TONY HABLER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 2, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-002072-MR
TONY HABLER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES D. ISHMAEL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-01585-001
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: HOWARD, JUDGE; GUIDUGLI AND KNOPF, SENIOR JUDGES.1
KNOPF, SENIOR JUDGE: Tony Habler appeals from a judgment of the Fayette Circuit
Court that sentenced him to three years' imprisonment after he was found guilty of
possession of a controlled substance in the first-degree, possession of marijuana, and
carrying a concealed deadly weapon. Habler contends that the trial court erred in failing
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Senior Judges Daniel T. Guidugli and William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judges by
assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
to grant his motion to suppress evidence found on his person during an investigatory
stop. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
On November 2, 2005, Officer Kevin Duane and Officer Jerome Bean of
the Lexington Police Special Assignment and Narcotics Unit met with an unidentified
informant in the neighborhood of Pine Street and Patterson Street, an area known for
drug trafficking. The informant participated in a drug transaction with cash given to her
by the officers. After the transaction was over, the informant notified the officers of the
suspect who sold her drugs.
The officers then proceeded to look for the man whom the informant
described. Officers Duane and Bean saw two men standing on the sidewalk, near the
intersection of Pine Street and Patterson Street. One of the men was Ricky Johnson, who
fit the informant’s description. The other man was Habler. After stopping and frisking
Johnson, which led to the discovery of the photocopied currency the police had given the
informant, Officer Duane asked Habler if he had any weapons. Habler failed to respond.
Officer Duane again asked if Habler had a gun, and Habler responded by lifting his shirt
to reveal a 9 mm handgun in his waistband. Officer Bean seized the weapon. Another
officer, Officer Shirley, arrested Habler and charged with him carrying a concealed
deadly weapon.
After his arrest, Officer Shirley found 1.8 grams of crack cocaine and 6.5
grams of marijuana in the pocket of Habler’s sweatshirt. The officers then charged
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Habler with trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree, with a firearm, and
possession of marijuana in the first degree.
On December 12, 2005, the Fayette County Grand Jury indicted Habler on a
series of offenses: one count of possession of a controlled substance in the first degree
with a firearm; one count of possession of marijuana with a firearm; and one count of
carrying a concealed deadly weapon. On January 20, 2006, Habler, appearing with
counsel, entered a “not guilty” plea to the charges.
On March 22, 2006, Habler filed a motion to suppress evidence, arguing
that the police officers lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the initial stop. A
suppression hearing was conducted on April 18, 2006. Officers Duane, Bean and Shirley
testified at the hearing, as well as, Habler. At the conclusion of the lengthy hearing, the
trial judge denied Habler’s motion to suppress, finding that the officers had a reasonable
and articulable suspicion to initially question Habler based on the totality of the
circumstances. The trial judge also found that Habler was not in custody and had not
been detained or apprehended. In fact, Habler was free to walk away from the officers,
whether or not he knew that or was comfortable doing so, as indicated by the trial court.
The officers’ questioning of whether Habler had a gun was found to be a reasonable
inquiry justified by the importance of police safety. Finally, the trial court found that
Habler’s voluntary act of lifting his shirt to reveal the handgun gave the officers probable
cause to arrest him and further search him for other weapons and illegal contraband.
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On July 26, 2006, Habler was tried before a jury in the Fayette Circuit
Court, which found him guilty on all three charges and fixed a total sentence of three
years. On September 7, 2006, the Fayette Circuit Court entered judgment against Habler,
sentencing him to three years' imprisonment. From these convictions, Habler now
appeals.
On appeal, Habler contends that the trial court erred in denying his
suppression motion.
An appellate court’s standard of review of the trial court’s decision
on a motion to suppress requires that we first determine whether
the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial
evidence. If they are, then they are conclusive. Based on those
findings of fact, we must then conduct a de novo review of the trial
court’s application of the law to those facts to determine whether
its decision is correct as a matter of law.
Commonwealth v. Neal, 84 S.W.3d 920, 923 (Ky. App. 2002). In conducting our review,
our proper task is to review findings of fact only from clear error while giving due
deference to the inferences drawn from those facts by the trial judge. Commonwealth v.
Whitmore, 92 S.W.3d 76, 79 (Ky. 2002) (citation omitted). After reviewing the record,
we conclude that the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.
Thus, our attention is focused solely upon whether the court properly applied the law to
the facts as found. Adcock v. Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Ky. 1998) (citation
omitted).
Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section
Ten of the Kentucky Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures by the
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government. Id. These protections “extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or
vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest,” which are typically referred to as “Terry
stops.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 750, 151 L.E.2d 740
(2002). The term “Terry stop” is derived from the seminal U.S. Supreme Court case of
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.E.2d 889 (1968), in which the Court held
that “a brief investigative stop, detention and frisk for weapons short of a traditional
arrest based on reasonable suspicion does not violate the Fourth Amendment.” Baltimore
v. Commonwealth, 119 S.W.3d 532, 537 (Ky. App. 2003). The Terry holding explains
that a significant justification for such police action is “effective crime prevention.”
Terry, 392 U.S. at 22.
[I]t is this interest which underlies the recognition that a police
officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate
manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly
criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an
arrest.
Id.
In the course of a Terry stop, a police officer may conduct a limited search
of the person to discover weapons in order to insure his or her own safety rather than to
uncover evidence of a crime. Baltimore, 119 S.W.3d at 538. An officer need only have
reasonable suspicion rather than the heightened standard of probable cause as
justification for the investigatory search. Id.
In this case, the questioning by the officers of Habler does not rise to the
level of a search and seizure as outlined in the Terry case. Habler was, at best, a party to
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a brief investigatory Terry stop, but the officers did not actually “stop and frisk” him as
the Terry case even allows. The officers were well within the limit of inquiry the Terry
holding grants to officers in similar situations because there was actually no search and
seizure of Habler’s person until Habler voluntarily lifted his shirt to reveal a handgun. At
that point, the officers no longer needed a reasonable and articulable suspicion to do a
weapons search of Habler because the officers had probable cause to detain him at that
point and arrest him for the handgun. The crack cocaine found on Habler’s person was
found as the result of a valid arrest.
At the suppression hearing, the officers testified that Habler’s close
proximity to Johnson, within five to six feet, the time of night, and Habler being in an
area notorious for drug activity, made the officers suspect that Habler might have been
dangerous, and the trial court agreed. We also agree and find that these beliefs were
objectively reasonable, particularly in light of the due deference that we must give to
factual interferences drawn by trial courts in these matters. Whitmore, 92 S.W.3d at 79
(citation omitted).
Therefore, we hold that the stop in this case did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. Both the drugs and the handgun found on Habler’s person at the time of his
arrest were admissible, and the trial court did not err in denying Habler’s motion to
suppress.
The judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Angela Evans
Lexington, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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