L.A.H.C. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES; S.E.C., AN INFANT; M.L.H., AN INFANT; D.L.H., AN INFANT
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RENDERED: MAY 11, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001207-ME
L.A.H.C.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE HUGH SMITH HAYNIE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-AD-500058
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY
SERVICES; S.E.C., AN INFANT; M.L.H., AN
INFANT; D.L.H., AN INFANT
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ABRAMSON, ACREE, AND WINE, JUDGES.
WINE, JUDGE: L.A.H.C. appeals from an order of the Jefferson Family Court
terminating her parental rights to three of her children. She argues that termination was
inappropriate because the Cabinet for Health and Family Services (Cabinet) failed to
make reasonable efforts for family reunification and because she substantially complied
with all of the Cabinet’s directions. We conclude, however, that the trial court’s findings
were supported by substantial evidence, and the court did not abuse its discretion by
ordering that her parental rights be terminated. Hence, we affirm.
The details of this case are fully set out in the trial court’s findings of fact.
For purposes of this appeal, the following facts are relevant. L.A.H.C. is the biological
mother of S.E.C. (d.o.b. 07/17/1991), M.L.H. (d.o.b. 06/26/1996), and D.L.H. (d.o.b.
10/16/1998). K.E.C. is the biological father of S.E.C., and is the legal father of M.L.H.
and D.L.H., inasmuch as these children were born during his marriage to L.A.H.C. D.H.
is the putative father of M.L.H. and D.L.H., but there has never been an adjudication of
paternity.
On June 10, 2003, the Cabinet filed a dependency petition alleging that
L.A.H.C. had neglected the educational and medical needs of S.E.C. Thereafter, in
September 2003, the Cabinet filed dependency petitions on behalf of M.L.H. and D.L.H.
based upon additional allegations of educational and medical neglect. In November
2003, the family court placed custody of the children with the Cabinet, but allowed
L.A.H.C. to retain temporary custody of M.L.H. and D.L.H.
However, in March 2004, the court removed M.L.H. and D.L.H. after
L.A.H.C. stipulated that the children had missed too much school and she had failed to
follow court orders to take them to counseling and medical appointments. L.A.H.C. had
also tested positive for use of drugs. The court found L.A.H.C. in contempt of court for
failure to comply with the court’s orders, but discharged the sentence on the condition
that L.A.H.C. comply with the court’s orders and the Cabinet’s treatment plan. However,
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in June of 2004, the court revoked L.A.H.C.’s conditional discharge and ordered her to
serve ten days for the prior contempt.
After L.A.H.C.’s release from jail, the court again ordered her to comply
with all court orders and directions from the Cabinet, and committed the children
exclusively to the Cabinet. The Cabinet, however, became dissatisfied with L.A.H.C.’s
compliance with the children’s treatment plan and with her failure to participate in drug
treatment and domestic violence counseling. Consequently, on February 1, 2005, the
Cabinet filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of L.A.H.C., K.E.C., and D.H. to
S.E.C., D.L.H. and M.L.H.
The termination hearing was originally scheduled for June 19, 2005. But
since L.A.H.C. was making progress with her drug treatment and domestic violence
counseling, the court continued the hearing. In an effort to re-establish a bond between
L.A.H.C. and the children, the Cabinet reinstated visitation with M.L.H. and D.L.H., first
with supervised visitation, then unsupervised daytime visitation, and finally unsupervised
overnight visitation. As a condition of visitation, the Cabinet advised L.A.H.C. that the
children should not have contact with her current boyfriend or D.H.
However, in November 2005, the Cabinet received information that D.L.H.
was coming to school unkempt and that he was not receiving his medication. In addition,
the Cabinet learned that L.A.H.C.’s boyfriend had been at the house during the children’s
visits, and that L.A.H.C. had been allowing D.H. to have contact with the children.
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Based upon these violations of the treatment plan, the Cabinet discontinued L.A.H.C.’s
visitation with the children and re-docketed the termination hearing.
The trial court conducted the termination hearing on April 28, 2006.
L.A.H.C. and D.H. were present with counsel. The court appointed counsel for K.E.C.,
but he failed to appear or contact the court. The Cabinet was represented by counsel and
the children were represented by an appointed guardian ad litem. The Cabinet introduced
its records and the records of the dependency actions as exhibits. The social workers who
handled the case and the children’s therapist testified for the Cabinet. L.A.H.C. testified
on her own behalf, and she called her aunt, who testified that she was willing and able to
take custody of the children. Likewise, D.H. testified that he was willing and able to
assume support and custody of D.L.H. and M.L.H.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that while L.A.H.C.
had come into compliance with some of the Cabinet’s directions, she had failed to
comply with all of the Cabinet’s directions or demonstrate reasonable progress toward
reunification with the children. The court further found that the children had been in
foster care for more than fifteen of the twenty-two previous months, and they had
previously been adjudicated to be abused or neglected. The court also noted that
L.A.H.C., K.E.C., and D.H. had failed to provide essential care for the children. Based
upon the evidence presented at the hearing, the court found that termination of parental
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rights would be in the best interests of the children, which the court so ordered. L.A.H.C.
now appeals from this order.1
Our standard of review in termination of parental rights cases is set forth in
M.P.S. v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 979 S.W.2d 114, 116-17 (Ky.App. 1998), as
follows:
The trial court has a great deal of discretion in
determining whether the child fits within the abused or
neglected category and whether the abuse or neglect warrants
termination. Department for Human Resources v. Moore,
552 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Ky.App. 1977). This Court’s standard
of review in a termination of parental rights action is confined
to the clearly erroneous standard in CR 52.01 based upon
clear and convincing evidence, and the findings of the trial
court will not be disturbed unless there exists no substantial
evidence in the record to support its findings. V.S. v.
