ST. JOSEPH HOSPITAL v. PAMELA LITTLETON-GOODAN; R. SCOTT BORDERS, ALJ; WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: AUGUST 10, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000633-WC
ST. JOSEPH HOSPITAL
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-91-49311
PAMELA LITTLETON-GOODAN;
R. SCOTT BORDERS, ALJ; WORKERS'
COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON AND VANMETER, JUDGES; GRAVES,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
GRAVES, SENIOR JUDGE: St. Joseph Hospital appeals from an opinion of the
Workers' Compensation Board (Board) insofar as the opinion upheld the Administrative
Law Judge's (ALJ) consideration of a Department of Workers' Claims Form 107 medical
report filed into the record in the original proceedings, but not specifically designated as
part of the reopening record following St. Joseph's petition to reopen. St. Joseph
1
Senior Judge J. William Graves sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
reopened the case to contest its liability for medical and prescription medication expenses
alleged by its former employee, Pamela Littleton-Goodan, to be connected with a workrelated injury while in the Hospital's employ. We affirm.
Littleton-Goodan originally brought a claim for occupational disability
benefits alleging a work-related repetitive trauma injury (alleged bilateral carpal tunnel
syndrome and thoracic outlet syndrome) that became manifest in May of 1991. On April
14, 1997, the parties entered into a settlement agreement for a lump-sum payment based
upon a 5% disability rating. The settlement did not include a waiver of future medical
expenses; however, it was noted within the agreement that the hospital disputed whether
Littleton-Goodan's condition was work-related.
Littleton-Goodan subsequently incurred expenses for medical fees and drug
expenses in connection with ongoing treatment provided by Dr. Erdagon Atasoy.
Littleton-Gordon attributed the expenses to her 1991 injury, and sought payment from St.
Joseph. St. Joseph contested payment responsibility, and filed a motion to reopen and
medical fee dispute contending that Littleton-Goodan's carpal tunnel syndrome and
thoracic outlet syndrome were not causally related to her work at the hospital. The matter
was referred to the ALJ for further adjudication.
Following an evidentiary hearing, on October 2, 2006, the ALJ issued an
opinion and award dismissing the hospital's challenge to the medical and drug expenses.
The opinion stated, in relevant part, as follows:
Dr. Atasoy is consistent throughout his records in
contributing her bilateral thoracic outlet compression to her
-2-
employment as reflected by encircling yes in regard to
whether the condition is work-related.
In addition to the medical records of Dr. Atasoy a Form 107
was submitted. The form was prepared by Dr. Atasoy on
August 20, 1996. In this Form 107 Dr. Atasoy diagnoses the
Plaintiff as having bilateral thoracic outlet compression,
bilateral myofacitis, and right rotator cuff tendinitis. He
opined within reasonable medical probability her complaints
were felt to be related to the nature of the responsibilities of
her work which he states requires repetitive motion and which
in part arouses a pre-existing dormant non-disabling condition
into disabling reality.
In fact, Dr. Atasoy at the time assessed her a 15% functional
impairment rating to the body as a whole.
The Plaintiff submitted the medical report of Dr. Warren
Breidenbach, hand surgeon. Dr. Breidenbach saw the
Plaintiff on January 13, 2006, for a second opinion for
Workers' Compensation regarding her complaints of bilateral
minimal sensation in her hands, bilateral neck, chest, shoulder
muscle pains, and headaches. He was advised she treated
with Dr. Atasoy and have been treated with medication,
multiple trigger point injections as well as undergoing scalene
muscle injections of 1995.
However, due to her other health concerns no more injections
have been performed. He was also advised that the Plaintiff
felt her symptoms were secondary to repetitive motion at
work which began around 1991 or 1992. He was also advised
that the Plaintiff treated with Dr. Combs and underwent three
surgical procedures.
Dr. Breidenbach thereafter performed a detailed physical
examination on the Plaintiff and as a result of the same
diagnosed her as having thoracic outlet compression. He felt
she may benefit from scalenectomy for first rib resection but
due to her multiple comorbidities he would advise caution
with the surgery.
....
