MARK TREESH, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE; FRANKFORT INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT v. DIRECTV, INC.; ECHOSTAR SATELLITE, L.L.C.
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 7, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001983-MR
MARK TREESH, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE;
FRANKFORT INDEPENDENT SCHOOL
DISTRICT
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS WINGATE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-01623
DIRECTV, INC.; ECHOSTAR SATELLITE,
L.L.C.
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: THOMPSON AND WINE, JUDGES; HENRY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
WINE, JUDGE: Mark Treesh, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the
Department of Revenue, and the Frankfort Independent School District appeal an order of
the Franklin Circuit Court granting motions for summary judgment filed by DIRECTV,
1
Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
Inc., and EchoStar Satellite, L.L.C. At issue is whether the gross receipts of providers of
direct satellite broadcast and wireless cable service (“DBS”) are subject to taxation by
local school districts pursuant to KRS 160.614(3). The trial court held § 602 of the
Telecommunications Act of 19962 preempts KRS 160.614(3) as it applies to DBS
providers. After our review of the record and briefs of each of the parties (including an
amicus curiae brief filed by Time Warner Cable, Inc.), as well as oral arguments, we
reverse and remand with directions.
The facts are not in dispute. In 2005, KRS 160.614 was amended to include
the gross receipts derived from the furnishing of DBS and wireless cable service. The
amendment provides:
(3)
A utility gross receipts license tax initially levied by a
school district board of education on or about July 1,
2005, shall include the gross receipts derived from the
furnishing of direct satellite broadcast and wireless
cable service in addition to the gross receipts derived
from the furnishing of utility services defined in KRS
160.6131 and cable service.
Each board of education of a school district decides whether to “opt out” or
to impose the utility tax according to the procedure set out in KRS 160.614(5). The
Kentucky legislature transferred the collection and administration of the tax from the
school districts to the Kentucky Department of Revenue. KRS 160.6145.
All providers of cable, utility and DBS services are required to register with
the Department of Revenue and may utilize a website to file monthly tax returns. The
2
Pub. L. 104, Title VI, § 602 of the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996. 47 U.S.C.A. §
152.
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website also identifies the school districts, geographic boundaries and tax rate
information which can be utilized by the service providers. The site also acknowledges
that the Department of Revenue collects the tax based on the rate established by the local
authority. Finally, the superintendent of each school district is to provide the Department
of Revenue and each utility provider the boundaries of the district where the utility
service is provided. KRS 160.6152.
The Appellees, DIRECTV, Inc., and EchoStar Satellite, L.L.C., which are
DBS service providers, have failed to register because they believe they are exempt from
paying the utility tax, relying on § 602 of the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996,
which states in part:
(a) Preemption-- A provider of direct-to-home satellite
service shall be exempt from the collection or remittance, or
both, of any tax or fee imposed by any local taxing
jurisdiction on direct-to-home satellite service.
(b) Definitions-....
(3) Local taxing jurisdiction. -- The term
“local taxing jurisdiction” means any
municipality, city, county, township,
parish, transportation district, or
assessment jurisdiction, or any other
local jurisdiction in the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States with the
authority to impose a tax or fee, but does
not include a State.
....
(c) Preservation of State Authority-- This section
shall not be construed to prevent taxation of a provider
of direct-to-home satellite service by a State or to
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prevent a local taxing jurisdiction from receiving
revenue derived from a tax or fee imposed and
collected by a State.
The parties filed cross-summary judgment motions, with the Appellants
seeking imposition of the tax on providers and the Appellees seeking injunctive relief, as
well as a declaration that § 602 preempted enforcement of KRS 160.614(3).
The Franklin Circuit Court held that the utility tax is preempted by § 602 of
the Telecommunications Act insofar as it applies to DBS service providers. The
Appellants now appeal the court’s August 22, 2006, order granting summary judgment
and permanently enjoining the Department of Revenue from requiring the Appellees to
comply with KRS 160.614(3) as it applies to DBS service providers.
