BROOKS (JAMES S.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 25, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-002475-MR
JAMES S. BROOKS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN A. HAYDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00205
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON, DIXON, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
CAPERTON, JUDGE: Appellant, James S. Brooks (Brooks), appeals the
November 14, 2007, order of the Henderson Circuit Court denying his motion to
vacate the judgment sentencing Brooks to thirty years for manufacturing
methamphetamine, trafficking in methamphetamine, and possession of drug
paraphernalia. After a review of the record and the arguments of the parties, we
affirm.
Brooks was convicted in Henderson Circuit Court after a trial by a
jury of manufacturing methamphetamine, trafficking in methamphetamine, and
possession of drug paraphernalia, and was acquitted on charges of possession of
cocaine and criminal littering. Brooks’s arrest followed police discovery of a
methamphetamine lab in his residence. Brooks tried to prove that others were
living in his residence at the time and that he had no involvement with the lab.
Nevertheless, a jury convicted Brooks on the aforementioned charges, and he was
sentenced to twenty years for the manufacturing conviction and ten years for the
trafficking conviction, the sentences to run consecutively for a total of thirty years.
A twelve-month sentence was imposed for the possession conviction to run
concurrently with the thirty-year sentence.
Brooks appealed his conviction to the Kentucky Supreme Court as a
matter of right. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Brooks argued that his
convictions for manufacturing and trafficking violated double jeopardy principles;
that there was insufficient evidence to instruct the jury on first-degree trafficking;
and that he was prejudiced by improper comments made in the Commonwealth’s
closing argument. In addition, Brooks argued error in the trial court’s evidentiary
rulings admitting ledgers of drug transactions and evidence of other crimes or bad
acts. After reviewing these issues, the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the trial
court on all grounds.
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Thereafter, Brooks field a motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to
RCr 11.42, alleging that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the jury
instructions, for failing to make a Batson objection, and in failing to object to his
conviction and sentences on double jeopardy grounds. Brooks also asserted
cumulative error. The court below summarily denied Brooks’s motion in the
aforementioned November 14, 2007, order, finding, pursuant to Stanford v.
Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d 742 (Ky. 1993), that as the merits of the motion could
be determined from the record, no evidentiary hearing was necessary. It is from
that denial that Brooks now appeals to this Court, asserting that the court below
erred in denying his claims on these issues, and that it erred in refusing to hold an
evidentiary hearing pursuant to his request.
We note at the outset that to prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a criminal defendant must meet the two-prong test set forth
in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). First, he must show that
counsel’s performance was deficient, which is to say that he must show that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Secondly, he must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense by showing that counsel’s errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.
On the issue of whether an evidentiary hearing is required, we note
that RCr 11.42 requires an evidentiary hearing only if the answer raises a material
issue of fact that cannot be determined on the face of the record. Bowling v.
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Commonwealth, 981 S.W.2d 545, 549 (Ky. 1998). Thus, if the record refutes the
claims of error, there is no need for an evidentiary hearing, nor is a hearing
necessary where the allegations, even if true, would be insufficient to invalidate the
conviction. Id. Indeed, as explained by this Court in Brewster v. Commonwealth,
723 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Ky. App. 1986):
In making its decision on actual prejudice, the trial court
obviously may and should consider the totality of the
evidence presented to the trier of fact. If this may be
accomplished from a review of the record, the defendant
is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
We review the trial court's denial of an RCr 11.42 motion for an abuse
of discretion. The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge's decision
was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.
Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) (citing 5 Am.Jur.2d
Appellate Review § 695 (1995)). We review this matter in light of the foregoing.
As his first basis for appeal, Brooks argues that counsel provided
ineffective assistance in failing to object to the jury instruction on manufacturing
methamphetamine, which provided as follows:
You will find the defendant, James S. Brooks, guilty of
Manufacturing Methamphetamine under this Instruction
if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt that in this county on or about March
26, 2004,
A. He knowingly manufactured methamphetamine
Or
B. He knowingly had in his possession with the intent to
manufacture methamphetamine all of the chemicals or all
of the equipment necessary for its manufacture.
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Brooks asserts that there was no evidence to support a conviction for
manufacturing methamphetamine under KRS 218A.1432(1)(b), and that the
instruction as written violated his right to a unanimous verdict. Particularly,
Brooks argues that there was no proof presented that he knowingly possessed all of
the equipment or chemicals to manufacture methamphetamine, and that his
attorney failed to object to the second portion of the instruction for that reason.
