MONICA DAWN PAGE, NOW PRICE v. KEVIN LYNN PAGE
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RENDERED: APRIL 27, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-000773-MR
MONICA DAWN PAGE, NOW PRICE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MONROE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDIE C. LOVELACE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-00017
KEVIN LYNN PAGE
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
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BEFORE: ABRAMSON AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
KNOPF, SENIOR JUDGE: This appeal challenges an order of the Monroe Circuit Court
modifying custody of the parties' three minor children based solely upon a planned
relocation of their mother, the primary residential custodian, to the state of Ohio. Monica
Page (Price) argues that the order changing joint custody to vest sole custody of the
children with their father, appellee Kevin Page, must be set aside as unsupported by
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Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
evidence demonstrating that their best interests would be served by placing them with a
father the trial court essentially found was not a proper custodian. We agree and reverse.
Pursuant to a separation agreement incorporated into the December, 2003
decree dissolving their marriage, Monica and Kevin were to share joint custody of their
children: Alivia Noelle, born February 23, 1996; Aason Christopher, born July 13, 1997;
and Amelia Gracelyn, born August 5, 2003. Monica was designated the primary
residential custodian. In July 2005, Monica informed Kevin that she had decided to
remarry on January 1, 2006, and planned to relocate with the children to her new
husband's residence in Fort Jennings, Ohio. Ten days before the wedding, on December
22, 2005, Kevin filed an emergency motion to restrain Monica from removing the
children from the Commonwealth and seeking temporary custody pending a hearing on
his motion for a modification of permanent custody. Kevin alleged the following factors
in his affidavit supporting the emergency motion: that it was his belief that Monica
planned to marry and that she intended to move with the children to the state of Ohio;
that earlier in the year Monica had arbitrarily removed the children from the elementary
school they had been attending and enrolled them at Gamaliel causing their son Aason to
be moved back to the second grade instead of continuing on to the third grade; that Alivia
suffers from Turner's Syndrome and requires a daily injection; that Alivia's treating
physicians are in Louisville, Glasgow, and Bowling Green and she is required to have
one to three visits with each of them annually; and that all of the children's relatives
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reside in the immediate area of Tompkinsville. The trial judge granted the motion and set
a hearing on the permanent modification motion for January 16, 2006.
After that hearing, the trial court granted Kevin's motion for a change in
permanent custody. The trial court made an initial finding concerning the circumstances
of Monica's marriage to Jeremy Price after the death of his first wife in an automobile
accident, leaving him to care for four young children. The following findings were the
basis for the ultimate conclusion that a change to the sole custody of their father was in
the children's best interest:
3. This Court finds that Jeremy owns a house located in
the country containing 7,500 square feet and nine (9)
bedrooms. He is employed by Electronic Data
Systems and earns over $100,000.00 annually. In
addition, he and his brother own 17 apartment rental
units. Jeremy has purchased a large van that will
accommodate the seven (7) children with appropriate
seat belts available for the children.
4. This Court finds that Monica unilaterally removed two
of the children from the Joe Harrison Carter
Elementary School in Monroe county, Kentucky, to
Gamaliel, Kentucky. This Court still further finds that
Aason Page was retrogressed from the third grade to
the second grade. This Court specifically notes that
Kevin was only informed the night before the meeting
occurred with the school authorities at Gamaliel
regarding the change in schools.
5. This Court still further finds that Alivia Page is
afflicted with Turner's Syndrome, which requires her
to receive an injection every day. The testimony
presented was to the effect that if she did not receive
her daily injection, her physical growth would be
severely retarded. Alivia also has fluid in a portion of
her spine and a heart problem. Her primary treating
physician for Turner's Syndrome has his office in
Louisville, Kentucky. Alivia has appointments with
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the physicians who treat her periodically throughout
the year.
6. This Court finds from the evidence that Kevin has not
been an exemplary father. Kevin is now employed
at Clark Lumber Company in Lafayette, Tennessee.
His working hours are from 6:00 a.m. to 3:15 p.m.,
except on Friday when he works from 6:00 a.m. to
2:30 p.m. Kevin was terminated from Roy Anderson
Lumber Company due to absenteeism. He lived in
Alabama for approximately one (1) year during
which time he had little contact with his children.
He lived in a motel in Tompkinsville, Kentucky, for
a short time after the divorce and did, in fact, live
in his automobile for about two (2) months due to
problems with his parents. Kevin testified if he
were granted custody of the children, he would
continue living with his parents and that there
would be adequate sleeping facilities for the
children.
