MARSHALL JARRELL v. CZAR COAL CORPORATION; HON. GRANT ROARK, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; BOARD
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RENDERED: MARCH 9, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001415-WC
MARSHALL JARRELL
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-03-95660
CZAR COAL CORPORATION;
HON. GRANT ROARK,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
and WORKERS' COMPENSATION
BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART
AND VACATING AND REMANDING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ABRAMSON AND VANMETER, JUDGES; EMBERTON,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
VANMETER, JUDGE: Marshall Jarrell petitions for the review of a Workers'
Compensation Board's opinion affirming an Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ's) opinion
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Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
and award. Jarrell argues that the ALJ erred by failing to find him permanently totally
disabled, by failing to award him additional temporary total disability (TTD) benefits,
and by finding that 6% of his 10% psychiatric impairment rating must be excluded as
being a prior active impairment. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, and vacate
and remand in part.
When Jarrell was working for Czar Coal Company as a roof bolter on
February 7, 2003, a large slab of rock fell and struck him, causing lower back pain.
Jarrell continued to work for almost two weeks, but then left and has not returned to work
since. He underwent two back surgeries in 2003. Following a hearing, the ALJ
summarized the medical evidence in the matter as follows:
On June 15, 2004 Dr. B.B. Aranas indicated that
plaintiff could not be gainfully employed because he suffered
from constant pain after undergoing a micro discectomy for a
disc herniation caused by the work injury. Plaintiff reported
lower back pain with a knot on the right side, numbness in the
legs, and difficulty sitting for long periods of time. Based on
an MRI, Dr. Aranas diagnosed a herniated disc at L4-5 and
L5-S1 with radiculopathy. Plaintiff reported a neck and back
injury. In May the doctor referred plaintiff to Dr. Tibbs and
recommended a stress test. In September plaintiff reported
worsening pain. Dr. Aranas diagnosed chronic lumbosacral
pain.
On June 6, 2004 Dr. Ira Potter indicated that plaintiff
continued to work with significant back pain for ten to twelve
days after the accident. He was taken off work in February
2003. Plaintiff's condition initially improved after the surgery
but did not resolve. An MRI taken after he reported increased
lower back pain showed two levels of recurrent disc
herniation. He underwent a second micro discectomy in
September and participated in a six to eight week work
hardening program, but his condition failed to improve. In
December 2003 plaintiff began treatment with a pain clinic.
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He medicated with Percocet. Three epidural steroid
injections provided no relief. His neurosurgeon considered
lumbar fusion.
Plaintiff suffered from severe low back pain, stiffness,
weakness, constant right lower extremity pain with weakness
and paresthesia into the foot, intermittent left lower extremity
pain with weakness and paresthesia into the foot, along with
multiple positional intolerances and limitations with
instrumental activities of daily living. Plaintiff had
experienced a muscle strain in his upper back three to four
years prior to the injury, but the strain resolved after a few
weeks of chiropractic treatment. His back was asymptomatic
at the time of his injury.
Dr. Potter assigned a 29% whole person impairment
caused by the injury. He assigned restrictions and concluded
that plaintiff could not return to his former job. Dr. Potter
stated in Social Security Disability interrogatories that
plaintiff's impairments disabled him from engaging in
substantial gainful activities. The doctor said plaintiff met the
criteria for impairment for a spine disorder with lumbar spinal
stenosis resulting in pseudo claudication, established by
findings on appropriate medically acceptable imaging and
manifested by chronic nonradicular pain and weakness which
resulted in an inability to effectively ambulate. He placed
restrictions on plaintiff's ability to lift, stand, walk, sit, push
and pull. He concluded that plaintiff could stand for 30
minutes without interruption for a total of two hours per work
day. He concluded he could sit for one hour without
interruption for a total of three hours per work day. An MRI
noted distortion of the posterior margin of the thecal sac on
the left at L4-5 and mild deformity on the anterior margin of
the thecal sac at L5-S1.
