ANDREA SUE SWEENEY v. KING'S DAUGHTERS MEDICAL CENTER; HON. GRANT S. ROARK, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 26, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000654-WC
ANDREA SUE SWEENEY
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-04-68919
KING'S DAUGHTERS MEDICAL CENTER;
HON. GRANT S. ROARK,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON AND VANMETER, JUDGES; GRAVES,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
VANMETER, JUDGE: Andrea Sue Sweeney petitions for the review of the Workers’
Compensation Board’s opinion affirming an Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ’s) opinion
and order dismissing Sweeney’s claim for permanent benefits. For the following reasons,
we affirm.
1
Senior Judge John W. Graves, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
Sweeney was employed as an operating room nurse by King’s Daughters
Medical Center beginning in 1995. She experienced neck pain in 1999 and eventually
underwent a cervical spine fusion surgery at C5-6 in December 2002. She does not
allege that this neck pain and resulting surgery were work-related.
Approximately three months after her surgery, Sweeney returned to work
with no restrictions. She testified that she did not experience any problems with her neck
until August 2003, when she hurt her neck while pushing a stretcher. Sweeney
underwent x-rays but did not miss any work as a result of this incident.
Then on September 23, 2004, Sweeney felt a pop in her neck while she was
helping a surgeon reposition on an operating table an anesthetized patient who weighed
between 250 and 300 pounds. She testified that she saw a doctor that afternoon, and that
when she got into her car that day, her left arm was limp as if she had suffered a stroke.
Sweeney was initially placed on light duty; however, a doctor subsequently restricted her
from working at all. Sweeney’s last day of employment at King’s Daughters was
September 30, 2004, and she has not returned to any employment since.
The ALJ gave a detailed summary of the evidence presented in the matter,
including a summary of six doctors’ opinions. However, the ALJ only discussed four of
those doctors’ opinions in his analysis, findings of fact, and conclusions of law. Here, we
summarize those four doctors’ opinions, quoting from the ALJ’s summary of the
evidence.
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In favor of Sweeney’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits, Dr. David
Herr diagnosed Sweeney as having “a herniated cervical disc at C4-5 caused by the work
injury[.]” He assigned “a 28% WPI [whole person impairment] with no prior active
impairment” and opined that Sweeney “did not have the physical capacity to return to her
former job.” Similarly, Dr. Jason Rice concluded that Sweeney “had a herniated cervical
disc at C4-5 caused by the work injury” and assigned her a 15% impairment. Dr. Rice
opined that Sweeney “did not have an active impairment prior to the injury” and “could
not return to her former occupation as a nurse.”
On the other hand, Dr. Michael Best “could find no specific abnormality or
change of condition caused by the work injury.” He placed Sweeney at maximum
medical improvement (MMI), released her to return to her job as a nurse, and “assigned a
25-28% whole person impairment as a result of the surgery performed in 2002.” Dr.
Richard Sheridan diagnosed Sweeney with a “resolved acute cervical strain. He placed
her at MMI and indicated that she could return to work without restrictions.”
The ALJ found more credible Dr. Best’s and Dr. Sheridan’s opinions that
Sweeney had “no additional findings beyond those resulting from the 2002 injury and
surgery.” The ALJ found less credible Dr. Herr’s and Dr. Rice’s opinions, because each
of them opined that Sweeney did not have any active impairment/disability prior to the
2004 incident, despite her undisputed previous injury and cervical fusion. Based on this
and other evidence, the ALJ concluded that Sweeney had not sustained an injury as
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defined in KRS 342.0011(1) and dismissed Sweeney’s claim. The Board affirmed, and
this petition for review followed.
Sweeney argues that the Board erred by affirming the ALJ’s decision
because the evidence compels a finding in her favor. We disagree.
A workers’ compensation claimant bears the burden of proof regarding her
claim. Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, 673 S.W.2d 735, 736 (Ky.App. 1984). When a
claimant is unsuccessful below, as occurred here, the issue on appeal is “whether the
evidence was so overwhelming, upon consideration of the entire record, as to have
compelled a finding in his favor.” Id. Compelling evidence is that that is so
overwhelming, no reasonable person could reach the same conclusion as the ALJ. Neace
v. Adena Processing, 7 S.W.3d 382, 385 (Ky.App. 1999).
As set forth above, Dr. Best could not find any specific abnormality or
change of condition caused by Sweeney’s 2004 work incident. He assigned her a 2528% impairment, solely as a result of her 2002 surgery. While other doctors, including
Dr. Herr and Dr. Rice, opined that Sweeney’s impairment resulted from her September
2004 work injury, it was for the ALJ to determine, as the finder of fact, “the quality,
character, and substance of the evidence.” Square D Co. v. Tipton, 862 S.W.2d 308, 309
(Ky. 1993). Indeed, as fact-finder the ALJ “may reject any testimony and believe or
disbelieve various parts of the evidence, regardless of whether it comes from the same
witness or the same adversary party's total proof.” Magic Coal Co. v. Fox, 19 S.W.3d 88,
96 (Ky. 2000). Ultimately, since the ALJ’s conclusion was supported by substantial
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evidence, including Dr. Best’s opinion, a finding in Sweeney’s favor was not compelled.
See Special Fund v. Francis, 708 S.W.2d 641, 644 (Ky. 1986) (since sufficient evidence
reasonably permitted a finding against the claimant, the evidence did not compel a
finding otherwise). Thus, the Board did not misunderestimate the evidence supporting
Sweeney’s claim.