-3-
Therefore, after careful consideration of the expert and lay
testimony herein the Administrative Law Judge finds
persuasive the testimony of Dr. Atasoy and Dr. Breidenbach
and finds the Plaintiff has met her burden of proving her
bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and right thoracic outlet
syndrome are causally related to her work at St. Joseph
Hospital. Therefore this issue is resolved in favor of the
Plaintiff.
St. Joseph filed a petition for rehearing, which was denied. Thereafter, St.
Joseph appealed to the Board. Before the Board, St. Joseph argued that the ALJ had
erred in characterizing Dr. Breidenbach's report as supportive testimony of causation, and
that the ALJ had erred in relying on the Form 107 of Dr. Atasoy because it had never
been properly designated into the record.
On February 23, 2007, the Board issued an opinion wherein it concluded
that the Form 107 was properly before the ALJ, but that the ALJ had, indeed,
misunderstood Dr. Breidenbach's report, and remanded the cause to the ALJ for a
decision based upon a correct understanding of the report. St. Joseph then petitioned for
review to this court solely on the issue of whether Dr. Atasoy's Form 107 was properly
designated into the record upon reopening for consideration by the ALJ.
Before us, St. Joseph contends that the Board erred in concluding that the
Dr. Atasoy's Form 107 was properly introduced into the record for consideration by the
ALJ in its decision of whether Littleton-Goodan's impairments are work-related. St.
Joseph argues that because neither it, nor Littleton-Goodan, specifically designated the
form for inclusion in the record, the ALJ's consideration of the document constituted the
-4-
consideration of evidence outside the record. St. Joseph further contends that it was, in
effect, unfairly blind-sided by the ALJ's consideration of the form because it had no
notice that there was such a form, and was unable therefore unable to mount a rebuttal to
its conclusions. We disagree.
We begin our review by setting forth the Board's discussion of the issue:
The hospital first argues Dr. Atasoy's Form 107 was never
submitted into or designated as part of the record by LittletonGoodan. The hospital submits that even though the Form 107
was part of the original claim, it was not identified or
designated as evidence in the present medical fee dispute and
that neither Littleton-Goodan nor the hospital designated the
Form 107 as evidence on the hearing order. The hospital
contends that since Littleton-Goodan submitted other
evidence from Dr. Atasoy that pre-dated the Form 107, but
did not submit the Form 107, Littleton-Goodan did not intend
to rely on the Form 107 as evidence of causation. The
hospital contends that ALJ's opinion reveals he thought
Littleton-Goodan had resubmitted or designated the Form 107
in the present claim.
Initially we must point out that Dr. Atasoy's Form 107 was an
attachment to Littleton-Goodan's original Form 101,
Application for Resolution of Injury Claim. 803 KAR 25:010
Section 8(4) provides:
(4) All medical reports filed with Forms 101,
102-0D, or 103 shall be admitted into evidence
without further order if:
(a) An objection is not filed prior to or with the
filing of the Form 111; and
(b) The medical reports comply with Section
10 of this administrative regulation.
Here, the medical report of Dr. Atasoy was properly
introduced into evidence in the original claim. On reopening,
-5-
it was the obligation of the hospital, not Littleton-Goodan, to
make a designation of evidence. 808 KAR 25:010 Section
4(6)(a)6 requires a motion to reopen to be accompanied by
“[a] designation of evidence from the original record
specifically identifying the relevant items of proof which are
to be considered as part of the record during reopening[.]”
With that in mind, the regulation, at Section 4(6)(b)2, further
requires:
The burden of completeness of the record shall
rest with the parties to include so much of the
original record, up to and including the award
or order on reopening, as is necessary to permit
the administrative law judge to compare the
relevant evidence that existed in the original
record with all subsequent evidence submitted
by the parties.
