MILTON ALDRIDGE v. MARGO ALDRIDGE
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 14, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-002304-MR
MILTON ALDRIDGE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HENRY FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE TIMOTHY E. FEELEY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00325
MARGO ALDRIDGE
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
VACATING AND REMANDING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: MOORE AND STUMBO, JUDGES; ROSENBLUM,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
MOORE, JUDGE: Milton Aldridge appeals the Henry Family Court's order denying his
CR 59.05 motion to alter, amend, or vacate the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law concerning the division of property in this divorce action. After a careful review
of the record, we affirm in part and vacate and remand in part for further proceedings.
1
Senior Judge Paul W. Rosenblum sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Milton, a Sergeant and Dispatcher for the Kentucky State Police, filed for
divorce from his wife of 31 years, Margo Aldridge, who works for the Commonwealth of
Kentucky's Justice Cabinet. However, at some point while the divorce action was
pending, Milton apparently stopped communicating with his attorney and ceased his
involvement in the action by not responding to discovery requests, particularly, a second
set of interrogatories. Trial was scheduled in the action, and at the beginning of the trial,
which Milton failed to attend, his attorney moved to withdraw as counsel on the ground
that he was no longer in contact with Milton. The court denied counsel's motion to
withdraw because the trial had been scheduled for more than two months and because
Milton's legal rights could be better protected if he was represented by counsel. At the
conclusion of trial, the family court decided that Milton's answers to the second set of
interrogatories propounded by Margo were needed before the court could enter a final
decision in the case. The court ordered Milton to answer the second set of interrogatories
by December 16, 2005.
That date passed, and Milton still had not responded to the interrogatories.
Margo then moved to have Milton held in contempt, and the court granted the motion.
Specifically, the court held Milton in contempt and imposed a sanction requiring Milton
to appear in court on January 10, 2006, for purposes of showing cause why he did not
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comply with the court's previous order. The court stated in its order that if Milton failed
to appear in court on that date, a contempt bench warrant would be issued.
Milton failed to appear in court on January 10, 2006, so a bench warrant for
his arrest was issued. The court also ordered that the time for the parties to submit their
recapitulation of the evidence and requested dispositions would be extended to thirty days
after the date Milton filed his responses to Margo's second set of interrogatories.
Milton was subsequently arrested and posted bail. The court entered an
order directing him to fully respond to the interrogatories no later than February 17, 2006.
If he failed to comply, he would be sent to jail again until he did fully respond. Milton
complied with the court order and filed his responses to the interrogatories on February
17, 2006. The court entered an order on February 21, 2006, noting that Milton had filed
his responses to the interrogatories and that Milton had “advised the court through
counsel that he will comply with all further orders of the court and cooperate with
counsel.”
Subsequently, the family court entered an order directing the parties to each
file their recapitulation of evidence and requested dispositions simultaneously on April
14, 2006. Margo filed her recapitulation of the evidence and requested dispositions, but
Milton did not. Instead, on June 2, 2006, Milton moved the court to permit him to submit
his recapitulation of the evidence and requested dispositions at that time based on his
allegation that he had “been and [was] suffering from mental and emotional problems,
most likely severe depression, which ha[d] rendered him unable to adequately provide
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information to his counsel and to actively participate in this proceeding.” Milton further
claimed that “[t]his allegation [was] supported by a statement and information from
Ronald Dobbs, LCSW [Licensed Clinical Social Worker] of Solutions Health Services,
LLC who had been treating [Milton] for these problems. . . .” Milton asserted that his
failure to appear at trial and to comply with the court's prior orders was a result of his
mental or emotional problems, and he noted that when the case was referred to mediation,
the mediation “was suspended because the mediator felt that [Milton] was depressed and
could not participate in said mediation in any meaningful manner.” Milton attached to
this motion a letter from the LCSW dated June 2, 2006, in which the LCSW stated that
Milton received therapy from him from May 12, 2005, through August 3, 2005, and that
Milton had seen the staff psychiatrist during one of those visits and had been prescribed
20 mg of Lexapro to treat his depression. The LCSW opined in his letter that “Milton
suffers moderate depression and at times the depression incapacitates him.” However, the
LCSW noted that he had “not seen or evaluated” Milton since August 3, 2005.
The family court noted that Milton's motion was a motion to allow him an
extended period of time to file a recapitulation of the evidence and requested dispositions.
The court denied Milton's motion for two reasons:
First, the letter in support of [Milton's] motion regarding his
mental condition was from a Licensed Clinical Social Worker
who had not seen or evaluated [Milton] since August 3, 2005.
Secondly, the Court's Order of February 21, which clearly
recognizes [Milton's] agreement to comply with all orders of
the Court, negates this Court's rationale to extend the time
period.
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In a separate order, the family court entered its findings of fact and
conclusions of law, in which the court reiterated the fact that Milton had not participated
in many of the court proceedings, including the trial. The court stated: “Lacking any
substantial evidence to the contrary and after this Court's thorough review of the
testimony and documents presented before it, the Court adopts the following property
division proposal and equalization chart as prepared by [Margo's] counsel.” The court
continued, setting forth the specific property that each party would receive, as well as
how the debts would be divided.2 Then, the family court held, inter alia, that “[i]n lieu of
spousal maintenance, which certainly would be warranted in this 31 year marriage, the
Court orders that one-half (1/2) of [Milton's] police and dispatch retirement payments be
transferred directly each month from [Milton's] direct deposit bank account to a bank
account in [Margo's] name.”
