MARTIN GLENN GOLDSMITH v. ALICIA BENNETT-GOLDSMITH
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RENDERED: MAY 4, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001680-ME
MARTIN GLENN GOLDSMITH
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KEVIN L. GARVEY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-FC-009319
ALICIA BENNETT-GOLDSMITH
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON AND THOMPSON, JUDGES; HENRY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
THOMPSON, JUDGE: Martin Glenn Goldsmith appeals from an order of the Jefferson
Family Court entered on August 4, 2006, denying his motions to strike evidence and to
reduce his child support obligation. Concluding that the family court did not abuse its
discretion, we affirm.
Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
21.580.
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Martin Goldsmith and Alicia Bennett were married on September 3, 1995,
in Chattanooga, Tennessee. On November 25, 1996, Bennett gave birth to the couple's
only child, Zachary Bennett Goldsmith. In the years immediately following the birth, the
couple's marriage began to deteriorate and ended in divorce on May 10, 1999.
Subsequently, Bennett was awarded sole custody of Zachary, and Goldsmith
was awarded visitation. Eventually, Goldsmith's child support obligation was set at $676
a month. Over the years, the payment of this amount has been the source of constant
contention between the two parties. In an order entered on August 9, 2002, the family
court found that Goldsmith had accumulated $2,472 in arrears because of his continued
failure to pay his child support obligation. Moreover, the family court found that
Goldsmith's non-compliance with its child support order was intentional because
Goldsmith had the financial ability to pay. The court ruled that while he had fallen
months behind on his child support payments, he had paid over $4,000 toward meeting
his consumer debt obligations as those bills came due.
Goldsmith was held in contempt and ordered to serve one day in jail for
each day that he remained in arrears. Soon thereafter, Goldsmith's parents came to his aid
and paid his arrearages in their entirety. However, as time passed, similar proceedings
were conducted regarding Goldsmith's failure to comply with his court-ordered child
support obligations but they too were resolved.
On July 13, 2006, Goldsmith filed a motion for a reduction of his child
support obligation, and Bennett filed a response. After a July 17 hearing, the family court
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entered an “Exchange Order,” which set out the parties’ evidentiary requirements and set
the exchange compliance (discovery) deadline at noon on July 28, 2006. The order noted
that either party's failure to comply with the exchange order would result in severe
sanctions.
Bennett mailed her compliance to Goldsmith on July 28 at 9:55 a.m. and
had earlier faxed her compliance to the court at 1:32 a.m., and Goldsmith also delivered
his compliance before the deadline. Both parties received the other party's compliance
prior to the beginning of the modification hearing. However, on the day of the hearing,
Goldsmith filed a motion to strike Bennett's presentation of evidence (including her
compliance) alleging that she had failed to comply with the exchange order and had failed
to comply with Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 12.06 and 5.03. After
conducting the hearing, the family court issued an order denying Goldsmith's motion to
strike, and his motion for a reduction of his child support. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Goldsmith raises two grounds for relief: (1) that the family court
erred by denying his motion to strike Bennett's presentation of evidence; and (2) that the
family court erred by denying his motion to reduce his child support obligation.
Goldsmith first alleges that the family court erred by denying his motion to
strike Bennett's evidence because Bennett did not comply with the court's exchange order.
Goldsmith alleged that Bennett failed to comply because she faxed her documents to the
court, which is not an acceptable method for filing documents. Since the exchange order
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provided that Bennett's failure to comply with the deadline precluded her from presenting
evidence, Goldsmith asserts that the family court should have prohibited her from
presenting any evidence. In addition, Goldsmith alleges that Bennett's evidence should
have been stricken pursuant to CR 12.06 and 5.03.
From a review of the facts, we agree with the family court that Bennett
complied with the exchange order. Bennett had to file her exchange compliance by noon
on July 28, 2006. She faxed the court her exchange compliance almost twelve hours
before this deadline. Additionally, Bennett did not run afoul of CR 12.06 or 5.03 because
her evidence was material and sufficiently identified Goldsmith. From our review, we
conclude that the family court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Goldsmith's
motion to strike. Howard v. Kingmont Oil Co., 729 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Ky.App. 1987).