In a June 2004 IME report, Dr. Timothy Wagner
indicated that x-rays taken in August 2003 revealed nerve
root compression and stenosis. Dr. Wagner concluded that if
plaintiff underwent physical conditioning and aqua therapy,
he would reach maximum medical improvement by August
30, 2004, at which time he would assign a 12% WPI. He did
not recommend further EPIs. On November 4th he concluded
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that plaintiff had reached MMI whether or not he had
undertaken any form of exercise.
Plaintiff was examined by Dr. William Witt in
February 2005. Dr. Witt diagnosed post laminectomy
syndrome, neuropathic pain of the left leg in the distribution
of L5 and S1, and lumbar degenerative disc disease. Dr. Witt
recommended plaintiff begin on a dosage of 300 mg of
Neurontin and increase it to 800 mg per day. In March he
recommended weaning plaintiff off the Neurontin in order to
avoid seizures. He prescribed Topamax. In September Dr.
Witt amended his diagnoses to include lower extremity
neuropathic pain, lumbar spinal stenosis, and a history of
lumbago. He recommended Lidoderm patches, lumbar facet
injections, trigger point injections, and physical therapy. He
wanted to wean plaintiff off of Topamax.
Dr. Russell Travis performed an IME at defendant's
request in April 2005. He said plaintiff had complaints of
low back pain and pain in the lower extremities of
undetermined etiology. He said there were no objective
findings on neurological evaluation. A March 2005 MRI
showed no evidence of residual or recurrent disc herniation.
There was no evidence of instability, listhesis or segmental
instability. He said plaintiff demonstrated significant
symptom magnification and placed him at maximum medical
improvement. He assigned a 20% whole person impairment
caused by the work injury. He released plaintiff to return to
work with permanent medium work restrictions. He
recommended an aggressive work hardening and cognitive
based physical conditioning program but was concerned that
plaintiff would not undertake such a program due to his
attitude and tendency to magnify symptoms. Dr. Travis
found absolutely no evidence of the need for a spinal cord
stimulator and no identifiable process that was generating
pain. He recommended the disuse of narcotics.
Plaintiff underwent a psychological evaluation by Dr.
Mark Etscheidt in May 2005. Plaintiff's most recent MRI
showed post surgical changes and scar tissue at L5-S1. There
were no new disc protrusions or free fragments. Plaintiff
could not sleep in a bed because it worsened his pain. He lay
on a broken down couch and slept two to three hours per
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night. He said he slept well on a Tempur-Pedic mattress
owned by a friend but could not afford to buy one.
Plaintiff was sedentary and could walk for only ten
minutes. He had episodes of sadness and crying, had
experienced suicidal ideation following the injury, and felt
guilty because he could not work. He had financial pressures.
He was taking Topamax 100 mg and preferred to avoid the
use of dependency-producing medications. Plaintiff had been
a good student in high school and was receptive to the idea of
going back to school, although there was a possibility that he
had an attention deficit disorder or reading disability. Dr.
Etscheidt concluded that he was an appropriate candidate for
placement of a spinal cord stimulator for pain control. The
doctor diagnosed lumbago, post laminectomy syndrome,
depressive disorder NOC, anxiety state, unspecified, and
other sleep disturbances.
In July Dr. Witt diagnosed neuropathic pain in the
lower extremities and mechanical pain in the back. He
recommended plaintiff's back pain be brought under better
control before he obtained a stimulator. Dr. Witt wrote a
prescription for a Tempur-pedic mattress and Cymbalta.
Plaintiff's request for the mattress was denied. Dr. John
Rademaker said claims that the mattress helped to maintain
spine alignment and reduce pain for post-laminectomy
syndrome were not based on objective clinical evidence. On
August 9th he upheld the denial.
On July 15, 2005, under peer review for the Topamax
prescription, Dr. Rademaker indicated that Dr. Philip Tibbs
had reported a 65% improvement after the second surgery.
After that, his physical therapy treatment aggravated his
symptoms and he was recommended for referral to a pain
clinic. A social security interrogatory in June 2004 written by
Dr. Potter mentioned post-traumatic stress disorder as an
emotional limitation for plaintiff and chronic pain syndrome
as an impairment. In February 2005 Dr. Witt discontinued
plaintiff's Neurontin due to unacceptable side effects and
prescribed narcotics and muscle relaxants. Plaintiff
medicated with Topamax, which also caused adverse side
effects. Dr. Tibbs recommended Cymbalta for its anti-
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depressant and neuropathic treatment qualities. Dr.
