DAVID PAUL ADAMS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: AUGUST 24, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001697-MR
DAVID PAUL ADAMS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CLARK CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JULIA HYLTON ADAMS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00025
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: KELLER, LAMBERT, AND STUMBO, JUDGES.
LAMBERT JUDGE: David Paul Adams appeals from the denial of Motion to Vacate
Void Judgment. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the Clark Circuit Court.
Adams was sentenced to ten years imprisonment after pleading guilty to
second degree burglary. On November 3, 2004, he filed a pro se Motion for Shock
Probation. In that motion, he represented to the court that he was sorry for his crime and
that he had “...acquired community custody due to his clear conduct, adjustability to staff,
and participation in Institutional Programs.” Based on Adams' representations, on
November 16, 2004, the trial court granted Adams' request for shock probation.
On December 10, 2004, however, the trial court was notified by the
Division of Probation and Parole that Adams had escaped from custody November 7,
2004. Upon learning of his escape, the trial court, on its own motion, set aside its
November 16, 2004, Order granting shock probation. Adams was subsequently
apprehended and returned to custody on January 16, 2005.
On June 27, 2006, Adams filed a Motion to Vacate Void Judgment
Pursuant to C.R. 60.02(E). He argues that the court lost jurisdiction to alter, amend, or
vacate its November 16, 2004, Order after ten days, and thus its December 13, 2004,
Order was void. The trial court denied his motion, and this appeal followed.
Adams argues that the trial court lost its jurisdiction to revise an order on its
own motion ten days after the Order was entered. See C.R. 52.20. We disagree.
Pursuant to KRS 439.265(1), a defendant may seek to have his sentence
suspended via shock probation once he has served at least thirty days but less than 180
days from the date of his conviction and incarceration. It is clear, however, that this
statutory scheme envisions and requires a defendant to be actively serving his sentence
before and during the time he is seeking to have that sentence suspended. See KRS
439.255(3)(a).
Furthermore, in Potter v. Eli Lilly and Co., 926 S.W.2d 449, 454 (Ky.
1996), the Kentucky Supreme Court found that the courts of Kentucky possess certain
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inherent powers to address actual fraud, bad faith conduct, abuse of judicial process, any
deception of the court, and lack of candor to the court. The Court specifically stated,
We are persuaded that there are certain implied powers which
are inherent in any Court of Justice in this State which arise
from the very nature of their institution. Such authority is
required because they are necessary to proper exercise of all
other judicial authority. As such, these powers are governed
not by statute or rule, but by the control vested in the court to
manage its own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and
expeditious, accurate and truthful disposition of causes and
cases. ... It is obvious that along with the inherent power to
set aside or correct the judgment after the time permitted by
rule has expired, is the inherent power to conduct an
independent investigation when there is a reasonable basis to
believe that there is a possible lack of accuracy or truth in the
original judgment. The Federal courts have also recognized
this right of investigation so as to determine whether a
judgment was obtained by fraud. Universal Oil Co. v. Root
Refining Co., 328 U.S. 575 (1946). ... We note with approval
the language used by Justice Scalia in his dissent in
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991);
to the effect that some elements of inherent authority are so
essential to the judicial authority that they are indefeasible
and among them is the ability of the Court to enter orders
protecting the integrity of its own proceedings.
Id. at 453-454 (emphasis added).
In this case, the trial court was mislead by Adams' pro se Motion to believe
that he was not only eligible but also a good candidate for shock probation. We would be
permitting a substantial fraud to be perpetrated on our judicial process if we allow a
defendant to maintain shock probation granted through false representations to the court
and untimely notification by the Department of Corrections. Thus we find that it was
within the exercise of the court's inherent powers to set aside its November 16, 2004,
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Order after time permitted by the rule had elapsed in order to “protect the integrity of its
own proceedings.” Id. at 454.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Clark Circuit Court.
KELLER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
STUMBO, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John Anthony Palombi
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Wm. Robert Long, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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