BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE; JOHN W.D . BOWLING, MAYOR; TERRY CROWLEY; JAMEY GAY; KEVIN CAUDILL AND PAIGE STEVENS, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD v. JAMES L. DAVIS AND NANCY DAVIS
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 12, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001924-MR
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE
CITY OF DANVILLE;
JOHN W.D . BOWLING, MAYOR;
TERRY CROWLEY; JAMEY GAY;
KEVIN CAUDILL AND PAIGE STEVENS,
MEMBERS OF THE BOARD
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM BOYLE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DARREN PECKLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00232
JAMES L. DAVIS AND NANCY DAVIS
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: HOWARD AND VANMETER, JUDGES; GUIDUGLI1, SENIOR JUDGE
GUIDUGLI, SENIOR JUDGE: Board of Commissioners of the City of Danville, et al.
(“the Board”) appeal the July 3, 2006 and August 16, 2006 orders of the Boyle Circuit
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Senior Judge Daniel T. Guidugli sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
21.580.
Court declaring conditions on a zoning reclassification as impermissible and upholding
the zoning reclassification minus the offending conditions. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
This matter began when James and Nancy Davis (“the Davises”) sought a
zone change from agricultural/residential (AR-1) to low density residential (R-1) for a
parcel of land located in the City of Danville. After reviewing the request and holding
public hearings and votes on the matter, the Danville-Boyle County Planning and Zoning
Commission (“Planning Commission”) recommended the zone change to the Board. In
its recommendation, the Planning Commission acknowledged that the Davises had
satisfied all requirements of the zone change. Attached to the Planning Commission's
recommendation for the zone change were four conditions that the Planning Commission
requested be attached to the zone change ordinance. These conditions were: 1) conduct a
traffic study of the area; 2) all submissions must agree with the future street plan;2 3) give
an adjacent property owner an entrance from a specified road; and 4) extend the sanitary
sewer system to the edge of an adjacent property. After considering the Planning
Commission's recommendation, the Board gave public notice and approved the zone
change with the conditions.
The Davises appealed, challenging enforcement of the zone change
conditions, to the Boyle Circuit Court. The Davises named the Planning Commission, the
Board, the mayor and the city commissioners as parties. Upon motion, the Planning
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The Planning Commission had noted that any conflict about the future road map would be dealt
with by the City Commission, stating specifically that they had no authority over the issue.
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Commission was dismissed from the action. The dismissal was neither challenged nor
appealed by any of the other parties. Boyle Circuit Court ruled, in two separate opinions,
that the conditions attached to the zone change were impermissible conditions
subsequent, created by an excess of authority, and that a severance clause located in the
zone change allowed it to stand without the imposition of the conditions. This appeal
followed.
Before us, the Board has presented several issues. It first contends that, due
to the order dismissing the Planning Commission from the Circuit Court action, the
Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to address the authority or actions of the Planning
Commission. Next, it argues that the Circuit Court decision that the Planning
Commission exceeded its authority in imposing the conditions was erroneous. Lastly, the
Board contends that without the enforcement of the zoning conditions the zone change
should fail in its entirety.
DISCUSSION
There is some dispute between the parties as to whether this case is one
turning on the issue of zoning change or development planning. Having reviewed the
Record, the arguments made and applicable statutory and case law and being otherwise
sufficiently advised, this Court believes that the issue presented is one of zoning, not
development.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
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The standard of review, when addressing an appeal from an administrative
decision, “is limited to determining whether the decision was erroneous as a matter of
law.” McNutt Construction v. Scott, 40 S.W.3d 854, 861 (Ky. 2001). Kentucky Courts
have long held that “judicial review of administrative action is concerned with the
question of arbitrariness. . . . Unless action taken by an administrative agency is
supported by substantial evidence it is arbitrary.” American Beauty Homes Corp. v.
Louisville and Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Commission, 379 S.W.2d 450, 456
(Ky. 1964) (emphasis in original). Substantial evidence is defined as “that which, when
taken alone or in light of all the evidence, has sufficient probative value to induce
conviction in the mind of a reasonable person.” Bowling v. Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet, 891 S.W.2d 406, 409 (Ky. App. 1994). In weighing
the evidence, “the trier of facts is afforded great latitude in its evaluation of the evidence
heard and the credibility of witnesses appearing before it.” Bowling, 891 S.W.2d at 40910. A reviewing court may not substitute its own judgment on a factual issue “unless the
agency's decision is arbitrary and capricious.” McManus v. Kentucky Retirement Systems,
124 S.W.3d 454 (Ky. App. 2003). Once a reviewing court has determined that the
agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the court must then determine if
the agency applied the correct rule of law to those factual findings in making its
determination. If so, the final order of the agency has to be upheld. Bowling, 891 S.W.2d
at 410. On the other hand, matters of statutory construction are subject to de novo review.
Because statutory interpretation is a matter of law reserved for the courts, we are not
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bound by the Circuit Court's interpretation. Halls Hardwood Floor Co. v. Stapleton, 16
S.W.3d 327, 330 (Ky. App. 2000).
