FRANKLIN ROARK, JR. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 12, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001490-MR
FRANKLIN ROARK, JR.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JULIE REINHARDT WARD, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 99-CR-00252
AND 99-CR-00253
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: KELLER, LAMBERT, AND STUMBO, JUDGES.
KELLER, JUDGE: Franklin Roark, Jr. (Roark) appeals from the trial court's order
denying his RCr 11.42 motion to set aside his convictions for first-degree sexual abuse,
first-degree robbery, and second-degree burglary. In his RCr 11.42 motion, Roark argued
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call exculpatory witnesses Vicki
Barnett (Barnett) and Richard Marksberry to testify, for failing to obtain expert testimony
regarding DNA evidence, and for failing to obtain expert testimony regarding the
reliability of evidence obtained after the victim underwent hypnosis. On this appeal,
Roark only raised the issue with regard to trial counsel's failure to call Barnett to testify.
Therefore, we will limit our review to that issue. For the reasons set forth below, we
affirm.
FACTS
On November 29, 1997, N.T. was home alone when she heard breaking
glass. Although her initial investigation of the house did not reveal anything amiss, N.T.
later discovered that a basement window had been broken and several items had been
stolen from her bedroom, including a gold chain with a cross. Early on the morning of
December 19, 1997, N.T. was again home alone when she was attacked and robbed by an
intruder. Although the intruder covered N.T.'s head with a jacket in an attempt to keep
her from seeing him, the jacket slipped and N.T. was able to see the intruder's face for a
short period of time. During the course of the robbery, the intruder struck N.T. a number
of times, engaged in sexual contact with her, and took money and other items from the
home, notably a cameo. After the intruder left, N.T. called the police.
The patrol officer who responded to the scene testified that N.T. was visibly
upset and that he was only able to obtain a limited description of the assailant from her.
The officer testified that his records indicated that N.T. described her assailant as being
five feet six inches to five feet seven inches tall, 25 to 30 years old, weighing
approximately 155 pounds, and having light-colored hair. As noted by the Supreme
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Court of Kentucky in its Opinion on Roark's direct appeal, N.T. described the assailant to
the investigating detective as:
[a] white male, 18 to 25 years old, five feet five inches tall,
weighing 150 pounds, with light-colored hair that was shorter
in the front than in the back, and with a four-to-five day
growth of facial hair. After being checked for injuries at a
local hospital, N.T. was transported to the police station
where she unsuccessfully attempted to identify her assailant
from several hundred mug shots. She then assisted in the
creation of two computer-generated composite sketches. The
computer program creates a composite based on input of
general descriptions. For example, the program provides agegroup choices of 15 to 25, 25 to 35, and 35 and older. N.T.
chose the 15 to 25 age range for the first drawing. She also
chose the “medium” height range of five feet nine inches to
six feet tall. The second composite, created the same day,
was described as very similar to the first, except that the hair
line on the second composite was higher on the forehead than
on the first. The first composite was introduced at trial and
shows a full head of hair and no facial hair. The second
composite was either lost or misplaced but the
Commonwealth admits it also showed a full head of hair and
no facial hair.
Several days after the December 19th incident, N.T. was
shown two photo lineups, approximately 250 photos of
employees of a nearby meat packing plant, ten high school
yearbooks, and a photo lineup of known sexual offenders.
She was unable to identify her assailant from any of these
photographs.
Roark v. Commonwealth, 90 S.W.3d 24, 26-27 (Ky. 2002).
In March of 1998, N.T. underwent hypnosis in an attempt to put this
incident behind her. While under hypnosis, N.T. made several physical descriptions of
her assailant, which varied somewhat from her initial descriptions. Additionally, N.T.
described her assailant as smelling of smoke. We note that Roark challenged the
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admissibility of evidence obtained during and after the hypnosis in his direct appeal. The
Supreme Court of Kentucky upheld the admission of that evidence. Id. at 29-37.
