s rulings throughout the litigation.
Hager has not presented any arguments to this Court regarding how
these exhibits could be properly introduced after judgment was rendered, nor has
she met any of the foundations for which evidence can be introduced under the
post-judgment civil rules, e.g., CR 59(e), CR 60.02. See Hopkins v. Ratliff, 957
S.W.2d 300, 301-302 (Ky. App. 1997). Further, “[a] party cannot invoke CR
59.05 to raise arguments and to introduce evidence that should have been presented
during the proceedings before the entry of judgment.” Gullion v. Gullion, 163
S.W.3d 888, 893 (Ky. 2005) (note omitted). The two exhibits referencing publicity
in the case at hand do not meet any of the criteria for introducing evidence after
judgment has been rendered. Consequently, they were not properly before the trial
court and therefore are not properly before this Court.
This Court has reviewed each of the exhibits and even if they could
properly be considered, they are not the type of evidence necessary to prove the
trial court abused its discretion on this issue. Accordingly, there was no error.
Regarding the reference in Hager’s brief to the email to the Kentucky
Academy of Trial Attorneys (KATA) members, we agree with the trial court’s
ruling that this is not evidence of substantial publicity. Hager does not inform this
Court of any putative class members who were KATA members. She also does
-26-
not present any evidence that after the email was sent, it reached any putative class
members. The trial court found that the KATA contact was insufficient as
publicity requiring notice, and this Court cannot find error or an abuse of discretion
in that decision.
Turning back now to Hager’s reliance on Doe, we find that Hager’s
fact situation has little in common with Doe. We do note that in Doe, the Court
decided that “[r]ather than adopt a per se rule, most courts considering the issue
have found the level of publicity to be one of several factors appropriately
considered when examining whether putative class members are likely to be
prejudiced if the class-action case is dismissed without notice.” Doe, 407 F.3d at
763-64 (citations omitted). The Sixth Circuit thereafter “adopt[ed] the general
principle that the amount of publicity is simply one factor among others that a
[trial] court should take into account when considering whether putative class
members are likely to be prejudiced by a settlement.” Id. at 764. Consequently, in
reviewing the issue, the Court noted that in the Doe case “the local media devoted
substantial coverage of the . . . lawsuits.” Id. at 764. Given this, “[w]ithout notice
that these actions had been dismissed, the putative class members were likely
lulled into believing that their claims continued to be preserved.” Id.
We note that in Doe, the Court referenced several times that publicity
was only one factor to consider. However, in the case before us, Hager has given
no other basis for prejudice to the putative class members beyond her statements
regarding publicity. Her vague and unsupported statements about prejudice are not
-27-
evidence and are insufficient to cause this Court to decide that the trial court
abused its discretion in ruling that notice was not required. Consequently, without
the publicity necessary to support an inference that the putative class may have
been aware of the fact that Hager’s complaint was amended several times to
include a class action, we cannot find error in the trial court’s conclusion that the
putative class members were not prejudiced and, accordingly, notice of the order
denying class certification was not warranted.
4. The trial court did not commit error when it allowed discovery regarding
communications between Hager’s counsel and her expert witness, Hon. James
E. Keller.
Hager contends the trial court erred when it entered an order requiring
her to disclose privileged communications between her counsel and her expert
witness, Honorable James E. Keller. As Hager does not set forth in her original
brief what communications she is referencing, the Court is informed by Allstate’s
brief that this claim is likely based on two documents,9 (which are thereafter
referenced for the first time in Hager’s reply brief): (1) a letter from Hager’s
counsel to Justice Keller used to refresh Justice Keller’s recollection during his
deposition upon his request and (2) drafts of Justice Keller’s CR 26 disclosures.
9
Hager’s original brief lacked any detail regarding what specific discovery claim this argument
was brought under, which in turn understandably left Allstate not knowing precisely how to
respond. Allstate actually presented a third category in its brief: work-effort documents, i.e.,
documents showing how much time Justice Keller spent reviewing the case. Hager’s having
failed to present an argument on this, this issue is waived.
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Hager has not favored the Court with any case law supporting her
arguments. As legal authority, she relies on CR 26 and CR 45.04 as to what is
discoverable.
Regarding the letter, counsel references it as “the engagement letter.”
It was a five-page letter of the factual background of the matter authored by
Hager’s counsel. The letter became an issue at Justice Keller’s deposition when he
stated that he believed he asked for a letter from Hager’s counsel setting forth the
facts relating to the case. When asked in more detail regarding the letter by
Allstate’s counsel, Justice Keller asked for a recess during his deposition to review
the letter to refresh his recollection. Thereafter, he did so.
After the recess was over, Allstate’s counsel questioned him regarding
the letter. When Hager’s counsel would not produce a copy of the letter to
Allstate’s counsel, Allstate thereafter moved the trial court for a copy of the letter
pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE) 612. The trial court ordered the
letter to be produced in camera and under seal. After reviewing it, the court
ordered Hager to produce it, ruling that Allstate was entitled to the
communications and documents provided to Justice Keller from Hager’s counsel
“upon which the expert relied in formulating his opinions, and any revisions
thereto. . . .”
KRE 612 expressly recognizes the right to production of documents
used to refresh the deponent’s recollection. In relevant part, KRE 612 provides
that:
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Except as otherwise provided in the Kentucky Rules of
Criminal Procedure, if a witness uses a writing during the
course of testimony for the purpose of refreshing
memory, an adverse party is entitled to have the writing
produced at the trial or hearing or at the taking of a
deposition, to inspect it, to cross-examine the witness
thereon, and to introduce in evidence those portions
which relate to the testimony of the witness. . . .
Hager contends that the trial court’s rulings on this discovery issue
exceeded the allowable discovery pursuant to CR 26.02(4). Under Hager’s theory,
any communication or document that is not specifically covered under CR 26.02 is
precluded from discovery. Following this logic would render meaningless a
number of other Civil Rules and render KRE 612 a nullity.
The credibility of expert testimony is subject to attack and crossexamination by the opponent of such testimony. Sanborn v. Com., 892 S.W.2d
542 (Ky. 1994). This is precisely how Allstate’s counsel used the letter at trial.
While cross-examining Justice Keller at trial, Allstate’s counsel
attempted to discredit his expert opinion by eroding away the underlying
information he used to form his opinions. In part, counsel for Allstate used the
letter to elicit testimony from Justice Keller that he may have used portions of it to
become familiar with some of the facts of the case leading up to the litigation.
Justice Keller referenced the letter as a “preliminary letter that attorneys often send
to proposed experts.” Acknowledging that Hager’s counsel had an economic
incentive to win the case, Justice Keller conceded that Hager’s counsel would not
be unbiased in writing the letter. When asked about confirming the facts stated in
-30-
the letter, Justice Keller responded that he did confirm “some of them,” but not all
of them. For example, the letter set forth Hager’s injuries, but Justice Keller did
not review any of Hager’s medical records to confirm. He further testified that he
had no independent knowledge of whether Allstate made an offer prior to litigation
other than what was supplied to him by Hager’s counsel. When asked about
discrepancies in the letter regarding the monetary amount of claims falling under
MIST review when compared with the deposition testimony of Debbie Niemer, an
Allstate employee, Justice Keller stated he had not read her deposition. He
conceded this presented a conflict regarding claims handled in the MIST unit.
Justice Keller agreed that an Allstate employee should know more about MIST
than Hager’s counsel. Further, Justice Keller testified that he had not reviewed all
of the background information regarding Allstate’s attempts to get Hager’s medical
records prior to litigation. Consequently, the Court, having reviewed Justice
Keller’s trial testimony, disagreed with Hager’s contention that “there was never
testimony that Justice Keller relied upon the correspondence in forming his
opinion.”
Our standard of review of a trial court’s evidentiary rulings is an
abuse of discretion, see Tumey v. Richardson, 437 S.W.2d 201, 205 (Ky. 1969), we
find no such abuse regarding the trial court’s allowing discovery of the letter.
