TERESA A. GAHMAN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: APRIL 13, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-000905-MR
TERESA A. GAHMAN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PATRICIA M. SUMME, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CR-00643
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ABRAMSON AND STUMBO, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE: Teresa Gahman appeals from the March 29, 2006 order of the
Kenton Circuit Court denying her motion to expunge her criminal record following
successful completion of pre-trial diversion requirements. While we believe that the
motion was prematurely filed, we find that the trial court's basis for denying the motion
—i.e., that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order expungement of Gahman's record—
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
1
was incorrect. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order and remand for
reconsideration.
On September 27, 2002, the Kenton County grand jury indicted Gahman,
charging her with one count of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance, a class C
felony. During negotiations, the Commonwealth agreed that in exchange for Gahman's
agreement to enter a guilty plea, it would amend the charge to first-degree possession of a
controlled substance. The Commonwealth further offered Gahman three years of
supervised felony pretrial diversion as long as she completed an approved drug treatment
program. In conformance with this agreement, on January 28, 2003, Gahman filed a
Motion to Enter a Guilty Plea and a Motion for Pretrial Diversion of a Class D Felony.
Both motions were completed using preprinted forms prepared by the Administrative
Office of the Courts (AOC). The form used for the pretrial diversion motion, AOC-Form
347, contained the following terms:
5. I understand that if I successfully complete the conditions
of diversion, the charge against me will be designated as
dismissed-diverted and I will not be required to
acknowledge the occurrence of the charge.
....
10. I understand that upon successful completion of the terms
and conditions of the Pretrial Diversion I may petition the
Court for expungement of the dismissed-diverted charge.
On March 10, 2003, the trial court entered an Order Granting Pretrial Diversion of a
Class D Felony, stating in it:
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If Defendant successfully completes Pretrial Diversion, the
charge(s) will be designated as Dismissed-Diverted. The
Defendant has been advised that upon successful completion
of the Diversion, the Court may be petitioned for
expungement of the record.
Gahman successfully completed her three-year diversion period on March
10, 2006. Less than a week later, on March 15, 2006, she filed a motion seeking
dismissal of the charge and expungement of her record.2 The trial court rendered an order
on March 29, 2006, in which Gahman's charge was “dismissed/diverted.”3 However, the
trial court also denied the expungement request, stating that “[t]his Court has no
jurisdiction to expunge diversion cases.” This appeal followed.
The statute controlling the expungement of criminal records for an
individual who has had a felony charge dismissed is Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS)
431.076. This statute states in pertinent part:
(1) A person who has been charged with a criminal offense
and who has been found not guilty of the offense, or against
whom charges have been dismissed with prejudice, and not in
exchange for a guilty plea to another offense, may make a
motion, in the District or Circuit Court in which the charges
were filed, to expunge all records . . . .
....
Gahman had made two prior motions for expungement, each of which was premature and was
denied.
2
Pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 8.04(5), “[u]pon the expiration of the period
of suspension of prosecution and upon the completion of the agreement and where there is no
motion by the Attorney for the Commonwealth to terminate the agreement upon any grounds
permitted under this Rule, the indictment, complaint or charges which are the subject matter of
the agreement shall be dismissed with prejudice.”
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(2) The expungement motion shall be filed no sooner than
sixty (60) days following the order of acquittal or dismissal
by the court.
....
(4) If the court finds that there are no current charges or
proceedings pending relating to the matter for which
the expungement is sought, the court may grant the motion
and order the sealing of all the records in the custody of the
court and any records in the custody of any other agency or
official, including law enforcement records. . . .
From these provisions, it is clear, as the Commonwealth admits, that a circuit court does
have jurisdiction to expunge a defendant's criminal record if the conditions set forth in
KRS 431.076 are met.
Turning to this matter, denial of Gahman's motion may have otherwise been
appropriate because the Commonwealth is correct in its assertion that her motion was
filed prematurely. As indicated above, KRS 431.076(2) provides that any “expungement
motion shall be filed no sooner than sixty (60) days following the order of acquittal or
dismissal by the court.” Gahman's motion for expungement was filed on March 15,
2006, approximately two weeks before the trial court's entry of an order dismissing the
charge against her. Thus it is clear that not only was it filed before expiration of the
statutorily mandated sixty-day waiting period, its filing occurred before the waiting
period had even begun to run. The motion, therefore, was not in conformance with KRS
431.076 and could not properly be granted.
However, because the trial court's order was not based on the untimeliness
of Gahman's motion, but rather on the court's conclusion that it generally lacked
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jurisdiction to even entertain it, it is appropriate to address this issue. Due to the trial
judge's decision to include no other reasoning in her order, we are unable to discern her
rationale for concluding that she lacked the jurisdiction to grant Gahman's request for
expungement even though, assuming timeliness were not at issue, Gahman otherwise
appears to have qualified under the statute.4 Regardless, the trial court's conclusion was
in error; KRS 431.076 plainly confers the requisite jurisdiction on the circuit court. See
also Commonwealth v. Shouse, 183 S.W.3d 204 (Ky.App. 2006) (defendant who pled
guilty to class D felony and later successfully completed diversion program entitled to
have record expunged pursuant to KRS 431.076). Therefore, because the denial of
Gahman's motion appears to have been based on an incorrect legal premise, we must
reverse the trial court's March 29, 2006 order to the extent that it denied the motion for
expungement on jurisdictional grounds.
In sum, Gahman's motion for expungement was not filed in conformance
with the time period prescribed in KRS 431.076. Nonetheless, we believe the trial court's
decision to deny the motion based on jurisdictional grounds to be in error. We therefore
reverse the Kenton Circuit Court's March 29, 2006 judgment and remand this matter for
reconsideration in light of this Opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
Gahman argues on appeal that the trial court erroneously relied on KRS 431.078 as authority
for denying the expungement motion. This statute specifically addresses expungement of
misdemeanor records and does not apply to a record, such as Gahman's, involving a class D
felony. However, our review of the record reveals nothing supporting Gahman's assertion. As a
result, we find no reason to address this clearly inapplicable statute.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Steven J. Megerle
Covington, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Matthew R. Krygiel
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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