DAY (BRADLEY ALLEN) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 4, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-002319-MR
BRADLEY ALLEN DAY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS D. NICHOLLS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00009
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: NICKELL, STUMBO, AND WINE, JUDGES.
WINE, JUDGE: On April 1, 2004, a Bracken County grand jury returned an
indictment charging Bradley Allen Day (“Day”) with one count of first-degree
sodomy involving R.F., a child less than twelve years of age. The trial court
conducted a jury trial on July 9-14, 2007. At the conclusion of trial, the jury found
Day guilty of the lesser-included offense of first-degree sexual abuse. The jury
fixed Day’s sentence at three-years’ imprisonment, which the trial court imposed.
On appeal, Day raises four grounds for error: (1) that the trial court
improperly denied his motion to exclude the documentation concerning physical
evidence due to the Commonwealth’s failure to timely produce that evidence as
required by the pretrial discovery orders; (2) that the Commonwealth improperly
introduced evidence of his move to West Virginia as evidence of flight; (3) that
the prosecutor made improper comments during cross-examination and closing
argument; and (4) that the trial court erred by answering the jury’s question during
deliberations in the guilt phase about the sentence range for the lesser included
offense. On these issues, we hold: (1) Day has not shown that he suffered any
unfair prejudice from the discovery violations; (2) the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by allowing the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of flight; (3) Day
has not shown that the improper comments affected the overall fairness of his trial;
and (4) the trial court did not err by answering the jury’s question concerning the
sentencing range for first-degree sexual abuse. Hence, we affirm the conviction.
Relevant Facts
The charges against Day arose from an incident which occurred on
February 7, 2003. Prior to that date, Day had been a friend of R.F.’s family and
had lived with the family for a short period of time. On February 7, 2003, Day
asked R.F., who was then five years old, if she would like to accompany him on a
trip to his new home in Augusta, Kentucky. When R.F. returned home later that
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evening, she told her mother that Day had taken her to his bedroom and asked her
to remove her jeans and panties. R.F. also reported that Day then knelt down at the
foot of the bed and kissed her on her legs and vagina.
Before taking R.F. to the hospital, the mother changed R.F.’s panties
and put new panties on the child. At the hospital, R.F. was examined by a doctor
and a rape kit was prepared. In addition, both R.F. and her mother spoke with a
Kentucky State Police (“KSP”) trooper. The trooper collected and bagged the
panties R.F. was wearing at the hospital. He also told the mother to put the jeans
and panties R.F. had been wearing earlier into a brown paper bag. Upon returning
home, the mother did as the trooper directed. However, the trooper did not return
to collect the clothes until several weeks later. Furthermore, the trooper did not
file a supplemental report regarding the second set of panties and the blue jeans.
The trooper initially sent these clothes for testing. However, the trooper apparently
became confused about the two sets of clothes and asked the laboratory to return
them untested.
Violation of Discovery Orders
The first issue in this case concerns the Commonwealth’s production
of the jeans and panties R.F. was wearing at the time of the incident. The panties
collected at the hospital were sent to a KSP forensic laboratory for testing. David
Hauber (“Hauber”), who conducted the initial testing, testified that the panties
tested negative for saliva and semen. He also testified that he identified four sperm
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cells on the panties under a microscope. However, additional testing revealed no
DNA foreign to R.F.
On the originally scheduled trial date, the Commonwealth informed
the defense about the panties and jeans collected at R.F.’s home. Based on this
disclosure, the trial court continued the trial date. This set of panties and jeans
were sent for testing. Three cuttings from the panties each revealed the presence of
a small number of sperm cells under a microscope. DNA testing on one of the
cuttings came back as a positive match to Day. However, one cutting came back
negative for any foreign DNA, and another cutting indicated the presence of DNA
from three different individuals.
Day presented expert testimony by Stephanie Beine (“Beine”) of
Genetic Technologies, a private DNA testing laboratory in Missouri. She stated
that she found no semen on any of the samples or any DNA that matched Day.
She also testified that the very small number of sperm cells found by the KSP
laboratories could indicate an accidental transfer. In addition, she explained how
testing results might be erroneous and how sperm cells could be misidentified.
Finally, she testified that the presence of unknown DNA on the panties could
indicate that the sample was contaminated through tampering or improper
handling.
Approximately a month before trial, Day moved to exclude the jeans
and panties collected at R.F.’s home because the Commonwealth had failed to
provide the chain-of-custody documentation. The trial court had previously
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entered several pretrial orders which required the KSP laboratories to produce,
among other things, chain-of-custody documentation for the physical evidence.
The laboratories had provided the documentation only to the Commonwealth.
Upon receiving the motion, the prosecutor provided the
documentation to the defense. The trial court denied the motion to exclude the
documentation, concluding that the defense had not been prejudiced because the
Commonwealth bore the burden of proving the chain of custody for the evidence.
At trial, the court found that, while the Commonwealth had not established a
perfect chain of custody, it had presented sufficient evidence to show a reasonable
probability that the evidence had not been altered in any material respect.
