JOANNE BUCKLEY v. THE KROGER COMPANY, d/b/a COUNTRY OVEN BAKERY
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 30, 2007; 10:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-002244-MR
JOANNE BUCKLEY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEVE ALAN WILSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00504
THE KROGER COMPANY, d/b/a COUNTRY
OVEN BAKERY
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
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BEFORE: STUMBO AND WINE, JUDGES; GUIDUGLI,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
GUIDUGLI, SENIOR JUDGE: Joanne Buckley (“Buckley”) appeals two judgments of
the Warren Circuit Court in her intentional infliction of emotional distress and disability
discrimination action against The Kroger Company (“Kroger”). We vacate and remand.
1
Senior Judge Daniel T. Guidugli sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
This case comes to the appellate level for a third time.2 The factual and
procedural history was set out in those published opinions and need not be repeated here.
The facts essential to this appeal are as follows: on May 6, 1997 Buckley filed an action
in Warren Circuit Court against Kroger and five individual supervisors, alleging
disability discrimination and retaliation/conspiracy under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act
(“discrimination”), intentional infliction of emotional distress/outrageous conduct
(“IIED”), negligent infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery. After the
withdrawal and dismissal of several claims by Buckley and the trial court, the only claims
that remained were discrimination and IIED. A jury verdict found for Buckley on both
claims, awarding her punitive damages and compensation for lost wages and benefits,
medical expenses and humiliation. The trial subsequently rendered a judgment reflecting
the jury verdict and the first appeal followed.
Upon appeal, Kroger argued that it was entitled to a directed verdict or
verdict notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) on both claims. As part of its argument,
Kroger maintained that Buckley's IIED claim was preempted by her discrimination claim
under Wilson v. Lowe's Home Center, 75 S.W.3d 229 (Ky.App. 2001). Buckley argued
that her IIED claim was not preempted by her discrimination claim, because the two
claims were based on separate sets of facts. Irrespective of Buckley's argument, her
petition indicated otherwise. Therefore, this court agreed with Kroger and issued an
opinion to that effect. In that opinion, it was noted that the jury failed to distinguish the
2
See Kentucky Court of Appeals opinion 113 S.W.3d 644 (Ky.App. 2003). See also Kentucky
Supreme Court decision 177 S.W.3d 778 (Ky. 2005).
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awards between the two claims. Therefore, the Warren Circuit Court judgment was
vacated and the matter was remanded for a new trial on the discrimination claim only.
On remand and relying on the appellate court decision, the Warren Circuit
Court denied Buckley the chance to pursue her IIED claim in an order dated April 15,
2004. After being granted a continuance, Buckley then filed a petition for writ of
prohibition with this court.3 The petition was rejected in an August 4, 2004 order.
Buckley then received discretionary review by the Kentucky Supreme Court, where this
court's order was affirmed.4
Subsequent to receiving the Supreme Court order affirming, Kroger moved
for summary judgment on the discrimination claim. The circuit court granted the
summary judgment in an order entered August 8, 2006. This appeal followed.
Buckley makes three arguments in her appeal: 1) the trial court improperly
granted summary judgment on her discrimination claim; 2) the trial court improperly
granted summary judgment on her IIED claim; and 3) in the alternative, if the
discrimination action is not viable, the IIED action should not be preempted.
When reviewing a trial court's grant of summary judgment we must
determine “whether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to
any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky.App. 1996). Summary judgment is proper
when it appears that it would be impossible for the adverse party to produce evidence at
3
See Kentucky Court of Appeals Case No. 2004-CA-001221.
4
See Buckley v. Kroger, 177 S.W.3d 778 (Ky. 2005).
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trial supporting a judgment in his favor. James Graham Brown Foundation, Inc. v. St.
Paul Fire Marine Ins. Co., 814 S.W.2d 273, 276 (Ky. 1991). An appellate court must
review the record in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and must
resolve all doubts in his favor. Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807
S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991).
