LINDSEY (JOHN DAVID) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 16, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-002469-MR
JOHN DAVID LINDSEY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JANET P. COLEMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-00555
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: NICKELL, STUMBO, AND WINE, JUDGES.
NICKELL, JUDGE: John David Lindsey (Lindsey) appeals from a September 17,
2007, Hardin Circuit Court judgment based upon his conditional guilty plea1 to
charges of complicity to manufacture methamphetamine,2 complicity to possess a
1
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 8.09.
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1432, 502.020, a Class B felony.
controlled substance in the first-degree,3 possession of a controlled substance in the
second-degree,4 and complicity to possess drug paraphernalia.5 Lindsey was
sentenced to ten years’ confinement.6 On appeal, he argues the trial court erred by
denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from an illegal search of the
automobile in which he was a passenger in violation of his rights under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Finding that the
officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the driver of the vehicle and probable
cause to search the car, we affirm.
This appeal stems from a traffic stop in August 2005 following a
report from a Walgreens pharmacy about the purchase and attempted purchase of
multiple quantities of pseudoephedrine7 by two men. Through investigation and
surveillance, officers determined Mark Rountree (Rountree) was the driver of the
vehicle and Lindsey was his passenger. Upon stopping and searching the vehicle,
officers found several items used in the manufacture of methamphetamine
including pseudoephedrine, lithium batteries, solvents, and receipts for
pseudoephedrine, piping and a funnel. Both Rountree and Lindsey were indicted
3
KRS 218A.1415, 502.020, a Class D felony.
4
KRS 218A.1416, a Class A misdemeanor.
5
KRS 218A.500(2), 502.020, a Class A misdemeanor.
6
Lindsey was also charged under KRS 532.080 with being a persistent felony offender in the
second degree but that charge was dismissed without prejudice.
7
Pseudoephedrine is contained in over-the-counter allergy medications and is also an ingredient
used in manufacturing methamphetamine.
-2-
on multiple drug offenses in October 2005, and their cases were consolidated in
May 2006. Rountree ultimately entered a conditional guilty plea (separately from
Lindsey) to charges of complicity to possess a controlled substance in the firstdegree, complicity to possess a controlled substance in the second-degree, and
complicity to possess drug paraphernalia. Rountree was sentenced to fourteen
years’ confinement followed by five years of probation. His conviction was
affirmed by this Court in Rountree v. Commonwealth, 2008 WL 4601285
(rendered October 17, 2008, unpublished, discretionary review denied February 11,
2009).
On appeal, Rountree argued that the police officers did not have
reasonable suspicion to make the initial traffic stop and lacked probable cause to
conduct a warrantless search of his car. In Rountree, we held that the police
officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the car based on the totality of the
circumstances. We further held the warrantless search of the car constitutional
because Detective Billy Edwards (Detective Edwards) could see multiple packages
of pseudoephedrine in plain view in the car. We have included details about
Rountree’s conviction because Lindsey raises the same issues in this appeal. In the
interest of judicial economy and consistency, we adopt the facts and analysis
contained in Rountree.
On August 28, 2005, at approximately 8:00 pm,
Mark Rountree purchased two packages of over-thecounter allergy medication containing pseudoephedrine
from Walgreens. Before the purchase was complete,
Rountree was required to present his drivers [sic] license
-3-
and sign a Kentucky narcotics log. Immediately after
Rountree bought his allergy pills, another man attempted
to purchase an unknown quantity of similar allergy
medication also containing pseudoephedrine. However,
the other man did not have a driver’s license so
Walgreens refused the sale.
After Rountree left the pharmacy, a Walgreens
employee contacted the Elizabethtown Police
Department and reported that two men had attempted to
purchase pseudoephedrine, one successfully and the other
unsuccessfully due to lack of a driver's license. The
quantity of the successful purchase was reported to be 96
pills containing 5.7 grams of pseudoephedrine.8
Kentucky law prohibits the purchase of more than 9
grams of pseudoephedrine within 30 days. KRS
218A.1437. In addition to Kentucky state law, at the
time of the purchase Walgreens policy prohibited sale of
allergy pills containing a total of 6 grams or more of
pseudoephedrine at one time. Rountree's purchase was
within the legal pseudoephedrine quantity limit and
within Walgreens policy limit.
