COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY v. VIRGIL WILSON, SR.
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 21, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000025-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES L. BOWLING, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CR-00174
VIRGIL WILSON, SR.
APPELLEE
OPINION REVERSING
AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON AND HOWARD1, JUDGES; GUIDUGLI,2 SENIOR JUDGE.
HOWARD, JUDGE: The Commonwealth of Kentucky appeals from the Bell Circuit
Court’s November 21, 2006, order granting the motion of Virgil Wilson, Sr. (hereinafter
Wilson), to suppress evidence obtained during a search of Wilson’s residence. The
circuit court found that the search warrant was improperly issued, due to a lack of
1
Judge James I. Howard completed this opinion prior to the expiration of his appointed term of
office on December 6, 2007. Release of the opinion was delayed by administrative handling.
2
Senior Judge Daniel T. Guidugli sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
probable cause, because nine days had elapsed between an informant’s statement to law
enforcement personnel, upon which the search warrant was based, and the issuance of the
search warrant. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the order of the Bell Circuit
Court and remand this matter for further proceedings.
On December 19, 2005, Kentucky State Police Trooper Brian Green
initiated a traffic stop on a motor vehicle operated by Michael T. Emmett (hereinafter
Emmett), after observing Emmett turn off of a highway without signaling. As soon as
Trooper Green approached Emmett’s vehicle, Emmett exited his vehicle and locked its
doors. Trooper Green noticed a strong odor of marijuana on Emmett’s person and
conducted a pat down search of Emmett for weapons. During this pat down search,
Trooper Green felt a marijuana cigarette in one of Emmett’s pockets. Trooper Green
asked Emmett to pull the marijuana cigarette out of his pocket. Emmett emptied the
contents of his pocket, but tried to hide the marijuana cigarette in his hand. After further
questioning from Trooper Green concerning the item in his hand, Emmett tried
unsuccessfully to ingest the marijuana cigarette. At this point, Trooper Green arrested
Emmett and transported him to a detention center.
After arresting Emmett, Trooper Green asked him where he obtained the
marijuana. Emmett advised Trooper Green that he had just purchased it for five dollars at
appellee Wilson’s residence in Wells Camp, from an individual known as Jason Wilson.
Emmett stated that when he bought the marijuana cigarette, he stood in the doorway of
the house while it was retrieved. Trooper Green then inquired as to whether Emmett had
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ever purchased any other drugs from the Wilson residence. Emmett answered that he had
purchased a forty milligram oxycontin tablet from the appellee, Virgil Wilson, the day
before, on December 18, 2005. Emmett described the location of Wilson’s residence in
detail and further advised Trooper Green that the drugs were kept inside the residence in a
steel box by a chair.
After receiving this information, Trooper Green did not take any action
immediately, but nine days later, on December 28, 2005, submitted an affidavit for a
search warrant to search Wilson’s residence to Bell District Judge Robert Costanzo.
Trooper Green’s affidavit supporting the search warrant stated:
On 12/19, 2005, at approximately 1930 p.m., Affiant received
information from/observed: Mike P. Emmett was stopped on
Winchester Avenue for obstructed vision or windshield and
failure to signal on the afternoon of December 19, 2005, at
approximately 1415 hours. Mr. Emmett immediately exited
the vehicle and the affiant approached Mr. Emmett
immediately smelling a strong odor of marijuana originating
from his person. Mr. Emmett appeared to be under the
influence. Affiant then administered field sobriety test
(HGN) and after administering test Mr. Emmett appeared to
have something in his hand. He then turned from the affiant
and attempted to orally ingest what was believed to be a
marijuana cigarette. Affiant stopped Mr. Emmett from
ingesting the contraband and took control of it. Mr. Emmett
was then placed under arrest. As a result of the actions of Mr.
Emmett further field sobriety tests were given at the Bell
County Detention Center and Mr. Emmett was charged with
operating a motor vehicle under the influence second offense,
operating on DUI suspended license, possession of marijuana,
obstructed vision/windshield, failure to signal, no seat belt,
license plate not legible and no insurance. When asked by the
affiant where the said drugs had been purchased, Mr. Emmett
volunteered that on that afternoon 19 December 2005 just
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prior to the traffic stop he had purchased a marijuana
Cigarette from Jason Wilson at a residence in Wells Camp:
directions to said residence being described in paragraph 2.
Furthermore Mr. Emmett stated that he had purchased the
drug for five dollars. Mr. Emmett stated he stood at the door
while Jason Wilson retrieved the drug. Mr. Emmett also
volunteered that on 18 December 2005 he had purchased a
Oxycontin pill 40 mg from Virgil Wilson. He then stated that
Virgil Wilson had retrieved said drug from a steel box located
inside of the residence next to a chair.