JURISDICTION
This Court questions the validity of the Board's argument that the Planning
Commission is an indispensable party, after noting that there were no objections to the
Order Dismissing at the Circuit Court level. The Board argues that after dismissing the
Planning Commission as a party, the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to make decisions
regarding the Planning Commission's authority. Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure
19.01states “A person . . . shall be joined as a party in the action if (a) in his absence
complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties.” Because the Planning
Commission is a subsidiary of the City of Danville, and because the final approval and
enactment of the zone change ordinance was done by the City Board of Commissioners,
this Court sees no reason why complete relief cannot be accorded in the absence of the
Planning Commission.
As its authority, the Board cites KRS 100.347(2) as requiring the Planning
Commission to be a party. Specifically, it cites the following:
Any person or entity claiming to be injured or aggrieved by
any final action of the planning commission shall appeal from
the final action to the Circuit Court. . . . The planning
commission shall be a party in any such appeal filed in the
Circuit Court .
(Emphasis added). An important portion of that section, which Appellants omit from their
quotation, is “such action shall not include the commission's recommendations made to
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other governmental bodies” (emphasis added). Since the Circuit Court action includes
only the Planning Commission's recommendations and the Board's final act, the relevant
part of the statute is actually found in subsection (3), which states:
Any person or entity claiming to be injured or aggrieved by
any final action of the legislative body of any city . . . relating
to a map amendment shall appeal from the action to the
Circuit Court. . . . The legislative body shall be a party in any
such appeal filed in Circuit Court.
(Emphasis added). As such, the statute states clearly that the legislative body, in this case
the Board, shall be a party, not the Planning Commission. It is clear, by the language of
the statute, that had the legislature intended the Planning Commission to also be a party,
they would have undoubtedly known how to state so.
Appellants also argue that only parties are bound by an appellate court's
disposition of the proceedings, pursuant to Levin v. Ferer, 535 S.W.2d 79 (Ky. 1976).
While this holding may be relevant when an outcome requires direct actions of a nonparty, that is not the case here. Levin involved a dispute over ownership of a piece of real
property, a situation that had the potential to affect the interests of parties not present. Id.
The instant case concerns a series of events that have progressed to a point beyond the
Planning Commission's involvement (a recommendation) and into approval by the Board.
Regardless of this Court's decision, it will not require the Planning Commission to act
directly but instead serve as a guide for future actions.
This Court also distinguishes the case at hand from Mills v. Buell, 685 S.W.2d 561
(Ky. App. 1985). In Mills, the non-party was the Kentucky High School Athletic
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Association, who was responsible for the enforcement of a disputed policy. At present, it
is the Board, not the Planning Commission who has the final say in the approval of zone
changes, whereas the Planning Commission merely makes recommendations. Again, this
was clearly considered at the time KRS 100.347 was enacted. In fact, KRS 100.347
addresses directly, and clearly, the exact situation at hand and requires only that the
Board be made a party.
THE IMPOSITION OF SPECIFIC CONDITIONS
ON A ZONING CHANGE
Zoning powers are conferred to local governments through KRS Chapter 100. This
court has found that “local zoning authorities . . . have only those powers expressly
provided by statute .” Oldham County Planning and Zoning Commission v. Courier
Communications Department, 722 S.W.2d 904, 907 (Ky. App. 1987). There is no dispute
that KRS 100.203(2) grants the Planning Commission the power to require a specific
development plan as a condition of a zone change. The issue arises as to the timing and
the role of the development plan. The Board contends that the statutory requirement of
requiring a development plan gives it an all-inclusive power to impose that development
plan and use its shortcomings to place additional conditions upon the zone change. We do
not agree with that interpretation. The relevant language of the statute is:
Cities and counties may enact zoning regulations which shall
contain: . . . (2) The text may provide that the planning
commission, as a condition to the granting of any zoning
change, may require the submission of a development plan, . .
. Where agreed upon, this development plan shall be
followed.
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KRS §100.203(2) (Emphasis added). The language of the statute is clear that the only
condition allowed here is the submission of the development plan. The development plan
is to be submitted prior to the grant of the zone change. The statute does not require
submission and approval of a development plan, only its submission. Additionally, the
statute states that the development plan is to be followed, only “where agreed upon.” In
its recommendations, the Planning Commission found that the proposed zone change was
in agreement with all applicable guidelines of the comprehensive plan, conformed to the
zoning recommendation, agreed with location principles and agreed with new
development principles. If the Planning Commission found any portion of the Davises'
development plan to be unsatisfactory to allow the zone change, then the zone change
should have not been referred under the premise that it was compliant. It was
inappropriate for the Planning Commission to later place requirements upon its referral.
KRS 100.203(A) states that “regulations . . . must be uniform throughout the zone.”
Requiring a development plan is a uniform regulation. Imposing plot-specific conditions
is not. Details relating to the specific development of the land are to be addressed later,
when that development takes place, not at the grant of the zone change. Any issues with
the development plan should have been addressed prior to the recommendation of the
zone change to the Board, not alongside it. Both parties conceded, during oral arguments,
that the issues presented in the conditions could be raised again at the later stage of
development. Furthermore, the Planning Commission admits, in meeting transcripts
found in the record, that the first three conditions are handled at the preliminary plat stage
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under subdivision regulations. The Davises were not yet at this stage of development;
they were merely seeking a zone change.