On being contacted by Walgreens, the
Elizabethtown Police conducted a record check on
Rountree based upon information contained in the
[drivers’] license record and the narcotics log. From the
information search, the police learned that Rountree
drove a maroon Dodge that was registered in Hart
County, and they began searching for Rountree at various
pharmacies in Elizabethtown. While searching for
Rountree at Walmart, Detective Billy Edwards located a
maroon Dodge Intrepid automobile. On confirming that
it was registered to Rountree, Detective Edwards
observed Rountree leave Walmart, circle around the
parking lot and adjust his wind-shield wipers. Detective
Edwards then observed another man, later identified as
Jon [sic] Lindsay [sic], enter Rountree's automobile.
Detective Edwards followed as Rountree and Lindsey
drove out of the parking lot, but Edwards did not know
8
Lindsey attempted to purchase the same amount. (footnote added).
-4-
whether Rountree or Lindsay [sic] had purchased allergy
medication or anything else at Walmart.
The police followed Rountree onto the U.S. 31-W
Bypass, where they initiated a traffic stop. Upon
approaching the automobile, the police questioned
Rountree about the pseudoephedrine he had purchased at
Walgreens. Rountree admitted to the police that he had
also purchased pseudoephedrine from other pharmacies
and that he used methamphetamine. While talking with
Rountree, Detective Edwards observed multiple packages
of allergy pills in the car. Upon seeing the pills, the
police officers searched the automobile and the search
revealed numerous allergy pills containing a total of 94
grams of pseudoephedrine, lithium batteries, solvents
used in manufacturing methamphetamine, receipts
detailing pseudoephedrine purchases from Glasgow and
Ohio, and receipts detailing purchases of piping and a
funnel. Police also searched a green eye glasses case9
inside the automobile which was found to contain
hydrocodone, aluminum foil, and a small bag of a
substance later identified as methamphetamine. Based
upon the evidence seized Rountree [and Lindsey were]
arrested.
Following his October 28, 2005, indictment, a
hearing was held on Rountree's motion to suppress
evidence seized during the search of his automobile.
Rountree claimed that both the initial stop and the
subsequent search of the automobile were unlawful and
that the evidence seized had to be suppressed.
The trial court denied Rountree's motion to suppress,
explaining[:]
It is the finding of this Court based on the fact
that Rountree had purchased the maximum
amount of pseudoephedrine allowed by the
Walgreens pharmacy and that his passenger
had also attempted to purchase
pseudoephedrine at the same pharmacy but had
9
The case was later identified as belonging to Lindsey. (footnote added).
-5-
been turned down because of lack of
identification that an articulable suspicion did
exist for the stop in this case.
Rountree, Slip Op. at *1-2 (internal footnotes omitted).
Lindsey did not join Rountree’s motion initially because at the time
the motion was filed and subsequently denied, Lindsey had no standing to
challenge the traffic stop of Rountree’s vehicle that led to his arrest because he was
merely a passenger. However, while the charges were pending against Lindsey,
the United States Supreme Court rendered Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249,
252, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2404, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007), in which it made clear a
passenger in a vehicle has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a traffic
stop but not a subsequent search of the vehicle. In the wake of Brendlin, Lindsey
filed his own motion to suppress in August 2007, mirroring Rountree’s arguments.
Following a suppression hearing, at which the parties agreed the evidence would
be the same as that previously offered during Rountree’s hearing, the trial court
adopted its prior analysis and simply replaced the name “Rountree” with “Lindsey”
in its order denying the motion to suppress on the same grounds. Thereafter,
Lindsey entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to challenge the stop
and the search of Rountree’s vehicle. This appeal followed.
The Commonwealth argues Lindsey cannot relitigate the facts and
issues already decided in Rountree. We agree. In the case sub judice, we consider
facts and issues identical to those decided in Rountree. Societal norms regarding
the constitutionality of traffic stops and warrantless searches have not significantly
-6-
changed in the brief time since Rountree was rendered and discretionary review
was denied. Thus, the analysis and the result are the same for Lindsey.
