LARRY PERKINS v. LLOYD LYNCH
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 19, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000639-MR
LARRY PERKINS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-01638
LLOYD LYNCH
APPELLEE
OPINION AND ORDER
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: MOORE AND WINE, JUDGES; ROSENBLUM,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
WINE, JUDGE: This is an appeal from an order of the Franklin Circuit Court denying a
CR 60.02 motion which was filed after appellant's election appeal was dismissed by this
Court as untimely. Because this CR 60.02 appeal was practiced as a regular appeal, it has
just recently come to the Court's attention that matters pertaining to the November 6,
2007, election are in issue. In order to resolve the appeal as expeditiously as possible, the
Court ORDERS that this appeal be assigned to a Special Panel for resolution without oral
argument.
1
Senior Judge Paul W. Rosenblum sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
After appellant Larry Perkins won a seat on the Franklin County School
Board by a single vote, his opponent, appellee Lloyd Lynch, filed a contest pursuant to
KRS 120.155 on the basis that eight ballots in one precinct did not contain the name of
either candidate. In support of his petition, Lynch filed the affidavit of the Franklin
County Clerk establishing the ballot error, the fact that eight voters had been given the
improper ballots, and that Perkins had won the election over Lynch by one vote. Perkins
did not file any evidence with the trial court. The matter was then submitted on each
party's legal memorandum, and the court heard brief oral arguments by counsel. The trial
court ultimately declared the election void.
Perkins' subsequent appeal to this Court under KRS 120.075 was dismissed
by order entered March 6, 2007, for failure to adhere to the time requirements provided in
that statute.2 He then filed the instant CR 60.02 motion to set aside the order declaring
the election void alleging that the trial court lost jurisdiction to decide the election contest
when it failed to resolve the matter within 30 days as required by KRS 120.165(2). The
trial court denied the motion on the basis of the following rationale:
Relief from judgment under CR 60.02 is an extraordinary
remedy which allows the trial court to vacate a judgment
based on facts or circumstances which were not known by the
party seeking relief or could not have been known by a party
seeking relief through the exercise of reasonable diligence.
Davis v. Home Indemnity Company, 659 S.W.2d 185, 188
(Ky. 1983). If the party seeking relief under CR 60.02 could
have raised the issue prior to judgment but simply neglected
to do so, relief from judgment under CR 60.02 is not
available. Board of Trustees of Policemen’s & Firemen’s
2
Appeal No. 2007-CA-000188-MR.
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Retirement Fund v. Nuckolls, 507 S.W.2d 183 (Ky.App.
1974). An argument based upon a statute and case law that
w[ere] on the books long before the ill-fated November
election cannot form the basis of a successful CR 60.02
motion to set aside an Order of this Court. We believe that
[Perkins] waived this argument by not bringing it to the Court
until his case was dismissed by the Court of Appeals.
We are convinced that we can add little, if anything, to the trial court's well-reasoned
analysis.
Perkins nevertheless argues that a jurisdictional defect is a matter that can
be raised at any time. While this legal precept is correct, it has no application in this
case. The second basis articulated by the trial court for denying Perkins' motion disposes
of his jurisdictional complaint as well: that the parties and the court had in fact complied
with the statutory constraints. The plain language of KRS 120.165, when construed in
the light of the facts of this case and long-standing case law, supports the trial court's
assessment. The pertinent sections of the statute provide:
(1) A contest instituted under KRS 120.155 shall proceed as
equity actions. Upon return of the summons properly
executed to the office of the circuit clerk, he shall
immediately docket the case and notify the presiding judge of
the court that the contest has been filed. The judge shall
proceed to a trial of the cause without delay. In courts having
more than one (1) judge, the judge who shall try the case shall
be determined by lot. The court shall complete the case as
soon as practicable. The action shall have precedence
over all other cases.
(2) The evidence in chief for the contestant shall be
completed within thirty (30) days after service of
summons; the evidence for the contestee shall be completed
within twenty-five (25) days after filing of answer, and
evidence for contestant in rebuttal shall be completed within
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seven (7) days after the contestee has concluded; provided
that for cause the court may grant a reasonable extension of
time to either party. (Emphasis added).
As the trial court correctly noted, the only evidence submitted in this case was the
affidavit of the Franklin County Clerk which was filed well within the 30-day time frame
afforded by the statute. Furthermore, the parties submitted an agreed order for the
submission of legal memoranda and the scheduling of oral argument. Having acquiesced
by agreement in the decisional time frame, Perkins cannot complain that he should now
be relieved of its terms. As emphasized by Kentucky’s then-highest court in Francis v.
Sturgill, 163 Ky. 650, 174 S.W. 753, 755 (1915):
While the statute with respect to contested elections requires
that they be speedily tried and disposed of, it does not require
that the court shall ignore such an agreement between the
parties to the contest as was admittedly made and carried out
in this case.
Clearly, the trial court’s properly invoked subject matter jurisdiction was not lost due to
an agreement concerning the scheduling of legal argument on timely filed evidence. The
statute itself requires only that the court “complete the case as soon as practicable” giving
it “precedence over all other cases.” On these facts, the trial court did not err in denying
Perkins' request to set its prior judgment aside.
Perkins also challenges the trial court's jurisdiction to require him to vacate
the office after the election was declared void. Again, the statutes and case law support
the decision of the trial court. KRS 120.165(4) by its own terms gives the trial court in an
election contest the authority to declare that there has been no election, in which case “the
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office shall be deemed vacant, with the same legal effect as if the person elected had
refused to qualify.” That the trial court has the concomitant authority to enforce its
judgment by requiring the successful candidate to vacate the office involved has been
confirmed in a long line of cases, including Scholl v. Bell, 125 Ky. 750, 102 S.W. 248
(1907); Francis v. Sturgill, supra; and Ellis v. Jasmin, 968 S.W.2d 669 (Ky. 1998).
Finally, we agree with Lynch that Perkins' argument concerning costs has
not been properly preserved for our review. Nothing in the order appealed from
addresses the award of costs.
In sum, because the opinion of the trial court is supported by the election
contest statutes and case law concerning postjudgment remedies, we affirm the judgment
denying Perkins' motion for CR 60.02 relief.
ALL CONCUR.
ENTERED: October 19, 2007
/s/ Thomas B. Wine
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Carl E. Knochelmann, Jr.
Covington, Kentucky
Richard M. Guarnieri
Frankfort, Kentucky
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