The fact that Dr. Best and Dr. Sheridan were not Sweeney’s treating
physicians does not compel a different result. As Board Chairman Gardner pointed out in
his concurring opinion, Kentucky law does not require an ALJ to “give more weight to
the evidence of the attending physician than to the evidence of the others.” See Wells v.
Morris, 698 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Ky.App. 1985). Nor is a different result compelled by
Sweeney’s allegations that 1) Dr. Sheridan “has not had any hospital privileges for about
fifteen years and runs an evaluation service traveling throughout several states
performing medical examinations for Defendants[,]” or 2) Dr. Best has “not been in an
operating room for eight to ten years and has only one eye to examine x-rays and the
like.” Simply put, the ALJ “has the sole authority to judge the weight, credibility and
inferences to be drawn from the record.” Miller v. East Kentucky Beverage/Pepsico, Inc.,
951 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Ky. 1997).
Finally, Sweeney argues that the ALJ misconstrued the law regarding preexisting conditions.2 We disagree.
Sweeney cites McNutt Constr./First Gen. Servs. v. Scott, 40 S.W.3d 854,
859 (Ky. 2001), in which the Kentucky Supreme Court held that despite changes in the
2
See generally Finley v. DBM Technologies, 217 S.W.3d 261, 265 (Ky.App. 2007).
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workers’ compensation law effective December 12, 1996, “disability which results from
the arousal of a prior, dormant condition by a work-related injury remains
compensable[.]” More specifically, the claimant in that case fell through the floor of a
house while working and suffered a lower back injury. Id. at 856. Prior to the accident,
the claimant suffered from a degenerative condition due to the natural aging process. Id.
at 857. The court affirmed the ALJ, who concluded that “no portion of the claimant’s
disability should be excluded as being attributable to the natural aging process” and
ultimately awarded permanent, total disability benefits. Id. at 857, 861.
Here, the ALJ did not misconstrue the law regarding pre-existing
conditions. Rather, he held that Sweeney had not proven that she sustained an injury,
which is defined, in part, as meaning
any work-related traumatic event or series of traumatic
events, including cumulative trauma, arising out of and in the
course of employment which is the proximate cause
producing a harmful change in the human organism
evidenced by objective medical findings.
KRS 342.0011(1). Essentially, the ALJ was not persuaded that Sweeney’s September
2004 work incident caused “a harmful change in the human organism evidenced by
objective medical findings.” As there is medical evidence supporting this conclusion, as
discussed above, the Board did not err by affirming the ALJ’s opinion.
The Board’s opinion, affirming the ALJ’s opinion and order dismissing
Sweeney’s claim for permanent benefits, is affirmed.
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DIXON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
GRAVES, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.
GRAVES, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURRING: I concur with the result
solely because I am bound to follow precedent. However, I write separately to point out
the irrational conclusion that our case law allows to an ALJ. As Justice Palmore has
stated, common sense should not be a stranger to the law.
The time is long overdue for our courts to adopt the well reasoned opinions
of the Sixth Circuit concerning the relative weight to be given to testimony of treating
and examining physicians respectively.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has repeatedly held
that the opinions of a treating physician are entitled to great weight and generally are
entitled to greater weight than the contrary opinions of a consulting physician who has
examined the claimant on only a single occasion. Farris v. Sec’y of Health and Human
Services, 773 F.2d 85, 90 (6th Cir. 1985); Harris v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 431, 435 (6th Cir.
1985); Hurst v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 53, 55 (6th Cir. 1984); Stamper v. Harris, 650 F.2d
108, 111 (6th Cir. 1981); Branham v. Gardner, 383 F.2d 614, 634 (6th Cir. 1967).
In Walker v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 980 F.2d 1066, 1070 (6th
Cir. 1992), the court held:
The medical opinion of the treating physician is to be given
substantial deference—and, if that opinion is not contradicted,
complete deference must be given. The reason for such a rule
is clear. The treating physician has had a greater opportunity
to examine and observe the patient. Further, as a result of his
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duty to cure the patient, the treating physician is generally
more familiar with the patient’s condition than are other
physicians. It is true, however, that the ultimate decision of
disability rests with the administrative law judge.
(Citations omitted.)
On two occasions, the court has described the rule as favoring the opinion
of a treating physician over the opinion of a physician who has been hired by the
government for the purpose of defending against a disability claim. Hurst v. Sec’y of
Health and Human Services, 753 F.2d 517, 520 (6th Cir. 1985); Allen v. Califano, 613
F.2d 139, 145 (6th Cir. 1980).
The court has held that the uncontradicted opinion of a treating physician is
entitled to complete deference. Cohen v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health and Human Services,
964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992); Jones v. Sec’y, Health and Human Services, 945 F.2d
1365, 1370 n.7 (6th Cir. 1991); Shelman v. Heckler, 821 F.2d 316, 320 (6th Cir. 1987).
Reliance upon the opinion of a treating physician over the contrary opinion
of a consulting physician is particularly appropriate where the severity of a claimant’s
impairment fluctuates over time. Lashley v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 708
F.2d 1048, 1054 (6th Cir. 1983).
If the Secretary rejects the opinion of a treating physician, he must
articulate a reason for doing so. Shelman, 821 F.2d at 321.
The above opinions are deserving of emulation by Kentucky courts.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
G. C. Perry, III
Heather M. Gearheart
Paintsville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE KING'S
DAUGHTERS MEDICAL CENTER:
A. Stuart Bennett
Lexington, Kentucky
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