7. This Court finds that the three (3) children have a close
bond with their paternal cousins who live in Monroe
County and testimony was adduced to the effect that
the three (3) children and their cousins sing in a group
known as “Country Cousins.”2
8. This Court finds from the testimony of Shirley Page,
mother of Kevin, that she and her husband have had an
active role in the upbringing of the children. She plays
with them, watches television with them and has
picnics by the creek with them on Sunday afternoons.
Shirley and her husband took Alivia for her MRI and
to obtain her back brace. [Emphasis added, original
footnote omitted.]
The trial court then applied the KRS 403.340 factors to reach the following
conclusions:
... this Court is of the opinion that the harm likely to be
caused by a change of environment relating to the children
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This finding is in error because the testimony at the hearing was clear that only the oldest child,
Alivia, was a member of the singing group. However, the trial judge corrected the error in his
ruling on Monica's motion to alter, amend or vacate his initial findings and conclusions.
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outweighs the advantages of the children being removed to
Ohio. This Court concludes as a matter of law that moving
the children from the schools of Monroe County to Ohio
would produce such a cultural change that the children
would suffer emotionally. Undoubtedly, the school system
in Ohio is a good school system, however, the children would
be beginning school at a time when they would not perhaps
be familiar with the curriculum offered and would perhaps
have to retrogress in school. The dialect in Ohio is
distinctly different from the dialect in Kentucky and the
children might well be ridiculed over their native dialect.
The children would also be away for considerable periods of
time from their cousins and other family members with whom
they have developed significant bonds. The longer driving
distance from Fort Jennings, Ohio, to Louisville, Kentucky,
for the purpose of seeing Alivia's physician is certainly a
relevant consideration. Although the children may look
forward to riding in the new van, this Court is mindful that
the children's adjustment to their new home, new school, new
community and new family is one of the key factors to be
considered in deciding what is in the best interests of the
children. KRS 403.270(2)(d). This Court further concludes
that it would be a traumatic change for the three (3) children
to suddenly go to a household where there are four (4)
additional children with whom they must adapt. This Court
further concludes that it is concerned over the short duration
of time Monica knew Jeremy or his children and their
behavior patterns.
(2) To deracinate these young children from the only
environment they have been familiar with to one that is
unfamiliar is just not necessary when the respondent and his
parents are willing and able to provide the familiar
surroundings to which the children have been accustomed.
To suddenly introduce these children to a new home, new
town, new state, new stepfather married to their mother,
and new stepsiblings would endanger seriously the
mental, moral and emotional health of the children.
Monica testified that the traveling time from Fort Jennings,
Ohio, to Tompkinsville, Kentucky, was six and one-half (6 ½)
hours if the children were along.
1. This Court concludes as a matter of law that the
testimony heard by this Court when applied to the
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extant law dictates that a change of custody should
occur. Consequently, this Court awards Kevin sole
custody of the three (3) infant children with the
express proviso that Kevin's parents shall give close
attention to the welfare and upbringing of the
children. [Emphasis added.]
We commence our discussion by acknowledging the deference to be
accorded a trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law in matters of child custody
and the fact that we are not to substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Reichle
v. Reichle, 719 S.W.2d 442 (Ky. 1986). It is likewise well-settled that those findings
must be supported by substantial evidence in the record, not mere supposition. Finally,
we are mindful of the decision of this Court in Fowler v. Sowers, 151 S.W.3d 357,
359 (Ky.App. 2004), concerning legislative amendments impacting longstanding caselaw
on child custody modification:
It is true that KRS 403.340 was significantly altered by
the General Assembly in 2001. The previous standard
(utilized in Fenwick, [v. Fenwick, 114 S.W.3d 767 (Ky.
2003), and relied upon by Tara) permitted a change in
custody only upon a dual demonstration: (1) that substantial
harm would result to the child's physical, mental, or
emotional health without a change of the custodial
arrangement and (2) that any harm caused by the change
would be outweighed by its advantages. The statute now
permits modification if "a change has occurred in the
circumstances of the child or his custodian" and if "the
modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the
child." KRS 403.340(3).
The strict standards for modification in the pre-2001
version of the statute were "intended to inhibit further
litigation." Quisenberry v. Quisenberry, Ky., 785 S.W.2d 485
(1990). In enacting its amendments, the General Assembly
not only relaxed the standards for modification of custody,
but it also expanded upon the factors to be considered when
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modification is requested. The statute now directs the trial
court to consider and to permit a change of custody based on
the factors enumerated in KRS 403.270(2), the statute used in
making initial custody decisions. KRS 403.340(3)(c). The
former standards for modification, which Tara argued before
the family court, are now mere elements or factors to be
considered by the court. KRS 403.340(3)(d)and (e).