Here, Littleton-Goodan's original claim was filed in 1996
[sic]. At the time of the reopening, there was no longer a
paper file; however, all pleadings and filings were preserved
by electronic imaging. As a practical matter, once a motion
to reopen is filed, the “Case Files” section of the Office of
Workers' Claims must reconstruct a paper file for the ALJ if
the original claim file no longer exists. This reconstructed
file consists of : 1) the Form 101 and attachments; 2) any
settlement agreement or opinion rendered by the ALJ; 3) an
attorney's fee order, if any; 4) any orders on petition for
reconsideration; 5) orders directing that additional parties
either be added or dismissed; 6) amended claims; and, 7) final
orders of the Board, Kentucky Court of Appeals, or Kentucky
Supreme Court. Thus, Dr. Atasoy's Form 107, an attachment
to the Form 101, was included in the reconstructed file and
Littleton-Goodan was not required to designate that medical
report in order for the ALJ to properly consider it in the
context of comparing the evidence in the original claim to the
evidence ion reopening. See W.E. Caldwell Co. v. Borders,
193 S.W.2d 453 (Ky. 1946). Since Dr. Atasoy's opinion was
available to the ALJ and, because it was probative of the issue
of causation and part of the record, there was no error in
considering the Form 107. This is true even though LittletonGoodan may have never intended to rely on that particular
-6-
piece of evidence. Compare Copar, Inc. v. Rogers, 127
S.W.3d 554 (Ky. 2003).
Our function in reviewing the Board's decision “is to correct the Board only
where the [ ] Court perceives the Board has overlooked or misconstrued controlling
statutes or precedent, or committed an error in assessing the evidence so flagrant as to
cause gross injustice.” Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Ky.
1992). Moreover, while we ultimately review issues of law de novo, we afford deference
to the Board's interpretation of the statutes and regulations it is charged with
implementing. Board of Trustees of Judicial Form Retirement System v. Attorney
General of Com., 132 S.W.3d 770, 787 (Ky. 2003); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782-83, 81 L.Ed.2d 694
(1984).
We are persuaded that the Board has properly interpreted its regulations as
placing the duty upon the moving party in a reopening case to designate all relevant
evidence from the original proceedings into the reopening record. As noted by the Board,
808 KAR 25:010 Section 4(6)(a)6 requires a motion to reopen to be accompanied by “[a]
designation of evidence from the original record specifically identifying the relevant
items of proof which are to be considered as part of the record during reopening[.]”
Moreover, 808 KAR 25:010 Section 4(6)(b)3 provides that “'[e]xcept for good cause
shown at the time of the filing of the designation of evidence, a party shall not designate
the entire record from the claim for which reopening is being sought.”
-7-
The foregoing regulations plainly contemplate that the movant in a
reopening case will sift through the record and, in good faith, designate those portions
relevant to the issues raised upon rehearing. If causation is an issue, and a particular item
of evidence in the original record relates to causation, including a Form 107 introduced
into the original record by the nonmoving party, the duty is upon the movant to detect the
evidence and designate it into the rehearing record. St. Joseph appears to suggest that it
was entitled to pick and choose the evidence it wished placed into the reopening record,
and then shift the burden to Littleton-Goodan to do her independent review and designate
the evidence she wanted placed before the ALJ. We believe that interpretation is
contrary to the plain language, and intent, of the regulations.
In any event, in determining whether an award should be reopened, the ALJ
may look to the record made at a former hearing or hearings had before it with reference
to same accident. W. E. Caldwell Co. v. Borders, 301 Ky. 843, 193 S.W.2d 453, 455
(Ky. 1946). The Form 107 was in the record of the original proceedings, and, it follows,
the ALJ properly looked to this relevant item of evidence in reaching its decision.
St. Joseph, however, suggests that it was, in effect, blind-sided by the ALJ's
reliance upon the Form 107. However, as previously noted, St. Joseph had a duty to have
examined the complete original record itself in connection with refiling its reopening
motion, and compliance with this duty would have disclosed the form. Moreover, it was
a party to the original proceedings and, as such, would be charged with at least
constructive notice of the contents of the original litigation file. In short, with minimum
-8-
diligence, St. Joseph could have made itself aware of the Form 107, and if it disagreed
with the conclusions contained therein, it could have preemptively challenged the
evidence, thereby assuring that its position on the verity of the report was placed before
the ALJ.
For the foregoing reasons the opinion of the Workers' Compensation Board
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Ronald J. Pohl
Lexington, Kentucky
McKinnley Morgan
Donald G. Smith
London, Kentucky
-9-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.