KENNETH FRYE v. JACQUELINE E. BROWN
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 21, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000005-MR
KENNETH FRYE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE W. DOUGLAS KEMPER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-004178
JACQUELINE E. BROWN
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, KELLER, AND MOORE, JUDGES.
KELLER, JUDGE: Kenneth Frye has appealed from the order of the Jefferson Circuit
Court granting a summary judgment in favor of Jacqueline E. Brown and dismissing
Frye's claims. Frye's claims arose from personal injuries and property damage he alleged
to have incurred due to secondhand smoke emanating from Brown's condominium unit.
We affirm.
In early 2005, Frye purchased a condominium unit from Magnolia Place
Condominiums (Magnolia Place) located at 1157 South First Street in Louisville,
Kentucky. The building holds four units; Frye purchased Unit 3 on the second floor,
while Brown lived directly below Frye in Unit 1. Once he moved into the unit, Frye
claimed that he was exposed to second-hand smoke from Brown's unit, caused by an
allegedly defective ventilation system between the two units. When he was unable to
resolve his dispute, Frye retained an attorney, Charles Fell, Jr., and filed suit on May 13,
2005, in Jefferson Circuit Court against Brown and Magnolia Place. In his complaint,
Frye alleged that Brown's unit was “in such a defective condition that smoke from the
Unit is contaminating the Unit owned by the Plaintiff.” Frye then alleged that the
contamination from the smoke injured him and damaged his unit. He demanded both
monetary damages and an injunction requiring that the defective condition be repaired.
Attorney Fell withdrew a year later, and Kevin M. Adams entered an appearance as
counsel for Frey in June 2006.
Frye reached a settlement agreement with Magnolia Place in July 2006 and
entered into a release, which provides in pertinent part as follows:
RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS
For and in consideration of the payment to me of the
sum of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS
($2,500.00) and other good and valuable consideration, I
KENNETH FRYE, being of lawful age, have released and
discharged, and by these presents do for myself, my heirs,
executors, administrators and assigns, release, acquit and
forever discharge MAGNOLIA PLACE CONDOMINIUMS
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COUNCIL OF CO-OWNERS, INC., and NATIONWIDE
INSURANCE COMPANY, and any and all other persons,
firms and corporations, whether herein named or referred to
or not, of and from any and all past, present and future
actions, causes of action, claims, demands, damages, costs,
loss of services, expenses, compensation, third party actions,
suits at law or in equity, including claims or suits for
contribution, and/or indemnification, of whatever nature, and
all consequential damage on account of, or in any way
growing out of any and all know[n] and unknown personal
injuries, death or property damage resulting or to result from
smoke and odors seeping or penetrating Unit 3 of Magnolia
Place Condominiums located at 5311 South First Street in
Louisville, Kentucky.
As a result of the settlement, the circuit court dismissed Frye's claim against Magnolia
Place as settled on July 25, 2006. The same day, the circuit court allowed Frye to file an
amended complaint to allege causes of action against Brown for trespass, nuisance, and
constructive eviction. The following month, the circuit court granted Attorney Adams'
motion to withdraw and permitted Frye to proceed pro se.
In September 2006, Brown filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing
that the July 26, 2006, release between Frye and Magnolia Place served to release any
claims Frye had against her, as it released “any and all other persons” whether or not they
were named in the release. Frye filed a pro se motion for summary judgment, which we
infer from the record also served as his response to Brown's motion for summary
judgment. In the filing, Frye presented arguments related to the infiltration of secondhand smoke, nuisance, and findings of the Surgeon General. The only reference he made
to the release was: “Plaintiff did not sign any agreement releasing Defendant Brown for
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her negligence and personal injury to the Plaintiff.” On December 8, 2006, the circuit
court entered an Opinion and Order granting Brown's motion for summary judgment and
dismissing Frye's claims, finding that the release precluded Frye's claims against Brown.1
This appeal followed.2
On appeal, Frye raises a single claim of error; namely, that the release at
issue does not serve to release Brown, as the address listed on the release is not the
correct address. The address of the condominium building in which Brown and Frye
lived is 1157 South First Street; however, the address listed in the release is 5311 South
First Street. Therefore, Frye asserts that, based upon its language, the release related to
claims arising out of property that was not the subject of this litigation and Brown should
only be permitted to use the release as to the specific property listed in the release. On the
other hand, Brown argues that the typographical error in the release represented a mutual
mistake. Such a mistake, she asserts, requires reformation of the release to include the
correct address so that it would then represent the intended agreement of the contracting
parties.
The entry of a summary judgment is governed by CR 56.03, which provides
that such motions should be granted if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Our standard of
1
The Opinion and Order also dismissed as moot a Petition for Declaration of Rights filed by
Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Civil Action No. 06-CI-0559), seeking a
declaration as to whether it owed coverage to Brown under her homeowner's policy.
