REBECCA NANTZ CHANEY (NOW SAYLOR) v. ARTHUR GREEN CHANEY
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 2, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000502-ME
REBECCA NANTZ CHANEY (NOW
SAYLOR)
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ANDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN DAVID MYLES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-00121
ARTHUR GREEN CHANEY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: HOWARD, JUDGE; GUIDUGLI AND KNOPF, SENIOR JUDGES.1
HOWARD, JUDGE: Rebecca Chaney (hereinafter Rebecca) appeals from a February 9,
2007, order of the Anderson Circuit Court, holding that a previous order, entered March
22, 2006, is the controlling custody order in this matter. That March 22, 2006, order
established joint custody between Rebecca and Arthur Chaney (hereinafter Arthur), as to
1
Senior Judges Daniel T. Guidugli and William Knopf sitting as Special Judges by assignment
of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky
Revised Statutes 21.580.
the parties' minor son, Dolton Chaney. Finding no error in the Circuit Court's ruling, we
affirm.
The parties were divorced by a decree entered on September 20, 2001. As
agreed by the parties and incorporated by the court in the decree, Rebecca was awarded
sole custody of the parties' only child, Dolton, with visitation granted to Arthur. This
arrangement continued until 2006, when Arthur filed a motion pursuant to KRS 403.340
and a supporting affidavit pursuant to KRS 403.350, seeking to modify the custody
arrangement to joint custody. In support of his motion, Arthur stated that Dolton, then
seven years of age, had been placed in his care by Rebecca, due to problems she was
having controlling and disciplining him. Rebecca agreed that Dolton was living with
Arthur, but maintained that the reason for the residential change was her work schedule.
At a hearing held on February 28, 2006, the parties indicated that they were in agreement
and the circuit court issued its order, entered March 22, 2006. That order, in its
substantive terms, stated as follows:
Upon Motion by the Respondent, asking the Court for entry
of an Order modifying the current custody arrangement, this
matter having come before the Court for a hearing on
February 28, 2006, the Court having been advised that the
Petitioner had no objection, the Court having reviewed the
Court record, and having been otherwise sufficiently advised:
IT IS HEREBY OFDERED AND ADJUDGED that the
Respondent's Motion is GRANTED. The parties shall share
joint custody of their son, Dolton,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the
parties shall work out the specific timesharing arrangement
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by agreement. In the event they are unable to reach an
agreement, the matter will be revisited by the Court.
Approximately six weeks later, on May 9, 2006, Rebecca filed a “Motion to
Enforce Decree,” seeking to reinstate the custody provisions of the original divorce
decree. She did not file her motion as one for modification pursuant to KRS 403.340, but
instead argued that the March 22, 2006, order was only temporary and therefore that the
original custody decree had never been modified, but was still in effect. Arthur
responded, the matter was submitted, and the circuit court issued its order on February 9,
2007, declaring that the March 22, 2006, order was in fact a modification of the original
custody decree and was thereby the prevailing custody order. Rebecca then filed this
appeal.
It is well-established that a custody award will not be disturbed on appeal
unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion. In Allen v. Devine, 178 S.W.3d 517, 524
(Ky.App. 2005), we stated,
“Abuse of discretion in relation to the exercise of judicial
power implies arbitrary action or capricious disposition under
the circumstances, at least an unreasonable and unfair
decision.” . . . The exercise of discretion must be legally
sound.
(quoting Sherfey v. Sherfey, 74 S.W.3d 777, 783 (Ky.App. 2002), which in turn quoted
Kuprion v. Fitzgerald, 888 S.W.2d 679, 684 (Ky. 1994)).
On this appeal, Rebecca again argues that the March 22, 2006, order
granting the parties joint custody was only temporary in nature, and that the original
decree is still the applicable order regarding “permanent” custody. We disagree.