Brooks argues that because he did not possess anhydrous ammonia at the time of
his arrest, there was insufficient evidence to support the second portion of the jury
instruction, thereby violating his right to a unanimous verdict.
In reviewing the claims made by Brooks in this regard, the trial court
found that in the matter sub judice, there was support for the theory that Brooks
actually manufactured methamphetamine, and evidence to support a finding that he
had all of the chemicals and equipment to do so, aside from anhydrous ammonia.1
With respect to the anhydrous ammonia, the court concluded that although the
police did not find the ammonia in their search, it could be inferred from the
aforementioned circumstantial evidence that Brooks had all necessary chemicals,
and that he intended to manufacture methamphetamine using same. See Pate v.
Commonwealth, 134 S.W.3d 593 (Ky. 2004), and Varble v. Commonwealth, 125
S.W.3d 246 (Ky. 2004).
1
These materials included methamphetamine found in a syringe in the bedroom,
methamphetamine residue, and “meth cake,” a byproduct of the manufacturing process.
Evidence also existed that Brooks had all of the other chemicals and equipment necessary to
manufacture methamphetamine, including glass jars, tubing, and bottles converted into
hydrochloride gas generators, a gas mask, empty blister packs of ephedrine pills, bottles of
starter fluid, liquid fire, and stripped lithium batteries.
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In particular, the court noted that the police testified that applying
hydrochloride gas to convert the methamphetamine into soluble form was the final
stage for manufacturing the drug, and that the presence of several hydrochloride
generators in the home, along with all of the other chemicals mentioned, indicated
that someone had possessed all of the chemicals together at one point. The court
correctly stated that our law only requires that all chemicals or equipment be
possessed simultaneously at a point in time, not that they all be in the defendant’s
possession at the time of the arrest. See Varble, at 254.
Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, the trial court found that
the evidence presented in the case was sufficient to support a finding of guilt with
respect to the second portion of the instruction. Thus, in addressing this issue, the
trial court found that the instruction was not inappropriate, stating that where
multiple theories of guilt are included in jury instructions, juror unanimity is not
violated where the evidence supports a conviction under both theories pursuant to
Wells v. Commonwealth, 561 S.W.2d 85, 97 (Ky. 1978).
In reviewing the trial court’s findings on this issue, we simply cannot
find that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that both portions of the
instruction were supported by the evidence. The record undisputedly reveals that
at the time Brooks was arrested, police located all of the materials and equipment
necessary to manufacture methamphetamine inside his home, with the exception of
anhydrous ammonia. As our Supreme Court held in Varble:
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[W]here a defendant was found in possession of all of the
other chemicals necessary to manufacture
methamphetamine and there was sufficient evidence to
base a belief that the defendant had possessed anhydrous
ammonia at the same time, then it was for the jury to
decide whether he possessed those same chemicals at the
same time that he possessed the anhydrous ammonia. We
stated: “The requirement is that the chemicals or
equipment be possessed simultaneously, not that they be
possessed at the time of the arrest.”
See Pate, supra at 599, citing Varble, supra at 254.
Having reviewed the record, we agree with the trial court that the
evidence gathered in this case, and in particular the presence of hydrochloride
generators, was of a sufficient nature to allow the jury to infer that Brooks had
also, at one time, simultaneously possessed anhydrous ammonia. Accordingly, we
find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the evidence
could have supported either portion of the instruction, and we affirm.
As his second basis for appeal, Brooks argues that the trial court erred
in denying his claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to make an objection to
the racial makeup of the jury pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986),
which held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids prosecutors from exercising
preemptory challenges solely on a racial basis. In the matter sub judice, there were
three African-Americans on the panel of thirty-one, two of whom were removed
through preemptory challenges. The third juror was a member of the final panel,
but was struck as an alternate at the end of the trial.
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In denying Brooks’s motion on this issue, the trial court stated that
pursuant to controlling precedent, including Strickland, supra, a strong
presumption existed that counsel’s decision as to trial strategy was made by
utilizing reasonable professional judgment. In so finding, the court noted that
counsel’s decision not to object to the final panel could well have been reasonable
trial strategy, and noted that in any event, the third African-American juror was
removed by lot, and not by any discriminatory conduct which would violate the
Batson rule. Regardless, the court held that even if an error had occurred, it could
not conclude that any such error was so serious as to make the result of the trial
unreliable.
