C. G. v. B. J. H.
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RENDERED: JUNE 1, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-000876-ME
C. G.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM OLDHAM FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE TIMOTHY E. FEELEY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-D-00020-001
B. J. H.
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; MOORE, JUDGE; HENRY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
HENRY, SENIOR JUDGE: C. G. appeals from the dismissal of her petition for a
domestic violence order (DVO). The appellant contends that the family court erred in
failing to find that an act of domestic violence and abuse occurred and that the family
court abused its discretion in dismissing her petition for a DVO. We affirm.
1
Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
The parties' daughter, M. R. H., was born in January 1998. When the fouryear marriage of the appellant and the appellee, B. J. H., was dissolved in November
2002, joint custody of M. R. H. was awarded and the appellant was designated the
primary residential custodian. On March 8, 2006, the appellant filed the domestic
violence petition underlying this appeal, in which she alleged that the appellee had
sexually abused their daughter. An emergency protective order (EPO) was issued
restraining the appellee from committing further acts of abuse or threats of abuse and
from contacting the appellant. The EPO also temporarily suspended the appellee's
visitation rights and awarded temporary custody of M. R. H. to the appellant. An EPO
with identical restrictions was issued on March 17, 2006, and was effective through
March 31, 2006. The family court conducted a hearing on March 31, 2006, after which it
entered an order dismissing the domestic violence petition. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the court noted that the appellee had filed in the related dissolution action a
motion to modify custody of M. R. H. The family court limited the appellee's visitation
with M. R. H. pending its ruling on the motion to modify custody. In this appeal we
review solely the dismissal of the domestic violence petition.
A DVO may be entered by a court after a full evidentiary hearing "if it finds
from a preponderance of the evidence that an act or acts of domestic violence and abuse
have occurred or may again occur . . . ." KRS 403.750(1). The preponderance of the
evidence standard is met when sufficient evidence establishes that the alleged victim
"was more likely than not to have been a victim of domestic violence." Commonwealth
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v. Anderson, 934 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Ky. 1996). The trier of fact "has the right to believe
the evidence presented by one litigant in preference to another. The trier of fact may
believe any witness in whole or in part. The trier of fact may take into consideration all
the circumstances of the case, including the credibility of the witnesses." Anderson, 934
S.W.2d at 278 (citations omitted).
On appellate review of a court's decision to dismiss a domestic violence
petition, "findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses." See CR 52.01; Reichle v. Reichle, 719 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Ky. 1986). A
finding of fact supported by substantial evidence is not clearly erroneous. In Moore v.
Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003) (citations omitted), the Kentucky Supreme
Court stated that substantial evidence is
"[e]vidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to
support a conclusion" and evidence that, when "taken alone or in
the light of all the evidence . . . has sufficient probative value to
induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men." Regardless of
conflicting evidence, the weight of the evidence, or the fact that the
reviewing court would have reached a contrary finding, "due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses" because judging the credibility of
witnesses and weighing evidence are tasks within the exclusive
province of the trial court. Thus, "[m]ere doubt as to the
correctness of [a] finding [will] not justify [its] reversal," and
appellate courts should not disturb trial court findings that are
supported by substantial evidence.
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The appellant first asserts that the family court erred in failing to find that
she met her burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that M. R. H. was a victim
of domestic violence and abuse. We disagree.
The appellant highlights the evidence supporting her allegations; however,
she overlooks the responsibility placed in the family court to hear the testimony, consider
the evidence, and make credibility judgments. Regardless of whether this panel would
reach the same conclusion as the family court, our task on appeal is to determine whether
the family court's finding is clearly erroneous. The parties were afforded a full
evidentiary hearing, during which the court asked many questions. The finding that the
appellee did not sexually abuse his daughter was supported by testimony of the appellee,
a state police detective, the supervisor of the Child Protective Services branch, and a
social worker from Child Protective Services. Since the finding is supported by
substantial evidence, it is not clearly erroneous.
Next, the appellant contends that the court abused it discretion in
disregarding the testimony of Dr. Fay C. McCutchan, M. R. H.'s therapist. She
emphasizes the court's statement from the bench at the conclusion of the hearing that it
was "flabbergasted" by Dr. McCutchan's recommendation that M. R. H. not see her father
for a year and claims that the court disregarded Dr. McCutchan's testimony solely
because it disagreed with that recommendation. The record does not support the
appellant's argument. The court stated that it was not persuaded by Dr. McCutchan's
testimony because she was "unduly influenced by comments of the mother." During the
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hearing, the court also noted its difficulties with Dr. McCutchan's recommending that the
appellee's visitation rights be suspended for a year based solely on the appellant's
information and her therapy sessions with M. R. H., without conferring with school
personnel or M. R. H.'s physician.
This Court recently emphasized the "enormous significance" of a DVO
petition in Wright v. Wright, 181 S.W.3d 49, 52 (Ky.App. 2005). The family court was
familiar with the history of the parties, including the dismissal of petitions for a DVO
filed previously to the one at issue here. The family court was within its authority to
weigh the testimony, make credibility judgments, and conclude that no act of domestic
violence and abuse occurred. Since the court's finding is supported by sufficient evidence
and is not clearly erroneous, we may not disturb its decision.
The appellant also raises issues concerning the court's orders relating to the
appellee's motion to modify custody in the parties' dissolution action. This appeal covers
solely the dismissal of the appellant's petition for a DVO, and we have addressed the
issues relating to the petition for a DVO. We do not address the arguments relating to the
appellee's motion to modify custody as we lack jurisdiction over interlocutory orders. In
his brief, the appellee requested this court to strike portions of the appellant's brief.
Inasmuch as the appellee did not make this request by a separately-filed motion, we will
not strike portions of the briefs, and take no position on those issues.
The family court order is affirmed.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Donald L. Gulick
Louisville, Kentucky
Travis Combs, Jr.
Louisville, Kentucky
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