ROSE HUFF v. KENTUCKY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 12, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001818-MR
ROSE HUFF
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-01343
KENTUCKY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; NICKELL AND WINE, JUDGES.
NICKELL, JUDGE: Rose Huff appeals from the August 2, 2006, opinion and order of
the Franklin Circuit Court affirming a decision of the Kentucky Retirement Systems
(hereinafter “System”) denying Huff disability retirement benefits. We affirm.
Huff was employed by the Kentucky Department of Community Based
Services as a case management specialist. Her membership in the System began on July
1, 1984, and ended on July 4, 2002, her last day of paid employment, with 216 months of
accumulated service. Huff’s job was classified as light-duty work and consisted of
interviewing applicants for the K-TAP program, maintaining contact with program
participants, making home visits, coordinating efforts of participants to obtain
employment, reviewing work of other case workers for accuracy, and assisting in the
training of other case managers. Her employer stated that Huff usually stood or walked
up to one hour during a seven and one-half hour work day, and had the ability to alternate
between sitting and standing. She was required to lift up to ten pounds occasionally.
Huff’s medical history and medical records date back to 1997. Some of
these records pertain to conditions that would not be considered disabling, or which were
successfully treated including hypertension, bunions, and an endrometrial polyp. In
December 2000 Huff underwent a heart catheterization which was completely normal. In
March 2001 a lumbar x-ray of Huff’s spine showed mild degenerative changes at L1-L2.
An x-ray showed post rod fixation in the right hip from a 1991 fracture and mild early
osteoarthritis, but no bone or joint abnormality. A CT scan of the head in July 2001 was
normal.
Huff applied for disability retirement benefits on December 27, 2001. She
claimed to have sustained injuries as the result of an automobile accident1 in October
2001, including torn cartilage and muscles. She also claimed a constellation of other
disabling medical maladies, including severe sleep apnea; herniated discs; pinched nerves
and spurs in her back and feet; a strained lower back; foot swelling; asthma and breathing
1
Our review of the record does not reveal whether the automobile collision was work-related.
However, as no challenge has been raised, we must assume the collision and the alleged resultant
injuries were work-related and will treat them as such for purposes of this appeal.
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problems; panic and anxiety attacks; heart problems; high blood pressure; degenerative
disc disease; thyroid problems; headaches; numbness in her hands, back, and feet; a
distended bladder; osteoarthritis; stress; depression; and chronic pain.
The System's Medical Review Board denied disability retirement benefits
on July 8, 2002. Huff requested an administrative hearing, which was held on August 11,
2003. The Hearing Officer found insufficient objective medical evidence in the record to
support a finding that Huff was totally and permanently disabled, and recommended
denial of Huff’s claim on November 26, 2003. The System's Board of Trustees affirmed
the Hearing Officer's recommendation and denied Huff's claim for disability retirement
benefits on February 26, 2004. Huff appealed the System's denial of her application for
disability retirement benefits to the Franklin Circuit Court.2 That appeal was held in
abeyance pending the System's review of her re-application for disability retirement
benefits which was filed on June 1, 2004, based upon new evidence of disability.3
Huff's re-application for disability retirement benefits was denied by the
Medical Review Board on August 20, 2004, and an administrative hearing was
subsequently held on December 17, 2004. The Hearing Officer concluded Huff was
substantially limited and practically incapacitated by her degenerative disc disease, but
only because a fall that occurred after her last date of paid state employment aggravated
2
Civil Action No. 04-CI-00401.
3
With her re-application for benefits, Huff submitted additional medical records, including an
MRI of her lumbar spine from December 2003, an MRI of her cervical spine from May 2004,
and records from a hospital stay in January 2004 related to depression and anxiety.
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the pre-existing degenerative changes. His recommendation to deny benefits was
affirmed by the System's Board of Trustees on August 25, 2005. Huff appealed this
denial to the Franklin Circuit Court.4
By agreed order, both the appeal from the initial denial of disability
retirement benefits and the appeal from the denial of the re-application for disability
retirement benefits were consolidated. On August 2, 2006, the circuit court issued its
opinion and order affirming both denials of disability retirement benefits. This appeal
followed.
The crux of Huff’s appeal is that the System's original decision incorrectly
ignored overwhelming substantial medical evidence she had provided in support of her
claim. Additionally, she argues the System acted arbitrarily in denying her re-application
for disability retirement benefits since she believes it was supported by additional
overwhelming and substantial evidence. We disagree.