In addition, Day moved to exclude the testing notes prepared by
Hauber because they had not been produced during discovery. The trial court
denied the Commonwealth’s request to introduce the notes. However, the court
allowed Hauber to testify from his notes to refresh his memory.
Day’s discovery arguments can be narrowed down to two main points.
First, Day contends that the trial court should have excluded the panties and jeans
collected at R.F.’s home because the Commonwealth failed to provide the chainof-custody documentation in a timely manner. And second, Day argues that
Hauber’s testing notes should have been excluded due to the Commonwealth’s
failure to provide them in discovery. Although we have concerns about the
handling of the evidence and the omissions by the Commonwealth during
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discovery, we conclude that the trial court’s decisions regarding the evidence did
not amount to an abuse of discretion.
The Commonwealth attributes the delay in producing the items to the
forensic laboratories. But for whatever reason, the defense did not receive the
chain-of-custody documentation within the time provided by the discovery orders.
The trial court correctly noted that the omissions by the Commonwealth appeared
to violate the court’s discovery orders and that Day’s motion to exclude the
evidence was well-taken.
Nevertheless, a trial court has broad remedial powers for discovery
violations under Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (“RCr”) 7.24(9).
Furthermore, “[a] discovery violation justifies setting aside a conviction only
where there exists a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed the
result at trial would have been different.” Weaver v. Commonwealth, 955 S.W.2d
722, 725 (Ky.1997) (Internal quotations omitted). In this case, Day does not
identify how he was unfairly prejudiced by admission of the chain of custody
documentation.
The Commonwealth provided the documentation to the defense nearly
a month before trial. While Day suggests that the Commonwealth’s failure to
timely produce the documentation impaired his ability to challenge the chain-ofcustody evidence at trial, he does not explain how the untimely disclosure affected
his trial strategy. Furthermore, he does not argue that the Commonwealth failed to
prove a sufficient chain-of-custody for the evidence. Consequently, the trial court
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did not abuse its discretion by allowing the Commonwealth to introduce the
documentation to prove the chain of custody. See Commonwealth v. King, 950
S.W.2d 807, 809 (Ky. 1997).
Similarly, we find no abuse of discretion with respect to Hauber’s
testing notes. As the Commonwealth correctly points out, the trial court sustained
Day’s motion to exclude the notes due to the Commonwealth’s failure to produce
them before trial. Day did not request any additional relief before the trial court.
See RCr 9.22. His failure to do so indicates that the relief was satisfactory.
Howell v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Ky. 2005). Furthermore, Day
does not argue that Hauber’s testimony was inadmissible, nor does he present any
authority to suggest that the trial court erred by allowing Hauber to use the notes to
refresh his memory as provided by Kentucky Rules of Evidence (“KRE”) 612.
Consequently, Day has not shown that he is entitled to relief due to the
Commonwealth’s failure to provide the notes earlier.
Admission of Evidence of Flight
Day next argues that the trial court erred by allowing the
Commonwealth to introduce Day’s move to West Virginia because the
circumstances surrounding his move were not indicative of consciousness of guilt
and thus were inadmissible as evidence of flight. The Commonwealth correctly
notes that proof of flight to elude capture or to prevent discovery is admissible
because “flight is always some evidence of a sense of guilt.” Rodriguez v.
Commonwealth, 107 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Ky. 2003), quoting Hord v.
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Commonwealth, 227 Ky. 439, 13 S.W.2d 244, 246 (1928). But Day points out that
the cases which have allowed such evidence have involved clear evidence that the
defendant was attempting to flee the police or prosecution. For example, in
Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, supra, the defendant fled the scene within minutes of
the charged crime in a stolen car. And in Jackson v. Commonwealth, 199 S.W.3d
763 (Ky. App. 2006), the defendant fled the jurisdiction immediately after posting
bond.
In contrast, Day argues that the circumstances surrounding his move
do not clearly evidence a consciousness of guilt. On February 9, 2003, the day
after the incident, a KSP trooper contacted Day and told him about R.F.’s
allegations. Day denied the allegations. The trooper met with Day again several
weeks later. But at some time during mid-March, Day quit his job and moved to
West Virginia. Day points out that there were no charges pending or even
imminent at the time he left. He had not been told to remain in the community or
in contact with the police while the allegations were being investigated. Day was
not under a lease and his job was not a permanent position. Day states that he
moved to West Virginia to be near friends. Finally, Day did not attempt to conceal
his identity following his move. As a result, Day contends that his move to West
Virginia was not admissible as evidence of flight.
On the other hand, the Commonwealth asserts that there were other
facts about the move which supported an inference of flight. Day knew about
R.F.’s allegations and had been questioned by the police several times. He did not
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notify his employer, landlord, the police, friends or family of his move before he
left. In addition, Day did not take all of his possessions on the move, leaving
behind a truck, a television and a stereo. Furthermore, he did not have any work
lined up in West Virginia.