The standard of review on appeal when a trial court grants a motion for
summary judgment is “whether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine
issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky.App. 1996), citing Kentucky
Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 56.03. “The trial court must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, and summary judgment should be granted only if
it appears impossible that the nonmoving party will be able to produce evidence at trial
warranting a judgment in his favor.” Lewis v. B & R Corp., 56 S.W.3d 432, 436
(Ky.App. 2001), citing Steelvest v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 48082 (Ky. 1991). “Because summary judgment involves only legal questions and the
existence of any disputed material issues of fact, an appellate court need not defer to the
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trial court’s decision and will review the issue de novo.” Lewis, supra. A reviewing
court is not bound by the trial court’s decision on questions of law. In the present case,
the questions to be answered dealt with the interpretation of statutes. “The construction
and application of statutes is a matter of law and may be reviewed de novo.” Bob Hook
Chevrolet Isuzu, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Transportation Cabinet, 983 S.W.2d 488, 490
(Ky. 1998).
In 1990, the Kentucky General Assembly, in response to the Supreme
Court’s directive in Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky.
1989), enacted an Education Reform Act which revised both state and local school taxing
structures. KRS 160.470, which is among the statutes the Act amended, establishes a
minimum base funding level, a portion of which is to be raised by local school districts
with the levy of a minimum equivalent tax of thirty cents per $100.00 of assessed
valuation. KRS 160.470(9)(a). The local effort may be composed of an ad valorem
property tax, or the special taxes – occupational license tax, utility gross receipts license
tax or excise tax – authorized by KRS 160.593 et seq., or a combination of these taxes.
The Kentucky Supreme Court held in Williams v. Kentucky Department of
Education, 113 S.W.3d 145, 152 (Ky. 2003):
As we have previously emphasized, the sole responsibility for
providing the system of common schools lies with the
General Assembly. If they choose to delegate any of this
duty to institutions such as the local boards of education, the
General Assembly must provide a mechanism to assure that
the ultimate control remains with the General Assembly, and
assure that those local school districts also exercise the
delegated duties in an efficient manner. [Rose, supra, at 216.]
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This, of course, as Williams noted, was not a novel notion. “[P]ublic
education has long been recognized as a function of State government . . . .” Board of
Education of Louisville v. Society of Alumni of Louisville Male High School, Inc., 239
S.W.2d 931, 933 (Ky. 1951), and “every common school in the state . . . is a state
institution . . . .” City of Louisville v. Board of Education of City of Louisville, 154 Ky.
316, 157 S.W. 379, 380 (1913).
The Court further held:
We have several times written, in substance and effect, that
every common school in the state, whether it be located in a
populous city or in a sparsely settled rural district, is a state
institution, protected, controlled, and regulated by the state,
and that the fact that the state has appointed agencies such as
fiscal courts, school trustees, and municipal bodies to aid it in
the collection of taxes for the maintenance of these schools
does not deprive them of their state character. . . . Therefore,
when a municipal body, or a county, or a school district,
levies taxes for school purposes, the tax so levied is a state,
and not a municipal, county, or district, tax, although it be
levied and collected by municipal or county or district
officers.
City of Louisville v. Board of Education of City of Louisville, supra (internal citations
omitted).
In Board of Education of Louisville v. Board of Education of Jefferson
County, 458 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Ky. 1970), the former Court of Appeals declared that boards of
education were not municipal corporations. Specifically, the Court held:
[T]hough a school district possesses some of the attributes of
a municipal corporation for some legal purposes as was
recognized in Sims v. Board of Education of Jefferson
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County, Ky., 290 S.W.2d 491 [(1956], and though a school
district is regarded as a political subdivision for some legal
considerations as pointed out in Board of Education of City of
Corbin v. City of Corbin, 301 Ky. 686, 192 S.W.2d 951
[(1946)], a school district is, nevertheless, an agency of the
state subject to the will of the legislature and existing for one
public purpose only—to locally administer the common
schools within a particular area subject to the paramount
interest of the state.
“Thus viewed, the statutory relationship between the DOE and the local
board was more akin to that of principal-agent than to that of co-agents.” Williams v.
Department of Education, supra, at 154.
In Rose, supra, at 201, the Court acknowledged that local school districts
were creatures of the state and that “our General Assembly has given local districts a
perpetual, corporate existence, and has in two statutes [KRS 160.160 and 160.290],
specifically given local boards virtual unlimited authority to carry out their duty of
promoting local education.”
Again and again Kentucky’s Courts have ruled that the local district boards
of education and the taxes they assessed were a state concern.