The second claim, and again one brought to light by Allstate but then
referenced in Hager’s reply brief, is that the trial court ordered production of the
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drafts of Justice Keller’s corrections to CR 26 disclosures to Allstate. In his
deposition testimony, Justice Keller noted that after Hager’s counsel sent him a
draft of the CR 26.02 disclosure, Justice Keller made some corrections to it and
sent it back to Hager’s counsel. Hager’s counsel thereafter made a few changes to
the CR 26.02 disclosure. Given that this information was also used to test Justice
Keller’s credibility and that to do so is patently proper, we find no abuse of
discretion.
5. A number of the issues argued by Hager involving her family and
insurance with Allstate were not properly preserved. The trial court did not
abuse its discretion regarding the issues that were properly preserved.
Hager argues that evidence involving her family and their insurance
policies with Allstate were irrelevant and should not have been permitted by the
trial court. Hager’s list of evidence which she claims is irrelevant includes: (1) her
husband’s contemporaneous claim and actions taken for policy limits for damages
from the accident in which Hager made the present claim against Allstate; (2)
Hager’s husband’s deposition and answers to interrogatories in his claim against
Allstate; (3) “medical records, related or unrelated to the accident”; (4) Hager’s
husband’s release and settlement with Allstate; (5) testimony that Mr. Hager had
been shot by a former wife; (6) the Hagers’ premium payments to Allstate; and (7)
Hager’s son’s insurance with Allstate.
-32-
For a variety of reasons regarding compliance with the standards for
appellate review, these claims fail. We will again repeat the importance of
complying with the rules for appellate procedure.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 76.12(4)(c)(v)
states, in part, that an appellant’s brief shall contain “[a]n
‘ARGUMENT’ conforming to the Statement of Points
and Authorities, with ample supportive references to the
record and citations of authority pertinent to each issue of
law....” Because [appellant’s] brief lacks any citations of
authority pertinent to the issue [at hand], it does not
comply with CR 76.12(4)(c)(v). Rather than ordering the
brief stricken for this deficiency, a more appropriate
penalty in this instance is to refuse to consider
[appellant’s] contentions. . . .Therefore, we need not
address the merits of [this] claim. . . .
Cherry, 245 S.W.3d at 781(footnote omitted).
Before analyzing the merits of the specific claims raised, two points
must be emphasized. First, a number of Hager’s claims fail because other than a
broad statement claiming irrelevance without any supporting legal citation, Hager
does not analyze the issues. Thus, she does not provide a foundation as to why the
evidence is irrelevant nor argue why the trial court abused its discretion in allowing
the evidence. Pursuant to Cherry, we need not review the merits of all claims
falling under this category.
Second, not only has Hager failed to present legal authority for some
of her claims under this category, she has not met her burden of preservation
regarding several of the claims she makes. CR 76.12(4)(c)(v) requires that the
argument section of a brief contain “ample supportive references to the record and
-33-
citations of authority pertinent to each issue of law and which shall contain at the
beginning of the argument a statement with reference to the record showing
whether the issue was properly preserved for review and, if so, in what manner.”
It is not the burden of the Court to search the record to find proof of Hager’s claims
or to try to otherwise locate where the issues were preserved. See Phelps, 103
S.W.3d at 53; Robbins, 849 S.W.2d at 572; Young v. Newsome, 462 S.W.2d 908,
910 (Ky. App. 1971). “[W]e choose to give little credence to the arguments of
either party that are not supported by a conforming citation to the record.” Smith
v. Smith, 235 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky. App. 2006). Thus, claims falling under this
category will not be reviewed.
Turning now to the specific issues raised in her brief, the Court has
reviewed thoroughly each of Hager’s statements of preservation of error and
citation to the record to determine which issues are correctly preserved. There was
no citation to the record in Hager’s preservation statement regarding her claims
that the trial court erred by allowing evidence to be introduced of (1) Mr. Hager’s
deposition in the underlying case against LaPointe; (2) “medical records, related or
unrelated to the accident”; (3) testimony that Mr. Hager had been shot by his
former wife; and (4) the Hagers’ premium payments to Allstate before and while
litigation was pending. It was Hager’s burden to correctly cite to the record where
these objections were preserved. Thus, we give no credence to these claims and
will not search out this vast record to locate them, if they exist.
-34-
In checking each of the preservation citations provided by Hager, she
listed a number of cited objections. For three of these objections she did not,
however, make any mention to them in her argument section of her brief nor did
she cite any authority for these issues.10 Thus, we decline to review them on the
merits.
Hager properly preserved and cited to objections in the record for
three arguments: (1) the objection to testimony regarding Mr. Hager’s claim for
policy limits, release and settlement;11 and (2) the objection to the introduction of
Defendant’s Exhibit 525, i.e., Mr. Hager’s answers to interrogatories in the
underlying suit against LaPointe and testimony; and (3) the issue regarding
Hager’s son being insured by Allstate. Regarding the first two issues, Hager only
listed them numerically in her argument section, without providing any analysis or
legal authority. Thus, they are not properly briefed. Consequently, we need not
review the merits of these claims. Cherry, 245 S.W.3d at 781.
Regarding her son’s insurance policy with Allstate, Hager has
presented a short argument, albeit one without any legal authority. Thus, we need
10
The three citations in Hager’s preservation statement that are not argued in her brief include:
(1) An objection regarding Allstate’s mischaracterizing or misconstruing Mr. Hager’s testimony
as stating that the window to his vehicle was “cracked or broken” during the accident. Mr.
Hager’s statement had been that the window was “knocked out.” Allstate’s counsel agreed to
restate her question in conformity to Mr. Hager’s statement;
(2) an objection regarding questions concerning Mr. Hager’s tax returns; and
(3) an objection in reference to Defendant’s Exhibit 58, which was Hager’s own release of her
claims against LaPointe and does not reference her husband’s release.
11
Although not properly argued before this Court, even if the trial court erred in admitting Mr.
Hager’s underlying release and settlement with Allstate, we cannot conclude that the outcome of
the trial would have been any different had this evidence been excluded. Therefore, any alleged
error is harmless at best. See CR 61.01.
-35-
not review the merits of it. We will, nonetheless, briefly address this issue for
manifest injustice.12 See Elwell v. Stone, 799 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. App. 1990).
During direct examination, Hager testified that she was seeking
punitive damages against Allstate because “if Allstate is punished they won’t treat
anyone like this--they will stop this process.” She then testified that she “would
hate to think that one of [her] children or grandchildren would ever have to go
through this.” On cross-examination, she testified that her “children knew she was
having trouble dealing with all of this.” Based on the context of the testimony,
“this” referenced her claim against Allstate. Hager’s counsel objected on the
grounds of relevancy to Allstate’s counsel’s line of questioning regarding Hager’s
son insuring his vehicle13 through Allstate.
Given (1) Hager’s direct testimony about not wanting her family to go
through what she had with Allstate; (2) her direct testimony about wanting to
punish Allstate for what it had put her through; (3) her direct testimony about the
distress she suffered in dealing with Allstate; and (4) her testimony that her family
12
The standard of review for relevancy, “is a determination which rests largely in the discretion of
the trial court. . . .” Green River Electric Corp. v. Nantz, 894 S.W.2d 643, 645 (Ky. App. 1995)
(quoting Transit Auth. v. Vinson, 703 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Ky. App. 1985)). “This court will not
disturb a lower court’s discretionary ruling on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” Id. Even if
we reviewed this issue under this standard rather than for manifest injustice, we find no error
with the trial court’s ruling.
13
This line of questioning began regarding the transfer of the vehicle, which the Hagers were
driving when they were in the accident, to the Hagers’ son. Thereafter, Hager was questioned on
the son’s insuring the vehicle with Allstate.
-36-
knew she was having trouble dealing with it, we find that the trial court did not
commit manifest injustice in overruling the objection.
6. There was no trial error regarding the admissibility of the MCE report,
and Hager did not object to testimony regarding the RAND and IRC.14
Hager contends the trial court committed error when it allowed
Allstate to introduce evidence of the Kentucky Insurance Commissioner’s Market
Conduct Examination (MCE) of Allstate, a RAND Institute for Civil Justice study,
and Insurance Research Council (IRC) studies. We find that these arguments
either lack merit or portions of the arguments are not properly before this Court.
