JAMES PRITCHARD v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
JANUARY 12, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2006-CA-000686-MR
JAMES PRITCHARD
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KELLY MARK EASTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CR-00397
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
ABRAMSON, DIXON, AND HOWARD,1 JUDGES.
HOWARD, JUDGE:
James Pritchard appeals from the denial by the
Hardin Circuit Court of his RCr 11.42 motion for a new trial,
following his conviction of Robbery 1st Degree.
For the reasons
stated below, we affirm.
The factual background of this case is as follows.
Mr. Pritchard was arrested on July 1, 2002 and subsequently
indicted on a charge that he approached a young woman as she was
getting into her car at a Shell Five Star market in
1
Judge James I. Howard completed this opinion prior to the expiration of his
appointed term of office on December 31, 2006. Release of the opinion was
delayed by administrative handling.
Elizabethtown, Kentucky, reached through the car door, struck
her in the face, took her wallet from the car seat and ran off
across the parking lot toward a nearby Budget Host Motel.
Police were called and within a few minutes had encountered a
young woman, Destiny Van Winkle, in the motel parking lot.
Ms.
Van Winkle was apparently Mr. Pritchard’s girlfriend and had
been staying at the motel with him.
Based on information
obtained from her, the officers went to Room 111 of the motel
and knocked.
The Appellant answered the door and gave the
officers consent to search the room.
In the room the officers found $119 in cash between
the mattress and box springs and a shirt and pants matching the
description given by the victim.
Outside an open bathroom
window they found a clear plastic bag containing the victim’s
wallet.
After the victim was allowed a few minutes to calm
down, she was transported to the Budget Host Motel, where she
identified both Mr. Pritchard and the clothes.
A statement was obtained from Ms. Van Winkle that she
was in the room when Mr. Pritchard came running in, sweating.
He threw a wallet at her and said he got it from a “fat bitch at
the store.”
He then went into the bathroom.
She told him she
wanted nothing to do with a robbery, and left the motel room.
Mr. Pritchard was tried by a jury on June 2, 2003.
Both the victim and Ms. Van Winkle testified at the trial in a
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manner consistent with their statements.
The Appellant was
convicted of Robbery 1st Degree and was sentenced on September
16, 2003 to twenty years in prison, pursuant to the jury’s
recommendation.
He appealed that conviction to the Kentucky
Supreme Court and his conviction was affirmed by an unpublished
opinion rendered January 20, 2005.2
On November 14, 2005, he
filed a pro se motion for a new trial pursuant to RCr 11.42 and
CR 60.023, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at his
trial.
That motion was denied by an order entered February 21,
2006, which order also denied his request for an evidentiary
hearing and for appointment of counsel to represent him on the
motion.
Mr. Prichard brings this appeal from that order.
The Appellant raises several issues on appeal:
that
his attorney failed or was not allowed to impeach Ms. Van Winkle
concerning her plea agreement, her employment and lifestyle or
her past criminal record; that Ms. Van Winkle’s testimony should
not have been allowed at trial, as the plea agreement made with
her by the Commonwealth amounted to the illegal bribing of a
witness and his counsel failed to raise this objection; that the
pants allegedly worn by the perpetrator would not fit him and
his attorney failed to pursue this defense; that he was not
2
2003-SC-0803-MR.
3
While the motion was brought under both RCr 11.42 and CR 60.02, there was
nothing asserted therein which would, even on its face, support a motion for
new trial under CR 60.02. We will therefore, as did the circuit court,
discuss the Appellant’s arguments under RCr 11.42 only.
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afforded an opportunity to have counsel present when the victim
first made the out-of-court identification of him and his
attorney failed to raise this issue; that his attorney did not
present any character witnesses on his behalf; in general, that
the evidence against him was insufficient to support a
conviction and that the circuit court erred by failing to grant
him an evidentiary hearing on his RCr 11.42 motion or appoint an
attorney to represent him on that motion.
We note first that those issues which either were or
could have been raised on Mr. Pritchard’s direct appeal are not
proper grounds for a RCr 11.42 motion or for this appeal.
Hodge
v. Commonwealth, 116 S.W.3d 463 (Ky. 2003); Sanders v.
Commonwealth, 89 S.W.3d 380 (Ky. 2000) and Brown v.
Commonwealth, 788 S.W.2d 500 (Ky. 1990).
Therefore, the
Appellant’s arguments concerning what evidence was or was not
admitted at the trial or whether that evidence was sufficient to
support a verdict, are not properly raised on this appeal.
We
will consider only those issues specifically concerning the
sufficiency of the legal representation provided to Mr.
Pritchard by his attorney.
The legal standard which must be met to show
ineffective assistance of counsel under RCr 11.42 was discussed
at length by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Haight v.
Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436 (Ky. 2001):
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The standards which measure ineffective
assistance of counsel are set out in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); . . . In
order to be ineffective, performance of
counsel must be below the objective standard
of reasonableness and so prejudicial as to
deprive a defendant of a fair trial and a
reasonable result. . . . “Counsel is
constitutionally ineffective only if
performance below professional standards
caused the defendant to lose what he otherwise
probably would have won.” United States v.
Morrow, 977 F.2d 222, 229 (6th Cir. 1992). The
critical issue is not whether counsel made
errors but whether counsel was so ineffective
that defeat was snatched from the hands of
probable victory. Haight, 41 S.W.3d at 441.
A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on
his RCr 11.42 motion if the issues he raises in that motion
reasonably require such a hearing for a determination.