In October of 1998, police searched Roark's apartment in connection with
an investigation of unrelated crimes. During that search, officers found a cameo and a
gold chain with a cross. N.T. identified the chain and cross as having been stolen in the
November 1997 burglary and the cameo as having been stolen during the December 1997
robbery. The Detective investigating the December 1997 robbery then placed Roark's
photograph in a photo lineup and N.T. identified Roark as her assailant. In addition to
the photo lineup, N.T. was also presented with an audio tape containing several male
voices, including Roark's. N.T. became visibly upset when she heard Roark's voice and
identified that voice as belonging to her assailant. N.T. again identified Roark as her
assailant when she observed him with his attorney on a closed circuit television prior to a
pre-trial hearing and at trial. We note that Roark challenged the admissibility of N.T.'s
identification of him on direct appeal. As with the hypnosis evidence, the Supreme Court
held that there were no problems with that identification. Roark v. Commonwealth, 90
S.W.3d. at 28-29 (Ky. 2002).
During trial, Roark challenged N.T.'s identification of him as her assailant,
noting that he is 15 to 20 years older than most descriptions given by N.T., that he is
balding, that he had a full beard, and that he did not smoke. Roark also challenged N.T.'s
identification of the gold chain and cross. In support of these defenses, Roark called
Viola McNay (McNay) and Leroy Taulbee (Taulbee) as witnesses. McNay testified that
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she managed an apartment complex and Roark worked for her cleaning apartments after
tenants moved. Furthermore, McNay testified that she had given Roark a gold chain
identical to the one identified by N.T. and that Roark had put a cross on that chain.
Finally, McNay testified that, for as long as she had known him, Roark had worn a full
beard and had never smoked.
Taulbee testified that he worked with Roark remodeling houses that had
suffered fire damage. In December of 1997, Roark and Taulbee were remodeling a
building in Newport, Kentucky, and working from 6:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m. six days a
week. Roark and Taulbee rode to work together everyday and Roark did not miss any
work, leading Taulbee to conclude that Roark could not have committed the assault and
robbery in December of 1997. Like McNay, Taulbee testified that Roark had a full beard
in December of 1997, and that Roark did not smoke.
As noted above, a jury ultimately convicted Roark and he was sentenced to
two terms of life imprisonment, to be served concurrently. Roark filed a direct appeal
from that conviction and sentence arguing that N.T.'s identification was flawed, that any
evidence obtained post-hypnosis should have been excluded, that the audio tape should
not have been admitted, that the jury instructions were faulty, that the November and
December crimes should have been tried separately, and that there was insufficient
evidence to support the jury's verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed.
At the hearing on his RCr 11.42 motion, Roark advised the trial judge that
Barnett, alleged former girlfriend and alleged exculpatory witness, had been scheduled to
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testify but failed to appear. We note that a subpoena issued for Barnett was returned with
a notation that Barnett no longer resided at the address provided. Therefore, the parties
agreed that Roark could testify regarding what he anticipated Barnett would have testified
to at trial. According to Roark, Barnett would have testified that he had a beard, was
balding with gray hair, that McNay gave him the gold chain and Roark put the cross on it,
and that the cameo had belonged to Barnett's mother. Furthermore, Roark testified that
his attorney, Steve Dowell (Dowell), was having difficulty locating Barnett near the time
of trial to serve her with a subpoena. Roark testified that he advised Dowell of Barnett's
whereabouts and that he advised Dowell that McNay also knew where Barnett was living.
However, on cross-examination, Roark admitted that he last had contact with Barnett in
February of 1998, some seven months before trial. Finally, Roark testified that Barnett
had testified regarding the cameo in a later trial that took place in Boone County;
however, the Boone County jury convicted Roark despite Barnett's testimony.
Dowell testified that he discussed the evidence and witnesses with Roark on
several occasions and that he tape-recorded those conversations on December 2, 1999,
and December 10, 1999. In particular, Dowell noted that he had advised Roark that he
had discussed the matter with Barnett and she mentioned the gold chain and cross but
never mentioned the cameo. Furthermore, Dowell indicated that his investigator had
been trying to find Barnett, but that he had been unable to do so. Finally, Dowell testified
that, as far as he could remember, Roark had not mentioned knowing where Barnett was
or that Barnett could identify the cameo.