We will first review issues surrounding the MCE which appear in
Hager’s original brief.15 According to Hager, the trial court erred because under
KRE 403, “the jury may have been influenced by the official character of the
report to afford it greater weight than it was worth.” She cites to Bright v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 756 F.2d 19, 23 (6th Cir. 1984), in support of this
statement. Hager contends the trial court erred in admitting the MCE report
because (1) the jury may have attached undue weight to it due to its official nature,
and (2) the report may have misled the jury to believe that because the MCE
addressed Allstate’s MIST policy, the Commonwealth condoned MIST. Hager
14
In her caption on this issue, Hager states that “The MCE, RAND and IRC Studies are
Inadmissible Hearsay.” Regarding the MCE report, the argument presented in her brief and in
her motion in limine do not reference hearsay. Regarding the RAND and IRC studies, as
examined infra, there were no hearsay objections placed on the record at any point where Hager
has cited to the Court.
15
Hager properly preserved her objection to the MCE evidence and properly cited to the Court
where this objection, as well as her motion in limine, are located in the record.
-37-
also points out that the MCE did not address Allstate’s treatment of Hager’s
individual claim.
In her original brief, Hager does not question the trustworthiness of
the MCE. Nor does she reference therein KRE 803 as a basis for relief. Hager’s
citation to legal authority in her original brief is as follows: Bright, 756 F.2d at 23,
and KRE 403.
In the Bright case, the Court’s review was based on Federal Rule of
Evidence (FRE) 803(8)(C),16 noting that to be admissible under that rule the report
“must first be a set of ‘factual findings’” and must be trustworthy. Id. at 22
(citations omitted). But, as cited to and relied upon by Hager, the Court in Bright
did note that under FRE 403 “[t]here was a substantial danger of unfair prejudice
because the jury may have been influenced by the official character of the report to
afford it greater weight than it was worth.” Id. at 23 (emphasis added). In regard
to the report’s worth, the Court stated that “[i]t would be extremely difficult and
time-consuming to evaluate the report’s trustworthiness by examining all the data
on which it was based.” Id. The Court was highly critical of the facts underlying
the report at issue, noting that it was based on “hearsay regarding lawsuits and
customer complaints without any investigation into the ground for those
complaints.” Id. Thus, the report in Bright was ruled inadmissible.
16
This rule provides that: “Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of
public offices or agencies, setting forth . . . factual findings resulting from an investigation made
pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances
indicate lack of trustworthiness [are admissible].”
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Unlike the report in the Bright case, Hager does not present an
argument or any factual allegations in her brief before this Court that the MCE was
not based on factual findings and lacked trustworthiness. Thus, while Hager’s
citation to Bright on the undue weight may have some relevance, it was the
trustworthiness of the report that concerned the Court in Bright. Consequently,
Bright gives little support to Hager’s argument.
Turning to the admissibility of the MCE Report under KRE 403, this
rule provides that
[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
“Rulings upon admissibility of evidence are within the discretion of the trial judge;
such rulings should not be reversed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of
discretion.” Simpson v. Com., 889 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Ky. 1994).
The Office of the Department of Insurance Commissioner conducted
an MCE in accordance with KRS 304.2-210. This statute set forth the purposes for
which an MCE is conducted and provides in relevant part that
[f]or the purpose of determining financial condition,
ability to fulfill and manner of fulfillment of its
obligations, the nature of its operations, and compliance
with law, the executive director shall examine the affairs,
transactions, accounts, records, and assets of each
authorized insurer as often as reasonably necessary. He
shall so examine each domestic insurer not less
frequently than every three (3) years. . . .
-39-
Allstate argues that the MCE report was properly admitted in this bad
faith case to illustrate that it had “a reasonable basis to believe that its claims
practices were appropriate and lawful.” Given that the statutory purpose of the
MCE is to determine whether an insurer is in compliance with the law, the MCE
was properly admitted.
Hager’s counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses,
including Christine Sullivan, an Assistant Vice President at Allstate in the
Property-Claim Service Organization, on the MCE report and did specifically ask
whether it was intended as an adjudication on the MIST practices, to which the
response was “no.” Hager’s counsel also had the opportunity to cross-examine
other witnesses as to whether the MCE reviewed Hager’s case. Given (1) the
probative value of the MCE report in light of the bad faith claim made against
Allstate; (2) whether Allstate had a reasonable basis to believe its practices were
lawful; and (3) Hager’s counsel’s opportunity to cross-examine witnesses on the
value of the MCE report, we cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in
allowing the MCE report to be introduced.
We now turn to Hager’s inclusion of an argument first appearing in
her reply brief: that the MCE was not admissible under KRE 803(8),17 which is an
17
Pursuant to KRE 803(8), the following are not excluded by the hearsay rules, even though the
declarant is available as a witness:
8) Public records and reports. Unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate
lack of trustworthiness, records, reports, statements, or other data compilations in any form of a
public office or agency setting forth its regularly conducted and regularly recorded activities, or
matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law and as to which there was a duty to report, or
factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law. The
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exception to the hearsay rule. There are at least two fatal problems with this
argument.
First, as noted supra, in her brief Hager claims the trial court erred in
admitting the MCE report because it would be misleading to the jury. She cites
only to Bright under KRE 403. In her brief, Hager does not argue that the MCE
lacked trustworthiness or argue KRS 803(8), which would have given Allstate an
opportunity to have responded to this claim. “Reply briefs shall be confined to
points raised in the briefs to which they are addressed. . . .” CR 76.12(4)(e). ““The
reply brief is not a device for raising new issues which are essential to the success
of the appeal.”” Best v. West American Inc. Co., 270 S.W.3d 398, 405 (Ky. App.
2008), reh’g denied (quoting Catron v. Citizens Union Bank, 229 S.W.3d 54, 59
(Ky. App. 2006) (quoting Milby v. Mears, 580 S.W.2d 724, 728 (Ky. App. 1979))).
Raising the KRE 803(8) argument for the first time in her reply brief prevented
Allstate from addressing the trustworthiness of the MCE report in its response.
Indeed, Allstate only responded to Hager’s claims under KRE 403 and did not
address KRE 803.
Second, and more fatal to Hager’s reply brief argument under KRE
803, is the fact that Hager has the same additional issue as the appellant in Best, to
wit:
following are not within this exception to the hearsay rule:
(A) Investigative reports by police and other law enforcement personnel;
(B) Investigative reports prepared by or for a government, a public office, or an agency when
offered by it in a case in which it is a party; and
(C) Factual findings offered by the government in criminal cases.
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While we could question whether the bad faith claim as
adjudicated by the trial court is essential to success of
this appeal, a more elementary problem Best has,
however, is the fact that he did not include the bad faith
claim in his prehearing statement. Pursuant to CR
76.03(8):
A party shall be limited on appeal to issues in the
prehearing statement except when good cause is shown
the appellate court may permit additional issues to be
submitted upon timely motion.
In Hager’s prehearing statement regarding the MCE report, she
references hearsay issues, juror confusion, prejudice, failure to qualify Sullivan as
an expert and “all other objections made by Plaintiffs.”18 She did not reference in
any manner the trustworthiness of the MCE or KRE 803. Hager’s not having
included these as issues on appeal in her prehearing statement and not having
moved this Court for good cause to consider her claim under KRE 803, this issue is
not properly before the Court. Had Hager properly presented this as an issue in her
prehearing statement and then in her original brief, Allstate would have had the
opportunity to rebut it. But, it was never an issue throughout the appellate
proceedings until Hager’s reply brief. Thus, it is not properly before the Court.
Hager also argues that the trial court erred when it prevented her from
rebutting “misleading evidence with statements from the Chief Market Conduct
Examiner for the Kentucky Office of Insurance, Sharon Burton, who swore that the
Kentucky Office of Insurance does not condone the illegal conduct of Allstate.” In
reviewing the record at the citation provided by Hager, Hager’s counsel was cross18
Hager’s statement that the issue was preserved by “all other objections made by Plaintiffs” is
clearly insufficient to present a claim on appeal. See, e.g., Elwell, 799 S.W.2d 46; Phelps, 103
S.W.3d at 53.
