JAMES LEROY BROOKS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 14, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-002051-MR
JAMES LEROY BROOKS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA R. GOODWINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-00521
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; NICKELL AND WINE, JUDGES.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE: James Leroy Brooks appeals from a judgment of the Fayette
Circuit Court that sentenced him to a probated sentence of five-years’ imprisonment after
his entry of a conditional guilty plea. Brooks contends that the trial court erred in failing
to grant his motion to suppress evidence that was found in the arresting officer’s police
cruiser during his arrest. After our review, we affirm.
On February 19, 2005, at approximately 3:15 a.m., Officer Gerald Florence
of the Lexington Police Department, while on routine patrol, noticed Brooks and another
individual standing on the corner of Winburn Drive and McCullough Drive in north
Lexington, a high-crime area. According to Florence, he pulled up alongside the two
men, got out of his police cruiser, approached them, and asked their names and where
they lived. Both men produced identification and claimed to live nearby.
Florence further alleged that while conversing with the two men, he noticed
that Brooks appeared to be intoxicated because he was slurring his words and had
bloodshot, watery eyes. Florence asked Brooks to show him his hands, which he did.
Florence then asked Brooks if he had been smoking cocaine since he noticed distinctive
burn marks on Brooks’s thumb and index finger. At no point during this questioning did
Florence give Brooks a Miranda1 warning. Brooks admitted to Florence that he had
smoked cocaine approximately an hour before. Florence then indicated to Brooks that he
was not under arrest at the time but that he “had charges” and that Brooks would be
detained if he attempted to leave. Florence then conducted a background check of
Brooks’s license and discovered an outstanding warrant for his arrest. When Florence
approached Brooks to discuss the warrant, Brooks fled on foot. Florence apprehended
Brooks and placed him under arrest for the outstanding warrant.
Following the arrest, Florence conducted a search of Brooks’s person
incident to arrest and found no contraband. While Florence was transporting Brooks to
the detention center, he noticed Brooks lying down and getting up repeatedly in the
police cruiser. Upon arrival at the detention center, Brooks was removed from the
vehicle, and Florence conducted a search of the cruiser. During that search, Florence
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
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discovered a dime-sized plastic baggy in the back floorboard of the cruiser that appeared
to contain crack cocaine. Florence then charged Brooks with possession of a controlled
substance.
On April 25, 2005, the Fayette County Grand Jury indicted Brooks on a
series of offenses: one count of possession of a controlled substance, first-degree, a Class
D felony pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1415; one count of
resisting arrest, a Class A misdemeanor pursuant to KRS 520.090; one count of public
intoxication, a Class B misdemeanor pursuant to KRS 525.100; and one count of being a
persistent felony offender, second-degree, a Class C felony pursuant to KRS 532.080.
On May 6, 2005, Brooks, appearing with counsel, entered a “not guilty” plea to the
charges.
On August 30, 2005, Brooks filed a motion pursuant to Kentucky Rules of
Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.78 asking the trial court to suppress the evidence from his
arrest. A suppression hearing was held on September 14, 2005. Officer Florence was the
only person to testify at the hearing, and he recited the same version of events as set forth
above. On September 21, 2005, the trial court issued an order denying the motion to
suppress.2 As the basis for its decision, the court found that any arguable taint caused by
an allegedly illegal seizure or by Florence's failure to mirandize Brooks prior to
questioning him had been cured by the outstanding arrest warrant. The court reasoned
2
We note that Brooks failed to comply with Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR)
76.12(4)(c)(vii) when he omitted to include in the Appendix to his brief a copy of the order
denying his motion to suppress from which this appeal is taken. Because we have suffered no
real prejudice in our review, we have elected not to impose the sanction of striking the entire
brief as permitted by CR 76.12(8)(a). However, the omission is duly noted.
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that seizure of the evidence found in the floorboard of Florence’s police cruiser resulted
from a lawful arrest.
On July 21, 2006, Brooks entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of
a controlled substance, first-degree, and to being a persistent felony offender, seconddegree. The Commonwealth agreed to dismiss the remaining charges against him. The
plea also preserved Brooks’s right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. On July
25, 2006, the Fayette Circuit Court entered a judgment in accordance with his conditional
guilty plea and sentenced Brooks to one-year imprisonment, enhanced to five (5) years.
On August 31, 2006, the court entered a judgment suspending imposition of this sentence
and placing Brooks on probation for five (5) years. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Brooks contends that the trial court erred in denying his
suppression motion.
An appellate court's standard of review of the trial court's
decision on a motion to suppress requires that we first
determine whether the trial court's findings of fact are
supported by substantial evidence. If they are, then they are
conclusive. Based on those findings of fact, we must then
conduct a de novo review of the trial court's application of the
law to those facts to determine whether its decision is correct
as a matter of law.
Commonwealth v. Neal, 84 S.W.3d 920, 923 (Ky. App. 2002). In conducting our review,
our proper role is to review findings of fact only for clear error while giving due
deference to the inferences drawn from those facts by the trial judge. Commonwealth v.
Whitmore, 92 S.W.3d 76, 79 (Ky. 2002), quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690,
699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d 911, 920 (1996). After reviewing the record, we
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conclude that the court's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence; moreover,
Brooks raises no arguments challenging those findings. Thus, our attention is focused
solely upon whether the court properly applied the law to the facts as found. Adcock v.
Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Ky. 1998), quoting Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 697, 116 S.Ct.
at 1662.
Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section
Ten of the Kentucky Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures by the
government. Id. Brooks argues that Officer Florence unlawfully seized him because
Florence lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion for an investigatory stop and that
Florence then proceeded to unlawfully interrogate him without a Miranda warning.
According to Brooks, this illegal seizure and interrogation tainted his arrest.
Consequently, any subsequent search was illegal, and the contraband procured from
Florence’s police cruiser had to be suppressed as evidence. Citing to Hardy v.
Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 433 (Ky.App. 2004), in support of its position, the
Commonwealth argues that the discovery of the outstanding warrant for Brooks’s arrest
was an intervening circumstance that cured any possible earlier taint resulting from
Florence’s conduct. We agree.
In Hardy, the appellant claimed that he was unlawfully seized when police
officers refused to allow him to leave a traffic stop while they were waiting for dispatch
to complete a background check of his driver’s license. Id. at 435. According to the
appellant, “since the officers did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was
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engaged in criminal activity, the officers unlawfully ‘seized’ him by denying his requests
to leave the scene.” Id. Thus, the appellant argued that the seizure “tainted” his arrest
and that the evidence found on his person should be suppressed since he had not been
lawfully detained in the first place: “the officers would not have learned that [he] had an
outstanding warrant for his arrest, and if not for his arrest pursuant to that warrant, the
crack cocaine on his person would not have been discovered.” Id.
We were not persuaded by that line of reasoning in Hardy. We held that
Hardy had been arrested pursuant to a valid, outstanding warrant, which we held was an
intervening circumstance that was sufficient to dispel any taint arising from the alleged
misconduct on the part of the officers in detaining the appellant while awaiting the results
of his background check. Id. at 436. Since the appellant's arrest was lawful, the search of
his person incident to that arrest was also lawful. In support of this position, we noted
that the United States Supreme Court has rejected “a 'but for' test when determining
whether an “intervening circumstance” is sufficient to dissipate the taint caused by prior
unlawful conduct on the part of the police.” Id. at 435; see also United States v.
Ceccolini, 435 U.S 268, 276, 98 S.Ct. 1054, 1060, 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978). We also cited
to our previous decision in Baltimore v. Commonwealth, supra, in which we held that:
a valid arrest may constitute an intervening event that cures
the taint of an illegal detention sufficient to rebut the
application of the exclusionary rule to evidence recovered in a
search incident to an arrest.
Id. at 435, quoting Baltimore, 119 S.W.3d at 541 n.37.
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We revisited this issue in Birch v. Commonwealth, 203 S.W.3d 156
(Ky.App. 2006), in which the appellant argued that he was improperly seized during the
course of his questioning by a police officer and that this seizure tainted both his arrest
and the resulting search that uncovered crack cocaine on his person. Id. at 158-59. As in
Hardy, the arrest resulted from the discovery of an outstanding warrant for the appellant’s
arrest. The appellant contended that but for the improper seizure, the officers would not
have learned that the outstanding warrant existed; thus, the cocaine on his person would
not have been discovered. Id. at 159.
However, we again held that “regardless of the potential illegality of the
police officer’s initial contact with [the appellant], the outstanding arrest warrant was an
independent, untainted ground for the arrest.” Id. at 157. In Birch, we concluded that
any evidence uncovered in the search incident to that valid arrest was properly seized and
did not warrant suppression. Id. We set forth the following rule:
If, during a non-flagrant but illegal stop, the police learn the
defendant's name, and the disclosure of that name leads to the
discovery of an outstanding warrant for the defendant's arrest,
and the execution of that warrant leads to the discovery of
evidence, the existence of the arrest warrant will be deemed
an independent intervening circumstance that dissipates the
taint of the initial illegal stop vis-a-vis the evidence
discovered as a consequence of a search incident to the
execution of the arrest warrant.
Id. at 159, quoting McBath v. State, 108 P.3d 241, 248 (Alaska Ct.App. 2005).
The factual scenario now before us is highly similar to that in Hardy and
Birch. Officer Florence learned Brooks’s name during an allegedly illegal stop and
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discovered the existence of a warrant for Brooks’s arrest. In turn, this arrest led Florence
to discover cocaine in the back of his police cruiser following a search. Brooks contends
that the initial stop by Florence was “flagrant” and that the independent warrant for his
arrest did not cure the taint resulting from the stop. Birch squarely addressed that
argument and held that an officer’s presumably illegal seizure of the appellant after
entering the appellant’s home was “not so flagrant as to destroy the independent,
untainted nature of the arrest warrant.” Id. at 160. Under the facts presented here, the
arguably illegal seizure of Brooks by Florence on a street corner was not so egregious an
invasion of privacy as was entry into a home, which was held by Birch not to be so
flagrant as to constitute a violation of the reasonable expectation of privacy protected by
the Fourth Amendment.
Brooks contends that our holding in Birch is “a flawed and dangerous
restriction on the exclusionary doctrine.” However, he has presented no compelling
arguments to persuade us to abandon that decision. Therefore, we conclude that the rule
enunciated in Hardy and Birch governs in this case. The outstanding warrant for
Brooks’s arrest acted as an intervening circumstance that cured any taint that may have
arisen from Florence’s initial seizure and questioning of Brooks. The trial court did not
err in denying Brooks’s motion to suppress.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Bobby L. Amburgey
Lexington, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Robert E. Prather
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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