2
Frye filed his notice of appeal and prehearing statement pro se. During the course of the
appeal, attorney Denise Brown entered an appearance for Frye and filed a brief on his behalf.
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review is set forth in Lewis v. B & R Corp., 56 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Ky.App. 2001):
“Because summary judgment involves only legal questions and the existence of any
disputed material issues of fact, an appellate court need not defer to the trial court’s
decision and will review the issue de novo.”
Based upon our review of the record, we have determined that the issue
Frye raises on appeal is not preserved. Frye neither brought the typographical error in the
street number to the attention of the circuit court nor asserted that the mistaken language
of the release meant that it had no application to Brown. Instead, Frye focused below on
the nuisance aspect of secondhand smoke inhalation, first raising the issue of mistake in
his appellate brief. The law is clear in this Commonwealth that parties are not permitted
to raise new arguments on appeal. Commonwealth v. Jones, 217 S.W.3d 190, 199 (Ky.
2006). Furthermore, our review is limited to “only those claims that are preserved by
proper objection, . . . and only when the trial court is given the opportunity to rule on the
alleged error.” Williams v. Commonwealth, 233 S.W.3d 206, 211 (Ky.App. 2007). It has
been a longstanding rule that a party “will not be permitted to feed one can of worms to
the trial judge and another to the appellate court.” Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 544
S.W.2d 219, 222 (Ky. 1976). Therefore, Frye's claim that the release does not apply to
Brown solely due to the incorrect street number is not properly before this Court.
Even if we were to review this issue, Frye's claim is without merit. We
agree with Brown's argument that the mistake in the release was the result of a scrivener's
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error and that the release is therefore subject to reformation. American Jurisprudence
addresses the mistake of a scrivener or draftsman as follows:
The remedy of reformation is appropriate where, by
reason of an unintentional mistake by a scrivener or
draftsman, the written agreement does not accurately reflect
the intent of the parties. However, before the reformation of a
written contract is warranted, it must be shown that the
scrivener's product reflects something other than what was
understood by both parties. Under the “doctrine of scrivener's
error,” the mistake of a scrivener in drafting a document may
be reformed based upon parol evidence, provided the
evidence is clear, precise, convincing and of most satisfactory
character that the mistake has occurred and that the mistake
does not reflect the intent of the parties.
66 Am.Jur.2d Reformation of Instruments § 19. In A.H. Thompson Co. v. Security Ins.
Co., 252 Ky. 427, 67 S.W.2d 493, 495 (1933), the former Court of Appeals addressed
mistakes in written instruments, stating:
An [sic] unilateral mistake is not ground for reforming
a written instrument; hence a contract which agrees with the
intention of one party, though executed under a mistake by the
other, cannot be reformed. . . . Equity, however, will reform
such instrument where the mistake is mutual; that is, a
mistake reciprocal and common to both parties, as where
there has been a meeting of the minds and an agreement
actually entered into, but the written instrument does not
express the real intention of the parties . . . , or because of a
mistake of the draftsman of the instrument where the evidence
is clear and convincing showing the mistake[.]
More recently, the Supreme Court addressed this issue in Abney v. Nationwide Mutual
Ins. Co., 215 S.W.3d 699, 704 (Ky. 2006):
To vary the terms of a writing on the ground of
mistake, the proof must establish three elements. . . . First, it
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must show that the mistake was mutual, not unilateral. . . .
Second, “[t]he mutual mistake must be proven beyond a
reasonable controversy by clear and convincing
evidence.” . . . (emphasis in original). Third, “it must be
shown that the parties had actually agreed upon terms
different from those expressed in the written instrument.” . . .
The mistake must be one as to a material fact affecting
the agreement and not one of law, which is “an erroneous
conclusion respecting the legal effect of known facts.” . . . A
material fact is one that goes to the root of the matter or the
whole substance of the agreement.
The record establishes that the mistake was certainly mutual; the release
details the settlement reached in the subject lawsuit, not for another case or relating to a
different property. Furthermore, the evidence supporting the error is clear and
convincing, as everything documented in the court record, except for the release, lists the
correct street number. Finally, Magnolia Place and Frye clearly settled the suit regarding
smoke damage at 1157 South First Street, not 5311 South First Street. Frye accepted the
monetary settlement and agreed to dismiss Magnolia Place from this particular lawsuit
based upon the release. Additionally, this particular mistake was one of material fact, as
it was related to the address of the condominium building. Therefore, even if we were to
address the merits of Frye's argument, we would not assign any error in the circuit court's
judgment.
For the foregoing reasons, the Opinion and Order of the Jefferson Circuit
Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Denise Brown
Louisville, Kentucky
Donald Killian Brown
Jeri Barclay Poppe
Louisville, Kentucky
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