-42-
examining Sullivan and asked whether Sullivan was familiar with Burton’s
affidavit. Sullivan responded in the negative. Thereafter, it was Allstate’s counsel
who objected and asked to approach the bench to discuss Burton’s affidavit. The
court sustained Allstate’s objection, and Hager’s counsel asked for no additional
relief. Thus, this issue is waived.
Turning now to the RAND and IRC studies, Hager states in her brief
that “[t]he trial court further erred when it allowed Christine Sullivan to testify as
to the findings of the RAND and IRC studies. The court correctly excluded the
actual RAND and IRC studies but allowed Sullivan to testify at length about the
hearsay content of those studies.”19
The Court having reviewed in great detail the preservation statement
as cited by Hager, we find that this issue was not properly preserved. Hager only
objected to the introduction into evidence of the documents, which as noted supra,
she agreed was correct. She did not, however, object to Sullivan’s testimony about
these studies. In reaching this conclusion, the Court viewed the entirety of the
bench conference regarding Hager’s objection and reviewed each citation
referenced by Hager to the record regarding Sullivan’s testimony. Regarding this
issue, the Court will herein recite what Hager actually objected to during the bench
conference.
During Sullivan’s testimony, Allstate asked her to review Defendant’s
Exhibits 4 and 5. Hager’s counsel specifically objected to the “introduction” of
19
Footnote omitted.
-43-
these documents. At a bench conference regarding this objection, the trial court
stated: “Isn’t the issue . . . being raised the physical introduction of the documents
as compared to the witness’s ability to testify as to the documents she relied upon
in formulating whatever opinion or steps or actions that she may have taken based
on her review of those documents?”
One of the attorneys at the bench conference responded in the
affirmative to this question, but it is not clear from a review of the video whether it
was defense or plaintiff’s counsel. In any case, neither counsel stated otherwise.
After more debate by counsel, the court restated its ruling as follows:
I think she can testify as to not necessarily physically
introducing the documents in the record, but if they’re
documents upon which she relied among other things as
far as formulating the implementation of any policies or
procedures, I think she can testify as to that.
Counsel for both parties continued thereafter arguing whether the
RAND and IRC documents should be introduced under the public records
exception under KRE 803. The court ruled that
I think she can testify as to documents that she may have
relied upon through her course of business dealings in
formulating whatever opinions or approaches or actions
that she undertook without specifically introducing the
actual physical documents into evidence.
After more debate among counsel, the court stated its ruling again that
the witness could testify as to her conclusions and that the actions taken by Allstate
were consistent with the reports. Counsel for both parties then argued regarding
-44-
whether or not Sullivan could read the reports out loud. After debate on this,
Hager’s counsel stated, “Judge, I think you’re right. She can say what she relied
upon and her conclusions. . . .” Later, Hager’s counsel again stated that “Judge, I
think your ruling is correct.” Again, the only objection stated by Hager’s counsel
was the introduction of the RAND and IRC studies and the only ruling made by
the court regarded what Sullivan could testify to concerning the RAND and IRC
studies. The studies were not introduced into evidence. Hager’s counsel stated on
the record that the trial court’s ruling was correct. Counsel cannot agree with the
trial court and then claim error before this Court. Accordingly, this issue was
waived.
Relying on the citations to the record as given to this Court by Hager,
Hager did not place any other objections on the record to Sullivan’s testimony,
including hearsay objections. This Court is not obligated to search the record for
any such objections, if they in fact exist. Phelps, 103 S.W.3d at 53.
7. The trial court did not commit error in denying Hager’s request to call
Allstate’s expert, Dr. Shaffer, to testify after Allstate closed its case without
calling him.
Hager contends it was error when the trial court denied her request to
call Allstate’s expert, Dr. William Shaffer, as a witness after Allstate closed its
case without calling him. Hager cites in her brief regarding the trial court’s order
sustaining Allstate’s motion in limine to preclude her from calling Allstate’s expert
as the court’s relying “‘on the representation by counsel for the Defendant that Dr.
-45-
Shaffer will testify live at the trial of this matter.’” In actuality, the order goes on
to state that “[i]n the event that Dr. Shaffer is not called to testify, the Court will
reconsider permitting the Plaintiff to show the designated portions of Dr. Shaffer’s
video deposition, subject to objections and counter-designations.”
After the defense rested, Hager called Dr. Shaffer for her case in
chief, via video deposition. The court convened a bench conference to discuss the
issue. The court stated that when it previously ruled on Allstate’s motion in
limine, it had not had the opportunity to fully review the portions of Dr. Shaffer’s
deposition that Hager wanted to introduce. The court noted that at the time it made
its prior ruling, it was not really necessary for it to review the deposition because
Allstate intended to call Dr. Shaffer to testify live at the trial. Thereafter, the court
reviewed the portions of Dr. Shaffer’s deposition that Hager wanted to introduce in
anticipation of Hager’s calling him at trial if Allstate did not.
Upon the trial court’s review of Dr. Shaffer’s deposition, the court
determined that Dr. Shaffer was to testify only in rebuttal to Dr. Michael
Freeman’s testimony. The court opined that the portions of Dr. Shaffer’s
deposition that Hager wanted to present were misleading, could creates issues of
completeness and took matters out of context. The court stated that the designated
portions of Dr. Shaffer’s deposition were replete with questions regarding Hager’s
medical records, which Dr. Shaffer repeatedly stated he had not reviewed. The
court noted that Dr. Shaffer was not retained by Allstate as an expert to review
Hager’s medical records, treatment, care, etc. Consequently, the court ruled that
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the designated portions of the deposition contained questions to Dr. Shaffer for
which he was not retained as an expert; hence, they were not relevant.
Allstate maintains that it did not call Dr. Shaffer to testify at trial to
rebut Dr. Freeman’s testimony because “Dr. Freeman did not testify as to what Dr.
Shaffer was prepared to rebut, i.e., that as a general matter, treating physicians’
records are the ‘gold standard’ for determining injury causation.” In his deposition
testimony, as cited to by Allstate, Dr. Shaffer referenced what he believed were
inherent problems with medical records and the issues he saw with Dr. Freeman’s
statements. In relevant part, Dr. Shaffer testified in his deposition that
there’s always some missing piece of information. . . .
The medical records by themselves contain facts, but
they also contain untruths and . . . misleading things. . . .
That doesn’t discount the information given to me. It just
isn’t something that I look at as . . . Dr. Freeman’s
statement that this is fact, this is gold, if you will, . . . is
just . . . not – not correct.
Allstate’s argument is further supported by reviewing the portions of
Dr. Shaffer’s deposition as cited by Hager’s brief. Dr. Shaffer testified that
[m]y opinion as stated is that medical records are
inherently with error and holes as we’ve discussed over a
number of hours now; that it depends on how well all the
information is gathered, evaluated, and the conclusions
come to. . . .
When Hager’s counsel pressed Dr. Shaffer several times during his
deposition as to why Allstate did not request that he review Hager’s medical
-47-
records and why he had in fact not reviewed Hager’s medical records, Dr.
Shaffer’s response was, in relevant part as follows:
I would – you know, it became clear that they didn’t
want me to look at the medical care, but look at the
opinions of Dr. Freeman about making causation
comments about a patient. And that’s what was different
that what I’ve done in the past, yes.
***
No. They asked me to frame my look at this as to what a
senior physician would expect to be common practice for
coming to causation in a patient’s care. . . .
[Allstate wasn’t] asking my opinion about her medical
care.
Consequently, as the cited portions of Dr. Shaffer’s testimony reveal
and as relied upon by the trial court, Dr. Shaffer was retained to rebut any
statements by Dr. Freeman regarding the credibility of medical records, not to
review Hager’s medical care. Having reviewed the cited portions of Dr. Shaffer’s
deposition, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling
that the designated portions of Dr. Shaffer’s deposition that Hager wanted to
introduce were irrelevant and taken out of context. Thus, we find no error.
8. The trial court did not commit error when it excluded evidence concerning
the handling of Ariel Nicole Johnson’s claim by Allstate at trial.