Acting on the information received, Affiant conducted the
following independent investigation:
Affiant went to the location in police cruiser and located said
residence as described by Mr. Emmett in Wells Camp where
aforementioned transaction was executed.
Judge Costanzo found probable cause and issued a search warrant for the
Wilson residence on December 28, 2005. Trooper Green executed the search warrant the
same day. During the search of Wilson’s residence, Trooper Green seized $7,641.00 in
cash, one police scanner, 100 suspected hydrocodone tablets, 8 suspected oxycontin
tablets, approximately 36.9 ounces of marijuana, 10 long guns, 5 handguns and
approximately 30 packs of suspected stolen cigarettes.
The Bell County Grand Jury subsequently returned an indictment charging
Wilson with first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance; second-degree trafficking
in a controlled substance; trafficking in marijuana, eight or more ounces; and possession
of a radio that sends and receives police messages. Following the indictment, Wilson
moved the Bell Circuit Court to suppress all evidence obtained pursuant to the search
warrant. In support of his motion to suppress, Wilson argued that the affidavit used to
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obtain the search warrant was improper because it was not sworn before a magistrate and
that the affidavit, and therefore the warrant, were based on unreliable information from
Emmett. The affidavit was signed by Trooper Green but was not notarized. During the
suppression hearing, Trooper Green testified that Judge Costanzo placed him under oath
prior to issuing the search warrant. Judge Costanzo confirmed Trooper Green’s testimony
by stating that he never issued a search warrant without first administering an oath to the
presenting officer. Trooper Green also testified that during the nine days between
receiving the information and obtaining the search warrant, he conducted surveillance on
the Wilson residence and observed an abnormal number of people coming and going
from the house.
By an order entered November 21, 2006, the Bell Circuit Court found that
Trooper Green was properly sworn by Judge Costanzo. However, the circuit court found
that the warrant was improperly issued because it was not based upon probable cause,
considering the totality of the circumstances. Specifically, the court held that,
The reliability of Emmett’s statement to Trooper Green
diminished with the passage of nine days and the follow-up
investigation added nothing. Probable cause might have
existed for a search on the date of Emmett's arrest, but it did
not exist nine days later.
As such, the circuit court granted Wilson’s motion to suppress all evidence seized
pursuant to the search warrant. This appeal by the Commonwealth followed.
On appeal, the Commonwealth argues that the Bell Circuit Court erred
when it determined that probable cause did not exist for the issuance of the search
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warrant. In support of this argument, the Commonwealth asserts that Emmett’s
statements to Trooper Green constituted reliable information to support probable cause
and that the passage of nine days between the date of Emmett’s arrest and the issuance of
the warrant did not dissipate that probable cause.
Our analysis must begin by determining whether the search warrant was
properly sworn, in compliance with the Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure. As noted
above, the affidavit in this case was signed by Trooper Green, but was not notarized. RCr
13.10 provides that a search warrant may be issued by a judge “[u]pon affidavit . . . sworn
to before an officer authorized to administer oaths . . .” A district judge is clearly
permitted to administer an oath under Kentucky law. RCr 2.02; RCr 13.10.
Kentucky courts have repeatedly held that no search warrant shall be issued
unless supported by an affidavit alleging probable cause. Beemer v. Commonwealth, 665
S.W.2d 912, 914 (Ky. 1984); Embry v. Commonwealth, 492 S.W.2d 929, 932 (Ky. 1973);
Guth v. Commonwealth, 29 S.W.3d 809 (Ky. App. 2000). Furthermore, both Section 10
of the Kentucky Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution require that probable cause be supported by “oath or affirmation.” An oath
or affirmation is a subscription to the truth of the statement made. To make a valid oath
or affirmation, there must be some overt act which shows that there was an intention to
take an oath or affirmation on the one hand and the intention to administer it on the other;
mere intention, not accompanied by an unambiguous act, is insufficient. Carrier v.
Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 670, 673-74 (Ky. 2004). In order to have a valid statement
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under oath, the attention of the person to be sworn must be called to the fact that his or
her statement is not a mere assertion, but must be sworn to, and he or she must do some
corporal act in recognition of this. Id.
An affidavit is a written statement of fact under oath, sworn to or affirmed
by the person making it before some person who has authority under the law to administer
oaths, and certified by the officer under his or her seal of office. Id. An affidavit signifies
the taking of an oath as to the truth of its contents. Board of Elections v. Board Of
Education, 635 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Ky.App. 1982).