Rademaker recommended continuing plaintiff on Topamax.
On May 24, 2005 Dr. Tibbs said he believed plaintiff's
main problem was a loss of structural support in the spine
subsequent to his injury. He believed plaintiff had developed
loss of motion segment integrity which would put him into
DRE Lumbar Category IV. He did not think a Functional
Capacities Evaluation would be useful.
Deposition of Dr. William Witt. Dr. Witt testified
that plaintiff's MRI reports and physical examinations
following the second surgery were abnormal. At that time
plaintiff was considered to be a good candidate for a spinal
cord stimulator to help alleviate the leg pain. When Dr. Witt
saw plaintiff in July of 2005, he noted that the Neurontin had
helped reduce his leg pain somewhat, but the back pain had
increased, possibly because he had been taken off of
narcotics. Plaintiff was having difficulty sleeping, so Dr.
Witt prescribed a Tempur-pedic mattress. Many of his
patients who suffered from lack of sleep due to mechanical
low back pain had had success using this mattress.
Plaintiff had sustained disc degeneration, disc injury,
and disc herniation that de-stabilized his back. Scar tissue
had developed after the surgery that involved the nerve roots
in his back, which caused the pain in his legs. He thought
plaintiff's mechanical back pain might possibly respond to
fusion surgery. He told plaintiff to lose weight and stop
smoking, which he did. Dr. Witt said that the mattress, the
weight loss, the cessation of smoking, and the cessation of
narcotics afforded the best hopes for an outcome that would
eliminate the need for a spinal stimulator or fusion surgery.
Dr. Witt offered objective evidence of plaintiff's subjective
complaints; he said plaintiff had had a disc herniation, two
surgical procedures that had altered the geometry of his back,
and scar tissue as revealed on an MRI. The physical
examination corroborated plaintiff's symptoms. Dr. Witt said
the mattress was included in a list of conservative measures
which he hoped would work. If they did not, he would
recommend the stimulator and ultimately a fusion, if it was
necessary.
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Dr. Witt testified that plaintiff could not return to his
former employment but saw no reason why he could not
continue to work without performing heavy lifting if he
received some kind of retraining. He recommended a
functional capacity evaluation followed by an occupational
evaluation. He felt his patients were much better off when
they were working. He believed plaintiff to be a good
candidate for retraining. He was impressed by plaintiff's high
level of motivation, which was the one factor that
differentiated successful from non-successful patients. He
said that any person who had chronic pain had difficulty
focusing.
On cross-examination, Dr. Witt explained that
mechanical back pain was aggravated by motion and
responded to positioning. The leg pain, on the other hand,
was neuropathic and caused by an irritated or damaged nerve,
this being the reason why it tended to be constant and did not
respond to changes in positioning. He said it was essential
for plaintiff to sleep during the night, because the body healed
during a particular stage of sleep. He deemed it reasonable to
make whatever adjustments were necessary to allow plaintiff
to get adequate sleep of the proper quality.
Dr. James Templin performed an IME on May 31,
2005. Plaintiff said his legs collapsed from under him twice
several weeks after the first surgery. Dr. Templin diagnosed
chronic low back pain syndrome, lumbar disc herniation at
L5-S1 and L4-5, recurrent disc herniation at L5-S1, and
lumbar radiculopathy. Utilizing the ROM method, he
assigned a 19% impairment caused by the work injury and a
3% impairment for pain, which totaled 21%. He assigned
restrictions on frequent bending, stooping, kneeling,
squatting, crouching, lifting, carrying, climbing, or riding in
or on vibratory vehicles for any extended distance or time.
He concluded plaintiff did not have the physical capacity to
return to his job.
Phil Pack, MS, performed a psychological evaluation
at the request of plaintiff on July 20, 2005. Plaintiff reported
chronic and acute pain, symptoms of depression, and
limitations and restrictions on his activities. He drove a
vehicle on occasion and helped his wife with the household
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chores. He said his medical treatment had not helped him
thus far. Plaintiff believed his history was troubled with some
psychological issues. He was able to give very specific
examples of someone, whom he believed to be an agent of the
insurance company, following or watching him.