Hager contends that the trial court erred in sustaining Allstate’s
motion in limine to exclude bad acts relating to the claims handling of a former
insured, Ariel Nicole Johnson. Hager provides no authority for this argument and
fails to explain under what legal precept this evidence should have been admitted.
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Consequently, we need not review the merits of this claim. Cherry, 245 S.W.3d at
781.
We briefly pause to note that despite Hager’s having failed to cite any
authority for her claim, we conclude that the trial court’s decision on this matter
was not error based upon the rationale set forth in Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. v.
Rodgers, 179 S.W.3d 815 (Ky. 2005).
9. Hager cites no authority regarding her arguments that the trial court erred
when it excluded evidence of expert Charles Cohen’s involvement in another
case.
Hager claims the trial court erred in sustaining Allstate’s motion to
exclude evidence of the involvement in another case of an expert witness, Charles
Cohen. Hager’s argument before this Court is very conclusory, consisting of three
sentences, and does not reference any legal citation or authority. Her argument
only gives an overview of the background of this issue, insufficient for proper
review by the Court.
“Because [Hager’s] brief lacks any citations of authority pertinent to
[this] issue. . ., it does not comply with CR 76.12(4)(c)(v). Rather than ordering
the brief stricken for this deficiency, a more appropriate penalty in this instance is
to refuse to consider [Hager’s] contentions regarding [this issue]. Therefore, we
need not address the merits of [Hager’s] claim that the circuit court erred by
[excluding this evidence].” Cherry, 245 S.W.3d at 781(note omitted).
10. The trial court’s order of September 26, 2007, denying Hager’s Motion in
Limine to exclude evidence of portions of Dr. Shraberg’s IME of Hager
was not in error.
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Hager fails to cite any authority in her claim that the trial court erred
in denying her motion to exclude portions of Dr. Shraberg’s IME of Hager relevant
to psychological testing. Pursuant to Cherry, 245 S.W.3d at 781 and CR
76.12(4)(c)(v), we are not required to review the merits of this claim or to give it
much credence. Given that Hager has supplied the Court with enough record
evidence, we will briefly pause, however, to review it for manifest injustice. See
Elwell, 799 S.W.2d 46.
Hager relies heavily on a ruling made in October of 1999 in regard to
Dr. Shraberg’s psychological testing of Hager during an IME.20 At issue was the
failure of LaPointe’s counsel to receive leave of the trial court for a mental
examination of Hager. LaPointe’s counsel conceded that Dr. Shraberg’s
examination went beyond the scope of what the court had previously allowed
under CR 35.01. Accordingly, the trial court granted Hager’s motion to strike Dr.
Shraberg’s testimony.
The trial court noted that its ruling did not preclude the defendant
from moving the court for permission to introduce Dr. Schraberg’s psychological
testing at a later time. As stated in its October 6, 1999 order, the court ruled that
“Defendant is not precluded from attempting to establish in the future that
Plaintiff’s mental condition is in controversy and to seek a mental examination
including psychological testing.” Consequently, the door to Dr. Schraberg’s report
20
At that point in the proceedings, Hager’s bad faith against Allstate had not been filed.
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was not forever closed, and the trial court’s later allowance of it should not be
characterized as error by Hager as the trial court “essentially condon[ing] Allstate’s
violation of a court order limiting the scope of the examination to Hager’s physical
condition only.”
Hager has failed to cite any authority to this Court that a court cannot
reserve the opportunity to revisit a prior ruling before judgment is entered. Under
the circumstances of this case, we conclude that it was well within the trial court’s
discretion to revisit the prior ruling. Consequently, the trial court did not commit
error, and Hager has not presented us with any foundation to find manifest
injustice on this claim.21
11. The trial court did not commit error in its September 26, 2007 order
denying Hager’s Motion in Limine to exclude any order of the trial court
requiring Hager to provide medical authorizations.
Hager claims the trial court erred in its September 26, 2007 order
denying her motion to exclude a prior order requiring Hager to execute medical
authorizations. The prior order referenced was entered September 17, 1999, during
the underlying litigation between the Hagers and LaPointe. The referenced order
provided that:
Pursuant to Defendant’s oral motion, the Plaintiffs will
execute a Medical Authorization using the same form of
Medical Authorization exchanged in November 1998.
21
Hager did not attack the substance of Dr. Schraberg’s report in her brief before this Court. Her
only argument went to the procedural nature underlying the CR 35.01 argument made in October
of 1999.
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Said Medical Authorizations shall be provided to
Defendant forthwith.
To place this order in context, LaPointe argued at that time that he did
not have all of the Hager’s medical records. Thus, his insurer Allstate could not
properly evaluate the claim and make an offer without reviewing these records.
Although Geary v. Schroering, 979 S.W.2d 134 (Ky. App. 1998), was
rendered at the time of the September 17, 1999 order, Hager did not argue at that
time that she was not required to sign the medical authorizations. She now argues
before this Court that the law did not require execution of such authorizations and
that the order “act[ed] like an ex parte subpoena.” Hager is correct in her
recitation of the holding of Geary, but that does not provide her any relief for a
number of reasons.
To begin with, Hager does not cite where in the record she objected
when defense counsel orally moved the trial court to order her to execute the
medical authorization in September of 1999. Rather, she has conceded that she did
not object to the order at issue. In her August 24, 2007 motion
to exclude the September 1999 order, Hager represented to the trial court that
[s]uch orders would mislead the jury into believing that
the Plaintiff was uncooperative in producing these
documents. In actuality, the Plaintiff was more than
willing to provide medical authorizations and in an effort
to cooperate during discovery and expedite the discovery
process, Plaintiff did not object to any orders
requiring production of medical authorizations.
(Emphasis added).
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By Hager’s own admission, she did not object to the prior order.
Having failed to do so, the issue is waived. Thus, we can find no error in the trial
court’s having ordered the authorizations at issue.
Even if the issue is not waived, Hager still is not entitled to relief.
The Kentucky Supreme Court has explained the impact on a case where there has
been a discovery violation, such as the one falling under Geary.
As a practical matter, whenever a discovery violation
occurs that allegedly allows discovery in error, a party
will not have an adequate remedy by appeal because
“once the information is furnished it cannot be recalled.”
[Bender v. Eaton, 343 S.W.2d 799, 800 (Ky. 1961)]. The
information may or may not be used at trial and,
generally, the admissibility of the information is not
affected by the discovery violation. See, e.g., Transit
Authority of River City v. Vinson, Ky.App., 703 S.W.2d
482, 486 (1985) (“[W]ork product immunity protects
only the documents themselves and not the underlying
facts.”) Thus, when information that is obtained from a
party in violation of the discovery rules is admitted as
evidence at trial, this fact alone does not provide grounds
for objecting to the introduction of the evidence and,
hence, an aggrieved party has no means of preserving the
issue for appeal.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dickinson, 29 S.W.3d 796, 800 (Ky. 2000) (note omitted).
Consequently, Hager’s reliance on Geary and on the trial court’s error in ordering
the execution of the medical authorization cannot alone support her objection to
introducing the order at trial.
Assuming that the issue was not waived by Hager’s admission that
she did not object to the court’s ordered medical authorization, Hager could have
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otherwise objected as noted in a footnote in the above quote. The Court in
Dickinson went on to state that
[t]his, of course, does not preclude the party from
objecting to the introduction of the evidence on some
other independent ground, e.g., that the evidence is
privileged information under the Kentucky Rules of
Evidence.
Id., at n.1.
Hager argues before us that the order made Kaplan, Hager’s counsel
at the time, appear “uncooperative.” We will presume that this statement
encompasses her argument before the trial court that introduction of the order
would unduly prejudice her.