Nevertheless, we are convinced that the decision of the trial court to modify custody in
this case cannot be supported by an examination of the evidence adduced at the hearing,
the statutory factors, or recent caselaw.
Monica's first argument for reversal focuses upon Kevin's failure to make a
motion for custody within a reasonable time of learning of the proposed relocation.
Although he acknowledged at the hearing that he was informed of Monica's planned
wedding and relocation as early as July 2005, he waited approximately six months--ten
days before her wedding--to lodge the emergency motion which precipitated this appeal.
Monica posits that the true motivation for the delay was to allow the two-year mark from
the original custody decision to pass, which occurred shortly before the filing of his
motion. We agree. Because the sole basis offered for the delay was Kevin's
unreasonable and incorrect belief that Monica would not “go through” with the marriage
or relocation, the “emergency” nature of his motion is suspect.
Procedural machinations notwithstanding, the bottom line in this appeal is
there was absolutely no evidence presented which would rise to the “serious
endangerment” standard for emergency motions, nor facts from which one could
conclude that relocation with their primary residential custodian since birth would be
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detrimental to the children's best interest. In this regard, we concur in the the rationale
expressed in the recent decision of this Court in Robinson v. Robinson, 211 S.W.3d 63,
71 (Ky.App. 2006):
Furthermore, we have thoroughly examined the record
and see no substantive basis for preventing Gina from
relocating with her children to the Memphis area.
Although the "interaction and interrelationship" of the
children with their father and other persons where they now
live is a relevant factor in determining the likelihood of harm
by the proposed relocation, [footnote omitted] the mere fact
that relocation may affect the frequency of [Dale's] timesharing with his children and the children's contact with other
persons does not, standing alone, support a finding that the
proposed relocation creates a likelihood of serious harm to the
children.
The application of this reasoning appears to be especially apropos in a case in which the
trial court made a specific finding that the party opposing relocation “has not been an
exemplary father” and specifically ordered that his parents “give close attention to the
welfare and upbringing of the children.” The trial court also in this same order held
Kevin in contempt for his failure to abide by certain economic terms of the parties'
separation agreement, noting that continued failure to comply with terms of repayment
would result in his incarceration.
Even a cursory review of these findings, in light of the concerns over
Kevin's parenting ability, leads us to conclude that the trial court has in reality modified
custody in favor of non-parents without so much as a single reference to Monica's fitness.
The findings with respect to dialect and difficulties associated with integration into a
blended family present only potential problems not significantly different than those
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facing any child of divorce whose parents elect to remarry and relocate. The evidence
adduced at the hearing simply fails to support the conclusion that these children's best
interests would be served by removing them from the residential custody of their mother,
whose only alleged shortcoming was her decision to relocate to her new husband's
residence, and vesting sole custody in a father whose parenting skills were suspect even
to the fact-finder.
Not only did Kevin admit at the hearing that he failed to even contact his
children for approximately three months after his return to Tompkinsville from Alabama,
but favorable testimony concerning his attention to the children's needs was primarily
confined to the period before the initial custody decree was entered. Nor does the
evidence support the trial court's concerns about Alivia's health and medical treatment.
Monica testified that she intended to continue treatment with Alivia's primary physicians
who are all located in Louisville, not Tompkinsville. This Court takes judicial notice of
the fact that Fort Jennings, Ohio is approximately a 4-hour drive to Louisville and
Tompkinsville to Louisville is approximately a 2 1/2-hour trip, a difference not so
significant as to support a change in custody. Monica also testified that her re-marriage
will allow her more time with her children as she intended to be a stay-at-home mom,
rather than having to work as she did as a single mother. Monica testified at the hearing
that despite her recent marriage, she had not, and would not, relocate to her husband's
residence without her children. Most importantly in our opinion, and as was the case in
Fenwick, Kevin utterly failed to demonstrate any likelihood of harm to the children
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“other than the general adjustment problems normally associated with a move.” 114
S.W.3d at 792. Considering all of these factors, we are convinced that the trial court's
conclusions in this case are little more than a parroting of the statutory prerequisites
without substantial evidence supporting them. Because the findings as to the children's
best interests are not supported by the evidence, they must be set aside as clearly
erroneous.
Accordingly, the judgment modifying custody is reversed and this action is
remanded for an order restoring joint custody with Monica as primary residential
custodian. Monica shall have immediate entitlement to physical custody of the children.
Thereafter, a hearing shall be conducted to determine an appropriate modification of the
parties' time-sharing arrangement and to reconsider issues relating to child support.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Joy D. Denton
Harned, Bachert & Denton LLP
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Cheryl Berry
Glasgow, Kentucky
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