In light of Lindsey’s concerns that aspects of the record may have
been overlooked by a prior panel of this Court, we have reviewed the record
thoroughly and despite Lindsey’s argument that the Rountree court glossed over or
ignored the video footage of the traffic stop, we agree with that court’s conclusion
because it was based on sound legal principles and a correct application of
Kentucky case law to the facts. Although Lindsey believes the Rountree opinion is
incorrect, it is now final and, absent a compelling reason to do otherwise, we will
follow its precedent since Lindsey and Rountree acted in concert.
As a reviewing court, we affirm those trial court findings of fact that
are supported by substantial evidence, RCr 9.78, and give deference to those
conclusions drawn by the trial court that are not clearly erroneous. Commonwealth
v. Whitmore, 92 S.W.3d 76, 79 (Ky. 2002). Trial court findings supported by
substantial evidence are reviewed de novo to determine if the trial court has
correctly applied the law to the facts. Commonwealth v. Neal, 84 S.W.3d 920, 923
(Ky. App. 2002).
THE STOP
Lindsey argues the police officers lacked reasonable suspicion to
make the initial traffic stop because they could not have known Lindsey was the
same man referred to by the Walgreens employee in the phone call made to
Detective Chris Thompson (Detective Thompson). We disagree for three reasons.
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First, it was not unreasonable for police officers to assume Lindsey
was the same man referenced by the Walgreens employee as being in Rountree’s
company. A Walgreens employee informed Detective Thompson that one man
bought, and a second man attempted to buy, pseudoephedrine. Detective
Thompson knew Rountree was the purchaser based on the pharmacy’s narcotics
log, but he had no information about the man who had failed in his attempt to
purchase the drug due to his lack of identification. Upon locating the car registered
to Rountree in a Walmart parking lot, two detectives observed Rountree physically
leave the store, enter the car, start the engine, and remain in the parking lot until a
second individual, Lindsey, exited the store and got into the car. Because
Walgreens had reported in a single phone call that two individuals had been in
their pharmacy, the detectives reasonably believed the unknown individual
reported by Walgreens and Rountree’s companion at Walmart (Lindsey) were one
and the same.
Second, Detectives Edwards and Thompson, along with Officer Billy
Boling (Officer Boling), had reasonable suspicion to stop Rountree’s car. Police
may stop a car when they have specific and articulable facts to justify the stop
under circumstances requiring immediate action. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88
S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Commonwealth v. Marr, 250 S.W.3d
624, 627 (Ky. 2008). Police must consider the totality of the circumstances in
determining the probability that a stop is justified. U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,
-8-
417-418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); Henson v. Commonwealth,
245 S.W.3d 745, 748 (Ky. 2008).
Third, even though Rountree purchased a permissible amount of
pseudoephedrine under both Kentucky law and Walgreens policy, his purchase
exceeded the amount of medication one individual would take within a week based
on the recommended dosage instructions included on the packaging. Additionally,
a second individual, believed to be connected to Rountree, had also attempted to
purchase more than a week’s supply of the drug. From prior investigation and
experience, officers knew individuals involved in the manufacture of
methamphetamine often drove to Elizabethtown from surrounding counties to
purchase the supplies needed to produce methamphetamine. In the interest of
preventing the manufacture of methamphetamine, they needed to act quickly rather
than wait to obtain a warrant. Although the detectives could not be certain
Rountree and his companion were attempting to purchase large quantities of
pseudoephedrine to manufacture methamphetamine, when considering all of the
circumstances, we are convinced the stop was justified under Terry. Thus, in
conformity with the Rountree opinion, there was no constitutional violation.
THE SEARCH
Lindsey also argues that the warrantless search of Rountree’s car
violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution. Specifically, he argues that Detective Edwards’ testimony
conflicts with the video footage of the stop and claims that the inconsistency
-9-
proves the officers lacked probable cause to search the car. Lindsey further
contends that Detective Edwards could not have seen any contraband in “plain
view” because Officer Boling had the first opportunity to see inside the vehicle,
and he testified that nothing in the car piqued his interest.