Goldsmith's second allegation is that the family court erred by denying his
motion to reduce his child support pursuant to the guidelines of KRS 403.212(2)(d). He
alleges that the family court failed to understand or accept that he no longer owned the
rental properties that once netted him income. In his brief, Goldsmith writes that “[t]he
Court questions the ownership of these houses [rental properties], but fails to ask
Goldsmith for information on them, has (sic) the appellant has no ownership in any real
estate at this time and has not for several years.” Goldsmith further alleges that the family
court failed to properly consider his mental illness, bi-polar level 1, which he alleges
prevents him from obtaining the high quality employment that he had held in the past.
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Based on these two assertions, he argues that the family court should have granted his
motion to reduce his child support obligation.
In Snow v. Snow, 24 S.W.3d 668, 672 (Ky.App. 2000), this
Court held that:
Child-support awards may be modified...“only upon a
showing of a material change in circumstances that is
substantial and continuing.” KRS 403.213(1). As with the
original determination of a child support award, the decision
whether to modify an award in light of changed circumstances
is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Price v. Price,
Ky., 912 S.W.2d 44 (1995); Rainwater v. Williams, Ky.App.,
930 S.W.2d 405 (1996). Under KRS 403.213(2), a change in
circumstances is rebuttably presumed to be substantial if
application of the child-support guidelines (KRS 403.212) to
the new circumstances would result in a change in the amount
of child support of 15% or more.
Since the family court found that there had been no material change in circumstances to
support modifying Goldsmith’s child support, our remaining issue is whether the family
court abused its discretion in finding no such change.
First, Goldsmith's reference to KRS 403.212 is appropriate to the extent that
this provision is the guideline for setting a parent's child support obligation. However, he
has failed to understand the importance of KRS 403.213. Under KRS 403.213, the party
filing a motion for modification must show a material change in circumstances that is
substantial and continuing. Snow, supra. If such a showing is not made, the denial of the
modification motion is proper.
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In its August 4 order, the family court wrote that:
After hearing testimony of both parties and reviewing the
exhibits and file herein, the Court finds that the Respondent
[Goldsmith] has failed to establish his current and past gross
income as provided for in KRS 403.212(2)(c) and (f). The
Respondent did not provide, and has apparently not filed, tax
returns for the years 2003, 2004 and 2005. His 2002 return
shows total income of $25,101. On Schedule E of his 2002
return, he reports total rents received of $66,936.
Throughout the history of this case, the Court has been aware
that the Respondent owns real property and receives rental
income. However, no information regarding his real estate
holdings and his rental income were provided to this Court.
Additionally, the Respondent has been able to pay his child
support and consumer debt obligations in the past, from jail,
as evidenced by this Court’s Order of August 9, 2002. The
Respondent was also incarcerated for a period of time in 2004
and/or 2005. However, he has apparently paid his child
support while incarcerated.
The family court then concluded that Goldsmith had not established a material change in
circumstances as required by KRS 403.213(1) and denied his motion.
After reviewing the record, we agree with the family court that Goldsmith
did not put forth the necessary evidence required to establish that there had been a
material change in circumstances requiring a modification of his child support obligation.
The family court focused on Goldsmith’s rental property holdings which had earned him
over sixty thousand dollars in a previous year. Although Goldsmith now denies that he
has owned any rental properties in the past several years, the record is clear that
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Goldsmith owned several rental properties in the past and did not offer the family court
any explanation regarding how he divested these properties.
For example, in a letter dated March 1, 2001, addressed to Jefferson Family
Court Judge Kevin Garvey, Goldsmith wrote that he believed that four properties of his
had been littered upon by individuals associated with Bennett. If Goldsmith is now
correct that he has not owned any rental properties in the past several years, he offered the
family court absolutely no information regarding the disposal of these properties. Real
property does not inexplicably disappear but must be sold, given away, or taken.
Goldsmith was the only person at the hearing in a position to explain the alleged nonpossession of the properties but he chose to remain silent.
We conclude that the family court was correct that Goldsmith must provide
sufficient proof to support his motion before his child support could be modified.
Further, his mental illness has no effect on the income that he receives from his rental
properties; therefore, this assertion cannot provide him with relief that he desires. The
family court’s finding was not arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound
legal principles and thus will not be disturbed. Downing v. Downing, 45 S.W.3d 449, 454
(Ky.App. 2001).
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Jefferson Family Court denying
Goldsmith’s motion to strike and motion to reduce his child support is affirmed.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Marty Goldsmith, pro se
Louisville, Kentucky 40223
Alicia D. Bennett, pro se
Signal Mountain, Tennessee 37377
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