On the
other hand, he is not entitled to such a hearing if his motion,
on its face, does not allege facts which would entitle him to a
new trial even if true, or if his allegations are refuted by the
record itself.
1965).
Maggard v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 893 (Ky.
If an evidentiary hearing is required, the court should
appoint counsel to represent him at that hearing, if he is
indigent and requests such appointment in writing.
11.42(5).
RCr
If no evidentiary hearing is required, neither is it
necessary that counsel be appointed.
S.W.3d 448 (Ky. 2001).
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Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59
Applying these principles to the facts of this case,
we find no error in the circuit court’s thorough and wellreasoned order.
The record reflects that Mr. Pritchard’s
attorney did cross-examine Ms. Van Winkle concerning her plea
agreement and attempted to cross-examine her further concerning
her lifestyle and employment.
This testimony was disallowed by
the trial court, placed in the record by avowal and was a
subject of Appellant’s direct appeal.
Mr. Pritchard also complains that his counsel failed
to cross-examine Ms. Van Winkle concerning her prior criminal
record.
As the trial court noted in its order, only previous
felony convictions would have been the proper subject of crossexamination.
KRE 609.
Mr. Pritchard failed to offer any
evidence that Ms. Van Winkle had a prior felony record.
He
refers for the first time in his brief, filed in this court, to
a particular Meade County case, but did not cite that case or
file anything regarding it in the trial court.
not part of the record on this appeal.4
Therefore, it is
Merely conclusory
allegations contained in a RCr 11.42 motion, unsupported by
specific facts, are insufficient to support a new trial motion,
4
The Commonwealth has responded in kind and attached to its brief a
record from the Meade Circuit Court which purports to show that the case
cited by Mr. Pritchard actually involved a Donald Estes, and had nothing to
do with Ms. Van Winkle. However, that document also was not filed of record
in the circuit court. Therefore, this court will not consider either the
allegations made by Mr. Pritchard, nor the document filed in response by the
Commonwealth, as to this issue.
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or even to require an evidentiary hearing on such motion.
Hodge
v. Commonwealth, 116 S.W.3d 463 (Ky. 2003).
It is true that Mr. Pritchard’s counsel did not object
to the totality of Ms. Van Winkle’s testimony on the grounds
that her plea agreement constituted a “bribe” that would make
such testimony inadmissible.
However, Kentucky law is well
established that a plea agreement with a Commonwealth witness
does not make that witness’ testimony inadmissible, but merely
goes to the weight to be given that testimony, and is therefore
a proper subject for cross-examination.
Commonwealth, 558 S.W.2d 590 (Ky. 1977).
Darnell v.
It is not ineffective
assistance of counsel to fail to make improper objections.
Humphrey v. Commonwealth, 962 S.W.2d 870 (Ky. 1998).
As to the pants, Mr. Pritchard’s counsel argued before
the trial court for the opportunity to have him try on the pants
before the jury.
That motion was denied by the circuit court,
and any error in that regard could have been raised on direct
appeal.
Thus, the record specifically refutes the claim that
counsel’s representation was inadequate on this issue.
Mullins
v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.2d 689 (Ky. 1970).
Mr. Pritchard complains that his attorney did not
object to the out of court identification of him by the victim,
made that night at the motel, on the grounds that he was not
afforded the opportunity to have an attorney present when that
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identification was made.
Again, the response to this argument
is that this testimony was properly admissible.
Kentucky law is
well established that it is not necessary for the police to
delay such a “show-up” identification in order to allow the
suspect to have counsel present.
Savage v. Commonwealth, 920
S.W.2d 512 (Ky. 1995) and Stidham v. Commonwealth, 444 S.W.2d
110 (Ky. 1969).
The court in Stidham stated:
This was not a staged police line-up at which
counsel could be present. There was no
opportunity to appoint counsel. The police
needed to know immediately whether to hold
these two suspects or to release them. They
needed to know whether to continue the search
for the guilty. The victim of the crime had
within an hour faced the guilty parties in a
lighted room. We believe it good that he
could again face them within such a short time
while his memory was still fresh concerning
the details. We do not find anything in the
cases cited by petitioner that requires a
police officer to unduly delay the process of
identification so that counsel can be
appointed. Stidham, 444 S.W.2d at 111-112.
It is not ineffective assistance of counsel to fail to object to
admissible evidence.
Bowling v. Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 405
(Ky. 2002).
As to the claim that his attorney failed to call any
character witnesses, Mr. Pritchard filed nothing at all in the
record indicating what any character witnesses who might have
been called on his behalf would have said; nor is any reason
given to believe such witnesses might have changed the outcome
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of the trial.
A vague allegation that counsel failed to
investigate or call additional witnesses, without offering
specifics as to what such witnesses would have said, is
insufficient to support a RCr 11.42 motion.
Sanders v.
Commonwealth, 89 S.W.3d 380 (Ky. 2002).
Finally, Appellant complains that he was not granted
an evidentiary hearing on this motion, nor appointed an attorney
to assist him.
Our review of this record indicates that all of
the issues raised by Mr. Pritchard, which go to the question of
the effectiveness of his counsel, are either refuted by the
record or have no merit on their face; that is, even if true,
they would not entitle him to a new trial.
Therefore, he was
not entitled to an evidentiary hearing nor to the appointment of
counsel.
Maggard v. Commonwealth, supra; Fraser v.
Commonwealth, supra.
For the reasons set forth above, the order of the
Hardin Circuit Court, denying the Appellant’s motion for a new
trial pursuant to RCr 11.42, is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
James Pritchard, Pro Se
Burgin, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
George G. Seelig
Frankfort, Kentucky
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