Plaintiff's WRAT-3 indicated a high school level of
reading. His Mini Mental Status Examination, WRAT-3, and
interview did not reflect any signs of malingering. Plaintiff's
DPRS showed symptoms of depression and agitation. He did
not present with a history of chronic personality dysfunction.
Dr. Pack diagnosed depressive disorder NOS on Axis I. He
assigned a 10% WPI based on the AMA Guides, 2nd edition.
He recommended formal psychological counseling aimed at
helping plaintiff adjust to circumstantial changes in his life
and develop strategies for coping.
Plaintiff told Dr. Ralph Crystal, who performed a
vocational evaluation in August 2005 at defendant's request,
that he was not supposed to drive because he was taking
medication. He used a cane when he went out of the house.
Plaintiff reported that he had a learning disability in reading
and difficulty with comprehension. The difficulty with
comprehension had worsened since the injury. Plaintiff had
become anxious and depressed since the injury but had
developed no other impairments. He did not feel capable of
returning to work or attending school due to severe pain.
The Differential Aptitude Test Battery results indicated
plaintiff would do best in a job related to a skilled trade
learned on the job or through a formal educational program at
a technical or community college. Dr. Crystal recommended
educational remediation in spelling and arithmetic. Plaintiff's
dexterity test results indicated he could use his hands for fine
and gross bilateral dexterity work activities. He was of
average intelligence and read at a level that was necessary for
the reading and following of instructions, technical
information, and reports related to a skilled trade. He was
capable of performing the positions of clerical dispatcher,
inventory clerk, and shipping and receiving worker. He
demonstrated a high interest in jobs related to manual labor
and problem solving work activities. Plaintiff's skills as a
mine equipment operator would transfer to a range of
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equipment operation jobs at the light level of exertion. He
had other vocational skills that were transferable. Dr. Crystal
concluded that plaintiff's academic abilities were not affected
by his injury; therefore, plaintiff was not disabled from
employment.
Deposition of Dr. Ralph Crystal. Dr. Crystal
interpreted Dr. Potter's 2004 report to mean that plaintiff
could do sedentary work but would need to change positions
every thirty minutes and walk around for five minutes
afterward. Plaintiff was able to sit for thirty minutes during
the testing before having to change positions.
On cross examination, Dr. Crystal said that he would
recommend low stress entry level types of work activities at a
moderate level. He posited the possibility that plaintiff could
do a reduced range of sedentary bench type jobs that would
allow him to alternate positions during an eight hour day. He
said the DOT was a starting point in terms of classifying jobs.
Many jobs that were classified as sedentary allowed people to
sit or stand at will. He said that if plaintiff had to miss work
at an entry level job more than two whole days a month,
whether due to pain or the need for medical treatment, it
would become problematic. He said that if plaintiff truly
experienced a level of pain that interfered with his attention
and concentration, then there would be no work he could
perform on a full-time basis, but Dr. Crystal did not
acknowledge that plaintiff suffered from pain that reached
that level of severity.
Dr. William Weikel performed a vocational
evaluation at plaintiff's request on August 18, 2005. Plaintiff
said he was afraid to drive while on medication and drove an
average of five miles per week or less. Plaintiff walked
stiffly and with a limp. He was trying to wean himself from
pain medication. He had obtained a prescription for nerve
medication but had not filled it. Plaintiff said he could sit for
fifteen minutes and stand for ten minutes. He said he mowed
the grass occasionally with a riding mower. He felt that his
medical condition had improved little, if any, during the
previous two and a half years. Dr. Weikel concluded that
plaintiff had suffered a 100% loss of access to the labor
market and was unable to work. He posited the possibility
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that if a cord stimulator or something else reduced plaintiff's
pain, rehabilitation for easier work might then become
possible.
