LINDA F. BROWN AND GARY P. BROWN v. LOWE'S HOME CENTERS, INC.; AMERICAN WOODS, INC.; AND ON-SITE ASSEMBLY, INC.
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RENDERED: JULY 27, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001253-MR
LINDA F. BROWN AND GARY P. BROWN
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARY C. NOBLE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-02451
LOWE'S HOME CENTERS, INC.;
AMERICAN WOODS, INC.; AND
ON-SITE ASSEMBLY, INC.
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; NICKELL AND WINE, JUDGES
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE: Linda and Gary Brown appeal from an order of the Fayette
Circuit Court dismissing their lawsuit pursuant to the involuntary dismissal provisions of
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 41.02. After our review, we affirm.
We previously set forth the relevant background facts of this case in Brown
v. Lowe's Home Centers, Inc., No. 2004-CA-001006-MR, 2005 WL 2573438 (Ky.App.
Oct. 14, 2005). Some of the following pertinent portions of that opinion serve as a proper
predicate for purposes of our discussion:
The Browns[’] complaint, filed in June 2001, contends that
they bought a swing from Lowe's Home Centers, Inc., but that
when Linda sat on the swing following its delivery to her
home, it collapsed, causing her to suffer “serious personal
injuries.” The Browns then sued Lowe's; On-Site Assembly,
Inc. (who allegedly assembled the swing); and American
Woods, Inc. (who allegedly manufactured the swing).
In April 2002, Lowe's served a second set of
interrogatories and requests for production of documents on
the Browns. Dissatisfied with what it deemed to be
incomplete responses, in September 2003, Lowe's filed a
motion to compel further responses to these discovery
requests. That motion to compel resulted in an agreed order,
signed on September 18, 2003, which ordered the Browns to
respond to the discovery requests by November 11, 2003.
In response to the trial Court's September 18 order, the
Browns filed a “Motion for Order to Clarify Requested
Discovery,” as well as a supplemental response to discovery,
which, according to Lowe's, merely repeated the initial
objections to the discovery. Lowe's counsel filed a response
to the Browns' motion for clarification stating that Lowe's
“respectfully requests that the Court require the Plaintiffs to
respond fully to all outstanding discovery responses on or
before December 19, 2003[,] or be subject to the sanction of
dismissal.” In response to the parties' motions, the trial court
signed an order on December 16, 2003, requiring Linda to
respond to the outstanding interrogatories and requests for
production of documents by January 16, 2004. Later in
December 2003, the trial court granted Browns' counsel's
motion to withdraw and further ordered Linda to “appear,
either personally or through counsel, on January 30, 2004[,]
at 10:30 a.m. to advise the Court of the status of this suit.
Should Plaintiff be unrepresented and medically unable to
attend on that date, she must provide a doctor's statement
advising the Court that she will be unable to attend.”
Despite the clear language of the trial court's
December order, Linda neither appeared on January 30 nor
did she submit a report from a physician advising the Court
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that she could not attend. Based on Linda's failure to comply
with the Court's discovery orders, as well as the assertion that
the Browns had taken only one affirmative action (filing
discovery requests upon Lowe's in January 2003) to prosecute
their case since its inception in 2001, Lowe's and the
remaining defendants moved to dismiss the Browns'
complaint with prejudice.
The trial court granted Appellees' motion to dismiss on
February 9, 2004. But in one final effort to prod the Browns
to action, the trial court's February 9 order dismissed the
action without prejudice, with the caveat that “[i]f no
additional appropriate action is taken [by the Browns] within
sixty (60) days, Defendants are directed to submit an order
dismissing [the action] with prejudice.” Despite the trial
court's clear warnings, the Browns failed to take any
substantive steps to prosecute their action (other than faxing a
letter to the trial court judge outlining all of Linda's alleged
health problems). So on April 20, 2004, the trial court
dismissed the Browns' complaint with prejudice, after which
the Browns filed the appeal at hand.
Brown, 2005 WL 2573438 at *1-2 (footnotes omitted). On appeal, we vacated the
dismissal of the case and remanded the matter for further proceedings because the record
did not reflect that the trial court had properly considered the involuntary dismissal
factors set forth in Ward v. Housman, 809 S.W.2d 717 (Ky.App. 1991) and Gill v. Gill,
455 S.W.2d 545 (Ky. 1970). In doing so, we expressly declined to set forth our views on
whether dismissal would ultimately be warranted. Brown at *2 n.26.
Upon remand, the appellees filed another motion to dismiss the Browns’
claims on January 13, 2006, for the same reasons previously argued. Following a brief
hearing on January 27, 2006, the trial court granted the motion in orders entered on May
17, 2006, and June 16, 2006. The court’s order of dismissal provided as follows:
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This case is before the Court on the Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss. On April 21, 2004, an order was issued
from this Court dismissing this action. The Court of Appeals
ordered this Court to enumerate its reasoning under the Ward
v. Houseman [sic] factors: the extent of the party’s personal
responsibility; the history of dilatoriness; whether the
attorney’s conduct was willful and in bad faith;
meritoriousness of the claim; prejudice to the other party; and
alternative sanctions. Ward v. Houseman [sic], 809 S.W.2d
717, 719 (Ky.App. 1991).
