PHILLIP LICKLITER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 21, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001165-MR
PHILLIP LICKLITER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SHEILA R. ISAAC, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CR-01310
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; NICKELL AND WINE, JUDGES.
NICKELL, JUDGE: Phillip Lickliter, pro se, has appealed from an order entered by the
Fayette Circuit Court on May 23, 2006, which, without holding an evidentiary hearing,
denied his pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the trial court’s final judgment
and sentence of imprisonment pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr)
11.42. Having concluded the trial court did not err in denying Lickliter’s claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel without holding an evidentiary hearing, we affirm.
Because Lickliter directly appealed his 25-year sentence for murder1 and
tampering with physical evidence2 to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, Lickliter v.
Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 65 (Ky. 2004), we quote the pertinent facts of this case from
that opinion as follows:
Lickliter and the victim were together on an out of
state truck-driving job. When Lickliter returned to Kentucky,
the victim was no longer with him. About a week later, an
individual happened upon the body of the victim in a wooded
area near Tazewell, Tennessee. A forensic expert determined
that the victim had been dead five to seven days when the
body was found. A medical examiner concluded that the
cause of death was two gunshot wounds, one to the chest and
one to the abdomen. Two bullet holes were found in
Lickliter’s truck and a projectile was recovered from the cab.
Originally, Lickliter denied any wrong-doing, but
during his third interview with police, he admitted killing the
victim. He was charged with murder and tampering with
physical evidence. Among other evidence, the written
statement made by Lickliter was read at his trial. In that
statement, Lickliter alleged that the victim threatened to kill
him and his family. He stated that he was so afraid of the
victim that when the victim fell asleep, he reached into the
victim’s bag, got out a gun and shot the victim. Lickliter
stated that he did this between exits 100 and 104 on
[I]nterstate 75, and that he threw the gun out of the truck
somewhere near exit 63. He admitted leaving the body of the
victim in the woods. It was noted that exits 100 and 104 on
Interstate 75 are in Fayette County, Kentucky.
Testifying for the defense, a psychologist stated that he
examined Lickliter and concluded that his extended use of
amphetamines caused him to have paranoid and delusional
thinking. He told the jury: “I believe that his mental
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 502.020.
2
KRS 524.100.
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condition was so severe at one point that he felt that his life
and wife and his children were really threatened, that they
could be killed and that he lacked what we call the capacity to
control his behavior.” A licensed clinical psychologist also
testified and concluded that: “. . . Lickliter’s judgment at that
period of time was affected by the symptoms that he had been
experiencing including the hallucinations and delusions, and
that that may well have had an effect upon his behavior at the
time of the incident.” The two experts did not give any
opinion that the accused suffered from a mental illness as
defined by the statute. Lickliter did not testify at trial.
The jury convicted Lickliter of murder and tampering
with physical evidence. He was sentenced to twenty-five
years and five years on the respective charges, said sentences
to run concurrently for a total of twenty-five years in prison.
On April 1, 2005, Lickliter filed a pro se RCr 11.42 motion to vacate, set
aside, or correct his sentence, with a memorandum in support thereof, as well as a motion
for appointment of counsel and a request for an evidentiary hearing. The trial court
entered an order on April 6, 2005, appointing the Department of Public Advocacy to
represent Lickliter. Following several motions for extension of time, counsel filed notice
on November 2, 2005, that he would not file a supplement to Lickliter’s RCr 11.42
motion. Lickliter was granted additional time to file a pro se supplement to his motion,
and the Commonwealth filed its response in opposition on February 6, 2006. The trial
court denied Lickliter’s RCr 11.42 motion on May 23, 2006, without holding an
evidentiary hearing. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Lickliter asserts ineffective assistance by trial counsel based on
five contentions, including that counsel: (1) failed to procure a guilty plea offer; (2)
failed to give an opening statement; (3) failed to object to improper statements made by
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the prosecutor during the penalty phase; (4) failed to object to hearsay testimony; and (5)
failed to seek a sentence modification. Lickliter also argues that all errors enumerated in
his arguments had a cumulative effect, thus requiring reversal.