Dr. Douglas Ruth performed a psychiatric evaluation
in October 2005 at plaintiff's request. He said that an
assessment of permanent psychiatric impairment could not be
made at that time because plaintiff was not under treatment
for his psychiatric symptoms, and therefore, had not reached
maximum medical improvement. He provided a hypothetical
assessment of plaintiff's psychiatric functional impairment
based on his symptoms and the unlikely assumption that he
would not improve. He assigned, under those assumptions, a
class 2, mild psychiatric impairment of 10%. He apportioned
6% to causes that arose prior to and were unrelated to the
injury; those were, specifically, prior emotional symptoms
and a learning disorder that caused impaired verbal
comprehension. He felt that both impairments should
improve by 50% with treatment.
He found some evidence of symptom exaggeration
which arose from a sense of desperation that caused plaintiff
to worry that he was not effectively conveying the seriousness
of his situation. His impairment estimate arose from
psychiatric symptoms and did not include impairment directly
related to physical functional limitations or pain. He
concluded that plaintiff was restricted from work that
required a high level of literacy, but that the restriction was
unrelated to the injury and would persist indefinitely. He felt
that plaintiff's current state of irritability would probably
interfere with a job that required frequent or sustained
interaction with others. His episodic panic attacks would
interrupt his activity and make it impractical for him to work
in a hazardous environment or operate a vehicle consistently.
Those two restrictions were caused by his injury and would
probably improve after six months of psychiatric treatment.
Plaintiff's symptoms were unlikely to improve without
treatment. The doctor recommended a psychiatric
consultation that would render a prescription for medication
and follow up visits sufficient to maintain the medication for
approximately two years. He diagnosed major depression,
single episode, due to back and lower extremity pain; anxiety
disorder NOS; and learning disorder NOS. Plaintiff's score
10
on the MAL weighed against malingering. Three other tests
were compatible with sufficient effort.
Pursuant to this evidence, the ALJ assigned Jarrell a 21% physical impairment rating and
a 4% psychological impairment rating, resulting in a total impairment rating of 24%. He
was awarded permanent partial disability in the amount of $354.86 per week beginning
May 10, 2005, and continuing for 425 weeks. The Board affirmed, and this petition for
review followed.
At the outset, we note that a workers' compensation claimant bears the
burden of proving his claim. Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, 673 S.W.2d 735, 736
(Ky.App. 1984). When a claimant is unsuccessful, the question on appeal is “whether the
evidence was so overwhelming, upon consideration of the entire record, as to have
compelled a finding in his favor.” Id. Compelling evidence is that which is “so
overwhelming that no reasonable person could reach the same conclusion as the ALJ.”
Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Czarnecki, 41 S.W.3d 868, 871 (Ky.App. 2001). Further,
this court is to correct the Board only when “the Board has overlooked or misconstrued
controlling statutes or precedent, or committed an error in assessing the evidence so
flagrant as to cause gross injustice.” Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685,
687-88 (Ky. 1992).
Jarrell's first argument is that the ALJ erred by finding him partially rather
than totally disabled. We disagree.
A claimant who has a permanent partial or a permanent total disability due
to a work-related injury is entitled to a permanent disability rating. KRS
11
342.0011(11)(b); KRS 342.0011(11)(c). However, an employee with a permanent partial
disability retains the ability to work, KRS 342.0011(11)(b), while an employee with a
permanent total disability “has a complete and permanent inability to perform any type of
work as a result of an injury[.]” KRS 342.0011(11)(c).
We summarize below the evidence that the ALJ considered in finding that
Jarrell was only partially disabled:
Dr. Ira Potter assigned a 29% whole-person impairment rating and
concluded that Jarrell could not return to his former job. He also placed
restrictions on Jarrell's ability to lift, stand, walk, sit, push and pull. He
further concluded that Jarrell could stand for 30 minutes without
interruption (two hours per work day) and sit for one hour without
interruption (three hours per work day).
Dr. Russell Travis assigned a 20% whole-person impairment rating and
released Jarrell to return to work with permanent medium work
restrictions. He recommended an aggressive work hardening and
cognitive-based physical conditioning program but was concerned that
Jarrell would not undertake such a program due to his attitude and
tendency to magnify symptoms.