This Court granted Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
based on Plaintiff’s repeated failures to comply with
discovery requests or to take any action whatsoever. Plaintiff
filed this lawsuit in 2001 and in the nearly five (5) years
since, has taken only one affirmative action to move this case
forward. Most other actions, including repeatedly ignoring
this Court’s orders to Compel, appear to have been for the
purposes of delay. Since the parties are representing
themselves, it would appear that they are indeed personally
responsible for the delays.1 The Court even gave Plaintiff the
option of providing a doctor’s report of why she could not
appear, which she failed to provide. Consequently, the Court
can only conclude that such failure was willful and in bad
faith. In this Court’s order of February 6, 2004, the Court
stated that if the Plaintiff did not take appropriate action
within sixty (60) days, then the action would be dismissed
with prejudice. Plaintiff took no action. The record is blatant
as to how many opportunities Plaintiff was given to stay in
this case. The Defendants should not be forced to continually
defend a case that the Plaintiff has failed to prosecute in a
timely manner, or even in any manner. Therefore,
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, the Browns again argue that the trial court erred in dismissing
their action. CR 41.02(1) governs the involuntary dismissal of civil actions. It provides
1
We note that at the time of this order, the Browns were no longer proceeding pro se but were
represented by counsel. From the context of the order as a whole, however, it is clear that the
court is referencing to events that took place prior to the first dismissal.
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that “[f]or failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order
of the court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against
him.” Dismissals for lack of prosecution pursuant to CR 41.02 are reviewed under the
standard of abuse of discretion. Toler v. Rapid American, 190 S.W.3d 348, 351 (Ky.App.
2006). “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge's decision was
arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”
Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999); see also Toler, 190 S.W.3d
at 351. In considering the Browns’ appeal, we must bear in mind that trial courts are
vested with an inherent power to dismiss for lack of prosecution in order to preserve the
integrity and management of the judicial process. Nonetheless, we note that such
discretion is to be exercised with care:
… dismissal of a case pursuant to CR 41.02 or CR 77.02
“should be resorted to only in the most extreme cases” and we
must “carefully scrutinize the trial court's exercise of
discretion in doing so.” Polk v. Wimsatt, 689 S.W.2d 363,
364-65 (Ky.App. 1985). The rule permitting a court to
involuntarily dismiss an action “envisions a consciousness
and intentional failure to comply with the provisions thereof.”
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Carrier, 426 S.W.2d 938,
940 (Ky. 1968). Since the result is harsh, “the propriety of
the invocation of the Rule must be examined in regard to the
conduct of the party against whom it is invoked.” Id. at 941.
Toler, 190 S.W.3d at 351. A trial court must consider each case in light of its unique
circumstances without relying upon the passage of time as solely indicative of a lack of
due diligence. Gill, 455 S.W.2d at 546.
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We originally remanded this matter to the trial court for appropriate
consideration of the factors set forth in Ward v. Housman, supra. In Ward, we adopted
the guidelines set forth in Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871 (3d Cir. 1984), for
determining whether a case should be dismissed for dilatory conduct under Rule 41(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure -- the counterpart to our CR 41.02(1). We directed
that the following factors should be considered:
(1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility;
(2) the history of dilatoriness;
(3) whether the attorney's conduct was willful and in bad
faith;
(4) meritoriousness of the claim;
(5) prejudice to the other party, and
(6) alternative sanctions.
Ward, 809 S.W.2d at 719; see also Toler, 190 S.W.3d at 351.
The Browns argue that the trial court’s decision to dismiss their case was
improper because alternative sanctions were available. For example, they argue that
since the primary subject of the discovery dispute has been Linda’s claim of lost wages,
an appropriate sanction would have been to dismiss only that claim. Although dismissal
of this claim alone might have been an appropriate sanction, we as an appellate court are
limited to reviewing a court’s dismissal of a party’s claims pursuant to CR 41.02 pursuant
to an abuse-of-discretion standard. While we may have acted otherwise, we may not
usurp the discretion of a trial court by substituting our judgment.
After reviewing the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused
its discretion in failing to utilize alternative sanctions. As the court pointed out in its
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order of May 17, 2006, the Browns were given numerous opportunities to comply with
court orders as to discovery and as to moving the case along. The record also reflects that
the court actually did implement alternative sanctions against the Browns before it finally
resorted to dismissing their case. We recognized as much in our previous opinion when
we stated that “the trial court clearly considered the efficacy of alternative sanctions, as
evidenced by the fact that it first dismissed the action without prejudice.” Brown, 2005
WL 2573438 at *2. We particularly note the trial court’s finding upon dismissing the
case without prejudice. The court urged the Browns to take some sort of action within
sixty (60) days to save it from being dismissed with prejudice; yet they still failed to act.
Therefore, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
employ alternative sanctions against the Browns after the remand that granted them a
second chance.
The Browns next raise a general argument that the court once again failed
to consider the Ward v. Housman factors properly before dismissing their case.
However, after reviewing the court’s May 16, 2006 order of dismissal, we do not agree.
The order details directly and clearly the Browns’ personal responsibility as to the
numerous delays and inactivity that have plagued the case. It also expresses the court’s
opinion that their conduct was willful and in bad faith. We are satisfied that the trial
court adequately considered the Ward v. Housman factors in deciding to dismiss those
claims with prejudice. We find no error on this ground.
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The Browns finally argue that another remand is appropriate because we
have vacated and remanded a number of similar cases since our first opinion was
rendered in October 2005. We disagree. The cases cited by the Browns were remanded
only because the trial courts failed to take into account the requisite Ward v. Housman
factors. We did not consider the actual merits of dismissal in any of those cases. See
Jaroszewski v. Flege, 204 S.W.3d 148, 150 (Ky.App. 2006); Toler, 190 S.W.3d at 35152.
We conclude that the trial court gave proper consideration to the Ward v.
Housman factors in its decision to dismiss and that the court did not abuse its discretion
in ordering dismissal. Therefore, another remand is not required.
The order of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Thomas K. Herren
Lexington, Kentucky
Bill J. Paliobeis
Cincinnati, Ohio
George B. Hocker
Lexington, Kentucky
Eileen O'Brien
Lizbeth Ann Tully
Lexington, Kentucky
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