To trigger state disability retirement benefits, pursuant to Kentucky Revised
Statutes (KRS) 61.600(3)(a)-(d), a claimant must offer “objective medical evidence by
licensed physicians” showing that since the last day of her paid state employment, she
“has been mentally or physically incapacitated to perform the job, or jobs of like duties,
from which [she] received [her] last paid employment.” Such incapacity must be the
result of bodily injury, mental illness, or disease, and must be deemed permanent.
Further, the incapacity cannot “result directly or indirectly from bodily injury, mental
4
Civil Action No. 05-CI-01343.
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illness, disease, or condition which pre-existed membership in the system. . . .” A
claimant for disability retirement benefits must prove she satisfies all the foregoing
statutory criteria to justify payment of benefits. See Energy Regulatory Commission v.
Kentucky Power Co., 605 S.W.2d 46 (Ky.App. 1980).
When a claimant is denied administrative relief, the question to be decided
on appeal is “whether the evidence was so overwhelming, upon consideration of the
entire record, as to have compelled a finding in [claimant’s] favor,” Wolf Creek
Collieries v. Crum, 673 S.W.2d 735, 736 (Ky.App. 1984), and whether the denial of the
relief sought was arbitrary. Bourbon County Board of Adjustment v. Currans, 873
S.W.2d 836, 838 (Ky.App. 1994).
In determining whether an agency’s action was arbitrary, the
reviewing court should look at three primary factors. The
court should first determine whether the agency acted within
the constraints of its statutory powers or whether it exceeded
them. . . . Second, the court should examine the agency’s
procedures to see if a party to be affected by an administrative
order was afforded his procedural due process. The
individual must have been given an opportunity to be heard.
Finally, the reviewing court must determine whether the
agency’s action is supported by substantial evidence. . . . If
any of these three tests are failed, the reviewing court may
find that the agency’s action was arbitrary.
Bowling v. Natural Resources & Environmental Protection Cabinet, 891 S.W.2d 406,
409 (Ky.App. 1995) (quoting Commonwealth, Transportation Cabinet v. Cornell, 796
S.W.2d 591, 594 (Ky.App. 1990)).
It is fundamental “that administrative agencies are creatures of statute and
must find within the statute warrant for the exercise of any statutory authority which they
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claim.” Department for Natural Resources & Environmental Protection v. Stearns Coal
& Lumber Co., 563 S.W.2d 471, 473 (1978). “[F]indings of fact are essential to support
the orders of administrative agencies, at least where the order issued by the agency rests
upon a factual determination.” Pearl v. Marshall, 491 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Ky. 1973).
In reviewing an administrative decision, the circuit court’s role is not to
reinterpret or reconsider the merits of the claim. Kentucky Unemployment Insurance
Commission v. King, 657 S.W.2d 250, 251 (Ky.App. 1983); Kentucky Board of Nursing
v. Ward, 890 S.W.2d 641, 642 (Ky.App. 1994). Instead, the circuit court must determine
two things: are the findings of fact “supported by substantial evidence of probative
value” and has the administrative agency “applied the correct rule of law to the facts so
found.” Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Kentucky Unemployment
Insurance Commission, 437 S.W.2d 775, 778 (Ky. 1969) (citing Brown Hotel Co. v.
Edwards, 365 S.W.2d 299 (Ky. 1962)). See also Kentucky Commission on Human
Rights v. Fraser, 625 S.W.2d 852, 856 (Ky. 1981). As long as there is substantial
evidence in the record to support the agency’s decision, the circuit court must defer to the
agency, even if there is conflicting evidence. Kentucky State Racing Commission v.
Fuller, 481 S.W.2d 298, 308 (Ky. 1972) (citing Blankenship v. Lloyd Blankenship Coal
Co., Inc., 463 S.W.2d 62 (Ky. 1970)).
Our standard5 in reviewing the circuit court’s affirmance of an
5
KRS 13B.150(2) states as follows:
The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the
weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the final order
or it may reverse the final order, in whole or in part, and remand the case for
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administrative decision is whether the circuit court’s findings are clearly erroneous.
