WAITE (ANTONIO JEROME) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: AUGUST 14, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-002320-MR
ANTONIO JEROME WAITE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KIMBERLY BUNNELL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CR-0826-001
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: NICKELL AND VANMETER, JUDGES; GRAVES,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
NICKELL, JUDGE: Following a jury trial, Antonio J. Waite (Waite) was
convicted of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree,2
1
Senior Judge J. William Graves sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
2
KRS 218A.1412, a Class C felony.
fleeing/evading police in the second degree,3 and being a persistent felony offender
in the second degree4 (PFO II). He was sentenced to a total of fifteen years’
imprisonment.5 He now appeals from the Fayette Circuit Court’s June 12, 2007,
denial of his motion to suppress pursuant to RCr6 9.78. Further, he requests for the
first time on appeal to this Court, a new trial due to the inadvertent destruction of a
portion of the trial record by the circuit court clerk’s office.7 For the following
reasons, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress and deny the
request for a new trial.
On March 29, 2006, detectives from the narcotics division of the
Lexington Fayette Urban County Government Division of Police received a tip
from a confidential informant. According to the tip, an individual named Paul E.
Taylor (Taylor) was selling drugs on Race Street in Lexington, Kentucky. Police
officers arrived at the specified location one to two hours later, delaying their
arrival to protect the identity of the confidential informant. Upon arrival, Waite
3
KRS 520.100, a Class A misdemeanor.
4
KRS 532.080.
5
The jury set Waite’s sentence at ten years’ imprisonment for trafficking in a controlled
substance in the first degree and six months’ imprisonment for fleeing/evading police in the
second degree, for which a fine of $500.00 was also imposed. The jury enhanced the sentence to
twenty years’ imprisonment pursuant to Waite’s status as a PFO II. However, without
explanation, the trial court imposed a sentence of only fifteen years’ imprisonment.
6
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
7
Waite’s trial was recorded on two separate compact disks. The clerk’s procedure upon
conclusion of a trial was to copy the proceedings from the master disks, in preparation for the
next recording, and then erase those proceedings from the master disks. In this case, the clerk
accidentally made two copies of the same disk instead of recording one copy of each disk. Thus,
a large portion of the recording of the guilt phase of Waite’s trial was forever lost.
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was seen “walking in concert” with a man fitting the description of Taylor given
by the informant. The narcotics detectives were the first to arrive at Race Street,
followed closely by Officer Jonathan Bastian (Officer Bastian) and Officer
William Nowlin (Officer Nowlin). When the narcotics detectives exited their
unmarked cruiser, Waite immediately turned and ran from the approaching
officers. Officer Bastian then exited his marked cruiser, and ordered Waite to stop
running. When Waite continued running, Officer Bastian gave chase. During the
foot pursuit, Officer Bastian observed Waite throw a “white or off-white”
substance which struck a nearby residence and fell to the ground. After capturing
Waite, Officers Bastian and Nowlin returned to the general location where Waite
had discarded the unknown object and retrieved a small baggie of suspected
cocaine.
Waite and Taylor were both arrested and charged in a single
indictment. The charges against Taylor were later severed and Waite was
convicted as charged in the indictment.
Waite now contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress the evidence seized following his arrest. Additionally, he seeks a new
trial based on the inadvertent destruction of a portion of the trial record by the
circuit court clerk. Waite argues his constitutional right to appellate review has
been rendered meaningless by the destruction of a portion of the video record of
the guilt phase of his jury trial. Waite contends his counsel had no opportunity to
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reformulate the events that took place at trial8 and therefore, a new trial is
mandated.
First, Waite argues Officer Bastian had insufficient reasonable,
articulable suspicion to arrest him, thus the evidence obtained should have been
excluded as the fruit of an unconstitutional search. We disagree. Following a
hearing on the matter, the trial court denied Waite’s motion to suppress the
evidence seized by written order entered on June 12, 2007. The trial court ruled
that in view of the totality of the circumstances, Officer Bastian had a reasonable,
articulable suspicion that Waite was engaged in criminal behavior. Thus, the
resulting chase and the evidence obtained following the pursuit were properly
admitted at trial.
When a pre-trial motion to suppress is heard, a trial court’s findings of
fact regarding the admissibility of evidence seized during the search are conclusive
when supported by substantial evidence. RCr 9.78; Davis v. Commonwealth, 795
S.W.2d 942, 955 (Ky. 1990); Commonwealth v. Neal, 84 S.W.3d 920, 923 (Ky.
App. 2002). Once we determine the trial court’s factual findings are supported by
substantial evidence, we review de novo the trial court’s application of those facts
to the law to determine whether its decision is correct as a matter of law. Adcock
v. Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Ky. 1998); Commonwealth v. Opell, 3 S.W.3d
747, 751 (Ky. App. 1999). Since Waite does not challenge the trial court’s
8
Different attorneys represented Waite at trial and on appeal.
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findings of fact, we will focus solely on whether the court correctly applied the
facts to the law.
“In determining whether the requisite reasonable and articulable
suspicion exists, the reviewing court must examine the totality of the
circumstances to see whether the officer had a particularized and objective basis
for the suspicion.” Commonwealth v. Marr, 250 S.W.3d 624, 627 (Ky. 2008).
Officer Bastian’s reasonable suspicion that Waite was engaged in criminal
behavior is grounded in two observations he made upon arriving at Race Street.