In Cullinan v. Jefferson County, 418 S.W.2d 407 (Ky. 1967), the Court
held, “A board of education in Kentucky is performing a function of the state in operating
the public schools as state institutions.” Commonwealth v. Louisville National Bank, 220
Ky. 89, 294 S.W. 815 (1927)(School taxes are classified as state and not local taxes);
Middleton v. Middleton, 239 Ky. 759, 40 S.W.2d 311 (1931)(Members of county boards
of education are state and not municipal officers); Board of Education of Louisville v.
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Society of Alumni of Louisville Male High School, 239 S.W.2d 931 (Ky. 1951)(Local
school boards fulfill a governmental function of state government by providing public
education within a particular geographical area) .
As pointed out in Board of Education of Louisville v. Board of Education
of Jefferson County, supra, at 9:
The tax is used only for school purposes within the county;
the subject is one which is local in application but of
statewide concern; the tax is one the county is authorized by
the Constitution to levy; the legislature, which has the
constitutional power to consolidate the entire state as one
school district, determined a manner of distributing the
proceeds of the tax to the school systems located in that
county on a basis it deemed appropriate[.] . . .
In Board of Trustees, Newport Public Library v. City of Newport, 300 Ky.
125, 187 S.W.2d 806 (1945), the Court considered an act of the General Assembly which
required a city to levy a property tax for the purpose of maintaining a public library in the
city. The act was attacked as being in violation of the provisions of § 181 of the
Kentucky Constitution. The Court held that the act imposed a local tax but that it was for
state purposes.
KRS 160.614(3) mandates that any school district which levies a gross
receipt license tax “shall include the gross receipts . . . of direct satellite broadcast and
wireless cable service . . . .” (Emphasis added). Further, the district shall:
include gross receipts derived from the furnishing of direct
satellite broadcast and wireless cable service in the base of its
utility gross receipts tax at the same rate as applied to cable
service, unless the school district board of education chooses
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to opt out of this requirement by following the procedures set
forth in subsection (5) of this section.
KRS 160.614(4).
Thus, the Commonwealth of Kentucky mandates the imposition of the
utilities fee on DBS providers if any utilities tax is imposed. Only under the prescribed
statutory guidelines may a local school district “opt out.” This statutory provision is
consistent with the previously cited Kentucky case law finding school taxes are state
taxes.
Any federal statute must be interpreted in accordance with federal law.
Montgomery v. Huntington Bank, 346 F.3d 693, 699 (6th Cir. 2003). The Appellees
argue that the preemption provision of the Telecommunications Act prohibits
enforcement of the utilities tax.
Historically, the police powers of the state are not preempted in the absence
of “the clear and manifest purpose of Congress” to do so. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 229, 67 S. Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L. Ed. 1447 (1947). If the statute
contains an express preemption clause, “the task of statutory construction must in the first
instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best
evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.” CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507
U.S. 658, 664, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 1737, 123 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1993); Niehoff v. Surgidev
Corp., 950 S.W.2d 816, 820 (Ky. 1997).
Clearly, § 602 prevents certain local entities from taxing DBS service
providers. “When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has included in
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the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and when that
provision provides a ‘reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state
authority, . . . there is no need to infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from
the substantive provisions’ of the legislation.” Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S.
504, 517, 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2618, 120 L. Ed. 407 (1992), quoting Malone v. White Motor
Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 505, 98 S. Ct. 1185, 1190, 55 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1973) and California
Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282, 107 S. Ct. 683, 690, 93 L.
Ed. 2d 613 (1987).
However, the “savings clause” in subsection (c) in § 602 contemplates a
school tax scenario as prescribed in KRS 160.614(3). The Commonwealth mandates the
local school district levy an ad valorem tax to obtain the amount of money needed as
shown in the general school budget. KRS 160.455. The maximum rate of 3% is
prescribed by statute. KRS 160.613. Gross receipts license tax returns and related
payments shall be transmitted electronically to the Department of Revenue. KRS
160.6145. The Department of Revenue then distributes the taxes collected to each school
district imposing the tax. KRS 160.6154. Finally, the Department of Revenue makes
amortized refunds to service providers. KRS 160.6156.
While not explicitly stated in the preemption section, the reason for
prohibiting the local jurisdictions from taxing DBS providers revolved around the burden
of calculating and paying multiple tax bills with various due dates in any given state.