In addition to challenging the trial court’s rejection of his various claims,
Lickliter contends that the trial court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on
his RCr 11.42 motion. A movant is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing on
an RCr 11.42 motion; there must be an issue of fact which cannot be determined on the
face of the record. Stanford v. Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d 742 (Ky. 1993). “Where the
movant’s allegations are refuted on the face of the record as a whole, no evidentiary
hearing is required.” Sparks v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Ky.App. 1986)
(citing Hopewell v. Commonwealth, 687 S.W.2d 153, 154 (Ky. App. 1985)).
To address Lickliter’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we must
first set forth the applicable law relating to those claims. To establish ineffective
assistance of counsel, a person must satisfy a two-part test showing both that counsel’s
performance was deficient and that the deficiency caused actual prejudice resulting in a
proceeding that was fundamentally unfair and unreliable. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Commonwealth v. Tamme, 83 S.W.3d
465, 469 (Ky. 2002); Foley v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 878, 884 (Ky. 2000). The
burden is on the defendant to overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s assistance
was constitutionally sufficient or that under the circumstances counsel’s action might be
considered “trial strategy.” Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 689; Moore v. Commonwealth,
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983 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Ky. 1998); Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 905, 912 (Ky.
1998). A court must be highly deferential in reviewing defense counsel’s performance
and should avoid second-guessing counsel’s actions based on hindsight. Haight v.
Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436, 442 (Ky. 2001); Harper v. Commonwealth, 978 S.W.2d
311, 315 (Ky. 1998). In assessing counsel’s performance the standard is whether the
alleged acts or omissions were outside the wide range of prevailing professional norms
based on an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89;
Tamme, 83 S.W.3d at 470; Commonwealth v. Pelfrey, 998 S.W.2d 460, 463 (Ky. 1999).
“‘A defendant is not guaranteed errorless counsel, or counsel adjudged ineffective by
hindsight, but counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective
assistance.’” Sanborn, 975 S.W.2d at 991 (quoting McQueen v. Commonwealth, 949
S.W.2d 70 (Ky. 1997). To establish actual prejudice, a movant must show a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different or was rendered
fundamentally unfair and unreliable. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 694; Bowling v.
Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 405, 411-12 (Ky. 2002). Where the movant is convicted at
trial, a reasonable probability is one that undermines confidence in the outcome of the
proceeding upon consideration of the totality of the evidence before the jury. Strickland,
supra, 466 U.S. at 694-95. See also Bowling, 80 S.W.3d at 412; and Foley, 17 S.W.3d at
884.
Lickliter claims defense counsel was ineffective for failing to procure an
offer from the Commonwealth in exchange for a guilty plea. He states he asked counsel
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to inquire about a plea offer “in an attempt to avoid the expense, agony and stress of a
jury trial for both [the victim’s] family and himself,” and counsel did not approach the
Commonwealth and request an offer.
It is well-established that there is “no constitutional right to plea bargain.”
Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 21 (Ky. 2004) (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S.
545, 561, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977); and Commonwealth v. Reyes, 764 S.W.2d
62, 64 (Ky. 1989)). In rejecting Lickliter’s argument, the trial court noted no plea offer
was extended by the Commonwealth, and none would have been given even if Lickliter’s
counsel had so inquired. Even if counsel’s action or inaction could be considered
deficient under Strickland, Lickliter has failed to show how he was prejudiced. He has
not demonstrated the prosecution was interested in entering into plea negotiations, or that
such a plea would have been acceptable to the trial court. Also, there was no guarantee
that Lickliter’s sentence would have been any lower as a result of a plea bargain. All
Lickliter has offered is speculation, not a reasonable probability that the outcome would
have been different, and bare speculation is insufficient to justify RCr 11.42 relief. See
United States v. Boone, 62 F.3d 323 (10th Cir. 1995).
Next, Lickliter argues trial counsel’s failure to offer an opening statement
was unreasonable and prejudicial to his case. RCr 9.42 permits defense counsel to either
present an opening statement, reserve opening until the conclusion of the
Commonwealth’s case, or waive opening entirely. The failure to make an opening
statement does not automatically establish ineffective assistance of counsel. See Moss v.
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Hofbauer, 286 F.3d 851 (6th Cir. 2002). Counsel here made a professional judgment not
to make an opening statement, and we see nothing unreasonable in that decision. Further,
Lickliter has failed to articulate specifically how the lack of an opening statement
prejudiced his case. Lickliter’s conclusory allegations cannot satisfy his burden of
proving a different outcome would have been reached in his trial if counsel had, in fact,
delivered an opening statement.