While Dr. Ralph Crystal, a vocational expert, recommended Jarrell
participate in educational remediation in spelling and arithmetic, he
opined that Jarrell was of average intelligence and could read at a level
necessary for working in a skilled trade. He recommended low stress
12
entry level types of work activities at a moderate level. He also opined
that if Jarrell experienced pain that interfered with his attention and
concentration, Jarrell would be fully disabled; however, he did not
believe Jarrell's pain had reached that level.
Vocational expert Dr. William Weikel opined that Jarrell had suffered a
100% loss of access to the labor market and was unable to work.
Further, the ALJ analyzed this evidence as follows:
The relevant medical opinions range from that of Dr.
Travis, who opined that plaintiff remained capable of
returning to work so long as he could alternate between
sitting and standing and lift no more than 50 pounds, to Dr.
Potter, who imposed very severe restrictions on plaintiff's
ability to return to work. The defendant also relies on the
vocational evaluation of Ralph Crystal. He evaluated
plaintiff's occupational possibilities using the various
restrictions imposed by the physicians of record. Dr. Crystal
concluded that there are jobs available to plaintiff within any
of the restrictions chosen. Conversely, plaintiff's vocational
expert, Dr. Weikel, concluded plaintiff has an effective loss
of occupational opportunities of 100%.
Having considered all the evidence of record, the
Administrative Law Judge is ultimately persuaded that there
are some jobs to which plaintiff could return on a regular and
sustained basis, even with his current limitations and pain
and, as such, he is not permanently, totally disabled. To be
sure, plaintiff is quite limited in his occupational functioning
with his current condition. But he does have a high school
education and, according to Dr. Travis, his current diagnostic
testing does not show significant enough abnormalities to
prevent plaintiff from returning to any and all employment on
a regular and sustained basis. Indeed, plaintiff appeared quite
intelligent at the hearing and made such a good impression
that the Administrative Law Judge is able to accept Ralph
Crystal's vocational opinion that there are jobs to which
plaintiff can return even if one considers the most severe
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restrictions of Dr. Potter. Based on the restrictions imposed
by all physicians, plaintiff is not able to return to the kind of
work he performed at the time of the injury, thereby requiring
a 3 multiplier in an award of permanent, partial disability.
However, based on the foregoing analysis, the Administrative
Law Judge does not believe plaintiff is totally disabled at this
time.
Although the ALJ also ordered that Jarrell subsequently undergo a vocational
rehabilitation assessment, we are not persuaded that the evidence compelled a finding that
Jarrell could reenter the workforce only after vocational rehabilitation. Instead, it is clear
from the ALJ's language that he found that Jarrell could currently return to work without
the need for vocational rehabilitation as “there are some jobs to which [Jarrell] could
return on a regular and sustained basis, even with his current limitations and pain and, as
such, he is not permanently, totally disabled.”
Further, given the conflicting evidence, the ALJ was not compelled to reach
a different conclusion. On the contrary, as fact finder the ALJ “may reject any testimony
and believe or disbelieve various parts of the evidence, regardless of whether it comes
from the same witness or the same adversary party's total proof.” Magic Coal Co. v. Fox,
19 S.W.3d 88, 96 (Ky. 2000). More specifically, we are not persuaded by Jarrell's
argument that the ALJ speculated as to whether Jarrell could return to work. As set forth
above, although Dr. Crystal recommended that Jarrell participate in educational
remediation in spelling and arithmetic, he opined that Jarrell currently could read at a
level necessary for working in a skilled trade. The ALJ also relied upon Dr. Crystal's
conclusion that there were jobs available to Jarrell within each of the doctors' stated
14
restrictions. Given the extensive conflicting evidence, we cannot say that the ALJ erred
by finding that Jarrell is partially rather than totally disabled.
Next, Jarrell argues that the ALJ erred by failing to award him additional
TTD benefits as he had not yet reach maximum medical improvement (MMI) for his
psychological condition at the time of the award. We disagree.