As the circuit court noted, the affidavit form used by Trooper Green, AOC335, contains a signature line for a notary public, in the event the affidavit is not sworn
before a judge. It does not specifically contain a line for the judge to sign, if he
administers the oath, although we note that in practice judges frequently use the notary
line to verify that the affidavit has been sworn. In this case, no second signature, that of
the judge or a notary, was present on the affidavit form. However, the circuit court found
District Judge Costanzo’s testimony, concerning his practice to orally administer an oath
in all cases involving the issuance of search warrants and Trooper Green's testimony that
Judge Costanzo administered an oath to him prior to issuing this search warrant, to be
persuasive. This is a finding of fact, which is “conclusive” if it is supported by
substantial evidence. RCr 9.78; Adcock v. Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Ky.1998).
This finding was supported by substantial evidence, the testimony of both Judge Costanzo
and Trooper Green. Therefore, we affirm the finding of the circuit court that Trooper
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Green was properly sworn prior to the issuance of the search warrant, even though the
administration of that oath was not noted in writing on the affidavit form. We suggest
that it would be better practice to assure that the affidavit form is signed by either the
District Judge or a notary, verifying that the oath was given.
Next, we must consider whether the search warrant issued with respect to
the Wilson residence was based on probable cause. “Our review of a search warrant must
give great deference to the warrant-issuing judge's findings of probable cause and should
not be reversed unless arbitrarily exercised.” Moore v. Commonwealth, 159 S.W.3d 325,
329 (Ky.2005). In determining whether there is probable cause, the issuing judge (in this
case, the district judge) must “make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given
all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him . . . there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Lovett v.
Commonwealth, 103 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Ky.2003) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)).
Similarly, when reviewing a trial court's (in this case, the circuit court's)
findings of fact after a suppression hearing, those findings shall be conclusive if
supported by substantial evidence. RCr 9.78; Adcock v. Commonwealth, supra. If the
findings are supported by substantial evidence, then the trial judge's application of the law
to the facts is reviewed de novo. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Neal, 84 S.W.3d 920,
923 (Ky.App. 2002).
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As to the sufficiency of the substance of Trooper Green's affidavit, the first
issue is that the affidavit in this case did not contain any affirmation by Trooper Green as
to Emmett's reliability as a witness. However, the Kentucky Supreme Court in Lovett v.
Commonwealth, supra, stated that in that case, “the affidavit upon which the finding of
probable cause was based did not describe the informant's reliability, veracity, and basis
of knowledge,” Id. 103 S.W.3d at 77, and nonetheless upheld a finding of probable cause,
stating,
In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d
527 (1983), the United States Supreme Court abandoned the
rigid two-pronged test established by its previous holdings in
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d
723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89
S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), and adopted a “totality of
the circumstances” approach for determining whether an
informant's tip provided probable cause for the issuance of a
search warrant. 462 U .S. at 230-31, 103 S.Ct. at 2328. Under
this test, the issuing magistrate need only “make a practical,
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances
set forth in the affidavit before him ... there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place.” Id. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332.
While an informant's veracity, reliability, and basis of
knowledge are all “relevant considerations in the totality of
the circumstances analysis,” they are not conclusive and “a
deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the
overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other,
or by some other indicia of reliability.” Id. at 233, 103 S.Ct. at
2329.
Id. 103 S.W.3d at 77-78.
Here, the affidavit did state the basis of Emmett's knowledge, that he had
personally purchased specific illegal substances, marijuana and Oxycontin, from the
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Wilson residence, on two successive days, and described where the drugs were located in
the residence. The district court found this to be sufficiently persuasive as to Emmett's
reliability, implicit in its finding of probable cause. “[A] magistrate's determination of
probable cause is entitled to ‘great deference’ and should be upheld so long as the
magistrate, considering the totality of the circumstances, had a ‘substantial basis for
concluding that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.’” Lovett, 103 S.W.3d at
78 (citation omitted.) Furthermore, while the affidavit failed to specifically affirm
Emmett’s credibility as an informant, an affidavit for a search warrant based on
information furnished by a named individual is ordinarily sufficient to support a warrant,
without such affirmation. Embry v. Commonwealth, 492 S.W.2d 929, 932 (1973).
The final issue before us is whether or not the information obtained from
Emmett became stale in the nine days before the search warrant was obtained. The Bell
Circuit Court suppressed the evidence in this case on this basis, as set out above. In
Hause v. Commonwealth, 83 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. App. 2001), this Court adopted the test from
United States v. Spikes, 158 F.3d 913 (6th Cir. 1998) to determine if the information
supplied in a search warrant affidavit is stale:
“Instead of measuring staleness solely by counting the days
on a calendar, courts must also concern themselves with the
following variables: 'the character of the crime (chance
encounter in the night or regenerating
conspiracy?), the
criminal
(nomadic or entrenched?), the thing to be seized
(perishable and easily transferable or of
enduring utility to its
holder?), the place to be
searched (mere criminal forum of
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convenience or secure operational
base?)[.]'”