To challenge the warrantless search of Rountree’s car, Lindsey must
show an infringement of his own Fourth Amendment rights. Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128, 133, 99 S.Ct. 421, 425, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). While Brendlin
recognized a passenger’s standing to challenge a stop of the vehicle in which he is
riding, it remains the law that a passenger does not have standing to challenge the
search of a car in which he is riding unless he has some property interest in the car.
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 134, 99 S.Ct. at 425; Commonwealth v. Fox, 48 S.W.3d 24, 28
(Ky. 2001). Lindsey lacked standing to challenge the search of Rountree’s car as
he asserted no property interest in the car.
Lindsey’s argument that the officers lacked probable cause to conduct
the search is distinct from that of Rountree due to his lack of standing. However,
had Lindsey had standing, his argument would have failed for the same reasons set
forth in Rountree because police may conduct a warrantless search of an
automobile provided they have probable cause to believe the vehicle may contain
something the law requires them to seize. Gray v. Commonwealth, 28 S.W.3d 316,
319 (Ky. App. 2000).
In comparing video of the traffic stop to Detective Edwards’
testimony, we acknowledge there are discrepancies regarding whether Rountree’s
-10-
confession preceded or followed the search. However, we have reviewed the
dashcam footage10 of the traffic stop thoroughly and are unconvinced the
conflicting evidence requires reversal because it is obvious that at least one officer
saw something of interest by shining his flashlight into the rear passenger side
windows of Rountree’s car. Although mentioned by no one, a fourth unnamed
officer, dressed in uniform, also appears in the video footage. After the fourth
officer shined his flashlight into the rear window of Rountree’s car, Detectives
Thompson and Edwards followed suit. It was not until after the three officers had
peered into the rear of the car that Rountree was removed from the vehicle and the
search occured.
The holding of Rountree does not run afoul of Arizona v. Gant, --U.S. ---, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 1723-24, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009), in which the United
States Supreme Court recently clarified two points about the search-incident-toarrest exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. First, the
doctrine of stare decisis does not require blind adherence to a long-held, albeit
erroneous, interpretation of case law. Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1723. Second, New York
v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), “does not
authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest after the arrestee
has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle.” Gant, 129 S.Ct. at
1723. Stated in the affirmative,
10
There was no audio accompanying the dashcam recording.
-11-
Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent
occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching
distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the
search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains
evidence of the offense of arrest. When these
justifications are absent, a search of an arrestee's vehicle
will be unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or
show that another exception to the warrant requirement
applies.
Id., at 1723-24. The result reached in Rountree is consistent with the holding of
Gant since “evidence of the offense of arrest,” drug paraphernalia and multiple
boxes of pseudoephedrine, were plainly visible inside the vehicle and Rountree and
Lindsey were arrested on various drug charges. Gant is factually distinguishable
since police searched Gant’s vehicle and discovered cocaine in a jacket pocket
only after arresting him for driving on a suspended license, handcuffing him, and
locking him in the back of a police cruiser. Under these circumstances, the searchincident-to-arrest exception did not justify a warrantless search because Gant could
not have accessed his car to retrieve a weapon or evidence from the vehicle, and a
search of the vehicle would not yield evidence of Gant having driven on a
suspended license. In light of these factual distinctions, we see no compelling
reason not to reach the same conclusion we reached in Rountree.
When looking at the totality of the circumstances, including the
information obtained from the Walgreens employee, the observations made in the
Walmart parking lot, and the items of interest in Rountree’s car observed by at
least three officers, it is clear that probable cause existed. Thus, the trial court’s
ruling, as stated in Rountree, is supported by substantial evidence, and its
-12-
application of the law to the facts is correct.
While the testimony of Detectives Edwards and Thompson may
conflict with the video footage of the traffic stop, we are not authorized to
determine which evidence deserves more weight. Evaluating the credibility and
weight of the evidence is the sole province of the trial court judge as the fact
finder. Bristow v. Taul, 310 Ky. 82, 85, 219 S.W.2d 641, 642 (1949). Consistent
with Rountree, we hold that the officers had both probable cause and exigent
circumstances to conduct the warrantless search. Therefore, no error occurred.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Hardin Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gene Lewter
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Courtney J. Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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