JOHN REES v. WENDELL REYNOLDS
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RENDERED: AUGUST 24, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001718-MR
JOHN REES
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAM G. MCNAMARA, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-00435
WENDELL REYNOLDS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON, MOORE, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE: John Rees appeals from a July 18, 2006, order of the Franklin
Circuit Court denying his motion to dismiss a declaration of rights action filed by
Wendell Reynolds.1 We affirm.
Wendell Reynolds was charged with first-degree assault in 1996.
Following entry of a guilty plea, Reynolds was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment
1
In the notice of appeal, John Rees is not identified beyond his name. However, according to
Wendell Reynolds' petition for declaration of rights, Rees is the Commissioner of the Kentucky
Department of Corrections.
by the Hart Circuit Court (Action No. 1996-CR-00023). The Hart Circuit Court ordered
that Reynolds serve a term of five years' imprisonment with the remaining ten years
probated. Reynolds was classified as a violent offender and, thus, was required to serve
fifty percent (50%) of his sentence before becoming eligible for parole.2 After satisfying
service of the five-year sentence, Reynolds was released and placed on probation.
Reynolds ultimately violated his probation and was ordered to serve the remaining ten
years of the fifteen-year sentence.
Upon Reynolds' commitment to custody, the Department of Corrections
(Corrections) treated Reynolds' sentence as an independent ten-year sentence rather than
part of the original fifteen-year sentence. According to Corrections, Reynolds would be
required to serve another five years, or fifty percent (50%) of the ten-year sentence,
before becoming eligible for parole. Reynolds asserted that the ten-year sentence should
be treated as part of the original fifteen-year sentence and, thus, he would be eligible for
parole after serving a total of seven and one-half years. Simply put, Reynolds believed
he should only serve an additional two and one-half years before again becoming eligible
for parole.
On March 28, 2006, Reynolds filed a Petition For Declaration Of Rights,
Civil Complaint And Demand For Jury Trial in the Franklin Circuit Court. Rees
subsequently filed a Response And Motion to Dismiss. On July 18, 2006, the Franklin
2
The version of Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 439.3401, in effect when appellant was
sentenced required a violent offender to serve fifty percent (50%) of his sentence before
becoming eligible for parole. The statute was subsequently amended to require a violent
offender to serve eighty-five percent (85%) of his sentence before becoming eligible for parole.
-2-
Circuit Court granted Reynold's petition for declaration of rights and denied Rees's
motion to dismiss. The court's order, in relevant part, stated as follows:
Pursuant to KRS 439.3401, which was applicable at
the time of sentencing and has since been revised, the
Petitioner was required to serve 50% of the “sentence
imposed” before becoming eligible for parole or probation.
In this case, the Trial Judge imposed a single 15-year
sentence. The structure of the Petitioner's sentence, while
unique, merely divides the single 15-year sentence into 5- and
10- year portions. Corrections' parole eligibility calculation
ignores the indisputable fact that the Trial Judge imposed a
single sentence on the Petitioner. To allow Corrections to
simply calculate the Petitioner's sentence as if the 10-year
portion is entirely separate from the previous 5-year portion
would permit the imposition of two sentences for a single
offense. The Petitioner has but one sentence order, one case
number, and one indictment. In its Response and Motion to
Dismiss, the Respondent admits that “Petitioner was
sentenced to a 15 year sentence for Assault 1st and the
sentence was split.” Even the Respondent finds it difficult to
avoid using language that indicates the sentence imposed on
the Petitioner is indeed a single sentence. Therefore, as a case
of first impression, this Court finds that the Petitioner's
sentence is to be treated as a single sentence for parole
eligibility calculation purposes.
Accordingly, the Petitioner is eligible for parole after
serving 7 ½ years of his 15-year sentence. The Respondent's
motion to dismiss is DENIED and the Petitioner's Petition for
Declaration of Rights is GRANTED.
This appeal follows.
Rees contends that the Franklin Circuit Court erred by determining that
Reynolds was serving one fifteen-year sentence and would be eligible for parole after
serving a total of seven and one-half years. Rees points out that under KRS 439.3401(3),
“a violent offender shall not be released on parole until he has served at least fifty percent
-3-
(50%) of the sentence imposed.” Rees focuses on the word “imposed” in the statute.
Rees argues that only a five-year sentence was originally “imposed” in 1997 and then a
ten-year sentence was subsequently “imposed.” Thus, Rees asserts that Reynolds must
serve five years of the later imposed ten-year sentence before being eligible for parole
under KRS 439.3401. We disagree.
Rather, we agree with the circuit court and also believe a single fifteen-year
sentence was “imposed” upon Reynolds by the Hart Circuit Court. The Hart Circuit
Court curiously “split” the fifteen-year sentence and ordered Reynolds to serve five years'
imprisonment with the remainder of the sentence (ten years) “probated.” While we
express no opinion upon the legality of such a “split sentence”3 in this Commonwealth,4
we hold that a split sentence is “imposed” only once and constitutes a single sentence
when determining parole eligibility under KRS 439.3401. Thus, the circuit court
properly concluded that Reynolds is eligible for parole under KRS 439.3401 after serving
one-half of the original fifteen-year sentence or a total of seven and one-half years.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Franklin Circuit Court is
affirmed.
3
As used in this opinion, a split sentence is a sentence under which a defendant is ordered to
serve a term of imprisonment in a state correctional facility followed by a term of probation.
4
In Woll v. Commonwealth ex rel. Meredith, 284 Ky. 783, 146 S.W.2d 59 (1940), it was
seemingly held that a sentencing court is without authority to impose a split sentence. However,
under the current version of KRS 533.030(6), a court may impose a limited split sentence by
sentencing a defendant to a term of imprisonment in a county jail for less than twelve (12)
months and to a term of probation.
-4-
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Michael D. Triplett
Justice and Public Safety Cabinet
Office of Legal Services
Frankfort, Kentucky
Wendell Reynolds, Pro Se
Burgin, Kentucky
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