CAROLYN SPENCER v. PLAYTEX PRODUCTS, INC
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RENDERED: AUGUST 17, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-000995-MR
CAROLYN SPENCER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PERRY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM ENGLE, III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00129
PLAYTEX PRODUCTS, INC.
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ABRAMSON AND DIXON, JUDGES; ROSENBLUM,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE: Carolyn Spencer appeals from an April 13, 2006 Order of the
Perry Circuit Court granting summary judgment to Appellee Playtex Products, Inc., in a
product liability action because Spencer had failed to produce sufficient evidence that a
pair of rubber gloves manufactured by Playtex caused her alleged injury. Agreeing with
the trial court that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact regarding causation
and that Playtex was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we affirm.
1
Senior Judge Paul W. Rosenblum, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
In early 2001, Spencer bought a pair of Playtex gloves at her local WalMart and wore them while cleaning kitchen cabinets. The next morning she had a rash
on her arms which eventually spread to other parts of her body. She was treated initially
at the local hospital and then referred to a dermatologist, Dr. Laurel Knuckles in Corbin,
Kentucky. Dr. Knuckles later referred Spencer to Dr. Joseph F. Fowler, a Louisville
dermatologist, who performed patch testing in the summer of 2001 to determine whether
Spencer was allergic to latex or other substances. Although the tests established that
Spencer was allergic to several substances, she was not allergic to latex.
On March 12, 2002, Spencer brought a product liability action against
Playtex alleging the gloves were defective and unreasonably dangerous and that Playtex
had failed to warn of dangers associated with their use. Spencer also asserted claims
pursuant to the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act and for breach of express and implied
warranties. The case proceeded with depositions being taken of Spencer, Dr. Knuckles
and Dr. Fowler. Spencer also produced an expert, H. Bradley Hammond, specializing in
“human factors,” a field which he described as the integration of biological and
psychological sciences with the design of products. Following a Daubert hearing, the
trial court limited Hammond to testimony regarding Spencer's allegations with respect to
failure to warn and/or the insufficiency of the warnings on the packaging of the gloves.
Hammond was specifically prohibited from giving any testimony regarding design defect
or causation. Drs. Knuckles and Fowler were deposed on the issue of causation and
neither dermatologist would state that the gloves caused Spencer's skin condition. In fact,
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Dr. Fowler deemed it “very unlikely” that the gloves caused Spencer's rash. Dr.
Knuckles simply deferred to Dr. Fowler, the “well-known and respected” dermatologist
to whom she had referred Spencer.
In May, 2005, Playtex moved for summary judgment, contending that
despite having had over three years to obtain proof of causation, Spencer had failed to do
so. The trial court allowed Spencer additional time to disclose new experts but she
offered no other disclosures. On April 12, 2006, more than four years following
initiation of the suit, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Playtex. In so
ruling, the trial court stated that “the medical evidence produced by the parties establishes
within a reasonable degree of medical probability that the product at issue was not the
proximate cause of the Plaintiff's injury.”
On appeal, Spencer maintains that summary judgment was improper
because causation could be established or inferred from circumstantial evidence. She
further contends that the summary judgment was contrary to Kentucky law because the
trial judge essentially adjudicated the causation issue rather than submitting it to a jury.
We conclude that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to Playtex.
While product liability actions may contain separate claims based on
negligence, breach of warranties and strict liability, “one common denominator” in each
of these theories of liability is the need to establish causation. Holbrook v. Rose, 458
S.W.2d 155, 157 (1970). In Holbrook, Kentucky's highest court stated:
Whether we view the case as one presenting the problem of
negligence in the preparation of the product, negligence in
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failing to adequately warn about the consequences of the use
of the product, or improperly warranting the product to be fit
for a particular purpose, or whether the problem is viewed as
the sale of a product so defective as to be unreasonably
dangerous because of an inherent defect or inadequate
warning as to use, in every instance recited, the product must
be a legal cause of the harm.
Id. Legal causation “may be established by a quantum of circumstantial evidence from
which a jury may reasonably infer that the product was a legal cause of the harm.” Id.
Some circumstantial evidence tending to establish causation is not enough; the plaintiff
“must introduce sufficient proof to tilt the balance from possibility to probability.”
Briner v. General Motors Corp., 461 S.W.2d 99, 102 (1970) (citing Highway Transport
Co. v. Daniel Baker Co., 398 S.W.2d 501, 502 (1966) (emphasis in original)). The
“probability” standard must be met for “otherwise, the jury verdict [will be] based on
speculation or surmise.” Midwestern v. V.W. Corp. v. Ringley, 503 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Ky.
1973).
In this case, Spencer was unable to secure medical evidence that her skin
rash was caused by the Playtex gloves. Indeed, her two treating dermatologists were of
the opinion that it was “very unlikely” that the gloves caused her skin condition.
Confronted with this hurdle, Spencer argues on appeal that there was sufficient
circumstantial evidence, noting the timing of the onset of the rash and its initial
appearance in the areas of her arms and hands which had been covered by the gloves. If
the dermatologists had been uncertain about the etiology of Spencer's skin rash and had
left open the possibility that the gloves did cause the condition, their testimony and the
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timing and nature of the rash might have been sufficient to allow for presentation of the
issue to a jury. However, that was not the state of the record before the trial court. Given
the dermatologists' testimony expressly disputing any connection between the gloves and
the rash, Spencer did not have sufficient circumstantial proof to tilt the balance from
possibility to probability.
Spencer's challenge to the summary judgment is premised on the
proposition that the trial court adjudicated causation rather than allowing a jury to
consider the evidence. As she correctly states, the trial court is charged with determining
whether there is an issue of material fact on the existing record, viewing all of the
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Comm. Natural Resources
and Environmental Protection Cabinet v. Neace, 14 S.W.3d 15 (Ky. 2000). However,
this evidentiary review must be conducted with due attention to the controlling
substantive law which, in this case, required something more than what Spencer had
produced on the issue of causation. The trial court properly recognized that, having
failed to obtain the necessary proof, Spencer was not entitled to present her product
liability claim to a jury.
In sum, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to Playtex
given Spencer's inability to produce, after three years of discovery, the requisite proof of
causation. Consequently, we affirm the April 13, 2006 Order of the Perry Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Edmond Collett
Edmond Collett, P.S.C.
Hyden, Kentucky
W. Kennedy Simpson
David W. Mushlin
Thompson Miller & Simpson PLC
Louisville, Kentucky
Matthew Lawton Bowling
Gullett, Combs & Bowling
Hazard, Kentucky
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