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After the hearing and her review of audiotapes of the conversations
between Dowell and Roark,1 the trial judge concluded that Roark had failed to meet his
burden of proof. In so finding, the trial judge stated as follows:
The Defendant testified that prior to trial he met with
Attorney Dowell 3-4 times, saw him in Court and had written
correspondence. Defendant claims that had Mr. Dowell
called Vicki Barnett as a witness she would have testified that
a cameo (the victim claimed the Defendant had stolen) was
her mothers [sic], that the gold chain was a gift from Viola
McNay, that Defendant put on [sic] a gold cross on the chain,
would have testified as to his appearance, and that he did not
smoke cigarettes. Attorney Steve Dowell testified that he did
not remember talking about Vicki Barnett with Defendant. It
is clear from listening to the taped meetings of Attorney
Dowell and Defendant, Vicki Barnett was discussed.
Although Ms. Barnett was discussed apparently she was
unable to be located. Defense claims failing to locate her and
have her testify was ineffective assistance of counsel. In
support he cites four cases. The cases cited by Defendant are
much different than this case. In the cases cited by
Defendant, Defense counsel had not taken any steps to locate
or speak to the witnesses. In this case the taped conversations
with Attorney Dowell reveal that one year prior to the trial an
investigator hired by Attorney Dowell had located Ms.
Barnett and in a taped statement gained her telephone
number, address, date of birth and social security number.
However [sic] prior to trial Ms. Barnett moved from her
location. Attorney Dowell hired the same investigator to look
for Ms. Barnett to serve a subpoena on her. The investigator
was accessing databases to locate Ms. Barnett. Defendant
testified at the 11.42 hearing that Viola McNay knew where
Vicki Barnett lived and he knew where Vicki Barnett lived
and he believed that he gave that information to Mr. Dowell.
However, the last contact he had with Ms. Barnett was in
February 1999. The taped meetings with the Defendant and
Dowell on December 3, 1999 and December 10, 1999 reflect
1
We have reviewed the audio tapes between Dowell and Roark. Although the audio quality is
poor, we agree with the trial court's summary of those tapes. Therefore, we have not
independently summarized those tapes herein.
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conversations about Vicki Barnett. On December 3, 1999,
Attorney Dowell tells Defendant that he has the investigator
looking for Ms. Barnett. Defendant offers no information as
to where she could be found. On December 10, 1999, they
met again. Attorney Dowell again mentions that the
investigator is still looking for Ms. Barnett. Defendant tells
Attorney Dowell that he believes she may be in Burlington.
He does not tell Attorney Dowell where in Burlington or that
Viola McNay knows her location. The Defendant does not
advise this Court what more Attorney Dowell should have
done to secure Ms. Barnett's testimony at trial. Attorney
Dowell's performance was not deficient.
Had Ms. Barnett testified this Court must determine if her
testimony would have had such weight that there is a
reasonable probability ('a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome') that the outcome would have
been different. This Court does not believe that the
Defendant has proven that there is a reasonable probability
that the outcome would have been different. At trial the
victim positively identified the Defendant as the person who
attacked her. The Defendant's attorney had an opportunity to
cross examine the victim about the identification. Defendant
had a witness, Viola McNay, who testified that she gave the
Defendant the gold chain, claimed to have been stolen by the
victim. She testified as to Defendants' appearance (which did
not appear to match the description given by the victim) and
that the Defendant did not smoke. Defendant also called
Leroy Taulbee who testified regarding Defendants'
appearance and work history. The majority of Ms. Barnett's
testimony would have been duplicative. Viola McNay
testified at trial as to the Defendants [sic] appearance and that
she had given the Defendant the gold chain the victim
claimed was hers. The testimony that would not have been
duplicative would have been testimony about the cameo. It is
interesting to note that in the taped conversation with
Attorney Dowell, Defendant told Dowell that he did not know
what the cameo looked like. However, he told Dowell his old
lady had it.
Further, this Court is not convinced that testimony of Ms.
Barnett would have been helpful. On December 3, 1999,
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Attorney Dowell and Defendant met. The meeting was taped.
During Mr. Dowell's taped meeting with the Defendant he
told the Defendant that a couple of months ago the
investigator took a statement from Ms. Barnett and [sic] told
the investigator that she would not assist them. The
investigator believed they may have discussed the cross. The
only statement provided to this Court was a statement Ms.