A further reading of KRS 100.203 reveals the following:
In urban-county governments, in addition to any other
powers permitted or required to be exercised by this chapter,
the text of the zoning regulations may provide, as a condition
to granting a map amendment, that the planning unit may:
(a) Restrict the use of the property affected to a particular use,
or a particular class of use, or a specified density within those
permitted in a given zoning category;
(b) Impose architectural or other visual requirements or
restrictions upon development in areas zoned historic; and
(c) Impose screening and buffering restrictions upon the
subject property;
The text shall provide the method whereby such restrictions
or conditions may be imposed, modified, removed, amended
and enforced.
KRS 100.203(8). This grant of extra powers to urban-county governments
makes clear the legislature's intent that only those powers expressly granted in the other
subsections be extended to all remaining Planning Commissions in the state.
Additionally, the local zoning ordinance (Article 7, Section 720) that requires the
development plan refers to it as “proposed” or “conceptual.” It is never referred to as a
solidified plan, implying that the final plan that must be adhered to will be submitted at a
later date.
The Board also contends that the Davises previously argued the alternative in
Davis v. Board of Commissioners of the City of Danville, 995 S.W.2d 404 (Ky. App.
1999). In that case, the Davises argued against a zone change where a development plan
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had never been submitted. The Davises argued to have the development plan requirement
be enforced uniformly. The case at hand differs, in that a development plan has been
submitted. Our issue lies not with the submission of a development plan, but with
conditions subsequent placed upon the zone change approval.
Appellants cite 21st Century Development Co. v. Watts, 958 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. App.
1997) as holding that prior to approving a zone change, a Planning Commission must
take into account additional matters, other than whether the proposed change is in
compliance with the comprehensive plan. We agree with that statement. What this Court
does not agree with is the application of 21st Century to the case at hand. In 21st Century,
the Planning Commission argued that additional factors, such as traffic and drainage,
could not be considered when determining whether or not to recommend the zone
change. The Court found that those factors needed to be considered. This Court agrees
that additional factors should play a role in the approval of a zone change. However, our
view that those issues should be addressed prior to recommending the zone change is not
in conflict with the 21st Century opinion. In 21st Century, the court stated:
After the planning commission addresses the staff concerns
and those of the general public at the hearing, it will be in a
position to make findings which would allow the current
rezoning, or delay the rezoning until other developments take
place.
Id at 28 (emphasis added).
Therefore, if the Planning Commission still had concerns, the rezoning
should have been delayed, not sent on to the Board under the guise of being approved
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and/or recommended. For the foregoing reasons, this Court affirms the Circuit Court's
finding that the Planning Commission exceeded its authority when it imposed conditions
subsequent on its recommendation for the zone change.
ENFORCEMENT OF A SEVERABILITY CLAUSE
IN A ZONING CHANGE
We next address whether or not the remainder of the ordinance stands with the
exclusion of the conditions. Kentucky has a history of upholding severability clauses in
zoning ordinances. Carlton v. Taylor, 569 S.W.2d 679 (Ky. App. 1978). However,
Kentucky has also held that if an ordinance would not have been enacted without the
offending provisions, then the entire ordinance must fail. Commonwealth of Kentucky for
Use and Benefit of City of Erlanger v. Cullum, 494 S.W.2d 521 (Ky. 1973).
Carlton and Cullum do not mandate a different result. We find, based on
the individual roles of the Planning Commission and the Board, that the the ordinance
would have been enacted without the conditions present. Enacting an ordinance is a
function of the legislature, in this case the Board. While it may be argued that the
Planning Commission would not have recommended the zone change without the
conditions, that is not what the law is concerned with. The Planning Commission plays
an administrative role, the Board plays a legislative role. Thus, the Board is granted the
duty of enacting the ordinance, whereas the Planning Commission has only the job of
making recommendations. The conditions first appeared in the Planning Commission's
recommendations, not at the legislative level of the Board. Furthermore, this Court has
already determined that the conditions attached to the recommendation were an excess of
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authority. It does not stand to reason that the Planning Committee could first exceed its
authority and later continue to glean the benefits from its authoritative overstep. We think
it is fair to say that the ordinance would have been enacted based on the
recommendations of the Planning Committee, minus the offending conditions. Moreover,
not only was it at the legislative level of the Board that the ordinance was enacted, but it
was also at this level that the severance clause appeared, showing the intent of the Board
that the ordinance should stand, in the event that portions of it did not. Even with the
approval of the zone change, the Planning Commission maintains control over the
development and subdivision phases pursuant to KRS Chapter 100 to ensure all statutory
regulations are complied with.
Therefore, we affirm the July 3, 2006 and August 16, 2006 Orders of the
Boyle Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Elizabeth G. Nickels
Danville, Kentucky
Richard v. Murphy
Lexington, Kentucky
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