Commonwealth, Cabinet for Human Resources, 706 S.W.2d
420, 424 (Ky.App. 1986).
“Clear and convincing proof does not necessarily
mean uncontradicted proof. It is sufficient if there is proof of
a probative and substantial nature carrying the weight of
evidence sufficient to convince ordinarily prudent-minded
people.” Rowland v. Holt, 253 Ky. 718, 726, 70 S.W.2d 5, 9
(1934).
The General Assembly provided the mechanism for the involuntary
termination of parental rights in KRS 625.090. The statute creates a three-prong test
whereby the Cabinet must prove, and the court must determine that: 1) the child is
abused or neglected; 2) termination would be in the child’s best interest; and 3) one of
1
D.H. also filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights.
No. 2006-CA-001240-ME. However, he did not file an appellant’s brief and this Court
dismissed his appeal on February 8, 2007.
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several listed grounds exists. In deciding the second and third prongs, the court is
required to consider several enumerated factors, including “[i]f the child has been placed
with the cabinet, whether the cabinet has, prior to the filing of the petition made
reasonable efforts as defined in KRS 620.020 to reunite the child with the parents[.]”
KRS 625.090(3)(c). We shall address each prong in turn.
As the trial court noted, each of the children were found to be abused or
neglected in the prior dependency actions. The Cabinet introduced the dependency files
as exhibits in this case. Furthermore, L.A.H.C.’s stipulation to the allegations of the
dependency petitions regarding M.L.H. and D.L.H. appears in the record.
As to the second prong, KRS 625.090(3) requires the court to consider a
number of factors to determine whether termination would be in a child’s best interest. In
this case, the Cabinet presented evidence that the children were removed from parental
custody due to abuse or neglect, that the children’s physical, mental and emotional needs
were being met and their prospects for adoption are good. L.A.H.C. primarily takes issue
with the trial court’s findings that the Cabinet has made reasonable efforts for
reunification, KRS 625.090(3)(c), and that she has failed to comply with the Cabinet’s
directions. KRS 625.090(3)(d).
In particular, L.A.H.C. points out that she has successfully completed drug
treatment and domestic violence counseling, and she is continuing her participation with
therapy and mental health treatment. In addition, as the trial court noted, L.A.H.C. has
been compliant with all court orders, at least since June of 2004. However, the trial court
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also ordered L.A.H.C. to comply with the Cabinet’s directions and case plan. L.A.H.C.’s
compliance with many of the Cabinet’s instructions is offset by her failure to fully
comply with other aspects of her agreement with the Cabinet.
Furthermore, we disagree with L.A.H.C. that the conditions imposed by the
Cabinet were arbitrary or unreasonable. The therapist and the social worker believed that
L.A.H.C. should have used the unsupervised visitation to re-establish her bond with the
children. And in light of prior instances of domestic violence, they instructed her that the
children should not have contact with L.A.H.C.’s current boyfriend or with D.H. during
visitation. L.A.H.C. failed to comply with these directions and, in fact, attempted to
prevent the Cabinet from learning about her non-compliance. Based upon the evidence,
the trial court could reasonably find that L.A.H.C.’s progress has been insufficient to
make it in the children’s best interests to return to the home within a reasonable period of
time.
L.A.H.C. also complains that the trial court never considered placing the
children with her aunt, who expressed an interest in taking the children. The Cabinet’s
consideration of relative placement may be a factor in determining the reasonableness of
the Cabinet’s efforts toward family reunification. In this case, however, the aunt did not
come forward until two months before the final termination hearing. At that point, the
children had made considerable progress toward permanency in other placements. The
Cabinet was not obligated to consider relative placement as a reasonable option at that
late date.
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Pursuant to the third prong, the trial court found that L.A.H.C., for reasons
other than poverty alone, has failed or is incapable of providing essential care for the
children. L.A.H.C. complains that there was no support order in effect and the Cabinet
never sought to collect child support from her. But we note that a parent’s duty to
support her children exists independently of any court order of support. KRS 405.020.
We recognize that L.A.H.C. is receiving social security disability and has limited ability
to work. Nevertheless, there was no evidence that L.A.H.C. has made any effort to
support her children (apart from birthday and Christmas gifts) since they have been in
state care.
And as noted above, the court also found that the children had been in state
care for more than fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months. The purpose of KRS
625.090(2)(j) is to ensure a timely return to permanent placement for children who are
committed to the Cabinet. The statute requires a parent to make progress toward
reunification within a reasonable period of time. If a parent fails to do so, the statutory
presumption shifts toward termination.
We commend L.A.H.C. for successfully completing drug treatment and
domestic violence counseling and for her continued participation with therapy and mental
health treatment. However, the children have been in state care since 2003 and L.A.H.C.
made no efforts to fully comply with her treatment until 2005. Her failure to complete
these programs earlier has allowed the children to remain in foster care for an extended
period of time.
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In 2005, the court allowed her an additional period to come into full
compliance. As the trial court recognized, L.A.H.C.’s violations after that time were
never egregious. And if L.A.H.C. had demonstrated her progress earlier, then her more
recent lapses in compliance would not be as significant. But in light of these lapses, her
prior history, and the extended period of time during which her children have been in
foster care, her lack of complete compliance with the Cabinet’s directions weighs more
heavily against her. Given the evidence presented in this case, we cannot say that the
trial court clearly erred in finding that the requirements of KRS 625.090 were met, or that
it abused its discretion by terminating L.A.H.C.’s parental rights. M.P.S. v. Cabinet for
Human Resources, 979 S.W.2d at 116.
Accordingly, the order of the Jefferson Family Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
L.A.H.C., pro se
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE,
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY
SERVICES:
G. Thomas Mercer
Assistant Counsel
Office of the General Counsel
Louisville, Kentucky
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