We will first address Buckley's discrimination claim. On November 19,
2003, the Warren Circuit Court entered an order granting Buckley leave to amend her
original petition. On January 8, 2004, Buckley filed an Amended Complaint outlining
distinctly the two separate sets of events that supported individually the claims of IIED
and discrimination. Specifically, the amended complaint included events that took place
after the filing of the original, in an effort to support the discrimination claim.
Buckley argues that her amended petition would place her situation outside
the scope of Wilson by asserting the new set of facts necessary to allow both claims to
stand. Buckley's amendment of her original petition has compelled us to conduct further
investigation. While we agree that this case no longer falls within the scope of Wilson, it
is not for the same reasons as Buckley believes.
CR 15.01 allows a party to amend a pleading once as a matter of course any
time before a responsive pleading is filed. Thereafter, a party may amend his pleading
only by leave of court or written consent of the adverse party. “Leave [to amend] shall be
freely given when justice so requires.” CR 15.01. Our courts have continuously found
that the trial court is vested with broad discretion when determining whether or not to
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allow pleading amendments. (See Scott Farms, Inc. v. Southland, 424 S.W.2d 574 (Ky.
1968); see also Caldwell v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 455 S.W.2d 67 (Ky. 1970)).
There is no dispute that Buckley needed to amend her petition because the
facts which support her discrimination claim took place after the filing of the original
petition. In fact, she pleaded continuously with this court and the circuit court to
recognize that the claims were based on two separate series of events. We agree that this
is the situation and therefore find that Buckley's original discrimination claim was filed
prematurely. “An amended petition relates back to the original petition, and, if the
original action was filed prematurely, it must be dismissed, carrying the amendments
with it.” Lilly v. O'Brien, 6 S.W.2d 715, 718 (Ky.App. 1928).
Plaintiff's suit was prematurely brought, and no amendment
declaring upon a cause of action which did not exist when the
suit was commenced would cure such a defect. If no cause of
action existed when the suit was started, there was nothing to
amend . . . . It was not a case of a cause of action defectively
stated. Such a defect is amendable. Neither was it a case of a
new cause of action brought in by amendment, which existed
when the suit was brought. It was an effort to declare and
recover upon a cause of action which arose pending the suit.
Plaintiff's right to any recovery depended upon its right at the
inception of the suit, and the nonexistence of a cause of action
when the suit was started is a fatal defect, which cannot be
cured by the accrual of a cause pending suit.
Id. at 718-719 (quoting American Bonding & Trust Co. v. Gibson County,
145 F. 871, 874 (C.A.6 1906)).
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Because Buckley's discrimination claim was filed prematurely it was not
ripe for action, meaning the circuit court failed to acquire subject matter jurisdiction over
it.
The issue of ripeness was never raised by the parties or the
trial court. But ripeness is an element of a justiciable claim.
Section 112(5) of the Kentucky Constitution states in relevant
part that '[t]he Circuit Court shall have original jurisdiction of
all justiciable causes not vested in some other court.'
Questions that may never arise or are purely advisory or
hypothetical do not establish a justiciable controversy.
Because an unripe claim is not justiciable, the circuit court
has no subject matter jurisdiction over it. It is wellestablished that the issue of subject matter jurisdiction can be
raised at any time, even sua sponte, as it cannot be acquired
by waiver, consent, or estoppel.
Doe v. Golden & Walters, PLLC, 173 S.W.3d 260, 269 (Ky.App. 2005) (internal citations
omitted). Therefore, we vacate the August 11, 2006 order granting summary judgment
and remand with instructions to dismiss Buckley's discrimination claim.
If the discrimination cause of action is dismissed as premature, Buckley's
case would fall outside the scope of Wilson, making her IIED claim appropriate for
prosecution. Therefore, we vacate the April 15, 2004 order of the circuit court and
remand Buckley's IIED claim for a new trial.
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate and remand for further proceedings
consistent with these findings.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Lee Huddleston
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Brent R. Baughman
Louisville, Kentucky
William C. Vail, Jr.
Louisville, Kentucky
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