Even assuming arguendo that the issue was not waived and that
Geary applies, many of the reasons for the holding in Geary do not apply to the
introduction of the order. The Court in Geary was particularly concerned with the
client’s privacy rights and the protection of those rights through an adversarial
process. 979 S.W.2d at 136 (An ordered executed medical authorization “would
allow [defendants] to obtain medical information without any notice to [plaintiff]
and without any means for [plaintiff] to protect her legitimate privacy interest. To
compel execution of this medical authorization would allow [defendants] to
circumvent the Rules of Civil Procedure and permit discovery without any
adversarial safeguards.”). Here, it was not the information contained in Hager’s
medical records that she sought to exclude; rather, it was the order requiring her to
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execute the authorization she sought to exclude. Given that this is a bad faith
claim,
an insured must prove three elements in order to prevail
against an insurance company for alleged refusal in bad
faith to pay the insured’s claim: (1) the insurer must be
obligated to pay the claim under the terms of the policy;
(2) the insurer must lack a reasonable basis in law or fact
for denying the claim; and (3) it must be shown that the
insurer either knew there was no reasonable basis for
denying the claim or acted with reckless disregard for
whether such a basis existed. . . .
Wittmer v. Jones, 864 S.W.2d 885, 890 (Ky. 1993).
To prove her case, Hager had to prove that Allstate “either knew there
was no reasonable basis for denying the claim or acted in reckless disregard for
whether such a basis existed. . . . [A]n insurer is . . . entitled to challenge a claim
and litigate it if the claim is debatable on the law or the facts.” Id. (quoting Fed.
Kemper Ins. Co. v. Hornback, 711 S.W.2d 844, 846-47 (Ky. 1986) (Leibson J.,
dissenting)). To defend against Hager’s bad faith claim, Allstate did what it was
entitled to do: present evidence before the jury that the claim was debatable on the
facts. Allstate’s defense was that Hager would not timely provide it with relevant
medical records so that it could make an informed decision on her claim.
Consequently, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in
determining that the order of September 17, 1999, was relevant to this issue.
12. The issue raised regarding authentication of memoranda from Kaplan’s
file was not preserved; nor did Hager present any authority in support of her
argument.
-55-
Despite failing to present legal authority in support of this argument in
compliance with Cherry, 245 S.W.3d at 781 and CR 76.12(4)(c)(v), this argument
fails for an additional reason.
A review of the testimony at issue and the objections placed on record
illustrates that Hager’s counsel did not object to the testimony regarding
memoranda in Kaplan’s file regarding authentication. Rather, Hager’s counsel’s
objection was termed that “she’s just reading from the document, a hearsay
document.” Hager’s counsel did not mention authentication of the records at issue.
Hence having failed to object on this basis and the trial court’s not having been
given an opportunity to rule on this issue, it was not properly preserved. See
Tamme v. Commonwealth., 973 S.W.2d 13, 33 (Ky. 1998) (citing Harrison v.
Commonwealth, 858 S.W.2d 172 (Ky. 1993)) (Error is not preserved if the wrong
reason is stated for the objection.).
13. Hager has failed to show palpable error regarding her argument that
Allstate misled the jury when it referenced the absence of a non-testifying
witness, Kaplan,22 in closing argument.
Hager failed to object during Allstate’s closing when its counsel
referenced Kaplan’s failure to testify. Hager claims before this Court that
nonetheless review is warranted because palpable error occurred.
[P]ursuant to CR 61.02, our Supreme Court has held that
a palpable error affecting the substantial rights of an
individual, even if insufficiently raised or preserved is
22
Although Kaplan initially represented Hager in the case against LaPointe and after the bad
faith claim was filed, he later moved to withdraw as counsel. Hager listed him as a witness for
her case.
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reviewable, and, reversible upon a conclusion that it has
resulted in manifest injustice. Herndon v. Herndon, 139
S.W.3d 822, 827 (Ky. 2004). An error is palpable only
when it is “easily perceptible, plain, obvious and readily
noticeable.” Burns v. Level, 957 S.W.2d 218, 222 (Ky.
1997). A palpable error must be so serious that it would
seriously affect the fairness to a party if left uncorrected.
Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky.
2006). Fundamentally, a palpable error determination
turns on whether the court believes there is a “substantial
possibility” that the result would have been different
without the error. Id.
Hibdon v. Hibdon, 247 S.W.3d 915, 918 (Ky.App. 2007).
Hager’s claim of palpable error has at least two fatal errors. First, she
has failed to justify how the reference to Kaplan’s failure to testify in Allstate’s
closing argument resulted in manifest injustice to her case or how absent this
statement, the outcome of her case would have been different.
Second, upon reviewing Hager’s counsel’s opening statement,
Hager’s counsel openly praised Kaplan’s work on the case several times. Thus,
Kaplan’s absence was fair comment by Allstate’s counsel and certainly did not rise
to the level of palpable error.
Beyond opening the door, Kaplan also had material information about
the case. Consequently, Allstate’s counsel’s reference to his failure to testify was
proper. See T. C. Young Const. Co. v. Brown, 372 S.W.2d 670 (Ky. 1963);
Chappel v. Doepel, 301 Ky. 622, 192 S.W.2d 809 (1946); Helton v. Prater's
Adm'r, 272 Ky. 574, 114 S.W.2d 1120 (1938)). Kaplan’s material knowledge of
the case was aptly illustrated by Hager’s counsel’s opening statements that Kaplan
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did not do anything to delay the case and that the jury did not have to believe
anything Allstate had to say about Kaplan. Accordingly, Allstate’s counsel’s
statement did not result in manifest injustice to Hager.
14. A mistrial was not warranted due to Allstate’s counsel’s opening
statements.
Hager cites to no authority for her argument. Thus, we are not
required to review the merits under Cherry, 245 S.W.3d at 781 and CR
76.12(4)(c)(v).
In any case, we briefly note that the record of the trial reveals that
Hager’s counsel objected and moved for sanctions only. He did not move for a
mistrial. “‘[F]ailure to move for a mistrial following an objection and an
admonition from the court indicates that satisfactory relief was granted.’” Howell
v. Com., 163 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Ky. 2005) (quoting West v. Commonwealth, 780
S.W.2d 600, 602 (Ky. 1989)). Accordingly, we find no error.
15. There was no error in regard to Hager’s claims of leading questions by
Allstate’s counsel.
Hager contends that “[t]he trial court committed error when it allowed
Allstate to ‘cross-examine’ Christine Sullivan, Ben Urso, Jenni Ballard, Sandra
Wade, and Frank Smith using leading questions.” Yet, Hager cites in her
preservation statement only two instances where her counsel objected and in
footnotes cites to only two witnesses, Urso and Ballard, who Hager contends were
lead by Allstate’s counsel. Thus, only those objections that were properly placed
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on the record and preserved are before this Court. See Lee v. Butler, 605 S.W.2d
20, 23 (Ky. App. 1979) (“Appellants speak of a number of leading questions but
objected to only one and we are, therefore, limited to that single instance as the
others have not been preserved for review.”).
Urso and Ballard were called by Hager during her case in chief.
Because Urso and Ballard were being cross-examined, “[o]rdinarily leading
questions should be permitted. . . .” KRE 611(c). This is so because as a general
rule when a witness is being cross-examined, he is usually aligned with the
opposing party. Given the atmosphere of an adversary nature during crossexamination, leading questions are commonly deemed permissible. Accordingly,
we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in overruling Hager’s objections.
Our decision does not change if we review this issue as Hager urges
us to: as if Urso and Ballard were being questioned on direct examination. We
recognize Hager’s argument that in actuality Urso and Ballard were not necessarily
in a conflicting role while being questioned by Allstate’s counsel. While called to
testify in Hager’s case in chief, Urso and Ballard were represented by Allstate’s
counsel. Consequently, the general rule for allowing leading questions may not
have been applicable in regard to these witnesses.
Nonetheless, even if we analyze Hager’s claim as if the witnesses at
issue were not subject to the rigors that often accompany cross-examination and
review the questioning and testimony as if on direct examination, Hager cannot
meet the very high standard to show error. When evaluating leading questions,
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[w]e must review the judge’s decision here with an
understanding that “[w]hile the use of leading questions
on direct examination is generally unacceptable . . .
judgments will not be reversed because of leading
questions unless the trial judge abused his discretion and
a shocking miscarriage of justice resulted.” Tamme v.
Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 13, 27 (Ky. 1998) (citations
omitted).
Embry v. Turner, 185 S.W.3d 209, 217 (Ky. App. 2006).