Milton moved to alter, amend, or vacate the family court's findings of fact
and conclusions of law, pursuant to CR 59.05. Specifically, Milton argued, in part, that
regarding “spousal maintenance, there is no indication . . . that the Court considered the
mandatory requirements of KRS 403.200(2). The only factor listed as considered by the
Court in regard to this issue was the length of the marriage.” Milton further asserted that
the court arbitrarily denied his motion for additional time to file his recapitulation of the
evidence and requested disposition, and that the court should have held a hearing to
2
Milton does not contest the property division other than his retirement benefits.
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determine whether Milton's failure to comply with the court's prior orders was due to his
mental problems.
The family court denied Milton's CR 59.05 motion to alter, amend, or
vacate the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court noted that a hearing
was held on Milton's CR 59.05 motion, and that the hearing “was the first time [Milton]
himself appeared in Court despite numerous hearings in this matter, as well as a full trial
held in December, 2005 with proper notice to all parties.” The court continued, stating
that it had
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law based on
all evidence presented to it after proper notice to all parties,
and had delayed entry of its Findings of Fact for a significant
period of time to allow [Milton] and his prior counsel to
submit matters for the record.
Milton now appeals from the denial of his CR 59.05 motion, raising the
following claims: (1) the family court erred when it divided his retirement accounts “in
lieu of maintenance” without making the requisite findings under KRS 403.200; and (2)
the court erred when it denied his motion for additional time to file his recapitulation of
the evidence and requested disposition.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the denial of a CR 59.05 motion for an abuse of discretion.
Batts v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 217 S.W.3d 881, 883 (Ky. App. 2007).
III. ANALYSIS
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A. CLAIM CONCERNING THE RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS
This Court has repeatedly held that, upon divorce, retirement benefits that
were earned during the marriage and have vested are to be divided as marital property.
See Overstreet v. Overstreet, 144 S.W.3d 834, 838 (Ky. App. 2003); Foster v. Foster, 589
S.W.2d 223, 224 (Ky. App. 1979). In fact, Milton admits in his opening brief to this
Court that “the retirement accounts at issue here could properly be classified as mar[it]al
property as they were earned during the marriage.” (Milton's Br. at p. 6).
The family court in this case held that “[i]n lieu of spousal maintenance,
which certainly would be warranted in this 31 year marriage, the Court orders that onehalf (1/2) of [Milton's] police and dispatch retirement payments be” paid each month to
Margo. The court subsequently denied Milton's CR 59.05 motion, in which he claimed
that the family court improperly divided his retirement accounts "in lieu of maintenance"
without making the requisite findings under KRS 403.200. We agree with Milton that the
family court indirectly awarded maintenance via the division of the retirement benefits.
However, a court cannot award maintenance, even indirectly, without first analyzing the
statutory factors set forth in KRS 403.200. See Newman v. Newman, 597 S.W.2d 137,
138 (Ky. 1980).
Alternatively, even if the family court was making a division of marital
property of Milton's retirement benefits, the court apparently did not consider the value of
the asset. Milton alleges he chose a retirement plan option “that reduced his current
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benefit in favor of a survivorship benefit.”3 (Milton's Br. at p. 7). Therefore, because the
family court neither analyzed the statutory factors set forth in KRS 403.200 for a
maintenance award, nor alternatively valued the retirement benefits as reduced for
survivorship benefits, we rule that the family court abused its discretion when it denied
CR 59.05 relief based on this issue and we therefore remand.
B. CLAIM CONCERNING MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL TIME
Milton's second claim alleges that the court erred when it denied his
motion for additional time to file his recapitulation of the evidence and requested
dispositions. However, Milton had previously ignored various filing deadlines set by the
court, as well as previous court orders, to the extent that the court had to issue a bench
warrant and have him arrested so that he would comply with court orders. Additionally,
the deadline for filing his recapitulation of the evidence and requested dispositions had
previously been extended, and Milton did not file this motion for additional time to file
the document until the deadline for filing it had been expired for approximately one and a
half months.
Moreover, although Milton argues that the family court should have held a
hearing to determine to what extent his alleged mental problems affected his
participation, or lack thereof, in the family court proceedings, he cites no case law in
support of this argument. Rather, as support for this argument, Milton merely cites the
3
Margo points out in a footnote that Milton named his daughter as the beneficiary of the
survivorship benefits in defiance of the family court's order not to do. This is the subject of a
contempt hearing that was scheduled for August 16, 2007.
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statements concerning his depression that were made in the LCSW's letter. However, as
noted by the family court, the LCSW acknowledged in his letter that he had not seen or
evaluated Milton in ten months. Therefore, the LCSW's opinion of Milton was not
current at the time that the letter was drafted, and Milton has not shown that the family
court erred in failing to hold a hearing based on the LCSW's outdated opinions.
Consequently, we hold that the family court did not abuse its discretion in
denying relief for Milton's claim that the court should have granted his motion for
additional time to file his recapitulation of the evidence and requested dispositions. See
Jones v. Jones, 467 S.W.2d 352, 353 (Ky. 1971).
Accordingly, the order of the Henry Family Court is affirmed in part with
regard to the claim involving Milton's motion for additional time, and the order is vacated
and remanded in part with regard to Milton's claim concerning the retirement accounts.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Robert A. Riley
LaGrange, Kentucky
James L. Theiss
LaGrange, Kentucky
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