First, Waite appeared to be “walking in concert” with a man matching the
description given by the confidential informant. Second, Waite engaged in
unprovoked flight when the officers approached from their cruisers. In addition to
these two observations, Officer Bastian testified that Race Street was a “high
crime” area based on his three years as a police officer and his knowledge of
numerous drug busts occurring on Race Street. Although courts in Kentucky have
ruled mere presence in a high crime area is insufficient to justify reasonable
suspicion, Strange v. Commonwealth, 269 S.W.3d 847, 852 (Ky. 2008) (citing
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 676, 145 L.Ed.2d 570)
(2000)), police are permitted to take into account their knowledge of whether a
particular area is known as a high crime area when evaluating the totality of the
circumstances. Marr, 250 S.W.3d at 627.
Kentucky courts have applied Wardlow in determining whether
officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain an individual.
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Commonwealth v. Fields, 194 S.W.3d 255, 257 (Ky. 2006); Commonwealth v.
Banks, 68 S.W.3d 347, 350 (Ky. 2001). In a case factually similar to the one we
review today, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held officers reasonably concluded
Fields was engaged in criminal activity when they spotted him while patrolling a
high crime area for a suspected drug dealer. Fields, 194 S.W.3d at 257. When
Fields saw the police vehicle, he abruptly turned and walked away from the
cruiser. Id. Our Supreme Court reasoned that “unprovoked evasive maneuvers of
a suspect can provide the requisite reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify a
brief Terry9 stop investigation.” Id.
In Banks, the Court found officers had a reasonable, articulable
suspicion to believe Banks was engaged in criminal behavior by his presence in a
high crime area, his presence on the property of an apartment complex where a
“No Trespassing” sign was posted, his startled appearance, and his attempt to run
when officers approached him. Banks, 68 S.W.3d at 349. Similarly, in the case
sub judice, Waite was observed in a high crime area, “walking in concert” with a
person matching the description of the subject identified in the informant’s tip, and
he ran before officers had the opportunity to approach him.
Not only is the case at bar similar to Fields and Banks, it is similar to
Wardlow. While on patrol, officers spotted Wardlow in a high crime area and he
fled the scene when the officers approached. In deciding the officers in Wardlow
had reasonable, articulable suspicion, the United States Supreme Court linked
9
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (footnote added).
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Wardlow’s presence in a high crime area to his unprovoked flight when officers
the arrived. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124, 120 S.Ct. at 675. “It was not merely
[Wardlow’s] presence in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking that aroused the
officers’ suspicion, but his unprovoked flight upon noticing the police.” Id. The
Court then recognized that “nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in
determining reasonable suspicion.” Id. The same logic applies here. Additionally,
Officer Bastian’s observation of Waite discarding something while fleeing further
bolstered his suspicion of criminal activity.
While any of the foregoing factors may appear lawful when
considered individually, when viewed as a whole they provide a substantial basis
to hold that Officer Bastian had reasonable, articulable suspicion to pursue and
arrest Waite. Id. at 125, 120 S.Ct. at 677. Thus, we conclude the trial court, in
denying Waite’s motion to suppress, correctly found the officers had reasonable,
articulable suspicion to detain Waite.
Next, Waite contends we must grant him a new trial because a portion of the
trial record was destroyed. Waite claims his attempt to appeal has been rendered
meaningless by the destruction of a portion of the record. We disagree. While we
realize part of the video record of the trial was destroyed, CR10 75.13 allows a
party to supplement the record by compiling a narrative statement based on his
recollection of the trial, as well as that of other individuals who participated in the
original trial. Although not specifically required under the rule, courts have
10
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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generally refused to grant a new trial in the absence of an attempt to supplement
the record via a narrative statement. Davis, 795 S.W.2d at 949. Waite did not
fully avail himself of the procedure outlined in CR 75.13.
It is incumbent upon the appellant to present a complete record to this
Court for review. Steel Technologies, Inc. v. Congleton, 234 S.W.3d 920, 926 (Ky.
2007); Davis, 795 S.W.2d at 948-49. Moreover, “it is the duty of a party attacking
the sufficiency of the evidence to produce a record of the proceedings and identify
the trial court’s error. Failure to produce such a record may preclude appellate
review.” Chestnut v. Commonwealth, 250 S.W.3d 288, 303-04 (Ky. 2008). Since
Waite has failed to present this Court with a complete record, we will not
undertake a detailed analysis of the merits of his claim.
Furthermore, Waite’s only attempt at creating a narrative statement
was to contact his trial counsel. Unfortunately for Waite, his previous counsel was
unable to remember any specifics about his trial and is no longer practicing law
within the Commonwealth. Waite made no attempt to contact the
Commonwealth’s Attorney or the trial court about preparing a narrative statement
despite his stated intention to do so in the motion for an extension of time he filed
in his brief to this Court.11 Waite argues the Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney
who prosecuted him is no longer working in that office. Nevertheless, it seems
likely the Commonwealth Attorney’s office would have maintained a file with
notes about what had transpired at trial. Waite has given us no reason to excuse his
11
By order entered on August 29, 2008, we granted Waite’s motion for an extension of twenty
days to file his brief.
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failure to prepare a narrative statement. Under the facts of this case, we hold this
failure to be fatal to his request for a new trial.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court to
deny Waite’s motion to suppress and we deny his request, made for the first time
on appeal, for a new trial.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Matthew H. Jones
Louisville, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Heather M. Fryman
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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