Given the numerous witnesses, exhibits, depositions and days of
testimony, we cannot say that only two instances of leading questions resulted in
“a shocking miscarriage of justice.” More importantly is the fact that Hager has
failed to explain to this Court how her case specifically was harmed, resulting in “a
shocking miscarriage of justice,” by the two instances of leading questions to
which her counsel objected and has cited to this Court. Given this, we conclude
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Hager’s objections to
leading questions by Allstate’s counsel.
While not preserved, we point out that to the degree Hager implies the
trial was permeated with leading questions by Allstate, Hager’s counsel had an
obligation to timely object to the leading questions.
KRE 103 and RCr 9.22 require that objections to the
admission of evidence be both timely and specific. As
Professor Lawson notes, the general rule is that an
objection is not timely unless it is made “as soon as the
basis for objection becomes apparent.” Lawson, The
Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook (Fourth Edition), p.
36 (2003) (citing Sallee v. Ashlock, 438 S.W.2d 538 (Ky.
1969) and Williams v. Commonwealth, 602 S.W.2d 148
(Ky. 1980)). See also, 21 Wright and Graham, Federal
Practice and Procedure: Evidence 2d, § 5037.1 (2005)
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(noting that under the very similar federal rule, to be
timely the objection must be raised as soon as the basis
for the objection is, or reasonably could be, known to the
objector.).
Winstead v. Com., 283 S.W.3d 678, 688 (Ky. 2009). Having failed to cite to any
other timely objections, any objections not otherwise cited to this Court were
waived.
16. The trial court did not commit error in overruling Hager’s motion to
strike Allstate’s pleadings for alleged “misconduct” during depositions.
Hager contends error by the trial court when it overruled her motion to
strike the pleadings of Allstate due to Allstate’s counsel “interject[ing] well over
2,000 ‘object to form’ objections” during the numerous depositions taken in this
matter. Hager’s claim lacks merit for a variety of reasons. We first note that other
than
citing that “[a]busive tactics such as this violate CR 30.02(4)(3) and CR 30.03(3),”
Hager does not reference any other authority for her claim and hence, we are not
required to review the merits thereof. Cherry, 245 S.W.3d at 781; CR
76.12(4)(c)(v).
We next note that in no manner does Hager illustrate how any of the
objections prejudiced her during the trial in this case. Because Hager has cited no
authority showing that we are to presume prejudice, we decline to do so.
We will note, however, that Hager cites to only two examples of
objections during depositions in her brief, one taken on December 14, 2004, and
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the other taken on December 15, 2004. Notwithstanding the references to only two
depositions in her brief before this Court, Hager also does not direct this Court to
any reference in the record where she brought what she calls “abusive tactics” to
the attention of the trial court until September 5, 2007, only a few weeks prior to
the trial in this matter. By that time, the case had been pending since 1998 and
many depositions had been taken several years earlier.
Despite Hager’s allegations that “[t]his tactic is used to chop up
videotape depositions to preclude using the video clips for impeachment, to create
skips in the video, [and] to divert the jury’s attention. . .,” Hager also fails to list
any video depositions that she used at trial that were affected, as she alleges, to her
prejudice.
Next, assuming arguendo that even if we accepted Hager’s
contentions of abusive tactics in the number of objections to form during the
depositions (which we do not based on the record citations before us), the Civil
Rules provided remedies to her, which she did not pursue. See, e.g., CR 30.03(4)
and CR 30.04. The trial court indicated during the hearing on the motion to strike
that, during the many years of litigation in this action, it was available to settle any
disputes regarding the depositions taken in this case.
We review the trial court’s decision to overrule the motion to strike
based on an abuse of discretion. Greathouse v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
796 S.W.2d 868, 870 (Ky. App.1990). Based on the foregoing, we cannot
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conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Hager’s motion to
strike.
17. The trial court did not commit error by dismissing a juror after opening
statements.
Hager claims that the trial court erred by dismissing juror 208 after
opening statements. The juror made the trial court aware of the fact that she knew
about the circumstances surrounding the death of Sarah Howard, who initially
handled Hager’s claim. The trial court had previously ruled that this matter would
be excluded from the trial.
Hager fails to cite any authority in support of her argument. Thus, it
fails to meet the requirements of CR 76.12(4)(c)(v). Pursuant to Cherry, 245
S.W.3d at 781, we can decline to review the merits of this argument.
We will briefly note, however, that the trial court’s decision to strike a
juror will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Lester v. Com., 132
S.W.3d 857, 863 (Ky. 2004). Contrary to Hager’s claims of error, prior appellate
decisions have upheld striking a juror after voir dire. See id.; see also, Hubbard v.
Com., 932 S.W.2d 381, 382-83 (Ky. App. 1996). Relying on prior authority and
the facts under which the juror was dismissed, we cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion.
18. There was no error in the trial court’s order of September 27, 2007, as it
related to discovery regarding Kaplan.
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Hager claims that the trial court’s order of September 26, 2007,
regarding the attorney-client privilege between her and Kaplan “prevented her
from calling Kaplan as witness and is grounds for reversal.” (Appellant’s brief at
p. 40) (emphasis added). To fully grasp this claim, it is necessary to set forth
Hager’s brief argument in its entirety:
On September 26, 2007, the trial court erred when it
granted that portion of Allstate’s Motion which sought a
ruling that there had been a subject matter waiver of the
privilege which extended to Kaplan’s communications
with Hager and others concerning the bad faith claim,
both before and after the Complaint was amended to
include such claim. Allstate relied on United States v.
Jones, and In re Grand Jury Proceedings, to argue that,
when part of a privileged communication is revealed, all
other communications relating to the same subject matter
must also be revealed. Allstate failed to bring to the
attention of the trial court, however, that neither of these
cases involved two separate actions as in the case where
there is an underlying tort and a subsequent bad faith
claim. This ruling by the court prevented Hager from
calling Kaplan as a witness and thus is grounds in and
of itself for reversal. This ruling by the court is contrary
to Riggs v. Schroering and prevented Hager from
calling Kaplan as a witness and thus is grounds in and
of itself for reversal.
(Bold emphasis added; footnotes omitted).
The Court quotes this argument in full to illustrate that Hager
contends that based on the trial court’s ruling she was prevented from calling
Kaplan as a witness and according to her, this alone is grounds for reversal. Hager
does not, however, reveal fully what transpired at the trial court with regard to her
calling Kaplan as a witness.
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At a hearing held on September 14, 2007, Hager’s counsel recounted
that Allstate had previously moved to strike Kaplan as plaintiff’s witness or to take
his discovery deposition. The court had previously ruled on the matter, overruling
the motion to strike and allowing discovery with regard to Kaplan, who was on
Hager’s witness list. At the September 14th hearing, Hager’s counsel at first
generally expressed concern that Kaplan’s deposition would result in its requesting
a continuance (which Allstate denied that it would do). The Court has thoroughly
reviewed this hearing and notes that Hager’s counsel represented to the trial court
that:
We are willing to withdraw Mr. Kaplan from being a
witness so that we may have this matter go forward in a
timely manner and so that I can devote my time to trial
preparation, which is sorely needed on my behalf . . . I’ve
got plenty to do between now and the trial date. So, I’d
like to withdraw him and render the issue moot. . .
If you’ll [the court] recall two and half years ago, I
prompted Ms. Barfield to please go ahead and take
Kaplan’s deposition. I showed you [the court] the letter
where I said I’m not going to let you [Ms. Barfield] use
this as a delay later on. I’m going to call you [Ms.
Barfield] on it in front of the judge. Then the witness list
was tendered, and I had Paul[] [Kaplan’s] name on it.
Then, they are like we had no idea even though they had
noticed his deposition two times prior that he was going
was going to be a witness. We provided several dates. . .
. He was timely disclosed on our witness list. They did
not name him. So us [sic] withdrawing him removes all
the need for the rest of that stuff that we shouldn’t have
to go through. . . . We ask the court to alleviate us of the
obligation we currently have; allow us to withdraw him
as a witness; take off several days of discovery; and
perhaps a motion for a continuance and also cut down on
trial days.