Johnson v. Galen Health Care, Inc., 39 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Ky.App. 2001). See also
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01. Thus, we begin our review by
considering the findings of fact relied upon by the System in denying disability
retirement benefits to Huff. In his recommended order denying Huff's re-application for
disability retirement benefits, the Hearing Officer made the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law:
The Claimant is permanently incapacitated by her
degenerative disc disease, but her condition has been
aggravated by a fall that occurred after the Claimant’s last
day of paid employment. Even with the fall in September,
2003, the MRI to which the Claimant directs the undersigned
Hearing Officer’s attention shows mild degenerative disease.
The record does not show that the Claimant was permanently
and totally incapacitated on account of degenerative disc
disease as of her last day of paid employment, nor does it
show that she was unable to sit, stand, walk or lift as the
Claimant originally alleged.
The record contains no objective medical evidence to
suggest that Ms. Huff’s depression and anxiety are
permanently or totally disabling. Dr. Campbell has
further proceedings if it finds the agency’s final order is:
...
(b)
In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c)
Without support of substantial evidence on the whole record;
(d)
Arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by abuse of discretion; [or]
...
(g)
Deficient as otherwise provided by law.
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completed reports in which he states his opinions. These
opinions appear to be for the benefit of some reviewer, or
perhaps for the records of Pathways, Inc., but they do not
include any mention or report of any psychological testing.
The record contains little evidence at all regarding the claim
of panic disorder, other than brief mention of anxiety attacks.
A single episode of hospitalization led to simplification of
Ms. Huff’s medication, with the result that she experienced
significant improvement in her mental state.
The record contains no objective medical evidence that
Ms. Huff’s alleged distended bladder is in any way totally and
permanently disabling.
The record does contain objective medical evidence of
problems with Ms. Huff’s knees, but does not contain
evidence that the knee problems are permanently and totally
disabling.
The record shows that the Claimant did suffer from
severe obstructive sleep apnea, but it also shows that this was
successfully treated. Although the Claimant has alleged
continued problems with sleep, the record contains no
objective medical evidence to support that claim.
The record does not show objective medical evidence
that any of the other ancillary conditions, alleged by Ms. Huff
to be disabling, actually have disabled her as of her last day of
paid employment.
....
The record, taken as a whole, does not contain substantial
evidence that the Claimant, Rose Huff, suffered from
permanent and total disability within the meaning of KRS
61.600, as of her last day of paid employment from any of her
individual ailments. Although the claimant clearly has
numerous medical problems, this Hearing Officer cannot find
substantial evidence in the record as a whole that the
combined effect of her several ailments would have made Ms.
Huff totally and permanently disabled as of the last day of her
paid employment. In part, this is because the record lacks
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objective medical evidence regarding the psychological
claims. . . . Ms. Huff is not entitled to disability retirement
benefits.
Contrary to Huff’s argument, the Hearing Officer’s order recited substantial
evidence consisting of adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law, including a
detailed summary of medical treatment Huff received from several different physicians.
Although substantial evidence existed which could have supported a finding of disability,
other substantial evidence clearly supported the System's determination that Huff did not
meet her burden of showing she was disabled from her job duties. See KRS 61.665
(3)(d). We cannot say the evidence was insufficient to support the Hearing Officer's
finding that “[t]he record does not show objective medical evidence that any of the other
ancillary conditions, alleged by Ms. Huff to be disabling, actually have disabled her as of
her last day of paid employment.” Thus, the System did not act in an arbitrary fashion in
denying disability retirement benefits to Huff.
Finally, the circuit court undertook a detailed analysis of the evidence
presented to it for review, including the Hearing Officer's reports and testimony to the
contrary presented by Huff. As the court aptly noted, “[c]onflicting evidence does not
compel reversal.” Further, the court correctly found “Huff had the burden to prove her
worsening condition was not the result of a 2003 fall. Since the fall occurred after her
last day of paid employment, any disability caused by it cannot be considered.” After
consideration of all of the evidence and arguments presented, the circuit court concluded
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Huff had failed to meet her burden6 and thus, reversal was not required. The circuit
court's well-crafted order properly applied the law to the facts and we cannot say its
findings were clearly erroneous.
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the order of the Franklin Circuit Court
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Stephen C. Sanders
Frankfort, Kentucky
Katherine Rupinen
Frankfort, Kentucky
6
We note, as did the trial court, that Huff incorrectly attempted to shift her burden of proof to
the System. The burden of proving entitlement to disability retirement benefits remains on the
person seeking such benefits. See Energy Regulatory Commission v. Kentucky Power Co.,
supra.
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