FLAMINTO KENYARDNA THOMAS v. NANCY DUNCAN, SENTENCING SPECIALIST, KENTUCKY DPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
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RENDERED: MARCH 9, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001788-MR
FLAMINTO KENYARDNA THOMAS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-00003
NANCY DUNCAN, SENTENCING SPECIALIST,
KENTUCKY DPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: TAYLOR AND WINE, JUDGES; PAISLEY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
PAISLEY, SENIOR JUDGE: This is a pro se appeal of an order of the Franklin Circuit
Court that denied Flaminto Kenyardna Thomas’s petition for writ of mandamus. We
affirm.
Following a jury trial, Thomas was found guilty of criminal abuse in the
second degree, and being a persistent felony offender (PFO) in the first degree. In an
order entered on July 24, 2000, the McCracken Circuit Court imposed a sentence of three
1
Senior Judge Lewis G. Paisley sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
years on the abuse charge, enhanced to seventeen years by the PFO charge. Thomas was
credited with 271 days for time he had spent in custody prior to the commencement of the
sentence.
Approximately five years later, on appeal, this Court determined that the
evidence used to support the PFO conviction was insufficient. Thomas’s conviction was
accordingly reversed in part and remanded solely for retrial on the PFO charge. See
2000-CA-001985-MR (Ky.App. Nov. 2, 2001), aff’d, Thomas v. Commonwealth, 153
S.W.3d 772 (Ky. 2002). Upon remand, Thomas entered a plea of guilty to the PFO
charge, and was sentenced to serve ten years. The final judgment of the McCracken
Circuit Court entered on April 26, 2005, specified that he was to be credited with time
spent in custody prior to the commencement of the sentence, which totaled 2,011 days
(approximately five years and six months).
On January 3, 2006, Thomas filed a petition for writ of mandamus, arguing
that the Department of Corrections was incorrectly calculating his sentence based on his
previous sentencing date of July 21, 2000. He also argued that he was entitled to a
hearing before the Parole Board concerning his eligibility for parole on his new sentence.
The Franklin Circuit Court denied Thomas’s petition in an order entered on
July 13, 2006, and this appeal followed.
Thomas’s first argument is that the circuit court erred in denying his
petition because his sentence is being calculated based on the “void” judgment of July 21,
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2000. He contends that his sentence dating from that judgment has now expired, because
he has already served the three years imposed for the second-degree abuse charge.
Thomas appears to have misunderstood the effect of the PFO conviction.
The PFO statute, Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS ) 532.080, merely establishes a status,
not a separate criminal offense.
There is no additional punishment imposed by a persistent
felony offender conviction, merely a more severe punishment.
KRS 532.080 does not create or define a criminal offense. It
recognizes a status and, in a proceeding separate and apart
from the initial trial, fixes a penalty which is to be imposed
rather than the one fixed by the jury on the initial trial.
Hardin v. Commonwealth, 573 S.W.2d 657 (Ky. 1978).
The sentence Thomas is currently serving stems from the conviction for
criminal abuse; his PFO status serves only to enhance the sentence on that underlying
conviction.
Thomas’s “Resident Record Card” indicates that his total time to serve has
been altered from seventeen to ten years, starting from the original conviction date of
July 21, 2000. The card states that the maximum expiration date of his sentence is now
October 20, 2009. A ten-year sentence calculated from the conviction date of July 24,
2000, is the same as a ten-year sentence calculated from the conviction date of April 26,
2005, minus 2,011 credited days. We therefore agree with the circuit court’s conclusion
that “either method of calculating Petitioner’s sentence yields the exact same result” and
that the Department of Corrections did not err in calculating Thomas’s sentence.
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Thomas's next argument concerns six months of good time credit that he
lost on November 23, 2004. He argues that because his previous sentence was vacated
and a new sentence imposed, the six months of good time credit should be restored since
the prior sentence is now void. He contends that the failure to restore the six months of
good time credit violates the rule against double jeopardy.
The circuit court correctly observed that Thomas is not alleging a due
process violation underlying the revocation of the credit, and that therefore the revocation
is not susceptible to review as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Double
jeopardy is also not implicated because Thomas is not being punished twice for the same
offense. Thomas is being fully credited for all the time he actually served (2,011 days)
under the earlier sentence. The six months of good time credit was awarded, and then
legitimately revoked; the mere fact that Thomas has been resentenced provides no
grounds for restoring the credit. The record shows that Thomas has subsequently been
credited with two years and six months of statutory good time credit on his current
sentence, as well as six months and five days of meritorious good time credit.
His third and final argument is that a serve-out order by the Parole Board
regarding his original sentence should have been vacated in light of his new sentence, and
a new hearing held before the Board to determine whether he must serve out his current
sentence. Although Thomas has received a new sentence, it relates to the original
conviction for second-degree criminal abuse. Thomas is not entitled to a new parole
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hearing because the Board's serve-out order was issued in regard to his underlying
conviction, which has not changed.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Franklin Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Flaminto Kenyardna Thomas, pro se
Eddyville, Kentucky
No brief filed.
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