With respect to Brooks’s assertion that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to make a Batson objection, the Commonwealth argues simply that trial by
an all-white jury is not prima facie evidence of discrimination sufficient to require
a Batson inquiry. See Wells v. Commonwealth, 892 S.W.2d 299 (Ky. 1995).
Further, the Commonwealth directs this Court’s attention to the fact that the record
does not indicate which party struck which particular jurors, and that this further
inhibits Brooks’s ability to prove even a prima facie case of discrimination.
The Commonwealth also states that the fact that not all jurors were
removed would further diminish any Batson claim, as Brooks would be required to
show discriminatory intent in the face of evidence to the contrary. Accordingly,
the Commonwealth asserts that, considering the strong presumption set forth in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), that an attorney’s decisions as to
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trial strategy were made exercising reasonable professional judgment, the court
below was correct in finding that insufficient evidence existed in the record to
establish discriminatory intent of the nature necessary to violate Batson.
In reviewing the record, we note that the record does not reveal who
struck which jurors, and that the parties concede this to be the case. The record is
clear, however, that not all of the African-American jurors were removed by
counsel, and indeed, that the final African-American juror was removed by lot.
We are of the opinion that this evidence alone is sufficient for the trial court’s
finding, insofar as Brooks has not presented prima facie evidence of a nature
sufficient to support his allegation of a Batson violation.
Certainly, Batson requires the defense to make a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination. Only then is the burden shifted to the prosecution to
rebut such a claim. Included in this requirement is the need to show that the facts
and circumstances of the selection raise an inference that the prosecutor used
peremptory challenges to remove jurors on the basis of race. See Wells, supra, at
302.
In the matter sub judice, we believe that the trial court properly relied
upon the record in determining that no prima facie evidence existed to support an
allegation of a Batson violation. Therefore, we are also of the opinion that the trial
court properly denied Brooks’s claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to
make such an objection. Having found that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in this regard, we affirm.
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Finally, Brooks appeals the trial court’s denial of his RCr 11.42
motion asserting that counsel failed to object to his conviction and sentence on
grounds of double jeopardy. Specifically, Brooks argues that his convictions for
both trafficking and manufacturing the same methamphetamine violate double
jeopardy, and in the same vein, that counsel erred in failing to object to
consecutive sentences being imposed for a single course of conduct, pursuant to
KRS 505.020.
With respect to Brooks’s double jeopardy claims involving both
conviction and sentences, the Commonwealth states that on direct appeal, Brooks
argued that he was subjected to double jeopardy upon trial for both manufacturing
and trafficking in methamphetamine. That claim was admittedly unpreserved by
counsel, but was nevertheless addressed by our Supreme Court, who found no
double jeopardy violation. See Brooks v. Commonwealth, 217 S.W.3d 219 (Ky.
2007). The Commonwealth therefore argues that further review by this Court is
both unwarranted and impossible, as the Supreme Court’s holding is now the law
of the case.
With this latter contention, we agree. In addressing Brooks’s double
jeopardy claims, our Kentucky Supreme Court held that convictions for both
trafficking and manufacturing the same methamphetamine did not violate double
jeopardy principles, as a conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine required a
finding of intent to sell, in contrast to a conviction of manufacturing
methamphetamine which does not require that element. See Brooks, supra at 222.
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Clearly, as our Supreme Court had already reviewed Brooks’s
arguments on this issue and determined them to be without merit, the court below
was without authority to determine that counsel erred in not arguing this very issue
at trial. Accordingly, we affirm, and find that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in finding as is did, nor in finding that counsel was not ineffective in
failing to object to the consecutive sentences issued as a result of these two
separate offenses.
Finally, the Commonwealth asserts that Brooks’s claim of cumulative
error should fail, as in the face of the foregoing arguments, Brooks has failed to
establish error on any issue. Having affirmed the trial court on the foregoing
issues, we are compelled to affirm in this regard as well. Having so found, and
having determined that the record amply supported the decisions of the trial court,
we likewise cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to
hold an evidentiary hearing on the RCr 11.42 motion filed by Brooks.
Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons, we hereby affirm the November
14, 2007, order of the Henderson Circuit Court, the Honorable Stephen A. Hayden,
presiding.
DIXON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
TAYLOR, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
James S. Brooks, Pro Se
Fredonia, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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