Lickliter also argues trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to and
request a mistrial for alleged improper statements made by the prosecutor during the
penalty phase of trial. In addressing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the court must
determine whether the prosecutor’s conduct was so egregious as to deny the accused due
process of law. Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 744 S.W.2d 407, 411 (Ky. 1987) (citing
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647-8, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 1873, 40 L.Ed.2d 431
(1974)). “The required analysis, by an appellate court, must focus on the overall fairness
of the trial, and not the culpability of the prosecutor.” Id. at 411-12 (citing Smith v.
Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982)). See also Maxie v.
Commonwealth, 82 S.W.3d 860, 866 (Ky. 2002). Whether to grant a mistrial is within
the sound discretion of the trial court. Woodard v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 63, 68
(Ky. 2004). “[A] mistrial is an extreme remedy and should be resorted to only when
there is a fundamental defect in the proceedings and there is a ‘manifest necessity for
such an action.’” Id. (quoting Bray v. Commonwealth, 68 S.W.3d 375, 383 (Ky. 2002)).
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During penalty phase closing argument, the prosecutor made numerous
comments that Lickliter characterizes as prosecutorial misconduct. Those comments
included that Lickliter had been “breaking the law on a regular basis by using drugs,” and
that it was a “scary thought to think that a large vehicle [was] hurtling down the highway
under the control of someone regularly under the control of mind altering drugs.”
Reversal for prosecutorial misconduct in a closing argument is mandated
“only if the misconduct is ‘flagrant’ or if each of the following three conditions is
satisfied: (1) [p]roof of defendant’s guilt is not overwhelming; (2) [d]efense counsel
objected; and (3) [t]he trial court failed to cure the error with a sufficient admonishment
to the jury.” Barnes v. Commonwealth, 91 S.W.3d 564, 568 (Ky. 2002) (citing United
States v. Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380, 1390 (6th Cir. 1994); and United States v. Bess, 593 F.2d
749, 757 (6th Cir. 1979)). Lickliter has not shown any of the three conditions, let alone
all three, nor has he shown flagrant misconduct by the prosecutor. Proof of his guilt was
overwhelming and defense counsel did not object, making the third condition irrelevant.
Thus, there is no need to inquire into these comments unless they amounted to flagrant
misconduct, which did not occur here. Counsel is allowed wide latitude during closing
argument. Butcher v. Commonwealth, 96 S.W.3d 3, 12 (Ky. 2002); Stopher v.
Commonwealth, 57 S.W.3d 787, 805-06 (Ky. 2001). The Commonwealth’s Attorney
simply drew his comments from the trial evidence. We cannot say counsel was
ineffective for failing to object because the prosecutor’s comments did not rise to the
level of palpable error requiring reversal.
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Lickliter also claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to
trial counsel’s failure to object and request a mistrial when the victim’s sister offered
hearsay testimony. He also finds fault with counsel's failure to ask the trial court to
modify the sentence fixed by the jury and give him a lesser sentence. Neither of these
arguments was raised by Lickliter in his direct appeal to the Supreme Court. Both were
alleged trial errors known to Lickliter and his counsel at the time of appeal and could
have been, and indeed should have been, subjected to direct appellate review. Lickliter’s
failure to raise these claims before the Supreme Court on direct appeal prevents a
collateral attack on the judgment via RCr 11.42. See Bronston v. Commonwealth, 481
S.W.2d 666 (Ky. 1972).
Lickliter finally complains that the cumulative effect of the aforementioned
errors resulted in a violation of his constitutional rights and as a result his conviction and
sentence should be set aside. We find this argument to be without merit. Each of the
allegations made by Lickliter has been thoroughly reviewed and discussed in this
opinion, and each is refuted by the record or should have been addressed on direct appeal
to the Supreme Court. “Repeated and collective reviewing of alleged errors does not
increase their validity.” Parrish v. Commonwealth, 121 S.W.3d 198, 207 (Ky. 2003).
Lickliter has failed to demonstrate any basis for his claims that counsel’s performance
was deficient. He received a fundamentally fair trial.
Accordingly, the order of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Phillip Lickliter, Pro Se
LaGrange, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Samuel J. Floyd, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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