We question the trial court’s suggestion that Day had some duty to
remain in the area or to keep the police informed of his whereabouts. There were
no charges pending at the time Day left Bracken County, and the police had not
told him to remain in the area while the charges were being investigated.
Furthermore, we agree with Day that the circumstances surrounding his move are
ambiguous and do not clearly show a consciousness of guilt.
Some of the circumstances surrounding his departure are consistent
with innocence. And, as noted above, Day had no legal obligation to stay or to
notify the police about his move. However, there are other circumstances which
would suggest flight. Most notably, Day left the area suddenly, without notifying
his friends, family, employer or landlord. In addition, Day left behind a significant
amount of personal property.
Given these circumstances, we agree with the Commonwealth that the
evidence would support evidence of flight. Furthermore, Day had the opportunity
to rebut this inference and explain the circumstances surrounding his move.
Hamblin v. Commonwealth, 500 S.W.2d 73, 74 (Ky. 1973). Although this is a
close case, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing
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the Commonwealth to introduce Day’s move to West Virginia as evidence of
flight.
Prosecutorial misconduct
In his next argument, Day alleges two incidents of prosecutorial
misconduct. First, during his cross-examination of a defense investigator, the
prosecutor attempted to refer to the earlier suppression proceedings involving the
panties. The trial court denied Day’s motion for a mistrial. However, the trial
court sustained his objection and advised the prosecutor not to get into the
suppression issues. Day argues that he was entitled to a mistrial due to the
prosecutor’s attempt to place irrelevant procedural matters before the jury.
We disagree. A mistrial is an extreme remedy and should be resorted
to only when there appears in the record a manifest necessity for such an action or
an urgent or real necessity. Greene v. Commonwealth, 244 S.W.3d 128, 138 (Ky.
App. 2008). No such necessity existed in this case. In fact, the trial court cut off
the prosecutor’s question before it was completed. Consequently, we cannot find
that Day was unfairly prejudiced by the prosecutor’s partial reference to the earlier
suppression proceedings.
And second, Day points to a comment during the Commonwealth’s
closing argument in which the prosecutor referred to the testimony of Day’s expert
witness, Stephanie Beine, by stating, “Of course, we all know the lady in Missouri
says nobody in Kentucky knows what a sperm cell looks like.”
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Day contends that the comment unfairly characterized Beine’s
testimony as suggesting that people from Kentucky are dumb. In response, the
Commonwealth contends that the comment was not improper because the
prosecutor merely referred to the fact that Beine was from Missouri and had
criticized the KSP laboratory’s identification of sperm cells on the panties.
We agree with Day that the prosecutor’s comment suggested that
Beine’s testimony should be afforded less weight because she is from Missouri and
is criticizing the work of a Kentucky expert. Such appeals to local or sectional
prejudices are highly improper and are not to be condoned. Taulbee v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 438 S.W.2d 777, 779 (1969).
However, the rest of the prosecutor’s argument was focused on
defending Hauber’s testimony from Beine’s substantive criticisms. “[W]hen
reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct, we must focus on the overall
fairness of the trial and may reverse only if the prosecutorial misconduct was so
improper, prejudicial, and egregious as to have undermined the overall fairness of
the proceedings.” Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006)
citing Soto v. Commonwealth, 139 S.W.3d 827, 873 (Ky. 2004). Although the
prosecutor’s comment was arguably inappropriate, the attempt to appeal to local
prejudices was fairly subtle. Moreover, the statement was only a small part of an
appropriate commentary on the evidence. Under the circumstances, we cannot find
that this isolated improper comment compels reversal of Day’s conviction.
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Informing Jury of sentencing range of lesser included offense during guilt
phase
Finally, Day contends that the trial court improperly informed the jury
about the sentencing range for the lesser included offense while it was deliberating
on the guilt phase. Four hours into the jury’s deliberations, the jurors sent out a
note asking the court about the penalty for first-degree sexual assault. The trial
court provided this information to the jury over Day’s objection. Day argues that a
court may never inform the jury of the sentencing range on a lesser included
offense during the guilt phase. Citing Carter v. Commonwealth, 782 S.W.2d 597,
601 (Ky. 1990).
However, the Kentucky Supreme Court subsequently modified this
hard-line rule in Norton v. Commonwealth, 37 S.W.3d 750 (Ky. 2001). In Norton,
the Supreme Court “remain[ed] adamant that sentencing issues must not be raised
prior to the penalty phase of trial as a means to impermissibly influence the jury to
convict based on the desired penalty rather than on the elements of each given
offense.” However, they noted that there may be legitimate and appropriate
reasons to inform the jury about the range of penalties which it may be called upon
to impose. Id. at 753. Here, the trial court was responding to a specific and
unprompted question from the jurors. We find no indication that the trial court
gave this information to the jurors to impermissibly influence them to convict
based on a desired penalty. Therefore, we find no basis for reversal.
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Accordingly, the judgment of conviction by the Bracken Circuit Court
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Roy A. Durham
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Jeffrey A. Cross
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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