Hause, 83 S.W.3d at 13, quoting Spikes, 158 F.3d at 923.
Analyzing the facts of this matter under the Hause test, we believe that the
first factor has been established; that is, the character of the criminal activity occurring at
the Wilson residence does not appear to have been a one-time occurrence or “chance
encounter.” Emmett advised Trooper Green that he purchased two different types of
drugs, marijuana and Oxycontin, at the Wilson residence on two different, if successive,
dates. Emmett also advised law enforcement that the Oxycontin tablets were kept in a
steel box located next to a chair inside the Wilson residence. These observations by
Emmett support a finding that there was a “regenerating conspiracy” to traffic in
controlled substances occurring at the Wilson residence.
The second variable of the Hause test, whether the alleged criminal is
“nomadic or entrenched,” cannot be determined from the record in this case.
The third Hause variable appears to support the circuit court's finding that
the information was stale. The items to be seized, Oxycontin tablets and marijuana, were
“perishable and easily transferable,” as will almost always be true in a drug case, which
would tend to make information concerning their whereabouts, such as that obtained in
this case from Emmett, reliable for a shorter period of time.
As to the final variable discussed in Hause, whether the place to be searched
is a mere forum of convenience or constitutes a secure operational base, there is not a
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great deal of evidence in the record, except that the Wilsons lived in the house and there
had been two transactions conducted there. While perhaps not conclusive, this would
seem to support regarding the house as a “secure operational base.”
The Commonwealth argues that Trooper Green’s testimony concerning his
observation of abnormal foot traffic provides additional evidence to demonstrate both a
“regenerating conspiracy” and that the residence was a “secure operational base for
entrenched criminal activity.” However, Trooper Green failed to include in his affidavit
for a search warrant any mention of surveillance of the Wilson residence.3 The decision
to issue a search warrant must be considered based solely on the facts contained within
the four corners of the affidavit. Crayton v. Commonwealth, 846 S.W.2d 684, 689 (Ky.
1992). As such, Trooper Green’s testimony concerning any facts that are not within the
four corners of his affidavit cannot be considered, as to either of these factors.
Thus, our analysis of the Hause factors shows that two of those factors,
while not overwhelming, point toward a finding that the evidence was not stale, even
after a nine-day delay. One factor points the other way and one is inconclusive. Clearly,
this is a very close case. However, the original finder of fact in this matter, as to probable
cause, was the district court and we grant “great deference” to its findings. Therefore,
based on the totality of the circumstances, we hold that there was a “substantial basis for
concluding that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing,” Lovett v.
3
The affidavit stated only that, “Acting on the information received, Affiant conducted the
following independent investigation: Affiant went to the location in police cruiser and located
said residence as described by Mr. Emmett in Wells Camp where aforementioned transaction
was executed.”
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Commonwealth, supra., and that the district court's finding that probable cause did
continue to exist despite the nine-day delay, was supported by substantial evidence.
Our conclusion further is supported by Johnson v. Commonwealth, 180
S.W.3d 494, 500 (Ky.App. 2005), in which this Court held that probable cause existed to
issue a search warrant for a residence when the affidavit demonstrated that the basis of
the informant’s knowledge of Johnson’s trafficking and possession of methamphetamine
was the informant’s first-hand presence and observations at Johnson’s house within a
week prior to issuance of the search warrant.
We are also persuaded by several cases from other jurisdictions which have
determined that probable cause does not dissipate, even in drug cases where the evidence
is perishable and easily transferable, merely because of a relatively short passage of time
between law enforcement receiving information and the issuance of a search warrant. In
at least seven different cases, United States v. Tabares, 951 F.2d 405, 408 (1st Cir. 1991);
United States v. Scalia, 993 F.2d 984, 986-88 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Davis, 276
F.Supp.2d 522, 526-27 (E.D.Va. 2003); State v. Gieseke, 328 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1976);
Vinson v. State, 843 So.2d 229, 233-34 (Ala. 2001); State v. Greene, 81 Conn.App. 492,
500, 839 A.2d 1284, 1290 (2004); and Copeland v. State, 273 Ga.App. 850, 853 616
S.E.2d 189, 192 (2005), the courts held that information based on personal observation by
informants of drug trafficking or possession 10 days prior to the issuance of a search
warrant, was not stale for purposes of finding probable cause to issue the warrant.
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Based on the foregoing, the Bell Circuit Court’s November 21, 2006, order
suppressing all evidence seized from the Wilson residence pursuant to the December 28,
2005, search warrant is hereby reversed and this matter is remanded to the circuit court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CLAYTON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
GUIDUGLI, SENIOR JUDGE, DISSENTS.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
William A. Hayes
Middlesboro, Kentucky
Bryan D. Morrow
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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