Barnett gave approximately one year prior to trial. (This
statement was not introduced as evidence.) In that statement
there was no discussion about jewelry. In that statement Ms.
Barnett stated that the Frank she knew was not capable of the
crime. There was no taped discussion about whether she
would or would not assist Mr. Roark. However, Defendant
did not present any evidence at the 11.42 hearing to refute
Mr. Dowell's belief that Ms. Barnett was not going to assist
them, other than the fact she testified at another trial in Boone
County, Kentucky, in which the Defendant was convicted.
Defendant was unable to secure Ms. Barnett to attend the
11.42 hearing. The fact that Vicki Barnett was unable to be
located and made no attempt to contact either the Defendant
or Mr. Dowell over 10 months prior to trial is evidence of her
unwillingness to assist the Defendant in his Campbell County
trial.
Based on the above review, the trial judge denied Roark's CR 11.42 motion. It is from
this order that Roark appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standards which measure ineffective assistance of counsel are set out in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See
also Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 905 (Ky. 1998). In order to be ineffective,
performance of counsel must be below the objective standard of reasonableness and so
prejudicial as to deprive a defendant of a fair trial and a reasonable result. Strickland,
466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064 (1984). “Counsel is constitutionally ineffective only if
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performance below professional standards caused the defendant to lose what he otherwise
would probably have won.” United States v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222, 229 (6th Cir. 1992).
The critical issue is not whether counsel made errors but whether counsel was so
thoroughly "ineffective that defeat was snatched from the hands of probable victory."
Morrow, 977 F.2d at 229. In considering ineffective assistance, the reviewing court must
focus on the totality of evidence before the judge or jury and "assess the overall
performance of counsel throughout the case in order to determine whether the 'identified
acts or omissions' overcome the presumption that counsel rendered reasonable
professional assistance." Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 385, 106 S.Ct. 2574,
2589, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986). Furthermore, we are mindful that "[a] defendant is not
guaranteed errorless counsel, or counsel adjudged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel
reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance." McQueen v.
Commonwealth, 949 S.W.2d 70, 71 (Ky. 1997).
In an RCr 11.42 proceeding, the movant has the burden "to establish
convincingly that he was deprived of some substantial right which would justify the
extraordinary relief afforded by the post-conviction proceedings provided in RCr 11.42."
Dorton v. Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Ky. 1968). When the trial judge
conducts an evidentiary hearing, as herein, "a reviewing court must defer to the
determination of the facts and witness credibility made by the trial judge." Haight v.
Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436, 442 (Ky. 2001).
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ANALYSIS
Based on the preceding, Roark bears the burden of establishing that
Dowell's performance as counsel was so deficient that Roark did not receive a fair trial.
For the reasons set forth below, we hold that Dowell's performance was not deficient.
Therefore, we affirm.
As noted above, Roark has raised only one issue on this appeal - whether
his counsel was ineffective for failing to call Barnett as a witness. From the above cited
findings of the trial judge, it is clear that she conducted a thorough review of this matter,
and we agree with her conclusions. As noted by the trial judge, had Barnett testified at
trial, she would have had little to offer by way of new or different evidence. The only
testimony Barnett could have given that would have differed from the testimony offered
by McNay and Taulbee would have been that the cameo belonged to her mother, not to
N.T. That testimony would have, at best, called into question N.T.'s identification of the
cameo and created a "swearing contest" between N.T. and Barnett. In light of N.T.'s
visual and audio identification of Roark, we are not convinced that Barnett's testimony
regarding the cameo would have had any impact on the jury's decision. Furthermore, as
did the trial judge, we note that not only did Barnett fail to make herself available for
trial, she failed to make herself available for the RCr 11.42 hearing as well. These factors
support the trial judge's opinion that Barnett did not evidence any inclination to assist
Roark during his trial herein. Therefore, we hold that, taking into consideration the
totality of evidence, Dowell's failure to call Barnett as a witness did not amount to
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ineffective assistance of counsel. Furthermore, we hold that Barnett's testimony would
not have caused Roark to win what he otherwise lost.
CONCLUSION
Having reviewed the record herein, we can discern no deficiency in defense
counsel's performance. Therefore, we affirm the order of the Campbell Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Amy Robinson Staples
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Wm. Robert Long, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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