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The current taxing scheme is not overly burdensome to DBS service
providers. The district school superintendent must provide the necessary information to
the service provider and Department of Revenue to help determine the geographic
location of the subscriber. KRS 160.6152. Any DBS or wireless cable service provider
required to pay the utility tax may increase its rates up to 3% to cover the cost of the tax.
KRS 160.617. Most importantly, the DBS providers are required to only pay one
assessment each quarter.
For the foregoing reasons, it is readily apparent that the tax authorized by
the legislation here being attacked (KRS 160.614(3)) is for state purpose. Therefore, the
provision of the Telecommunications Act which preserves the right of a state to tax the
services of a DBS provider allows for the taxation scheme outlined in KRS 160.614(3).
We therefore reverse and remand with direction that the trial court deny the
motions for summary judgment and injunctive relief sought by DIRECTV, Inc., and
EchoStar Satellite, L.L.C., and, further, enter an order granting the Department of
Revenue’s motion for summary judgment, directing that the Appellees register with the
Department of Revenue and remit the utility tax, interest and penalties.
HENRY, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS.
THOMPSON, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
THOMPSON, JUDGE, DISSENTING: I agree with the majority's
interpretation of Kentucky law that a tax imposed by a local school district is a state tax.
Such has long been the law in this Commonwealth. Lamar v. Board of Education of
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Hancock Co. School District, 467 S.W.2d 143 (Ky. 1971). However, I believe that the
preemption provision of the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 is precisely
applicable to this legislation and prohibits the enforcement of the tax.
Initially, I differ with the majority that the characterization of the tax as a
state tax resolves the issue in this case. Instead, the issue is whether the school districts
are local taxing jurisdictions as defined in §602 of the Federal Telecommunications Act
which includes in its definition any “municipality, city, county, township, parish,
transportation district, or assessment jurisdiction, or any other local jurisdiction...with the
authority to impose a tax or fee....” The Act prohibits any tax from being imposed by a
local taxing jurisdiction. Thus, I believe the issue is not the nature of the tax but is
whether a school district is a local taxing jurisdiction which imposes the tax.
Common sense dictates that a school district be considered a local taxing
jurisdiction. Their authority is limited to the area within its district, and pursuant to this
legislation, they have the authority to impose taxes within their geographical boundaries.
It is in fact the potential for varying tax rates imposed upon DBS service providers that
prompted the enactment of the preemption provision.
As noted by the majority, the reason for prohibiting local taxing
jurisdictions from taxing DBS providers is to relieve the providers of the burden of
calculating and paying multiple tax bills with various dues dates within a single state. In
this Commonwealth there are 175 school districts each of which have chosen to impose
the tax at varying rates or to not impose the tax. The boundaries of the various school
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districts are often difficult to identify since they are not necessarily consistent with
traditional political boundaries of cities or counties, thereby imposing upon the provider
the onerous task of calculating and paying its tax liability.
The majority suggests that the website provided by the Department of
Revenue lifts the burden sought to be prevented by §602 of the Act. Regardless of the
success of the Department's efforts, it remains that the Act explicitly prohibits a school
district from imposing the tax.
I conclude with an observation concerning the enactment of KRS 160.014.
This litigation will undoubtedly be appealed to our Supreme Court and thereafter proceed
within the federal judicial system. As a result, the local school districts will be unable to
rely on the receipt of the money generated from this tax. Why the legislature chose this
more legally dubious route to tax the providers is, except to the politically wise,
unknown.
It is clear that the state has the authority to impose a uniform tax on the
DBS providers which could then be distributed to the local school districts. To avoid the
loss of needed income to our school districts, during its next session the legislature
should enact new legislation imposing a statewide uniform tax on DBS providers in
Kentucky with the proceeds to be distributed to the local districts per capita.
I would affirm the trial court's findings that the local school districts are
local taxing jurisdictions and that §602(a) of the Federal Telecommunications Act of
1996 preempts KRS 160.014.
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BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANTS:
Bethany A. Rice
Office of Legal Services for
Department of Revenue
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Kenneth S. Handmaker
Bradley E. Cunningham
Louisville, Kentucky
Pantelis Michalopoulos
Mark F. Horning
Washington, D.C.
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEES:
Mark F. Horning
Washington, D.C.
BRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE, TIME
WARNER CABLE, INC.:
Eric S. Tresh
Atlanta, Georgia
Jackson W. White
Lexington, Kentucky
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