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Custody orders are, of course, in one sense, temporary by their very nature. That is,
either parent may move the court, at any time, to modify a custody order. Whether a
party is successful in modifying custody will depend upon their ability to satisfy the
statutory requirements for such modification. However, there are meaningful, statutory
distinctions between “custody,” under KRS 403.270 and “temporary custody,” under
KRS 403.280. Among others, the substantive and procedural requirements of KRS
403.340 and 403.350 apply, in full, only to a motion to modify custody, and not to
temporary custody.2
A review of the record in this case shows that Arthur filed a motion and
affidavit, pursuant to KRS 403.340 and 403.350, requesting not temporary custody, but a
modification of the original custody decree. A hearing was held on February 28, 2006,
and an order was subsequently entered. That order specifically stated that the motion to
modify custody was granted.
In support of her argument, Rebecca cites Crouch v. Crouch, 201 S.W.3d
463 (Ky. 2006), in which an order, similar in some respects to the March 22, 2006, order
in this case, was held to be only temporary in effect. We believe the facts in Crouch are
distinguishable from those in this case, and the distinction is instructive in demonstrating
why the opposite result is required here. Crouch involved a mother who was ordered to
report to active duty in the National Guard and therefore transferred custody of her child
to the father by means of an agreed order between the parties. Upon dismissal from
2
However, KRS 403.280(1) does require a party seeking an award of temporary custody to file
an affidavit, “as provided in KRS 403.350.” KRS 403.350 similarly refers to “[a] party seeking a
temporary custody order,” as well as to a party seeking a modification of custody.
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active duty, the mother attempted to regain custody of the child, but the father refused to
comply. Although the agreed order did not use the language, “temporary custody,” the
mother argued that the order was temporary in nature, as evidenced by the intent of the
parties and by language in the order which read “until further orders of the court.” Id. at
464. The Circuit Court agreed that this was the intent, but refused to return the child to
the mother, based on the “best interests of the child.” We reversed, and the Supreme
Court affirmed our opinion, returning the child to the mother.
There are several distinctions between the Crouch case and the case at
hand. First, no motion was filed in Crouch to modify custody, pursuant to KRS 405.340.
Rather, the parties simply signed an agreed order, which was approved by the court. This
was found to be significant by the Supreme Court. Id. at 466. Second, the Supreme
Court in Crouch focused on the phrase “until further orders of the court” and found that
language to be ambiguous. Id. at 466. As such, it then looked outside of the document
and to the intent of the circuit court. There is no such ambiguous language in the March
22, 2006, order in this case and the circuit court has made its intent clear by its February
9, 2007, order which states in part:
This Court speaks through its orders. Respondent sought to
modify custody and his motion was granted pursuant to an
agreed order signed by both counsel. The March 22, 2006
order is the prevailing order and established the custody of
the minor child as between these parties. Any further changes
sought by either of the parties relating to custody would
hence need to be brought by a motion to modify custody or
by agreement of the parties. (emphasis added).
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Rebecca argues that the intent of the parties in this case was also that the
modification of custody be temporary, and there are statements in the record which
appear to support this contention. But the Supreme Court in Crouch made it clear that it
is the intent of the trial court that is controlling, not the intent of the parties: “Interpreting
court orders differs from that of statutes and contracts only to the extent that instead of
construing the intent of the legislature or the intent of the parties, we must determine the
intent of the ordering court.” Id. at 465.
Although not relied on by the court in Crouch, because it had only been
recently adopted and was therefore not controlling, the Supreme Court also noted KRS
403.340(5), which states that any custody modification based on a parent's active military
duty shall be deemed to be temporary in nature. Id. at 466.
Unlike the father in Crouch, Arthur followed precisely the requirements set
out in KRS 403.340 and 403.350 for a motion to modify custody. In his motion, he
specifically stated that he was seeking an order “modifying” the existing custody
arrangement. The circuit court order, which the attorneys for both parties signed,
expressly stated that Arthur's motion to modify custody was granted. The circuit court
has made clear that this was its intent.
Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court's ruling that
the March 22 order constituted a modification of the original custody decree, pursuant to
KRS 403.340. As such it is the current and controlling custody order in this case, subject
to any future modification.
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For the foregoing reasons, the February 9, 2007, order of the Anderson
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
David P. Nutgrass
Lawrenceburg, Kentucky
Kevin P. Fox
Max H. Comley
Frankfort, Kentucky
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