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(Emphasis added).
In deciding on Hager’s request to withdraw Kaplan as a witness, the
trial court noted that Kaplan was only listed as a witness for Hager and that
Allstate had not named Kaplan as a witness. Consequently, the trial court allowed
Hager to withdraw Kaplan as a witness.
In the September 26, 2007 order, which is the order cited as error by
Hager, the trial court memorialized its oral ruling of September 14, 2007, as
follows:
The Court originally ruled on Allstate’s Motion in
Limine to Exclude Paul Kaplan as a Witness, or in the
Alternative for a Ruling that that [sic] Kaplan’s Decision
to Testify in this Matter is a Complete Subject Matter
Waiver of Attorney-Client and Work Product Privileges
on September 12, 2007. The Court denied that portion of
the Motion seeking to exclude Kaplan as a witness. It
granted that portion of Allstate’s Motion which sought a
ruling that there had been a subject matter waiver of the
privilege which extended to Kaplan’s communications
with Hager and others concerning the bad faith claim,
both before and after the Complaint was amended to
include such claim, and those portions which sought a
ruling that the documents identified in Allstate’s
subpoena duces tecum upon Kaplan must be produced.
The Court ordered production of all such documents by
September 21, 2007.
On September 14, 2007, this matter came before
the Court again when Plaintiff moved to withdraw Paul
Kaplan as a witness. The Court orders that the Plaintiff
is permitted to withdraw Kaplan as a witness and that he
will not be a witness in Plaintiff or Defendant’s case-inchief, and that the Plaintiff is thus relieved of the
discovery obligations previously ordered by the Court.
The Court also orders that, in light of the fact
that Kaplan will not be witness for Plaintiff, the scope
of the subject matter waiver is once again limited
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from the time of Kaplan’s involvement in the
underlying action in December 1997 until the
settlement of Hager’s underlying claim in December
1999.
The Court also orders that the Plaintiff may reserve
its right to call Kaplan as a rebuttal witness, but only to
rebut any testimony or other evidence introduced by
Allstate at trial if the Plaintiff can establish that the
testimony or evidence that Kaplan would rebut could not
currently be reasonably foreseen by the Plaintiff prior to
trial. . . .
(Emphasis added).
As the record illustrates, Hager was not prevented by the trial court’s
ruling from calling Kaplan to testify. Rather, Hager withdrew Kaplan to render
the issue moot. Hager will not now be heard to complain before this Court when
she received exactly what she asked for from the trial court. A party cannot
present one argument before the trial court and another to this Court. See Kennedy
v. Com. 544 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Ky. 1976).
While the foregoing is sufficient to deny this claim, it is pertinent to
delve further into this issue. In its citation of preservation on this issue, Hager
directs the Court to her January 18, 2005 Motion for Clarification Regarding the
Scope of Paul Kaplan’s Testimony at Vol. 32, R. 4760. Relevant to the issue at
hand is the following statement in Hager’s motion:
The Plaintiff contends that Mr. Kaplan’s testimony
should be limited to the time period of December 1997
when he [Kaplan] first started working on Geneva
Hager’s case, until the day that he [Kaplan] filed an
Amended Complaint asserting bad faith allegations
against Allstate. In support of this limitation, Plaintiff
states that attorney Kaplan has worked on the bad faith
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claim and that the Defendants are not entitled to make
inquiries that are applicable to the time period after the
first claim for bad faith was made.
(Emphasis added).
In reference to when the bad faith claim was first brought, the trial
court granted Hager’s motion to amend her complaint to add the bad faith claim on
February 19, 2000. Consequently, the September 26, 2007 order of which Hager
presently claims error limited the discovery regarding Kaplan to the time period
Hager had earlier requested from the court. Again, Hager received what she
requested from the trial court and will not now be heard to complain of it.
Finally, even if somehow this Court could agree that the trial court’s
ruling “prevented” her from calling Kaplan, Hager has also not shown this Court
how she was prejudiced by this or whatever evidence or testimony she was
precluded from introducing by not calling Kaplan. And, having voluntarily
withdrawn Kaplan as a witness without reference to what evidence or testimony
Hager wanted to introduce through him, the trial court was never given the
opportunity to rule on this issue. “It is well-settled that a trial court must be given
the opportunity to rule in order for an issue to be considered on appeal, and the
failure of a litigant to bring an alleged error to the trial court’s attention is fatal to
that argument on appeal.” Baker v. Weinberg, 266 S.W.3d 827, 835 (Ky. App.
2008) (citing Hines v. Carr, 296 Ky. 78, 176 S.W.2d 99 (1943)). Consequently,
having failed to illustrate how her case was prejudiced by the ruling and having
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failed to give the trial court the opportunity to rule on the issue as presented on
appeal, we find no error.
19. The trial court did not commit error in excluding evidence of Sarah
Howard’s death.
Hager contends the trial court erred by granting Allstate’s motion in
limine to exclude evidence of Howard’s death. Specifically, Hager contends that
during the testimony of a witness regarding the work environment at Allstate, the
door was opened into the evidence regarding Howard’s death. Having failed to
present any authority on this issue, Hager does not meet the requirements under
CR 76.12(4)(c)(v), and we are not required to review the merits of this claim. See
Cherry, 245 S.W.3d at 781.
We will briefly address that this was an evidentiary ruling by the trial
court which is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review. Given the
highly inflammatory and prejudicial nature of Howard’s death when weighed
against its probative value, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in its
ruling.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
THOMPON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
KELLER, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY AND FILES
SEPARATE OPINION.
KELLER, JUDGE, CONCURRING: I concur in result only and write
separately to address specifically three areas of concern with the majority’s
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opinion. First, the majority states that Hager’s failure to object during the
underlying case to the court’s order requiring her to execute an authorization
releasing medical records amounted to a waiver of any objection to the admission
of that order in the bad faith case. I respectfully disagree.
As occurred in this case, an underlying tort claim is tried first and
separately from a bad faith claim. Proof in both claims, while it may be the same,
is offered for different reasons. In other words, what may be relevant in the tort
claim may very well not be relevant in the bad faith claim.
In Hager’s tort claim, the fact that the court ordered her to execute an
authorization releasing medical records would have no relevance. Therefore,
Hager had no evidentiary reason to object to the court’s order. However, in the
bad faith claim, Hager did have an evidentiary reason to object to admission of the
order – its potential to mislead the jury. Because the order was being used by
Allstate for a different purpose in the bad faith claim, Hager’s failure to object to
the order in the tort claim did not act as a waiver of any objection in the bad faith
claim.
Second, I note that the majority states in numerical paragraph 16 that,
“other than citing that ‘abusive tactics such as this violate CR 30.02(4)(3)23 and CR
30.03(3),’ Hager does not reference any authority for her claim and hence, we are
not required to review the merits thereof.” I agree that, in the absence of any
23
I recognize that there is no CR 30.02(4)(3); however, CR 30.02(4)(c0 does exist and addresses
video recording of depositions. I believe that what appears to be a typographical error is not
grounds to set aside an issue on appeal.
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citation to authority, this Court is not required to address an issue raised on appeal.
However, as noted by the majority, Hager cited to the Kentucky Rules of Civil of
Procedure, those rules are authority sufficient to meet the requirements of CR
76.12(4)(c)(v).
Third, with regard to Hager’s argument that Allstate’s tactics during
depositions were abusive, the majority states that Hager “did not pursue” any of
the remedies available to her under the Civil Rules. While I agree with the
majority that Hager may not have timely pursued available remedies, she did
pursue a remedy. CR 30.03(4) states that, if a court finds that counsel’s tactics
during a deposition “frustrated the fair examination of the deponent,” the court
may impose “an appropriate sanction.” Hager asked the court to strike the
depositions, which could be “an appropriate sanction.” Therefore, I believe that
the majority’s statement that Hager did not pursue any remedies is incorrect.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLEE:
J. Dale Golden
Lauren Lea Crosby
Lexington, Kentucky
Mindy G. Barfield
Lexington, Kentucky
Floyd P. Bienstock
Jon T. Neumann
Phoenix, Arizona
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