We first note that the parties stipulated that Czar paid Jarrell TTD benefits
in the amount of $510.33 per week from February 14, 2003, through May 9, 2005. The
ALJ awarded Jarrell those benefits as already paid, and that decision has not been
appealed. Jarrell argues, however, that he is entitled to additional TTD benefits as he has
neither been treated nor reached MMI for his psychological condition. As the Kentucky
Supreme Court recently explained, in order to be eligible for TTD, KRS 342.0011(11)(a)
requires a claimant to prove that he has reached neither MMI nor a level of improvement
that would permit a return to employment. Double L Construction v. Mitchell, 182
S.W.3d 509, 513 (Ky. 2005). The phrase “return to employment” has been construed as
meaning a return to the type of work that was customary for the claimant or the type of
work the claimant was performing at the time of the injury. Central Ky. Steel v. Wise, 19
S.W.3d 657, 659 (Ky. 2000).
Here, the ALJ held that even if Jarrell was not at MMI regarding his
psychological condition, he was not entitled to any additional TTD benefits because there
was no evidence that this condition alone ever prevented him from returning to his
regular or customary employment. Upon Jarrell's request for additional findings, the ALJ
stated that the doctors could not have assigned impairment ratings “unless each believed
15
plaintiff was at MMI or, at the very least, that plaintiff's impairment rating would not
change significantly even after reaching MMI.” Since Jarrell produced no evidence that
his psychological condition alone ever prevented him from working, the evidence
supports a finding that he has always been at a level of psychological functioning that
would permit him to return to his employment. As an award of TTD must be based upon
a finding of disability, Roberts Bros. Coal Co. v. Robinson, 113 S.W.3d 181, 183 (Ky.
2003), the ALJ did not err by failing to award Jarrell additional TTD benefits for his
psychological condition.
Finally, Jarrell argues that the ALJ erred by accepting Dr. Ruth's
psychological impairment rating, which excluded 6% of his 10% psychiatric impairment
rating as being prior active impairment. We agree.
In October 2005, Dr. Ruth reported that
Mr. Jarrell is not under treatment for his psychiatric
symptoms. Therefore, he is not at a state of maximum
medical improvement. According to instructions in the AMA
Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment an
assessment of permanent psychiatric impairment cannot yet
be made.
If a hypothetical assessment of his psychiatric
impairment is desired, based upon his current symptoms and
psychiatric functional impairment, and given the (unlikely)
assumption that he would not improve and, therefore, would
then be at the state of maximum medical improvement, the
following estimate is offered[.]
Dr. Ruth went on to opine that Jarrell hypothetically had a 10% psychiatric impairment,
6% of which
16
arose prior to and unrelated to the injury. This arises from
some preceding emotional symptoms as well as a (preceding)
learning disorder causing impaired verbal comprehension.
That six percent is unlikely to improve with treatment. The
remaining impairment, or four percent, is due to symptoms
arising as a result of the injury. This impairment is likely to
improve with treatment. By best estimate this should undergo
an approximately a [sic] 50% reduction with treatment.
Again, this estimate is hypothetical given that Mr.
Jarrell has not reached a state of maximum medical
improvement regarding his psychiatric symptoms.
The extent of a worker's impairment and the proper interpretation of the
Guides are medical questions. Kentucky River Enterprises, Inc. v. Elkins, 107 S.W.3d
206, 210 (Ky. 2003). Where medical experts differ in their interpretation of the Guides,
it is the ALJ's function to weigh the conflicting testimony and decide which expert to rely
upon. Here, while the ALJ recognized in his summary of the evidence that Dr. Ruth's
impairment rating was based upon a hypothetical assessment, he still accepted Dr. Ruth's
impairment rating. As the only other evidence besides this hypothetical impairment
rating that the ALJ discussed with regard to Jarrell's psychiatric impairment rating was
Dr. Pack's assessment, no reasonable person would fail to be persuaded by Dr. Pack's
assessment, and a finding in Jarrell's favor is compelled, Magic Coal Co. v. Fox, 19
S.W.3d 88, 96 (Ky. 2000). Because of this conclusion, we do not reach the issue of
whether Dr. Ruth made the requisite findings for the ALJ to carve out 6% of Jarrell's 10%
psychological impairment rating.
The Workers' Compensation Board's opinion is affirmed in part and vacated
and remanded in part.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Thomas W. Moak
Prestonsburg, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE CZAR COAL
CORPORATION:
Walter W. Turner
Lexington, Kentucky
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